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customer trust/loyalty - a variable/experimental factor to represent 
customer loyalty towards the 
manufacturer. In the model, it is defined as 
the probability that a customer will choose 
the same manufacturer as selected 
previously.  
dual-sourcing - a supply chain collaboration strategy where 
a firm has two suppliers at the same time. 
manufacturer trust - a variable/experimental factor to represent 
manufacturer trust towards supplier. It is 
described as the probability that a 
manufacturer would choose the same 
supplier as selected previously.  
manufacturer survivability - the duration of the manufacturer to survive 
when it collaborates with less efficient 
and/or responsive (undesired) supplier/s. 
multi-sourcing - a supply chain collaboration strategy where 
a manufacturer has more than two 
suppliers at the same time. 
shakeouts -  a term used in business and management 
studies to describe a phenomenon when 
massive exits of a number of companies 
from a market due to competition. 
single-sourcing - a supply chain collaboration strategy where 
a manufacturer has a single supplier.  
strategic mutation - a variable/experimental factor to reflect an 
extreme competition strategy where a firm 
drastically change its strategic position to a 
market segment that has not being served 
by the competitors. 
supplier trust - a variable/experimental factor to represent 
supplier trust towards the manufacturer. In 
the model, it is defined as the probability 
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that a supplier would follow the 
manufacturer strategic movement to 
maintain its current relationships.  
supplier survivability - the length of the supplier to survive, 
defined in time unit when it does not have 
a link with the manufacturer agent at all. 
supply chain fill rate - a term used in this Thesis to represent 
supply chain’s ability to meet the demand 
(demand fulfilment) in the market, 
described by the percentage of customers 
served by all supply chains in the 
simulation model. 
survivability - a term used in this Thesis to describe a 
company's or supply chain’s ability to 
survive when it is losing profits due to 
having no collaboration partner or 
collaborating with an undesired supplier. 
In this Thesis, this term represents a 
company’s or supply chain’s robustness to 
withstand or cope with adverse situation. 
time unit - the simulation time unit, where one time 
unit is assumed to be a period (between 3 
and 18 months) for the firms to make a 
slight strategic change. 
two-stage supply chain - a supply chain scope that consists of two 
stages of firms in the supply chain, such as 
supplier-manufacturer supply chain. 
willingness to compromise -  a term used in this Thesis to refer to the 
selection radius of agents to decide which 
agent that is closest to their preference. The 
radius is represented as a percentage of the 
diagonal length of the simulation space in 
NetLogo. 
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Abstract 
 
Competition has been considered as an effective means to improve business and 
economic competitiveness. However, competition in supply chain management 
(SCM) can be viewed as a source of uncertainty. Most recommended collaboration 
strategies in SCM literature tend to avoid the emergence of competition inside the 
supply chain, but, in reality, these strategies do not lead all supply chains to success. 
In addition, from strategic management perspective, these collaboration strategies 
are not believed to encourage firms to improve their performance. Both competition 
and collaboration are critical issues in achieving business success, but the effect of 
both factors on the market has not been explored concurrently in the literature. The 
complexity of this issue should be investigated using a comprehensive perspective, 
and it is hard to undertake by using an empirical approach.   
 This study develops an agent-based model of supply chain competition and 
collaboration.  It focuses on partnerships between supplier and manufacturer, which 
are particularly critical in innovative product markets, such as automobile and high 
brand apparels. A model representing two-stage supply chains is modelled, 
involving customers, manufacturers and suppliers. It assumes a simplified strategic 
landscape where the agents (customer, manufacturer, and supplier) attempt to reach 
the best strategic fit on two dimensions (criteria), defined as responsiveness and 
efficiency. A theory-driven approach is adopted to develop the model and observe 
the emerging outcome as a result of the agents’ intrinsic behaviour. Instead of 
focusing on a particular single supply chain, the problem is examined at market-
level, taking a system perspective. Thus, the performance measured is the rate of 
demand fulfilment and the number of supply chains which can survive in the 
market. 
The results indicate that competition can have both positive and negative 
impacts on supply chains. Competition can assist strategic alignment between 
collaborating firms (the supplier and the manufacturer), whereas it can lead to a 
massive exits of a number of companies from the market, known as shakeouts. 
Furthermore, not all competition and collaboration approaches recommended in 
SCM and strategic management field have significant better demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains for the long-term. These findings are counterintuitive 
with the existing literature and offer new insights on operations strategy. This study 
suggests that a strategy that is advantageous for a single company could be 
detrimental when it applies to all firms in the market. The market-level perspective 
adopted in the modelling approach also provides a novel approach that has not been 
implemented by previous studies.  
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CHAPTER 1!INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1! Introduction 
This chapter provides the general outlook for this thesis. An overview of this study 
is presented, followed by the aim and general objectives of the research as well as 
the related body of knowledge, which is supply chain management (SCM), strategic 
management, and agent-based modelling (ABM). This overview ends with the 
outline of thesis structure. 
 
1.2! Overview of this thesis 
Competition is an effective approach to improve business and economic 
performance. It results in lower prices and costs with better quality, more options, 
more innovation, higher efficiency and productivity, and furthermore. These 
benefits not only support wider business opportunities but also enhance a nation’s 
performance (Stucke 2013). Competition could also be viewed as an essential 
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trigger to firm performance improvement through innovation development, such as 
offering service extension as an addition to a product. This extension adds the firm’s  
competitive advantage, which is the key driver to corporate success (Walley 1998). 
Nevertheless, competition can be a potential source of uncertainty in supply 
chain management (SCM). It can increase operational costs (Walker and Weber 
1987; Altug and van Ryzin 2013) and makes the collaboration harder (Rice and 
Hoppe 2001). Therefore, most collaboration strategies in SCM are intended to 
minimise the emergence of competition, particularly within the supply chain.  
 SCM practices have been widely accepted as a fundamental determinant of 
business success. It shifts the conventional perspective from individual firm 
competition to supply chain competition. This SCM point of view makes 
collaboration between companies along the supply chains crucial in achieving 
business success (Christopher 2000; Sahay 2003; Lee 2004; Chopra and Meindl 
2007).  
The most popular collaboration strategies suggested in SCM are maintaining 
long-term collaboration and having a single supplier (known as a single-sourcing 
strategy). These strategies are trusted to optimise the supply chain’s competitive 
advantage for the long-term, particularly for the innovative product supply chains. 
The longer duration of collaboration is considered to promote better communication 
between collaborating firms and accelerate the innovation process along the supply 
chain (Boddy et al. 1998). Meanwhile, the single-sourcing strategy, which applies 
along with long-term collaboration, can minimise uncertainties in the supply side 
because it can secure the supply flow (Kraljic 1983). This strategy can also 
dramatically lessen the lead time to market as the intensive partnerships enable 
supplier involvement to rapid the product innovation process (Christopher 2000). 
Single-sourcing is also believed to be able to reduce the emergence of competition 
(Lee 2004). These claims are also supported by a successful SCM practices in 
several large companies, such as Toyota and Benetton.  
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 However, these supply chain strategies do not always lead every supply chain 
to success. Many firms have failed to establish successful collaborations even 
though they have imitated the collaboration practices of the successful enterprises, 
by implementing long-term collaboration and single-sourcing strategy. This failure 
makes their SCM practices to be ineffective and inefficient (Barratt, 2004; Cao and 
Zhang, 2011; Holweg et al. 2005; Lambert and Cooper, 2000). Moreover, several 
studies find that these suggested supply chain approaches do not always lead to a 
better supply chain performance, such as examined by Anderson and Jap (2005), 
Burke et al. (2007), Leeuw and Fransoo (2009), Squire et al. (2009), and Sun and 
Debo (2014).  
 Other factors that are often highlighted in business partnerships are trust and 
loyalty among the companies. In SCM, trust has been understood as the core enabler 
to collaboration success (Dapiran 1992; Dyer and Ouchi 1993; Ganesan 1994; 
Nyaga et al. 2010). As well as trust, loyalty is considered substantial for maintaining 
profitable relationships in other domain of business studies, such as Singh and 
Sirdeshmukh (2000), Alhabeeb (2007), Horppu et al. (2008), and O’Cass and 
Carlson (2012) in marketing research. Trust is often considered to describe 
relationships between corporates, while loyalty is used for describing customer. 
Both refer to behavioural-related aspects in which businesses strive to maintain. 
These factors tend to have a positive linear relationship (O’Cass and Carlson 2012), 
so these terms can be taken into account concurrently.  
 On the other hand, a good collaboration practice does not guarantee a supply 
chain to have a sustainable profitability. For example, Nokia’s collaboration with 
its supplier was considered as a best practice of supply chain partnerships (Fourtane 
2015; Johnson and Lauritzen 2015; Collin and Lorenzin 2006). It won the Supply 
Chain Management Award in 2015 for Excellence in Supply Chain Operations at 
the EXCHAiNGE conference. However, other supply chain experts and researchers 
regard that Nokia’s profit in mobile phone industries is declining compared to its 
main competitors, such as Apple and Korean manufacturers (McCray et al. 2011; 
Reeves and Deimler 2011). Another example of decreasing business with an 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
4 
 
appropriate practice of supply chain collaboration is the Japanese electronics 
industries, such as Sony, Panasonic, and Sharp. Similar to Nokia, these firms have 
declining profit as Apple and Korean manufacturers have a growing market share. 
This unexpected business pattern attracts many discussions between business 
reviewers, such as Hall (2009), Ihlwan (2009), Morris (2012), Fingleton (2012), 
and Wingfield-Hayes (2013). 
In addition, from strategic management view, these strategies can hinder firms 
to innovate and improve their performance. Experts in strategic management, such 
as Porter (1990; 1997), believe that cooperation or collaboration without 
competition will not enhance the quality of the relationship between firms.  
 These contradicting suggestions indicate that understanding the effect of 
competition and collaboration on supply chains is complicated. It requires a 
comprehensive point of view that elaborates the conflicting perspectives, which 
involve SCM and strategic management. Furthermore, the behaviour of all 
companies in the market contributes to the demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains in the competition. This complex issue is difficult to investigate by 
using an empirical approach.  Hence, this study aims to provide a better 
understanding of the effect of competition and collaboration on supply chains, by 
observing the problem from market-level perspective.  
 In this study, an agent-based modelling (ABM) approach is adopted to 
incorporate market-level perspective in analysing supply chain competition and 
collaboration strategies. This approach employs a non-aggregated method; it starts 
with modelling the individual entities - called agents, allowing them to interact with 
each other, and then analyse the resulting emergent behaviour in the system. This 
approach offers a comprehensive perspective on understanding the effect of 
individual firm-level behaviour on supply chains at market-level outcomes.  
 An agent-based model of competition and collaboration in supply chains is 
developed in this Thesis. It models two-stage supply chains, involving 
manufacturer and supplier, in innovative product markets. The agents act in a two-
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dimension strategic landscape, which is defined based on the basic supply chain 
competitive strategies, known as efficiency and responsiveness (Chopra and Meindl 
2007). The experimental factors are described to represent the suggested 
collaborative behaviour in SCM and competition strategy in strategic management. 
As the problem and the modelling approach are based on literature in SCM and 
strategic management, this study is considered as a theory-driven research. 
   
1.3! The aim and objectives of this study 
The main motivation of this research is to understand the effect of competition and 
collaboration on supply chains from a system-level perspective. Existing literature 
in SCM and strategic management have contradictory views about the benefits of 
competition and collaboration strategies. Most conflicting opinions are led by 
different perspectives used in the previous work. SCM studies apply an operational 
perspective to analyse supply chain competition and collaboration issues without 
considering the emergent behaviour of a particular SCM strategy in the market. 
Meanwhile, strategic management considers a market-level perspective without 
regarding partnerships and operational issues in supply chains to the analysis. To 
obtain better insights on understanding these current conflicting perspectives on 
competition and collaboration in supply chains, this study adopts a market-level 
perspective which has not been considered in SCM studies. Hence, the aim of this 
study is: 
“To explore the impact of competition and collaboration strategies on supply 
chains from a market perspective”. 
Based on this overall aim, the objectives are described as follows. 
 
Objective 1: To develop an agent-based model that explores the effect of 
competition and collaboration on supply chains. 
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As the aim is difficult to achieve using an empirical approach, an agent-based 
modelling approach is employed. The model is developed based on the literature 
review on competition and collaboration issues. The resulting behaviour of the 
model is then compared with a theoretical competition model to enhance the 
confidence of the agent-based model. For example, several case studies in 
shakeouts (a situation where a massive number of companies exit from a market) 
are applied to explain the plausibility of the model results. 
The model investigates several well-known strategies in competition and 
collaboration, particularly those applied in the manufacturer-supplier 
partnerships in innovative product markets. The collaboration strategies that are 
observed are duration of collaboration, number of partnerships, and trust. These 
strategies are believed essential in SCM literature. Meanwhile, the competition 
strategies examined are individual firm’s survivability and strategic mutation. 
The firm’s survivability depicts the individual firm robustness to cope with 
losses, and strategic movement is an extreme competition strategy that is popular 
in strategic management. The emergent effect of these competition and 
collaboration strategies are assessed based on two measures: the market ability 
to fulfil the demand (market demand fulfilment rate), and the overall supply 
chain’s survivability, which is represented by the number of supply chains which 
can survive in the long-term competition. 
 
Objective 2: To explore the effect of competition on supply chains and market 
structure, with regards to the demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains 
for the long-term. 
This objective considers the overall effect of competition on supply chains. It 
describes the emergent patterns that are consistently resulted in every 
experiment and have never been expected to appear. The effect represents the 
benefit and the downside of competition on the supply chains, observed from a 
market perspective. 
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Objective 3: To explore the effect of competition and collaboration strategy on the 
market, in terms of demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains over the 
long-term. The following factors are considered to describe the competition and 
collaboration strategies: 
1)! Duration of collaboration 
2)! Number of partnerships 
3)! Trust 
4)! Individual firm’s survivability 
5)! Strategic movement, i.e. strategic mutation 
The model is used to explore the firm behaviour in competition and collaboration 
through a set of experiments. The factors are first observed in isolation, and then 
several experimental scenarios are investigated under two different duration of 
collaboration, with respect to the number of partnerships and trust. This 
experimental design allows the author to obtain general intuitions about interaction 
among these factors as discussed in the literature. 
 
1.4! The findings and contributions 
The simulation results indicate that competition can have both positive and negative 
impacts on supply chains. The positive effect is that competition can assist strategic 
alignment within supply chains, while the drawback is that competition can lead to 
extreme shakeouts, with regards to monopoly. It means that competition is not 
always detrimental to supply chains as it could offer benefit in supply chain 
strategic alignment. 
 Moreover, the model outputs show that the recommended competition and 
collaboration strategies are not always beneficial to supply chains when it is 
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investigated under long-term competition. The manufacturer trust of the supplier, 
customer loyalty towards manufacturer, manufacturer survivability to work with 
less efficient and/or less responsive supplier, and manufacturer strategic movement 
(strategic mutation) have a significant effect on supply chains. This finding is 
counter-intuitive with the popular recommendations in SCM, which focuses more 
on the duration of collaboration, the number of partnerships, and trust, particularly 
from supplier to manufacturer.   
 This study contributes to three research domains: SCM, strategic management, 
and ABM. SCM and strategic management drive the description of the problem 
situation, the modelling process, and the analysis perspective. Meanwhile, ABM is 
the main approach used to achieve the aim and objectives of this study.  
 SCM is the primary point of view that affects the agent-based model 
development in this study. The agent’s characteristics and its interactions are 
constructed and analysed based on theory and findings in SCM literature. The 
market-level perspective employed in this study offers a novel approach that 
provides new insights in SCM. Instead of observing a single supply chain, the 
competition and collaboration issue is examined from market-level point of view. 
An essential insight obtained from this approach is that “what is good for a single 
company may be detrimental for the market”. This finding suggests insights on the 
fundamental or sensitive factors for supply chain collaboration and understanding 
the dynamic problem in supply chains.  
This study shows that the use of market-level perspective to study SCM could 
provide a building block to improve the current suggested collaboration strategies. 
The insight generated by this point of view can encourage academics, business 
managers, and market regulators to consider the system (the market) to rethink 
about the strategic relations inside a supply chain as well as deciding the appropriate 
competitive approach. To the best of the author’s knowledge, the market-level 
viewpoint has not been used to analyse competition and collaboration in the 
literature. Hence, this study offers a novel approach in SCM. 
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 In addition to SCM theory, previous works on business competition are 
employed to support the modelling process. Several theoretical models and cases 
in business competition, which are often discussed under strategic management 
field, are employed to define the agent’s competitive features. A strategic 
management point of view is also adopted in concluding the resulting emergent 
behaviour.  
With respect to the adoption of strategic management perspective on analysis, 
this research provides a new approach to analyse business dynamics by taking SCM 
perspective into account. The emerging outcome of the simulation model reflects 
the similar output as predicted by Hotelling (1929) even though this study applies 
different modelling assumptions. It suggests that the agent-based model proposed 
in this study can be considered as an extension of Hotelling’s competition model in 
ABM, by incorporating two-layer competition and allowing SCM features to the 
firm behaviour. Moreover, the adoption of SCM perspective to the modelling and 
analysis allows a new insight on understanding shakeouts in strategic management 
studies. 
 SCM and strategic management are related to operations management (OM), 
particularly for the analysis and discussions. Thus, OM can be considered as the 
general domain of the perspective used in this research. As for the contributions for 
OM, this research not only allows a new insight on strategy in both SCM and 
strategic management context, but also providing new insights on understanding 
the effect of competition and collaboration. 
 Meanwhile, the use of ABM to study competition and collaboration in supply 
chains is still limited to date. Studies that use ABM to study SCM issues focus 
primarily on software architecture than supply chain analysis, such as Barbuceanu 
et al. (1997), Parunak et al. (1998), Barbuceanu (1999), García-Flores et al. (2000), 
Jiao et al. (2006), Kwon et al. (2007, 2011), and Siebers and Onggo (2014). In 
addition, ABM research that has addressed collaboration issues in SCM, such as 
Zhu (2008) and Chen et al. (2013), only focuses on a single supply chain. Thus, this 
study provides a new implementation of ABM as a novel approach to modelling 
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supply chain issues by consolidating the different perspectives between SCM and 
strategic management. The model also offers an advancement of the existing agent-
based model of Hotelling’s model. 
 
1.5! Thesis outline 
This Thesis is organised into eight chapters. While the first chapter is about the 
introduction of this Thesis, the remaining chapters are described as follows. 
Chapter two provides a review of the previous works that discuss the extent of 
competition and collaboration impact on supply chain. The contradicting views on 
this issue, which are the basis of the research problem proposed in this study, are 
presented. The review in this chapter focuses on the discussion on competition and 
collaboration between supplier and manufacturer in supply chains. 
 Chapter three frames the existing literature of ABM in supply chain 
competition and collaboration. This chapter identifies the opportunity for the use of 
ABM as well as the potential contribution in this study on the agent-based 
modelling approach. 
 Chapter four details the research methodology of this study.  The hypotheses of 
objective 2 (to explore the effect of firm competitive and collaborative behaviour 
on supply chains, in terms of demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains 
over the long-term) and objective 3 (to explore the generic effect of competition on 
supply chains, with regards to the long-term demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains) are detailed. The research design to achieve all objectives of this 
research is also described in this chapter. 
Chapter five explains the model building process. The logic of the agent’s rules 
is detailed, and the several examples of the verification process of each agent’s rule 
or experimental factor are presented. 
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 Chapter six presents the results and analysis of the competition and 
collaboration effect on supply chains in the market. The analysis mainly addresses 
objective 2 and objective 3 of this study.  
Chapter seven discusses the findings of the experiments. The findings are 
associated with achievement of each objective of this study. It also explains the 
limitations of the findings that are the basis for suggesting the further research, 
which is presented in the next chapter. 
 The thesis is concluded in chapter eight. Summarising the main findings, this 
chapter addresses conclusions of each hypothesis and objective achievements of 
this study. It also provides discussions of the reflection for the contribution of the 
research to the related research domains, which are SCM, strategic management, 
and ABM. This includes how the SCM and simulation community views an issue 
from a different perspective by making use simulation approach and a theoretical 
or analogical model to understand a phenomenon which is hard to explain 
empirically. This reflection defines the potential opportunity to create an impact on 
knowledge and business practice. This Thesis ends with a detailed agenda for 
further work, followed by a summary and the author’s final comments. 
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CHAPTER 2! COMPETITION AND 
COLLABORATION STUDIES IN 
SUPPLY CHAINS: WHAT IS 
MISSING? 
 
2.1! Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of competition and collaboration in supply chains. 
It starts with an overview of supply chain management (SCM), which is the main 
domain that triggers the question of this study. Then, the scope and issues of each 
of competition and collaboration are described.  According to perspectives found 
in the literature, conflicting opinions exist on this topic. The gap between the views 
seems to be more noticeable when a strategic management perspective is taken into 
account. Thus, identification of the missing gap in the literature is formalised and 
concluded, which is provided in the last section of this chapter. 
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2.2! Overview of supply chain management (SCM) 
Supply chain management (SCM) is a field that is concerned with a set of 
techniques and practices for managing business networks. Meanwhile, supply chain 
is a term to describe a network of firms, including suppliers of raw materials, 
manufacturers, warehouses, retailers, and logistics service providers, who work 
together in replenishing demand of end consumers (Lambert and Cooper 2000; 
Simchi-Levi et al. 2000; Chopra and Meindl 2007). The term of SCM has been 
known since 1982 (Gibson et al. 2005), and the approach has been widely practised 
by many industries. 
 With regards to the relationships between firms, SCM views supply chains as a 
network of supply rather than a single chain of supply. Even though fragile, the 
network is a vital part of a supply chain; the network generates the critical 
competitiveness for the supply chain (Chopra and Meindl 2007; Simchi-Levi et al. 
2000). Hence, a supply chain needs to be sustainable and robust. However, 
managing the relationships between companies in a supply chain is hard because 
most firms cooperate with more than one company at the same time. An illustration 
of the supply chain network complexity is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
 
Supplier Manufacturer Distributor Retailer Customer
Supplier Manufacturer Distributor Retailer Customer
Supplier Manufacturer Distributor Retailer Customer
 
Figure 2.1 Supply chain complexity (Chopra and Meindl 2007) 
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 The Supply Chain Council, an independent non-profit organisation, consisting 
of 70 world class industries (Stewart 1997), defines supply chain activities as 
operational processes. This organisation develops a Supply Chain Operations 
Reference (SCOR) model as a standard for benchmarking, business process 
reengineering, and measuring supply chain performance (Supply Chain Council 
2010). The SCOR model divides supply chain operations into five elements:  plan, 
source, make, deliver, and return. The decision for these elements is suggested to 
be integrated not only in the internal scope of a firm but also with the supplier and 
customer operations. This integration is intended to support strategic alignment 
through integrated operations along the supply chain. For instance, according to the 
SCOR model, a manufacturer’s production plan should be determined together with 
its supplier and linked with the retailer’s marketing plan. This suggests that ideal 
SCM practices have a wider scope with strategic implications rather than merely 
affect the firm’s day-to-day operations. 
 In strategic management literature, supply chain activities are considered as the 
core business process of industries, such as modelled in the generic value chain 
model (Porter and Millar 1985), and in business process re-engineering of 
Computer integrated manufacturing open system architecture (Childe et al. 1994; 
Montreuil et al. 2000; Bititci et al. 2008; Bititci et al. 2011a; Bititci et al. 2011b). 
This means that supply chain decisions play a critical role in corporate decisions 
and performance, particularly in manufacturing industries.  
 SCM practices are a crucial determinant of business success. This has 
implications for its competitive advantage. It shifts the conventional view of 
competition, from individual companies to a supply chain perspective. SCM 
suggests that the real business competition should deal with the end consumers 
although firms in the supply market, such as suppliers of raw materials and 
components, have no direct interaction with them. Thus, coordinating activities 
along a supply chain through collaboration becomes the main focus of SCM. 
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 In short, SCM is a critical aspect to enhance competitive advantage for business 
competition that mainly focuses on material flows. It provides an essential 
contribution to reach sustainable competitive advantage through customer service 
level improvement and better business performance for the individual firm (Tracey 
et al. 2005; Li et al. 2006).  
 The remaining sections of this chapter focus on the discussions on competition 
and collaboration issues in SCM. Several related studies in strategic management 
are considered to enrich the review, which is presented in the next section. 
 
2.3! Competition in supply chains 
As SCM manages operations beyond a firm’s boundaries, supply chain 
competitiveness is driven by the product or material that flows between 
organisations (Fisher 1997). The right decisions on supply chain strategy have been 
shown to support business success, such as Toyota and Zara (Lee 2004; Christopher 
2005). A literature review that describes competition strategies in SCM and the 
literature gap in competition issue is presented in the following subsections. 
 
2.3.1 Competition strategies in SCM 
SCM defines supply chain products in two categories: functional and innovative 
products (Fisher 1997). Functional products refer to items required in daily 
necessities and consumed continuously in a relatively stable pattern, such as 
toiletries, food, and beverages; while innovative products represent items which 
compete on innovation, such as automotive and smartphones. Functional product 
supply chains compete in stock availability in the market as the product is highly 
substitutable and a part of the everyday needs of consumers. Meanwhile, innovative 
product supply chains contend in innovation to meet what customer wants for non-
primary needs, such as automobile, smartphones, and branded fashion. 
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 The type of products determines the required supply chain strategy, categorised 
as efficient or lean supply chain, and responsive or agile supply chain (Chopra and 
Meindl 2007). Efficient or lean supply chains fit with functional products which 
have a relatively low demand uncertainty. The supply chains compete on low cost 
and product availability since the product is easily rivalled and imitated by 
competitors. In contrast, the responsive or agile supply chain approach is best 
implemented when the product has an uncertain demand spectrum, which is a 
characteristic of innovative products. The supply chain competes on the innovation 
or product design and time to deliver the innovation to market. As the life cycle for 
innovative products is relatively short, involving the supplier to the process of 
product development is critical to support competitive product design as well as 
accelerating the time to market. Therefore, SCM emphasises collaboration between 
supplier and manufacturer for innovative product supply chains. 
 The selection of supply chain strategy would affect all operations strategies and 
decisions, such as product design, pricing, manufacturing process, and supplier 
selection (Chopra and Meindl 2007). In efficient supply chains, all operations 
strategies are driven by cost, price, and efficiency. Meanwhile, in responsive supply 
chains, most decisions in supply chains are based on speed and flexibility. Table 
2.1 summarises the focus of each supply chain strategy, as defined by Chopra and 
Meindl (2007). The fitness of the supply chain strategy with demand uncertainty 
level is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The zone of strategic fit shows the ideal area in 
implementing each supply chain strategy. The responsive supply chain strategy 
becomes more appropriate when the implied demand uncertainty spectrum is 
higher. 
 Many large companies achieve success because they select the right strategy for 
their supply chain. An example of competition on functional products is that of 
Walmart and Kmart. Walmart has the larger market share because it tends to operate 
its supply chain more efficiently than Kmart (Chopra and Meindl 2007). Through 
an efficient logistics strategy and aggressive supplier management, Walmart is able 
to offer lower prices to customers (Leinwald and Mainardi 2010).  
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Table 2.1 Efficient and responsive supply chains (adapted from Chopra and Meindl, 
2007) 
 Efficient supply chains Responsive supply chains 
Main goal Fulfil the demand at the lowest cost. Respond the demand quickly. 
Product design 
Strategy 
Minimise the cost. Generate modularity for the 
components to allow high product 
variation. 
Pricing strategy Lower profit margin as the price is 
the main driver of customer 
preference. 
Higher profit margin as a customer 
can tolerate the price. 
Manufacturing 
strategy 
Operate efficiently with high 
utilisation of the production line. 
Flexible manufacturing system 
with low utilisation on the shop 
floor. 
Supplier 
selection 
strategy 
Driven by cost and quality. Driven by speed, flexibility, 
reliability, and quality. 
  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Strategic fit in supply chain (Chopra and Meindl 2007) 
  
 Meanwhile, competition among popular branded apparel companies is an 
example of the appropriate use of responsive supply chains, such as Benetton, Zara, 
H&M, Marks and Spencer, and Gap. These firms are popularly mentioned as SCM 
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best practices by many authors, such as in Dapiran (1992), Christopher (2000), Rice 
and Hoppe (2001), Lee (2004), Chopra and Sodhi (2004), Thatte (2007), Squire et 
al. (2009), Turker and Altuntas (2014), and Stevens and Johnson (2015). 
 However, in reality, the implementation of supply chain strategy is not as linear 
as represented in Figure 2.2. Undertaking a survey study, Selldin and Olhager 
(2007) find that Fisher’s theory on the link between supply chain strategy selection 
and product characteristics is not fully adopted in practice. Most of them apply both 
supply chain strategies at the same time to enhance their competitive advantages.  
 This practice is more often found in functional product supply chains. They are 
prone to apply a responsive strategy to improve their competitiveness instead of 
being highly efficient as successfully practised by Walmart. For example, 7-Eleven 
is a well-known retailer that adopts a responsive supply chain strategy in its 
convenience stores. It sells functional products but applies a responsive strategy by 
customising the type of products sold in each store at different times. This approach 
is supported by Lee (2004) and Christopher (2000) who recommend that the 
responsive strategy is more successful than the efficient approach to make a supply 
chain more competitive in general. This literature shows that product characteristics 
do not strictly drive the decisions on supply chain strategy. 
 However, Blackburn (2012) finds that being responsive is not always beneficial 
for supply chains, particularly in make-to-stock supply chains of functional 
products. His analytical model indicates that being more responsive in terms of time 
does not result in a substantial effect on the unit cost. The marginal value of time 
in a functional product supply chain only falls less than one per cent of product cost.  
On the other hand, when a functional product is treated as an innovative product 
by introducing product customization by including additional features, it can make 
the operations more uncertain. Increasing product variety adds challenge to 
marketing and inventory management. It may also make it difficult for the company 
to understand what customers want. For instance, Starbucks and Ben & Jerry’s are 
traditionally understood to use on efficient supply chain strategy, but they improve 
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their product by offering a broad range of product selection. Even though the 
product innovation allows the firms to gain higher profit margins, it also increases 
their supply chain cost. This is because their individual products have a shorter 
lifecycle and the demand becomes more unpredictable and volatile (Fisher 1997).  
These supply chain cases reflect that the relevance of supply chain strategy is 
not as simple as illustrated by Chopra and Meindl (2007) in Figure 2.2. A supply 
chain is not possible to be both extremely responsive and efficient at the same time. 
On the opposite, it is also impossible for it to be highly inefficient and irresponsive. 
However, a supply chain can be exceptionally responsive yet sufficiently efficient 
compared to other supply chains, and vice versa. Most supply chains are likely to 
perform either in high responsiveness but less efficient or eminently efficient but 
less responsive. This applicability range of supply chain strategy is illustrated in 
Figure 2.3. The grey zones illustrate the “not possible” areas of supply chain 
strategy implementation, while the white zone in the middle describes the 
applicability areas of supply chain strategy. 
In practice, the level of responsiveness affects the level of efficiency. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between these factors is not linear. A higher level of 
responsiveness can either improve or lower the operations efficiency of a supply 
chain. On the contrary, when a supply chain is adjusted to have a higher efficiency 
level, the supply chain will likely need to decrease the responsiveness level. In other 
words, better operations responsiveness level could result in a wider range of 
efficiency level (zone a in Figure 2.3), while higher efficiency level would limit the 
supply chain responsiveness (zone b in Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3 Illustration of the applicability of supply chain strategy: efficiency and 
responsiveness 
 
 
2.3.2 Literature gap in competition  
Competition is also studied in other research domains, particularly in strategic 
management. However, conclusions of the effect of competition tend to be 
inconsistent with the findings found in SCM literature on competition. The detail 
of this conflicting discussion is provided in section 2.3.2.1. Also, little mention is 
made of supply chain strategy in strategic management makes a gap between SCM 
and strategic management analysis. The following sections explain the knowledge 
gap on competition in SCM and strategic management. 
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2.3.2.1 Conflicting opinions on impact of competition 
In strategic management, competition is considered to be an important factor in 
enhancing innovation (Porter 1997; Rathi 2014; Porter 1990). It is also beneficial 
for maintaining low prices, particularly for short-term contracts between suppliers 
and buyers (Humphreys et al. 2001). The absence of competition can worsen firms’ 
profitability in the market. An illustration of this situation is that of the competition 
of Italian construction industries in between the late 1980s and the early 1990s 
(Anderson and Jap 2005). During this period, the contractors in Italy practised a 
cartel-type environment where there was no competition between firms. This type 
of environment deteriorated the firms' profitability as it made the firms were less 
willing to innovate and to operate more efficiently. 
 In contrast, in SCM, competition takes place among supply chains, not between 
companies, to gain better profit and market share. For instance, Benetton’s and 
Zara’s supply chain compete with each other by accelerating their time to market, 
in terms of delivering the product design innovation to end consumer (Christopher 
2000; 2005). However, shifting a firm’s goal into the supply chain’s goal is still a 
significant challenge for most firms. Moreover, in reality, firm relationships are not 
as simple as a single chain of supply, as mostly assumed in SCM; in fact, the real 
supply chains are a complex network as illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
 Even though SCM has been well known by industry practitioners, competition 
among individual firms within the same supply chain still exists in the market. Each 
firm has conflicting interactions which create a restriction in achieving the goal of 
each firm. This interaction is unavoidable as each firm has limited resources while 
it wants to maximise its profit. In short, this competitive behaviour is mostly driven 
by the egocentric notion of the competing company (Meng and Layton 2011).  
 Several SCM researchers believe that competition can also be a cause of 
collaboration failures in supply chains. It makes good collaborations between 
organisations more difficult to establish (Rice and Hoppe 2001).  Supplier 
competition, for example, can lead to quality distortion from the supply side (Altug 
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and van Ryzin 2013). This drawback is supported by results of literature that 
examine this issue by using theoretical models. Moreover, researchers who work 
on total quality management, such as Walley (1998), demonstrate that competition 
provides fewer opportunities to reduce variation in lead time and quality. 
 Most arguments for examining the effect of competition in SCM focus on 
competition among suppliers. Through a game theory model,  Xiao et al. (2014) 
show that competition generates longer supply chain lead time. Competition among 
suppliers is also seen as the cause of increases in the operational costs (Altug and 
van Ryzin 2013).  
 On the contrary, some findings suggest that competition among suppliers leads 
to a better understanding between firms (Forker and Stannack 2000), supports the 
achievement of an equilibrium price (Li et al. 2010), improves supplier 
performance (Babich 2006), and results in a better supply chain performance (Wang 
and Shin 2015). Meanwhile, Parker and Hartley (1997) find analytically that 
sourcing under competition on the supply side is no worse than having an intense 
long-term partnership with a single supplier. It means that competition can be 
advantageous to the manufacturer as it enhances the quality of coordination 
between buyer and supplier. 
 In social science, particularly in the field of strategic management, competition 
has been regarded as beneficial in improving business competitiveness (Axelrod 
1997a). Competition supports corporate success (Porter 1990; 1997; 1998) and 
enhances innovation that leads to a better company profitability (Anderson and Jap 
2005). From economists’ perspective, competition can provide better value to the 
customer (Stucke 2013; Rathi 2014). It can also reduce total production costs for 
the manufacturer (Walker and Weber 1987). However, Huo et al. (2014) suggest 
that not all competition provides benefit to industries. They suggest only 
international scale competition has significant effects on business performance, 
especially in supply chains. 
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 Table 2.2 provides a summary list of SCM studies that primarily examines the 
effect of competition. The list also includes papers which address competition as a 
supporting discussion topic, such as Christopher (2000) and Lee (2004). The table 
identifies the research domain of the papers, considering operational research (OR) 
and operations management (OM). Studies with mathematical modelling and 
statistical analysis are classified into OR, while OM refers to studies that focus more 
on a broader scope of the management aspect.   Lastly, the research method used in 
each paper is detailed, regarding review paper, analytical paper, and empirical 
approach. Meanwhile, the list of strategic management studies that support the 
benefit of competition is provided in Table 2.3. To the author’s knowledge, there is 
no conflicting opinion on the effect of competition in strategic management 
literature. Similar to Table 2.2, the list provided in Table 2.3 also includes the 
research method employed in each research. 
 From both Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, it can be seen that previous research comes 
to contradicting conclusions on competition. Most studies promote competition in 
business, while the rest do not advocate the existence of competition as beneficial 
to the industries. It indicates that this is a topic that requires further exploration in 
order to understand the causes of these opposing conclusions. 
 
Table 2.2 Different recommendations on competition in SCM literature 
Finding/suggestion Author(s) Method* 
Competition is beneficial for the manufacturer 
when supplier competition exists. 
Operational research   
Parker and Hartley (1997) A/C 
Babich (2006) A 
Li et al. (2010) A 
Wang and Shin (2015) 
 
A 
Operation management   
Forker and Stannack 
(2000)  E 
Humphreys et al. (2001) E 
      
     
 Competition is not advantageous. Operational research   
 -  Competition between suppliers increases the  
    operational costs in a supply chain. 
Altug and van Ryzin 
(2013) 
A/N 
 -  It leads to a longer supply chain lead time.  Xiao et al. (2014) A 
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Finding/suggestion Author(s) Method* 
 
  Operation management   
 -  It adds uncertainties in supply chains. Christopher (2000) R 
  Lee (2004) R 
 -  It makes supply chain collaboration harder  
    to achieve. Rice and Hoppe (2001) R 
 -  Competition between suppliers increases  
    supply chain costs. Walker and Weber (1987) E 
 -  It increases lead time variations in supply  
    chains. 
Walley (1998) R 
      
*Note:   
R     : Review   
A     : Analytical approach (theoretical study)   
A/N : Analytical approach with numerical analysis (theoretical study)  
A/C : Analytical approach with a case study   
 E     : Qualitative approach (empirical study)  
 
 
Table 2.3 Recommendation on competition in strategic management literature 
Finding/suggestion Author(s) Method* 
Competition provides benefits to the 
enterprises. 
Walker and Weber (1987) 
Axelrod (1997) 
E 
R 
Porter (1990; 1997; 1998) R 
Anderson and Jap (2005) R 
Meng and Layton (2011) 
Stucke (2013) 
E 
R 
Rathi (2014) R 
   
*Note:   
R     : Review   
E     : Qualitative approach (empirical study)   
   
 
  
 
2.3.2.2 Differences in perspectives between SCM and strategic management 
Following the conflicting opinions discussed in section 2.3.2.1, SCM and strategic 
management have a different perspective in examining business competition even 
though SCM activities are explicitly studied in many strategic management models. 
The noticeable distinction between these two sciences is that SCM views the 
problem from an operations point of view, whilst strategic management draws the 
conclusions from a market-level perspective. 
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 For instance, SCM considers business failures as supply chain failures. The 
failures mostly arise as a result of mistakes in choice of supply chain strategy, 
and/or as failures on establishing a good collaboration. It does not consider the 
behavioural pattern of the market. An illustrative example of this case is the 
competition between Xbox and Play Station 2. From an SCM perspective, the 
defeat of Microsoft (the Xbox’s producer) by Sony (the manufacturer of Play 
Station 2) in 2001 was because of mistakes in the choice of supply chain strategy. 
At that time, Microsoft used responsive strategy to enable the firm to launch the 
product earlier than Sony. Nevertheless, Sony implemented a lower price strategy 
for Play Station 2 and won market share. Realising that responsive supply chains is 
not the right approach, Microsoft changed its manufacturing and procurement 
approach to efficient strategy. This supply chain strategy led the company to gain a 
better share in the game console market (Lee 2004). 
On the other hand, strategic management tends to view business failures as a 
consequence of mistakes in making a strategic movement, decisions in market 
segment selections, and/or as changing customer preference in the market. The 
operations and relationships between firms inside the supply chains are only 
considered as the supporting elements of the firm strategic movement. For example, 
Nintendo Wii lost is considered as a result of Nintendo’s failures in making a 
suitable strategic movement (Hollensen 2013). Nintendo decided to make a big 
strategic leap and create a blue ocean -  a term to describe an uncontested market 
space (Kim and Mauborgne 2005), but the company could not produce a product to 
protect its market share from the competitors - Play Station and Xbox. Nintendo 
experienced shortages of key components from its key suppliers when the demand 
of Wii was growing. 
Another example of initial supply chain success is that of Nokia. From strategic 
management perspective, Nokia was an early mover in the smartphone market 
(Reeves and Deimler 2011), while SCM views that the success was highly driven 
by its robust supply chain rather than the appropriate selection of strategic 
movement (Collin and Lorenzin 2006). Nokia’s collaboration with its supplier is 
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considered as a best practice of SCM (Fourtane 2015; Johnson and Lauritzen 2015; 
Collin and Lorenzin 2006) and won the Supply Chain Management Award 2015 
for Excellence in Supply Chain Operations at the EXCHAiNGE conference. 
However, Nokia is considered being defeated by its competitors, such as Apple. 
From strategic management point of view, Apple has a better strategic position than 
Nokia (McCray et al. 2011; Reeves and Deimler 2011), while this perspective has 
not been explained yet in an SCM-based review. 
Based on these examples, it can be concluded that in strategic management, the 
strategic movement is critical for a company’s competitiveness. Strategic 
movement is defined as "the set of managerial actions and decisions involved in 
making a major market-creating business offering", and has been regarded as a 
critical factor to support profitable growth (Kim and Mauborgne 2005). One of the 
recommended innovative approaches of strategic move is strategic leap, or blue 
ocean strategy (Kim and Mauborgne 1997; Mauborgne and Kim 1999; Kim and 
Mauborgne 2005; Kim and Mauborgne 2008). However, this approach has not been 
incorporated in SCM discussions yet since SCM never considers market-level 
perspective in its analysis. 
 Moreover, strategic management applies market-level perspective on research. 
The perspective enables the researchers to investigate the emergent pattern in a 
market, such as shakeouts (Bonaccorsi and Giuri 2000). This situation affects all 
firms in a market (Day 1997) and it is often interpreted as declining industries due 
to decreasing demand, or declining interest of customers in buying the product 
(Lieberman 1990). This kind of emergent phenomenon has not been considered in 
SCM literature. Instead, SCM analyses any business failures from operations-level 
perspective. If SCM perspective is incorporated into strategic management 
analysis, it will provide more comprehensive explanations. As a result, the market 
analysis could encompass not only one layer of competition but also several 
competition layers, as the scope of SCM is beyond a single company. 
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2.3.2.3 Competition strategies in SCM and strategic management: a missing 
link 
As SCM and strategic management have a different perspective in studying 
competition in business, there is still a lack of SCM studies that links supply chain 
competitive strategy with the competition approach defined in strategic 
management. Each research domain has a different approach although both SCM 
and strategic management focus on long-term profitability. This gap may also be 
the reason of a conflicting perspective in understanding the effect of competition 
for supply chains. 
 A popular competition issues in strategic management is related to strategic 
change or movement. This issue is considered critical to have a better performance 
under a competitive environment (Kim and Mauborgne 2005). Strategic flexibility 
is one type of strategic change approach (Margolis et al. 2003; Stuart 1991), and a 
popular strategy on this approach is the big leap or blue ocean strategy. The big 
leap strategy is described as an innovative approach to strengthening a company’s 
strategic position in the "blue ocean" of the market, where the competition is 
irrelevant. This strategy has been studied and suggested by many researchers, 
particularly by Rivkin (2000), Hart and Christensen (2002) Kim and Mauborgne 
(2005), Varga (2009), and Hollensen (2013). The closest SCM literature gets to this 
is supply chain flexibility as a part of supply chain competitive strategy (Duclos et 
al. 2003; Vereecke and Muylle 2006; Swafford et al. 2008; Squire et al. 2009). 
However, SCM defines the flexibility as a supply chain capability to response 
operational changes or dynamics rather than as strategic mutation or big leap 
strategy. 
The different definition of competitive strategy in SCM and strategic 
management shows that a different perspective between SCM and strategic 
management affects the resulting analysis in these research fields. Hence, linking 
the competition approaches defined in strategic management to supply chain 
strategy would provide a better understanding of some arguable issues in SCM, 
CHAPTER 2 – COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION 
28 
 
such as the impact of supplier competition to supply chains. Moreover, looking at 
competition from a market-level perspective could provide a new insight in 
understanding the relationships between competition and supply chain failures in 
the market.  
 
2.4! Supply chain collaboration between supplier and 
manufacturer  
Business collaboration along the supply chain is considered to be the main driver 
to achieve SCM success. In theory, it integrates all operations from the upstream 
(supplier of raw materials) and downstream (end consumer) supply chain. An ideal 
collaboration should also be practised by firms in strategic, tactical, and operational 
level decisions. However, many businesses find that ideal collaboration is difficult 
to achieve. Most companies face challenges in integrating their planning and 
operations even only for aligning supply chain operations inside a single 
organisation (Fawcett and Magnan 2002). This challenge becomes greater when it 
involves other organisations in the operations alignment. The following sections 
discuss the collaboration features and the popular issues in supply chain 
collaboration, with respect to the duration of collaboration, number of 
partnerships, trust, supply chain robustness in terms of survivability, and the 
conflicting opinions about the benefit of collaboration. 
 
2.4.1 Collaboration features in supply chain 
Some basic features of relationships with suppliers are discussed within the issue 
of supply management, including in the purchasing portfolio model proposed by 
Kraljic (1983). The model suggests that supplier-buyer relationships are driven by 
the type of material exchanged. Even though several firms may not fully follow the 
suggested approach, this purchasing portfolio has helped researchers and business 
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practitioners in SCM to understand and model the partnerships between buyer and 
supplier.  
 The Kraljic’s portfolio model is described by two dimensions: the strategic 
importance of the items, and the complexity of the sourcing market. The strategic 
importance of the items represents “the value added by product line, the percentage 
of raw materials in total costs and their impact on profitability”, whilst the 
complexity of the supply market gauged by “supply scarcity, pace of technology 
and/or materials substitution, entry barriers, logistics cost or complexity, and 
monopoly or oligopoly conditions". Based on these dimensions, it is found that the 
most complex procurement activities occur when the level of both the item strategic 
importance and sourcing market complexity are relatively high. The number of 
firms which can supply the items is limited, and it can cause a significant impact 
on manufacturers’ profitability as well as their survivability. As the items in this 
category are considered strategic to the manufacturers,  Kraljic (1983) recommends 
long-term partnerships with suppliers to minimise the risk in supply chains.  
 The model has assisted many SCM researchers to gain a basic understanding of 
the supply market features (Caniëls and Gelderman 2005). It helps the identification 
of the partnership approach with the supplier by determining the appropriate 
sourcing approach based on the characteristics of the supplied materials. However, 
this portfolio does not view the dynamic aspect of supply market, such as 
competition among the supply firms. The dynamics of the market can lead the 
portfolio model to be less accurate for some industries. 
 Similar to the competition strategy in SCM, supply chain collaboration 
strategies are categorised into responsive supply chain and efficient supply chain. 
This classification of strategies is the key driver of the sourcing decision or supplier 
selection, which is essential in establishing a successful collaboration (Matopoulos 
et al. 2007). Functional product supply chains are suggested to apply the efficient 
or lean supply chain strategy. Because the main materials of this product category 
are not difficult to obtain from the supply market, the collaboration issue with the 
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supplier does not often become the main topic. The collaboration focus of these 
supply chains is mostly to improve the accuracy of the forecast of finished products 
so that collaborations with downstream trading partners, such as between 
manufacturers and distributors or retailers, are often raised. The collaboration 
approaches employed in this supply chain are designed to boost the product 
marketability (Alvarado and Kotzab 2001). The most popular collaboration 
strategies proposed are vendor managed inventory (VMI) and collaborative 
planning, forecasting, and replenishment (CPFR). 
Meanwhile, supply chains for innovative products are considered to be best 
suited to adopting a responsive or agile supply chain strategy. This approach 
requires not only competitive product innovations but also competitive cycle time, 
which is defined as the time required from design to market. It means that the 
materials supplied by the suppliers have a significant influence on the 
manufacturing process and the value of the finished/end product. Hence, involving 
suppliers to the product design is important in order to achieve these goals, 
particularly the vendors of critical or strategic items.  
 The feature of partnerships in supply chains is detailed by considering the 
manufacturer or assembly plant of a finished product as the middle point of supply 
chains. Two categories of relationships are classified into the upstream level of the 
supply chain, and the downstream level of the supply chain. The interaction 
between a manufacturer and its supplier, including inbound logistics services, is 
considered as the upstream level of supply chains. Meanwhile, the relationships 
between the manufacturer and its customers, such as warehouses, retailers, end 
consumers, and outbound logistics services, are regarded as cooperation in the 
downstream level of supply chains.  
 The characteristics of supply chain collaboration, as well as the competition 
features, do not only depend on the supply chain strategy adopted (efficient and 
responsive supply chains) but also the stage of the supply chain. For the supply 
chain strategy, it has been clear that supply chain decisions, including the 
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collaboration approach, are driven by the supply chain competitive strategy: 
efficient and responsive supply chains. Each supply chain strategy has different 
focus regarding the stage of the supply chain. These collaboration characteristics 
are summarised in Table 2.4. This study focuses on the relationship between 
manufacturer and supplier which is critical for innovative product supply chains; 
hence, discussions in the remaining sections of this chapter focus on purchasing 
activities between manufacturer and supplier. 
 
Table 2.4 Supply chain elements that influence supply chain collaboration and 
competition 
Type of 
finished 
products 
Appropriate 
supply chain 
strategy 
Critical supply chain 
stage 
Critical item to 
manage 
Functional Efficient/lean Downstream supply 
chain 
Finished product 
Innovative* Responsive/agile Upstream supply 
chain 
Strategic or 
bottleneck items 
 
*this study focuses on upstream supply chains of innovative products 
 
 As an essential part of collaboration with suppliers, procurement activities 
provide a significant contribution to the manufacturer competitiveness. It has been 
found that product performance in the market is related to the performance of 
sourcing strategy (Kotabe and Omura 1989). Kraljic (1983) points out that working 
with the right supplier affects the supply chain performance significantly because 
it influences all the purchasing activities, which cost 40-70% of the cost of goods 
sold. Chopra and Meindl (2007) also find that 50-70% of total manufacturer’s 
expenses are from procurement. The reason for this is that procurement requires 
many processes, such as defining the criteria for materials and suppliers required, 
organising meetings for bidding and negotiations, preparing contracts and even 
aligning the information system to improve the communication between 
manufacturer and supplier. Managing the relationships with suppliers has led 
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several firms to achieve business success and made them be referred as the SCM 
best practices, such as Zara and Toyota  (Gelderman and van Weele 2005). 
However, this literature does not consider the dynamic aspect in the supply market, 
with regards to competition among suppliers. 
 
2.4.2 Collaboration studies in SCM 
Many studies discuss supply chain collaboration and competition under the issue of 
supply chain contract. For example, Cachon and Lariviere (2005) study revenue 
sharing contracts by incorporating the newsvendor model for the collaboration 
approach and game theory and Cournot model for modelling the competition. 
Dimitriou et al. (2009) investigate the performance of newsvendor model under the 
bounded rational decision. Altug and van Ryzin (2013) model product selection 
with revenue sharing under supplier competition in an assemble-to-order system. 
Wu and Chen, (2013) perform a laboratory experiment to investigate rationally 
bounded behaviour in newsvendor settings under several theoretical supply chain 
contracts.  
 However, these studies only focus on inventory and logistics policy. Most of 
them apply analytical studies to evaluate and model supply chain contract, which is 
more appropriate to implement in the downstream level of the supply chain. Thus, 
the situation presented in these studies can hardly be adopted in studying the 
collaboration approach between manufacturer and supplier, particularly for critical 
or strategic items in innovative product supply chains. 
On the other hand, several studies view that supply chain collaboration is taking 
a wider and more comprehensive scope. For instance, Simatupang et al. (2002) 
describe four supply chain coordination modes, which are logistics synchronisation, 
information sharing, incentive alignment, and collective learning. Holweg et al. 
(2005) define the key factors that drive supply chain collaboration; they are the 
geographical dispersion of customers and supplier plants, demand pattern of 
products, and product characteristics. Barratt (2004) proposes supply chain 
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segmentation through literature study in defining the appropriate collaboration 
approach. Cao and Zhang (2011) explore the nature of supply chain collaboration 
and its impact on company’s performance through empirical study in U.S. 
manufacturing enterprises. Purwaningrum and Evers (2012) study knowledge 
sharing in manufacturing industries in Indonesia and find that culture significantly 
affects the mechanism of supply chain collaboration. Ramanathan and Gunasekaran 
(2014) investigate the effect of collaborative planning, decision making and 
execution on all supply chain processes; they suggest that the successful short-term 
collaboration leads to a long-term relationship. However, none of these work 
attempts to address competition and collaboration in innovative product supply 
chains, particularly to analyse supply chain failure from market perspective. 
Compared to proposed approaches for downstream collaboration, the available 
strategies for upstream supply chain collaboration are relatively more limited in 
SCM literature. The popular strategies suggested in this topic are about the 
establishment of a long-term partnership with suppliers and single-sourcing, as 
advised by Boddy et al. (1998), Kraljic (1983), and Lee (2004). Nevertheless, the 
studies which address this issue are relatively fewer than research in downstream 
collaboration and competition. 
Few studies have attempted to review literature on supply chain collaboration, 
but they do not consider competition to the review. For instance, Soosay & Hyland 
(2015) consider publications on collaboration written from 2005 to 2014, but none 
of the reviewed articles studies the issue from a market perspective, particularly in 
measuring the effect through the degree of demand fulfilment and survivability of 
the supply chain. Moreover, they do not review supply chain collaboration by 
considering the type of products and the stage of supply chain which are 
fundamental to specify the feature and main problems of collaboration in supply 
chains. 
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2.4.3 Main topics in supplier-manufacturer collaboration 
A brief review of the supplier-manufacturer collaboration issues in SCM literature 
is next presented in the following subsections. Five issues are identified: the 
duration of collaboration, the number of partnerships, trust, robustness for 
survivability, and the contradicting opinions of collaboration benefits. 
 
2.4.3.1 The duration of collaboration: long-term partnerships 
Long-term collaboration is considered the most effective approach to achieve a 
sustainable performance improvement for supply chains (Boddy et al. 1998; 
Christopher 2000; Lee 2004). This strategy is beneficial particularly for the firms 
which supply the critical or strategic items of the product to secure the supply flow 
(Kraljic 1983). It reduces the lead time to market (Christopher 2000) which is the 
critical driving force in innovative product supply chain. This approach is also 
credited as a critical enabler to achieve a long-term competitive advantage and 
performance for all firms along the supply chain (Li et al. 2006). These views are 
illustrated by the best practices adopted in the supply chain of large companies, 
such as Toyota and Benetton, which support that these strategies lead them to higher 
profits. 
 Before this approach was introduced, buyers or manufacturers were considered 
as ‘antagonist players’ towards their suppliers in the mid of 1980’s. They tended to 
be demanding and avoiding a long-term partnership with suppliers. They preferred 
to cooperate with a large number of different suppliers to obtain a lower price from 
their suppliers (Matthyssens and Van den Bulte 1994). Then, between 1996 and 
2001, the partnerships trend drastically changed; establishing close relationships 
became popular in business strategy, including in SCM (Anderson and Jap, 2005).  
 Establishing close relationships with suppliers is one of the SCM goals to 
improve supply chain performance over the long-term. This strategy allows 
suppliers to get involved earlier in the process of product development, so both 
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supplier and manufacturer can obtain a long-term joint competitiveness, as 
practised by Benetton with its supplier (Dapiran 1992). Moreover, it promotes a 
better efficiency since this method reduces the number of suppliers that affects 
transaction costs (Matthyssens and Van den Bulte 1994). Kraljic (1983) also 
documented that a Japanese steel industry has decreased their total spending up to 
18% by applying this partnership style. Using a game theory model, Ren et al. 
(2010) also support this strategy as it facilitates trust improvement between 
collaborating firms. Nonetheless, the finding of the study is limited to information 
sharing on the sales forecast.  
 The most effective close relationship suggested are the ones where the 
manufacturers in the supply chain establish a long-term relationship with either one 
(single-sourcing) or two suppliers (dual-sourcing). This strategy has been 
considered as a fundamental approach in SCM to improve and optimise supply 
chain competitiveness over the long term (Matthyssens and Van den Bulte 1994; Li 
et al. 2006). It secures the supply, particularly in settling the long-term availability 
of critical goods or materials (Kraljic 1983). The lead time to market for introducing 
new products can also be lowered (Christopher 2000) because it enables 
information and operations integration that improves supply chain performance 
(Prajogo and Olhager 2012).  
 However, close partnerships do not always have positive impacts on the firms. 
Partnership failures have been found at a relatively high rate, which is between 30% 
and 50% (Anderson and Jap, 2005). Also, Parker and Hartley (1997) find that long-
term partnerships tend to cause suppliers to be more vulnerable in controlling the 
price of their materials compared to short-term partnerships. Kraljic (1983) also 
suggests that long-term partnerships can provide a significant benefit if the 
suppliers are operating beyond their capacity, and when the uncertainty level of the 
relationship is high and complicated. Furthermore, Porter (1997) does not 
recommend long-term partnerships as it can reduce suppliers’ willingness to 
innovate. 
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 Several findings also identify that closer relationships lead the partners to be 
more likely dissatisfied with the cooperation. Marketing researchers have 
empirically proven that long term relationships can lower trust and service 
performance (Grayson and Ambler 1999). Strategic management research posits 
that close partnerships encourage partners to be too dependent on each other 
(Inkpen and Beamish 1997). It suggests that close relationships can dampen 
innovations. In addition, when a firm has a better understanding of what the other 
knows through a high degree of information sharing between parties, the 
partnerships become unstable and fragile. Other findings also suggest that this 
method does not always provide a better supply chain performance, such as 
Anderson and Jap (2005), Burke et al. (2007), Leeuw and Fransoo (2009), Squire 
et al. (2009), and Sun and Debo (2014). This approach has been found to be more 
risky to implement when the demand uncertainty is very high or very low (Sun and 
Debo 2014).  
Different findings in analysing the relation between long-term partnerships with 
close relationships are also found in the previous work. Comparing U.S. car 
manufacturers with Japanese firms, Dyer and Ouchi (1993) conclude that a long-
term collaboration does not necessarily need a very high involvement of 
collaborating firms. This view contradicts the findings of a study by Prajogo and 
Olhager (2012) who suggest that high involvement, or a closer relationship, is 
required as it significantly affects the improvement of supply chain performance. 
However, Prajogo and Olhager do not particularly discuss the long-term 
collaboration in their study, but close relationships in general. 
This long-term relationship strategy is also often doubted by SCM practitioners. 
This strategy is viewed to be risky as developing and maintaining trust between 
firms are difficult in business relationships. This negative opinions often come from 
suppliers with larger scale buyers who aggressively established strategic and long-
term cooperation with them (Bensaou 1999). 
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 An empirical study conducted by Wagner (2011) finds that the length of 
partnership has no relationship with performance improvement, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.4. Instead, according to Wagner (2011), supply chain performance is 
influenced by the level of supplier development - a set efforts of a manufacturer 
spends to enhance supplier performance and/or capabilities. However, the 
effectiveness of supplier development tends to follow a curvilinear pattern against 
the length of partnership. It implies that excessive duration of relationship would 
not provide a significant benefit to the success of supplier development.  
 
 
Figure 2.4 The pattern of performance improvement, considering the level of supplier 
development and the length of partnership (Wagner 2011) 
 
This finding is consistent with the study conducted by Squire et al. (2009) who 
also conclude that collaboration has a curvilinear relationship. It improves 
manufacturer’s responsiveness, but when manufacturer becomes dependent on the 
supplier, it may have an adverse impact on suppliers' performance. It implies that 
the more stable the relationship between firms, the more vulnerable it is to 
destruction. This is because it requires high investments in order to establish the 
long-term partnership which then turns into a barrier dissolving an ineffective 
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relationship (Anderson and Jap 2005). However, both Wagner (2011) and Squire et 
al. (2009) do not explain the length of relationships duration for a specific unit of 
time. A summary of the conflicting views found in the literature is presented in 
Table 2.5.  
Table 2.5 Summary of various perspectives on long-term partnerships  
Finding/suggestion Author(s) Research domain Method 
 
Long-term 
partnerships provide 
more advantages to the 
supply chain than a 
short-term partnership. 
 
Kraljic (1983) 
Dapiran (1992) 
Matthyssens and Van den 
Bulte (1994) 
Boddy et al. (1998) 
Christopher (2000) 
Lee (2004) 
Ren et al. (2010) 
 
 
SCM 
SCM 
SCM 
 
SCM 
SCM 
SCM 
SCM 
 
Review 
Review 
Review 
 
Empirical study 
Review 
Review 
Analytical approach* 
 
Long-term 
collaboration does not 
consistently benefit the 
firms. 
Porter (1997) 
 
Parker and Hartley (1997) 
 
Grayson and Ambler (1999) 
 
Anderson and Jap (2005) 
 
Li et al. (2006) 
Leeuw and Fransoo (2009) 
 
Squire et al. (2009) 
Wagner (2011) 
Sun and Debo (2014) 
 
Strategic 
management 
SCM 
 
Strategic 
management 
Strategic 
management 
SCM 
SCM 
 
SCM 
SCM 
SCM 
Review 
 
Analytical approach 
with a case study 
Empirical study 
 
Review 
 
Empirical study 
Analytical approach* 
 
Empirical study 
Empirical study 
Analytical approach* 
*Note: theoretical study 
 
2.4.3.2 Number of partnerships 
The second collaboration topic that attracts SCM researchers is the number of 
partnerships (or number of sourcing). It refers to manufacturers’ decision in 
selecting and limiting the number of partnerships with suppliers. The decision of 
number partnerships is related to supply chain strategy to secure the supply flow.  
The issue raised on this topic is around the value of having one supplier (single-
sourcing), two suppliers (dual-sourcing), and many suppliers (multi-sourcing). 
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Many SCM experts recommend single-sourcing strategy to achieve a sustainable 
improvement in supply chain performance. This approach is generally adopted as a 
part of a long-term duration of collaboration and considered extreme because the 
manufacturer is only allowed to interact with and obtain supplies from one supplier 
only.  
 The single-sourcing approach is mostly supported by studies which consider 
variation reduction on product quality and lead time, such as Christopher (2000), 
Chopra and Meindl (2007) and Vereecke and Muylle (2006). This strategy would 
be more beneficial when the supplier has a large capacity (Kraljic 1983; Burke et 
al. 2007). 
 However, in reality, several Japanese firms that have claimed to adopt this 
strategy successfully are found to be no longer reliant on single-sourcing (Fisher 
2011). Furthermore, according to the findings in Richardson (1993), single-
sourcing is never perfectly practised in Japanese automotive companies, who 
applied this collaboration approach. Some apply dual or multi-sourcing. Dyer and 
Ouchi (1993) also find that even though the Japanese collaboration are 
characterised by long-term mutual partnerships, they cooperate with a relatively 
small number of suppliers. 
Many experts have also doubted the effectiveness of the single-sourcing 
approach. Porter (1990; 1997) does not recommend this strategy because it does not 
provide incentives to the suppliers to improve their overall performance. A finding 
from Squire et al. (2009) support this perspective by showing that supply chain 
performance would be worse when the manufacturer becomes dependent on the 
supplier, although collaboration with suppliers is proven to enhance manufacturer 
responsiveness. Parker and Hartley (1997) also suggest that having more than one 
supplier allows for a more competitive supply chains. 
Another alternative sourcing strategy is that of dual-sourcing. The strategy 
establishes close relationships with two suppliers. This strategy is generally 
understood to result in lower risks compared to single-sourcing while maintaining 
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cost effectiveness in partnerships. Through an analytical analysis on inventory 
decisions, Ramasesh et al. (1991) recommend that dual-sourcing is more efficient 
than single-sourcing. This finding is consistent with the conclusion of Lyon (2006) 
that suggest dual-sourcing over single-sourcing in order to achieve better efficiency 
in U.S defence procurement strategy. Chiang and Benton (1994) also suggest dual-
sourcing provides a better service level than single-sourcing. They also find that 
splitting the order to two suppliers does not mean that the buyer misses out on 
having quantity discounts on purchasing.  
However, several studies indicate that dual-sourcing is not better than single-
sourcing. Tyworth and Ruiz-Torres (2000) prove analytically that dual-sourcing in 
logistics practice results in lower efficiency than single-sourcing. Through an 
analytical approach, Yu et al. (2009) also show that dual-sourcing provides more 
benefit than single-sourcing when the material price is sensitive to the partnerships 
and supply disruption can be predicted.  
 Instead of having a single or two suppliers, recommendation on establishing 
relationships with many suppliers, known as multi-sourcing, are also provided in 
the literature. Multi-sourcing is commonly considered as the opposite of a close 
relationship. It is considered as an effective strategy to secure a steady supply by 
avoiding dependency on a particular supplier. Several studies suggest that multi-
sourcing provides more advantages than other sourcing strategies. Burke et al. 
(2007) find that multi-sourcing is an optimal sourcing approach, although single-
sourcing performs better when supplier capacity is relatively larger than demand. 
However, multi-sourcing has its own drawbacks for the supply chain. Even though 
multi-sourcing can lower risk of sourcing, having the risks of lead time discrepancy 
among suppliers tends to increase (Babich 2006). Moreover, having many suppliers 
can increase hidden costs, such as handling costs and transaction costs (Gadde and 
Snehota 2000). 
 On the other hand, maintaining relationships with a small number of suppliers, 
but not with a single supplier, is also considered beneficial compared to single-
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sourcing and multi-sourcing for long-term partnerships. This is due to the fact that 
long-term relationships are risky and costly to establish and maintain (Bensaou 
1999). This conclusion is supported by the findings of Kotabe and Omura (1989) 
who found that multi-sourcing with a limited number of suppliers results in a better 
supply chain performance. This situation is experienced by car manufacturer 
companies in Japan and Europe. 
 In relation to the SCM literature, a number of contradicting views have been 
expressed. In the early development of SCM, single-sourcing was the very popular 
approach for supply chain collaboration. However, this strategy could be too risky 
to implement. Hence several options are proposed, such as multi-sourcing and dual-
sourcing. A summary of the different views found in the literature is presented in 
Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 Various suggestions on number of sourcing  
Finding/suggestion Author(s) Research domain Method 
Single-sourcing is the 
best approach for 
supply chains. 
Christopher (2000) 
Vereecke and Muylle (2006) 
Tyworth and Ruiz-Torrez (2000)  
 
Chopra and Meindl (2007)  
 
 
SCM 
SCM 
SCM 
 
SCM 
 
Review 
Empirical study 
Analytical 
approach* 
Review 
 
Single-sourcing does 
not always provide 
benefit: 
Parker and Hartley (1997) 
 
 
Porter (1990; 1997) 
 
Lee (2004) 
SCM 
 
 
Strategic 
management 
SCM 
Analytical 
approach with 
a case study 
Review 
 
Review 
 
-  Dual-sourcing is 
better than single-
sourcing. 
Ramasesh et al. (1991) 
 
Chiang and Benton (1994) 
 
Lyon (2006) 
Yu et al. (2009) 
SCM 
 
SCM 
 
SCM 
SCM 
Analytical 
approach* 
Analytical 
approach* 
Empirical study 
Analytical 
approach* 
 
-  Multi-sourcing 
strategies provide 
better advantages to 
the supply chain. 
 
Gadde and Snehota (2000) 
Burke et al. (2007) 
 
 
 
SCM 
SCM 
 
 
 
Review 
Analytical 
approach* 
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Finding/suggestion Author(s) Research domain Method 
"!Multi-sourcing with 
a limited number of 
suppliers results in a 
better performance. 
Kotabe and Omura (1989) 
 
Bensaou (1999) 
 
SCM 
 
SCM 
Analytical 
approach* 
Review 
 
*Note: theoretical study 
 
2.4.3.3 Trust and loyalty 
Trust and loyalty are behaviour-related factors of an organisation or individual that 
deals with maintaining its relationship with a particular company. In many business 
studies, trust and loyalty are frequently considered simultaneously in a single study 
even though these terms do not have an identical interpretation. In SCM, trust is 
discussed as a core part of collaboration between enterprises, while loyalty is used 
to describe customer’s characteristics in buying a product from a similar company 
in other business fields. Both trust and loyalty are required to establish business 
relationships (Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000). Most studies consider loyalty as a 
consequence of trust and satisfaction (Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000; Alhabeeb 
2007; Horppu et al. 2008), while others suggest trust and loyalty have no cause and 
effect relationship, such as O’Cass and Carlson (2012). Therefore, with respect to 
these studies, trust and loyalty can be considered to provide concurrent effects on 
business partnerships. Henceforth, these terms are categorised into trust/loyalty in 
this Thesis. 
 In SCM, trust between collaborating firms is suggested crucial in achieving 
collaboration success (Dapiran 1992, Dyer and Ouchi 1993, Ganesan 1994,  and 
Nyaga et al. 2010). Meanwhile, Kannan and Tan (2003) recommend that supplier 
trust is the key success of supply chain collaboration. Many studies have addressed 
the issue of trust in supply chain collaboration, but most of them focus on trust 
improvement, such as a study conducted by Mohamed et al. (2015). None studies 
focus on examining the significant influence of trust from one of the collaborating 
companies, such as comparing the effect of manufacturer trust and supplier trust. 
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Moreover, in reality, it is difficult to establish a perfect trust along the supply 
chain. Trust building is challenging and difficult to perform during the partnerships. 
It often requires higher involvement to build the trust which can result in higher 
costs to support and maintain the relationship. When the collaborating firms trusted 
each other and established a close partnership, it may increase the vulnerability of 
the relationships as discussed by Anderson and Jap (2005). Furthermore, trust in 
intermediate level represents the reality of business partnerships, which means a 
firm may not extremely trust the collaborating partner forever. In this case, an 
imperfect (or non extreme) trust may not be significant in supporting collaboration 
success. This factor is difficult to measure, and it may not be possible to investigate 
in the real world. Therefore, exploring the effect of particular degree of trust in 
supply chain collaboration requires an advance approach, such as simulation.   
 
2.4.3.4 Supply chain robustness for long-term survivability 
SCM believes that successful collaboration with suppliers can enhance supply chain 
robustness. When a supply chain is resilient, it has an ability to minimise any risk 
from its supply market. This capability is able to be achieved by establishing strong 
relationships with one or more than one key suppliers (Yu et al. 2009). 
 One of best practices of robust supply chains is Nokia. The firm has strong 
relationships with its suppliers that support its supply chain robustness from supply 
disruption (Rice and Galvin 2006). However, in fact, its strong supply chain does 
not guarantee the company from its recent declining market share.  
 Japanese firms’ supply chains are also considered as best practices in 
maintaining supply chain robustness, such as Toyota, Sony, and Panasonic. A factor 
that assists their resilient supply chain is the government supports by protecting 
Japanese firms financially, particularly for companies which stay in the upstream 
supply chain (Dyer and Ouchi 1993). The subsidy has been proven effective in 
promoting their supply chains survivability although natural disasters frequently 
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occur in Japan. It aids Japanese firms to survive and maintain stable business 
partnerships in their supply chain.  
 However, Japanese electronics firms are now experiencing declining 
profitability. Suggested reasons for profit loss in Japanese firms are: inappropriate 
marketing approach (Fingleton 2012; Morris 2012; Wingfield-Hayes 2013), 
mistakes on strategic movement (Hall 2009), high manufacturing costs due to the 
deteriorating Japanese economy (Ihlwan 2009; Wakabayashi 2012), and the culture 
of Japanese firms (Ihlwan 2009; Hall 2009). None considers the loss caused by the 
supply chain. Indeed, their supply chain practices are still regarded as a success 
story. Again, this case indicates that supply chain robustness achieved from good 
collaboration practices could not secure long-term supply chain profitability.  
 In other words, the effect of individual firm’s survivability on supply chains 
long term robustness needs a further exploration. However, empirical observation 
is hard to adopt to the exploratory study. Simulation approach can be the 
appropriate alternative to research this issue. 
  
2.4.3.5 Benefits of collaboration 
Collaboration in SCM is intended to lower the operational uncertainties between 
collaborating firms. It is expected to allow the firms within the supply chain to have 
a similar perspective on winning the competition and working as a team. Most 
research in SCM considers collaboration is the most effective approach to improve 
supply chain performance, with regards to flexibility and speed. This perspective is 
suggested by, such as, Dapiran (1992), Matthyssens and Van den Bulte (1994), 
Christopher (2000), Simchi-Levi et al. (2000), and Chopra and Meindl (2007). 
Collaboration is also believed to be a strategy to align roles and responsibility 
between cooperating firms (Boddy et al. 1998).  Therefore, close and intense 
relationships have become a basis for supply chain collaboration.  
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 However, having close partnerships through collaborations do not suit all 
supply chains. Several studies, such as Anderson and Jap (2005), Burke et al. 
(2007), Leeuw and Fransoo (2009), Squire et al. (2009), and Sun and Debo (2014), 
suggest that the strategies do not consistently help a supply chain to have a better 
performance. This approach can also hinder the benefit of competition from a 
strategic management perspective (Porter 1990; 1997). Moreover, empirical 
evidence in U.S. manufacturing companies shows that the benefit of this approach 
is more significant to small firms compared to medium and large enterprises. This 
is because small firms relish the collaboration as a medium for learning and 
distributing knowledge while medium and large enterprises already have proficient 
capabilities (Cao and Zhang 2011). 
In addition, some studies suggest that the advanced collaboration practice does 
not necessarily improve supply chain performance. Parker and Hartley (1997) find 
that partnership sourcing (with a close and intense interaction) does not lead to a 
better performance than adversarial competition relationships, with regards to 
transaction costs during the partnerships. Vereecke and Muylle (2006) also 
empirically conclude that collaboration partially supports supply chain performance 
improvement, in terms of cost, flexibility, and procurement. Stank et al. (2001) also 
find that collaboration, either with customers or suppliers, would not enhance firm 
performance, particularly in logistical service performance. Even though 
collaboration and information sharing with external allows risk reduction and 
having more informed decisions, these benefits do not result in performance 
improvement.  
A summary list of these conflicting findings is presented in Table 2.7. However, 
these findings relatively have a minor position compares to other business research 
which endorses collaboration between firms. Also, these studies do not concentrate 
on supply-side collaborations, which is the main focus of this study. 
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Table 2.7 Summary of conflicting perspectives on supply chain collaboration 
Finding/suggestion Author(s) Method 
Collaboration enhances 
supply chain 
performance. 
Most studies in SCM, such as: 
Dapiran (1992) 
Matthyssens and Van den Bulte 
(1994) 
Boddy et al. (1998) 
Christopher (2000) 
Simchi-Levi et al. (2000) 
Lee (2004) 
Chopra and Meindl (2007) 
 
Review 
Review 
Empirical study 
Review 
Review 
Review 
Review 
Collaboration does not 
support performance 
improvement. 
Parker and Hartley (1997) 
 
Stank et al. (2001) 
Vereecke and Muylle (2006) 
Analytical approach 
with a case study 
Empirical study 
Empirical study 
  
 
 
2.5! Summary of the literature gap 
Based on the literature reviewed in this chapter, it can be concluded that although 
there is a healthy body of works on collaboration and competition in SCM and 
strategic management, contradicting views are still expressed. These concern the 
following: the duration of collaboration, the number of partnerships, trust, 
survivability of individual firm, and strategic movement. Some issues also remain 
unexplained, such as assessing the issue for long-term impact. With respect to this, 
several possible reasons are analysed to understand why they stay unaddressed, 
presented as follows.  
 
Reason 1: Difference in perspective 
Most conflicting opinions come from different perspectives used in the analysis. 
The gap is more apparent 
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investigate the effect of competition, so the resulting analyses and perspective of 
each discipline can be compared. Strategic management views the problem from 
market-level perspective and pays less attention to the operational aspects. In this 
research field, operational effectiveness is considered not a strategy to achieve a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Porter 2006). Meanwhile, SCM observes the 
issue from an operational perspective – without taking into account the emergent 
behaviour of the market. 
 However, according to the literature reviewed, social studies seem to have 
limited interest in investigating collaboration in supply chains, particularly in 
associating it with the strategic movement. Conversely, in SCM limited efforts have 
been made to link the competition approach in strategic management, such as big 
leap or strategic mutation approach, with popular collaboration strategies in SCM. 
This could explain cases, such as Nokia and Sony, which experience declining 
profit even though their collaboration practised are still endorsed in SCM. Hence, 
considering market-level perspective used in strategic management in analysing 
collaboration issues in supply chains would provide an opportunity to understand 
the problem in a more comprehensive approach. 
 
Reason 2: Unintegrated investigations  
Each critical factor in supply chain collaboration issues is mostly investigated 
separately from the competitive environment. Strategic movement of other 
competitors in the market has not been considered in current studies. Incorporating 
both aspects of competition and collaboration would be useful to understand the 
gap between the conflicting opinions found in the literature. 
Moreover, the competition observed in both SCM and social studies only covers 
one layer of competition. For instance, SCM tends to focus only on addressing 
competition among suppliers, while strategic management focuses more on 
competition between firms in downstream supply chains. However, in reality, 
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competition exists both in upstream and downstream level of supply chains, which 
means it occurs in each stage of supply chain. This different focus of analysis would 
result in different conclusions; SCM prefers to investigate the effect of competition 
from manufacturer’s perspective, whilst strategic management tends to observe it 
without considering competition in the supply market of an industry.  
 
Reason 3: Limited scope of existing work 
SCM research rarely observes the impact of competition and collaboration 
approach from supplier’s perspective. Most previous studies analyse the issues from 
the perspective of a manufacturer in the downstream market. This perspective is 
inconsistent with the aim of SCM in improving competitiveness along the supply 
chains. Instead, most SCM studies only assessed the issue from manufacturer’s 
point of view, and the impact for the supplier is often ignored.  
Moreover, supply chain performance is not only affected by the operations of a 
supply chain. It is also affected by other firms in the market. The current SCM 
perspective does not consider the firm behaviour in the markets to assess the 
effectiveness of supply chain collaboration approach, such as strategic movement. 
This limitation may be the reason why an appropriate collaboration practice with 
key supplier/s does not prevent the supply chain from profit loss and long-term 
survivability in the market.  
 Another factor that is considered essential in competition issue but still not 
regarded in supply chain collaboration literature is customer behaviour. It has been 
widely accepted that customers play a significant role in business competition, and 
the main issues are about understanding their preference and loyalty. Many studies 
have examined customer behaviour by considering preference and loyalty in order 
to analyse business competition, such as Irmen and Thisse (1998), Turnbull et al. 
(2000), and Reeves and Deimler (2011). However, most these studies undertake a 
strategic management lens to the issue. In SCM, demand market is often expressed 
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as a simplified uncertainty by assuming it into a form of statistical distribution of 
probability. Despite adopting this assumption, formalising the uncertainty as a 
result of decision-making behaviour, such as loyalty, allows more information to 
explore in studying competition and collaboration study.   
  
Reason 4: Limited study that measures long-term impact of a strategy on 
supply chain 
The benefit of business relationships is difficult to measure in reality, particularly 
in terms of its impact on the market. It is more complicated than measuring the costs 
for establishing and maintaining the relationships. This is because most benefits of 
partnerships are intangible and are not explicit in the firm's financial report (Gadde 
and Snehota 2000).  
 Even though SCM has a wide scope and multiple activities, supply chain 
success is often measured by its operations performance only. For example, the 
SCOR model employs the following metrics to measure the supply chain activities 
(Supply Chain Council 2010): 
a.! perfect order fulfilment  
b.! order fulfilment cycle time  
c.! upside supply chain flexibility  
d.! upside supply chain adaptability  
e.! downside supply chain adaptability  
f.! overall value at risk 
g.! total cost to serve 
h.! cash-to-cash cycle time 
i.! return on supply chain fixed assets 
j.! return on working capital 
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 Existing research has attempted to assess the supply chain collaboration 
performance, but it still views the performance from operational perspective. 
Although supply chain collaboration aims to enhance the operations performance, 
the perspective could not indicate the long-term effect of the collaboration, 
particularly to the market. Moreover, even though SCM has been known for 34 
years since it was first introduced in literature ─ 1982 by Oliver and Weber (Gibson 
et al. 2005), many firms still have not yet implemented successful collaboration. 
When a close and robust relationship is successfully developed between 
organisations within a supply chain, it does not guarantee the sustainability of 
business success. For instance, Nokia has been widely known to be successful 
because of its supply chain. It still has a strong supply network, but its market share 
is now declining significantly compared to Samsung and Apple.  
 It implies that the existing performance measures in SCM literature cannot be 
adopted to assess demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains over the 
long-term, particularly in investigating the effect of competition and collaboration 
on the supply chains in the market. The analysis of the supply chain should consider 
other perspectives and/or other approaches to measuring supply chain success, such 
as market-level perspective used in strategic management. 
 
2.6! Conclusions: The missing points from existing literature 
SCM and strategic management have both investigated competition and 
collaboration in business. Both disciplines have addressed the important elements 
of competition and collaboration, but there are still several gap and limitations 
found in the literature.  
To minimise the gap in the literature, linking the separate perspectives between 
related disciplines (SCM and strategic management) as well as relaxing the scope 
and limitations of the previous studies are required. The viewpoint of strategic 
management should be incorporated to supply chain analysis to allow a more 
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comprehensive understanding of the impact of the factors. A market-level 
perspective used in strategic management enables SCM researchers to measure the 
performance of supply chains, regarding the level of demand satisfaction and 
supply chain survivability in the market. In addition, competition in both supplier 
and manufacturer stage should be combined in the analysis. The competition 
approaches discussed in strategic management, regarding strategic move and big 
leap (or strategic mutation), are also required to be taken into account to obtain a 
better understanding of the impact of this strategy on supply chain collaboration. A 
reason for this is that the big leap strategy still has a limited doubt in strategic 
management literature so far, but many business practitioners are sceptical towards 
this strategy. In addition, supply chain robustness should be analysed by 
considering individual firm survivability. It could provide insights whether 
intervention in supporting individual firm robustness or survivability significantly 
improves the long-term supply chain performance and survivability. Finally, 
uncertainty in demand market should also be considered as a result of customers’ 
decision making, instead of assuming it into a demand rate with particular statistical 
distribution, which is performed by most SCM modelling with analytical 
approaches.    
 With respect to market-level perspective adopted in this study, the important 
factors of competition and collaboration can be generalised as companies’ 
behaviour in the market. As in reality and most literature assumes that collaborative 
initiatives come from the manufacturers of finished products, the collaboration 
strategies are regarded as a part of manufacturer behaviour.  
 The critical issues in competition and collaboration and the conclusions for each 
of these factors are summarised in Table 2.8. The conclusions are based on previous 
studies that do not fully support the benefit of these collaborative and competitive 
factors.  
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Table 2.8  Important behavioural factors of competition and collaboration and the hypotheses  
Essential issues Conclusions 
A Competitive and collaborative behaviour  
 1. Duration of collaboration The recommended duration of collaboration, 
which is long-term collaboration, does not 
guarantee a better long-term supply chain 
performance and survivability. 
 2. Number of partnerships. The number of partnerships may not significantly 
affect supply chains for the long-term. 
 3. Trust Trust among firms and customer may not be 
beneficial significantly to supply chains. 
 4. Individual firm's survivability Long-term supply chain profitability and 
survivability may not be related to individual 
firm’s robustness or survivability. 
  5. Manufacturer strategic movement 
(the strategic mutation) 
The big leap or strategic mutation may not be 
beneficial to supply chains. 
B Effect of competition on supply chains Competition may be not detrimental to supply 
chains. 
  
 The final point of this literature gap is that the high-level complexity of 
competition and collaboration in supply chains. Each issue addressed in this chapter 
have relationships with each other in reality. The interdependencies are difficult to 
model by using an analytical approach as performed by the previous research. It is 
also hard to explain empirically since it requires transparency in formalising firm’s 
behaviour in making decisions and long-term period investigation. An empirical 
approach would consume a great amount of cost and time, as well as causing 
potential problems related to research ethics. It indicates that an innovative 
approach is required to observe and investigate this issue.   
 
2.7! Summary  
The description provided in this chapter focuses on identifying the important issues 
in supply chain competition and collaboration that have inconsistent conclusions in 
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the previous studies and business articles. The findings in the literature are also 
linked to the current situations of several big companies based on news from 
reliable sources. The gap identified is used as the basis for defining the behavioural 
factors of competition and collaboration that are modelled in this research. The 
literature-based conclusions of each factor are also presented. Regarding the 
complexity that is incorporated into this study, it is indicated that simulation is the 
appropriate approach to bridge the gap from the literature.  
The following chapter (Chapter 3) discusses the research opportunity of agent-
based modelling (ABM) approach, which is employed to provide a novel and 
innovative approach for SCM analysis in this Thesis. The methodology of the 
implementation of ABM approach in modelling competition and collaboration in 
supply chains is presented in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3!   RESEARCH OPPORTUNITY OF 
AGENT-BASED MODELLING FOR 
STUDYING COMPETITION AND 
COLLABORATION IN SUPPLY 
CHAINS 
  
3.1! Introduction 
The previous chapter describes the literature gap addressed in this Thesis. The 
chapter also identifies the important issues in competition and collaboration. 
Meanwhile, the research opportunity of agent-based modelling (ABM) for studying 
supply chain competition and collaboration is outlined in this chapter. The 
description is pointed out based on reviews of existing ABM applications on 
competition and collaboration issues, particularly in supply chain management 
(SCM) and strategic management context. The review starts with an overview of 
ABM approach and follows with a synopsis of available ABM models of 
CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH OPPORTUNITY OF AGENT-BASED MODELLING 
55 
 
collaboration and competition. The ABM challenge, as well as the opportunity to 
use ABM in supply chains competition and collaboration, is identified in the next 
section. Finally, the conclusions and summary of this chapter confirm the position 
of this Thesis relative to the entire research domains involved, with regards to SCM, 
strategic management, and ABM. 
 
3.2! Overview of agent-based modelling (ABM) approach  
ABM is a simulation approach that is increasingly employed to explain phenomena 
emerged from complex and non-linear systems in our world(Heath and Hill 2010). 
The agent represents individual entities, which are independent but interact with 
others. This modelling approach has become popular since it can be applied in a 
wide variety of problem situations, such as cultural diffusion studies (Axelrod 
1997b), political party competition (Laver 2005; Axelrod 1997a), sociology 
(Gilbert 2004), transportation (Dugundji and Gulyás 2008), finance and economics 
(Schelling 1969; LeBaron 2000; LeBaron 2001; Leombruni and Richiardi 2005; 
Axtell 2007; LeBaron 2011), biology (Hilscher 2005), and strategic management 
(Robertson 2003; Robertson 2004; Robertson and Caldart 2008; Robertson and 
Caldart 2009). Moreover, supported by the advancement of computational 
capability, its application is becoming more widespread (North and Macal 2007). 
 As opposed to other simulation approaches, such as discrete-event simulation 
(DES) and system dynamics (SD), ABM employs a bottom-up modelling. The 
modelling approach starts with defining the individual agent, making them interact 
with each other, and ends with an observation on the resulting emergent behaviour. 
It is a non-aggregated method that allows system perspective analysis to the 
emergent results. Meanwhile, DES and SD use a top-down approach, starting by 
defining the system as an aggregate of entities. 
However, the implementation of ABM is still less popular than DES and SD, 
particularly in operational research. A reason for this is that ABM is still relatively 
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newly added to operational research, compared to DES and SD (Taylor 2014; 
Onggo and Karatas 2015). The lack of use of graphical notation or visualisation in 
ABM is also pointed out as a cause of the limited application of ABM in operational 
research and management science area (Siebers and Onggo 2014). DES and SD 
have a better approach in visualisation; DES employs process flow diagram to 
represent the simulated system and SD utilises stock and flow diagram to draw the 
logic of simulation. Furthermore, compared to DES and SD, also, ABM 
programming language is generally more complicated (Siebers et al. 2010). 
Its applications to SCM context are also still limited. As reviewed by Tako and 
Robinson (2012), 127 SCM journal articles applied DES or SD to the modelling, 
which indicates that DES and SD have been widely practised in SCM. Nevertheless, 
few ABM approach in SCM research can still be found. According to a literature 
survey of conducted by Jahangirian, Eldabi, Naseer, Stergioulas, and Young 
(2010), few studies published in between 1997 and 2006 have applied ABM to 
manufacturing and business analysis, including SCM. The detail discussion of this 
issue would be provided in section 3.3.1. 
Regarding the visualisation of the modelling approach, most DES and SD 
software and SD have visualisation embedded in their platform. For instance, Arena 
and Simul8, as examples of DES software, has a graphical view of entities’ flow 
and sequential boxes of processes or activities. Similarly, SD software has 
integrated stock and flow diagram is also a compulsory part of SD simulation 
programme, which is already incorporated in the SD software. This embedded 
graphical notation of investigated system into the simulation software has been 
found to assist the operational research modellers in developing the model; while 
ABM software does not have this feature (Siebers and Onggo 2014). However, 
when the problem complexity is high, DES and SD are less difficult to apply 
compared to ABM (Siebers et al. 2010). 
 In social science, the application of ABM approach is wider compared to the 
field of operational research and management science. It is proven by the number 
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of publications of ABM in social science that is higher than in operational research 
and management science. Nonetheless, Pavón et al. (2008) find that the application 
of ABM in social science is still limited when it is contrasted with other approaches 
such as mathematical models and qualitative reasoning approaches. As strategic 
management is considered as a part of social science, this finding also applies to 
the ABM implementations in strategic management. 
 The main features of ABM simulation are composed of a set of agents acting in 
an environment. The environment is the virtual world where the agents act. The 
agents take actions based on particular interaction rules and autonomy. The actions 
are executed based on timescales, or schedules, which is prosecuted discretely as in 
discrete event simulation (Collier 2003; Gilbert 2008; Robertson and Caldart 2009).  
The following sections detail the main features of ABM, which are the agent, the 
environment, the interactions and autonomy, the schedule, and the emergent 
behaviour. 
 
3.2.1 The agent 
The agent is the individual entity, which represents the intelligence object that we 
want to simulate. It can make a decision without an explicit guidance of humans or 
other agents. The agent is also sociable since it cooperates with the other agents to 
achieve its objectives or help the other agents. During its interactions with other 
agents, it can be responsive; it has an ability to plan and execute tasks. Finally, it 
has pro-active features which allow an agent to perform and learn how to improve 
its action and decisions (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995; Fu and Fu 2012).   
 The agents are modelled individually to create the system. Using a bottom-up 
approach, their individual autonomous actions generate the global patterns of the 
system. The agents are sociable and interdependent, so they can influence the others 
in response to the effect that they obtain. Even though the agents can have a learning 
ability, they are bounded rational as their main characteristic is continuously 
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seeking improvement to achieve their individual satisfaction (Watts and Gilbert 
2014).   
 
3.2.2 The environment 
The environment is the abstract space where the agents are populated. It can be a 
two-dimensional world in the simplest representation (Robertson and Caldart 
2009). It is defined based on the focus of the interaction, whether the link between 
the agents is necessary or the spatial space is more significant than the links. The 
agent’s position in the environment influences its state towards the other agents and 
its decision during their interaction with the others (Gilbert and Terna 2000). 
 
3.2.3 The interactions and autonomy (the rules) 
The rules of agent refer to the detail interaction, the autonomy of behaviour of an 
individual agent. This feature leads the individual actions or decisions of agents. A 
simple rule of the agent can lead to complexity represented as the emergent pattern 
in the system. The rules can be classified into two categories. The first one is the 
base rules, and the other is those that adjust or modify the base rules (meta-rules). 
The latter leads the agents to be proactive and adaptive (Macy and Willer 2002). 
These rules describe how the agents interact with others and the level of agent’s 
autonomy in the model. 
 
3.2.4 The schedule 
The schedule represents a list of events that are executed in a discrete quantum unit 
of time, which is known as a tick in the ABM platform (Collier 2003; Robertson 
and Caldart 2009). It regulates the sequence of agents' actions and triggers the time 
unit of the simulation. It controls whether all agents act at the same time or in a 
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particular order. When one or several events, or the actions, are prosecuted, the 
schedule allows the time unit of the simulation to advance by a tick. 
 
3.2.5 Emergent behaviour   
Regarding the computer modelling, the code is started by defining the agent’s 
characteristics. However, the modelling approach requires a description of the 
emergent phenomena of interest before developing the computer model. Gilbert and 
Terna (2000) define the emergent phenomenon in ABM is as follows: 
“A phenomenon is emergent if it requires new categories to describe it which are 
not required to describe the behaviour of the underlying components (in this case, 
the agents).” 
This emergent phenomenon can occur from simple features of an agent that creates 
complexity in the system. The complexity is represented by the interdependencies 
among factors in the real world, with stochastic variability for each factor, which 
creates emergent order. It also represents the decisions created by each agent are a 
result of the agent’s adaptation process. However, these interdependencies should 
be structured to help the analysis of the emergent pattern.  
In other words, the ABM approach is not a purely bottom up approach. In 
practice, ABM combines top-down and bottom-up approaches to the modelling 
process. This is because ABM approach is commonly started by describing the 
whole system by defining the emergent phenomenon. Then, it is followed by 
defining the individual agent. The final step is comparing the resulting behaviour 
with the expected emergent pattern. These stages are considered appropriate when 
ABM is used to model problems in the social science domain (Gilbert and Terna 
2000).  
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3.3!Existing ABM work 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the discussion of collaboration and competition arises 
not only in SCM but also in other contexts, particularly in strategic management. 
Here brief review on the application of ABM in modelling this issue is presented 
with regards to the type of contexts. 
 
3.3.1 Supply chain management context 
ABM is a growing body of research with many applications in supply chain 
operations, such as manufacturing, telecommunications, transportation systems, 
information management, interactive entertainments, and healthcare (Jennings et 
al. 1998). The agents are commonly described as companies with decision-making 
intelligence to manage sourcing, stocking, and shipping (Macal and North 2011). 
However, its application is still limited. 
 The earliest and most popular ABM simulation in SCM is the beer game (North 
and Macal 2007) although it is more popular to be modelled in system dynamics 
approach, such as Forrester (1962) and Sterman (2000). The beer game simulates 
the increase of demand volatility as it moves further up a supply chain, which is 
known as the bullwhip or whiplash effect. This effect emerges because each 
company inside the supply chain is a rationally bounded entity and does not 
coordinate with each other in their decision-making process. The pattern of the 
increases in demand volatility is considered as the emergent outcome resulting from 
the interaction of individual firm. The earliest version of the beer game, which was 
introduced before the computer modelling software was developed, is the first 
agent-based model in business competition and collaboration. 
 In addition to the beer game, a vast body of ABM literature in SCM context 
has been established. However, not all these studies focus on supply chain analysis. 
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Most of them are developed under computer science domain, so the research 
focuses on software development instead of analysing the supply chain problem.  
 SCM research that employs ABM in analysing the collaboration issue is still 
relatively limited. Several studies consider supply chain collaboration as firms 
integration, such as Xue et al. (2005) and Zhang et al. (2006). Xue et al. (2005) 
employ ABM to address collaboration issue in construction supply chain, but they 
concentrate on the information flow and negotiation. Zhang et al. (2006) present an 
ABM as an approach for e-manufacturing to provide flexibility, robustness, and 
adaptability to the rapid changes. Zhu (2008) also models supply chain 
collaboration, but it does not consider the collaboration as integration between 
firms; the study focuses on investigating the impact of information sharing in a 
single two-echelon supply chain. Chen et al. (2013) conduct a literature review on 
the use of ABM in supply chain risk management (SCRM). They consider that 
SCRM as a result of collaboration success in a supply chain. They define the goal 
of SCRM is establishing a robust supply chain, which is determined by supply chain 
ability to response changes and supply disruption. Other studies consider supply 
chain collaboration only in the scope of inventory decision, such as Dimitriou et al. 
(2009), Dimitriou (2010), and Robinson et al. (2016). The study examines the effect 
of bounded rational decisions in a classical inventory model for perishable products 
(the Newsvendor inventory model) by combining ABM and multiple linear 
regressions. Nevertheless, all these research are limited to a single supply chain. 
Trust between collaborating firms has also modelled and investigated by using 
ABM, but not many studies can be found in this topic. Only Mohamed et al. (2015) 
examine this issue in SCM context through an empirical approach in Malaysian 
industries. 
Meanwhile, other works focus on modelling and analysing collaboration issue 
in the downstream level of supply chain, such as Caridi et al. (2005). They review 
the literature on ABM applications in managing supply chain processes, 
particularly in collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment (CPFR). In 
SCM, CPFR involves procedures and guidelines for sharing sales and forecast 
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information between buyer and seller. The study finds that compared to traditional 
CPFR (without the support of intelligent agents), agent-based CPFR can reduce 
costs, inventory, sales, and shortages. 
 With regards to all ABM studies in supply chain collaboration, they concentrate 
mostly on software architecture than investigating the problem. These studies tend 
to employ ABM as a part of intelligent system in decision making rather than solely 
use it for simulation. The following are several examples of these studies described 
in brief. Swaminathan et al. (1998) utilise ABM as a multi-agent approach to 
develop a supply chain modelling framework. It addresses supply chain 
configuration, coordination, and contracts issues, which deal with inventory 
decisions. Julka et al. (2002) propose an ABM framework for developing a decision 
support system prototype to integrate supply chain processes in a refinery supply 
chain. However, the goal of the system is optimising a firm’s performance, not the 
supply chain. Jiao et al. (2006) apply an ABM system to develop a framework of 
collaborative negotiation in a supply chain. The framework incorporates supply 
chain network and inventory decisions. Kwon et al. (2007) develop an integrated 
framework of supply chain collaboration based on ABM and case-based reasoning. 
The ABM architecture emphasises on information sharing among supplier, 
manufacturer, and customer. Cheng (2011) proposes an agent-based supply chain 
collaboration model that studies production and logistics processes at enterprise-
level. The model comprises a single two-stage supply chain, which involves a 
manufacturer and a supplier. It considers competition to the model, but the 
competition is only represented by achieving on-time delivery target. Kwon et al. 
(2011) propose an agent-based web approach to support supply chain collaboration 
in e-business. It models a three-stage supply chain that consists of suppliers, 
manufacturers, and retailers. The framework focuses on inventory decisions and 
allows flexibility in coping with partnerships changes. Santos et al. (2013) develop 
a prototype of an agent-based framework for negotiation. The system is intended to 
support a supply chain collaboration network by improving the interoperability in 
the single supply chain. Hsieh and Lin (2014) proposes ABM model with multi-
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agent system (a distributed agent-based modelling) to manage collaborative 
workflows. However, it only focuses on scheduling activities within a firm.  
Besides supply chain collaboration, ABM has been widely applied in many 
SCM issues. To obtain a general view of ABM applications in SCM which is 
outside the collaboration issue, several of the studies are briefly reviewed. Parunak 
et al. (1998) compare ABM and equation based modelling for modelling inventory 
problems. They find the use of ABM is still relatively new compared to equation-
based modelling which is more mature in supply chain cases, particularly in 
inventory decisions. Gjerdrum et al. (2001) combine ABM with optimisation 
techniques to model a simple supply chain network which focuses on scheduling 
and inventory control. Kaihara (2003) formulates a supply chain model for 
resources allocation problem using ABM. Ahn et al. (2003) perform ABM to model 
adaptation processes in the financial transaction of a supply chain. It considers the 
dynamic of new products development, customers, and suppliers. D’Amours and 
Guinet (2003) compile literature on agent-based research in operational research 
area, which also represents SCM issues. Several research topics are related to ABM 
application in product development, scheduling, production management system, 
layout configuration problem, and real-time distributed control system. Akanle and 
Zhang (2008) introduce a methodology using ABM to optimise supply chain 
networks configuration of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Zarandi et 
al. (2008) employ ABM to reduce the bullwhip effect by coordinating all entities 
along the supply chain to minimise the total costs. Fu and Fu (2012) apply ABM to 
manage collaborative costs in supply chain. Li and Chan (2013) utilise ABM as a 
tool for studying the dynamic of supply chain in several manufacturing systems. He 
et al. (2013) examine pricing and inventory policies in a retailer supply chain 
through a laboratory experiment.  
 Other studies more focus on simulation software development rather than 
adopting ABM to analyse the problem. This is because they are conducted under 
the research area of computer science, not operational research and management 
science or SCM. For example, Barbuceanu et al. (1997) model a supply chain 
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system that focuses on the information architectures; Shen and Norrie (1999) 
survey the application of agent distributed computing in supporting the mechanism 
of manufacturing systems; García-Flores et al. (2000) introduce the use of ABM to 
manage information flow of a manufacturing industries’ supply chain.  
 For ABM competition models, there are only two ABM studies which model 
competition by incorporating SCM perspective to the modelling and analysis; they 
were conducted by Arunachalam and Sadeh (2005) and He et al. (2013). 
Arunachalam and Sadeh (2005) simulate competition between manufacturers of 
electronics industries by using an online participatory simulation approach. To 
assess the performance, the study compares inventory level, price, market share, 
and revenue between the competing teams. He et al. (2013) develop an agent-based 
competition model for multi-product supply chains, and only focuses on 
competition among retailers. Both these studies examine the competition issue in a 
particular single supply chain. Although Cheng (2011) claims his study covers 
competition, the model does not consider other companies in the competition.  
 Based on the literature that has been reviewed, there is still limited ABM 
research which incorporates competition and collaboration in SCM. Most previous 
studies investigate supply chain collaboration and competition in separate studies. 
When collaboration issue is addressed, they also do not regard collaboration 
strategy to the problem. All of these studies only observe a particular single supply 
chain; none of them views supply chain problems from a market-level perspective. 
In short, research that analyses firms’ behaviour in competition and collaboration 
by using an ABM approach has not yet been carried out in SCM.  
 Furthermore, compared to DES and SD, the use of ABM in supply chain 
analysis is still limited to date. This comparison is distinct when no paper has 
reviewed the applications of ABM in SCM. Where ABM has been applied to the 
SCM context, it is mostly conducted through computer science research. The works 
tend to focus on software architecture rather than analysing a problem of the 
proposed topic.  
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 A summary of previous research on competition and collaboration in SCM is 
presented in Table 3.1. The table also outlines the scope of application for each 
research, which are classified into 12 issues: supply chain planning, bullwhip effect, 
network/supply chain configuration, scheduling, trust, inventory, product 
development, logistics, supply chain risks, information sharing, supply chain 
financial aspect, and product pricing. This categorisation represents the scope of 
supply chain problems that is popularly discussed in SCM literature. According to 
the area of applications, it can be seen that all of these research measures 
collaboration performance based on the performance of supply chain operations. 
These measurement approaches could not assess the long-term survivability and 
performance of the supply chain in the market.  
 
3.3.2 Strategic management context 
ABM has been increasingly used to model business interactions issue. Many of them simulate or 
adopting a well-proven theory to the agent-based model, such as the Prisoner’s dilemma or game 
theory (Axelrod 1997a) in business and politics, NK model (Robertson and Caldart 2009) in strategic 
management, and Hotelling’s competition model (Wilensky 2013) in economics.  
 Simulation in social science, including ABM in strategic management, is 
employed as a methodology rather than as a tool to solve a problem (Gilbert and 
Terna 2000). It helps social scientists to develop a theory, which is more complex 
than predicting the future of a system. This perspective of the use of simulation is 
opposite to engineering and operational research field, which more focuses more 
on prediction than theory development. ABM has also been considered as a sensible 
approach to model a market (Onggo 2016). This is because a market is formed by 
interactions among individual - whether it is customers or individual firms. The 
result of individual behaviour creates market behaviour that emerges at system 
level. 
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Table 3.1 Previous work of supply chain competition and collaboration that employ ABM 
Author(s) 
Topic   Scope 
Coll Comp   Plan Bull Netw Sche Trus Inve Pro Log Risk Info Fina Pric 
Forrester (1962) !       !       !             
Swaminathan et al. (1998) !         !     !             
Ahn et al. (2003) !                         !   
Xue et al. (2005) !                             
Arunachalam and Sadeh (2005)   !             !           ! 
Caridi et al. (2005) !     ! !       !             
Zhang et al. (2006) !                          !   
Jiao et al. (2006) !         !     !             
Kwon and Lee (2007) !                             
Zarandi et al. (2008) !       !                     
Zhu (2008) !                       !     
Dimitriou et al. (2009) and  
Dimitriou (2010) !               !             
Cheng (2011) ! !               ! !         
Kwon et al. (2011) !               !             
Fu and Fu (2012) !                         !   
Chen et al. (2013) !                     ! !     
He et al. (2013)   !             !           ! 
Santos et al. (2013) !         !                   
Hsieh and Lin (2014) !           !                 
Mohamed et al. (2015)  !             !               
                                
 
Note:   
Coll  : Collaboration/coordination Sche   : Scheduling Risk   : Supply chain risks 
Comp : Competition Trus  : Trust Info   : Information sharing 
Plan  : Supply chain planning Inve   : Inventory Fina   : Supply chain financial aspect 
Bull   : Bullwhip effect Pro   : Product development Pric    : Pricing 
Netw   : Network/supply chain configuration Log   : Logistics    
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 As ABM is used to understand the real world rather than to solve a problem, the 
studies are mostly theory-driven works (Siebers and Onggo 2014). Also, the model 
is used for learning and understanding the problem rather than implementing the 
findings in the real world. It means no empirical data is required to the modelling 
approach so that dynamic hypotheses play a major role in the model development.  
 Moreover, ABM allows social researchers, including strategic management 
researchers, to undertake inductive and deductive analysis. Inductive finds patterns 
from empirical data and deductive derives conclusions from particular axioms, 
ABM enables both approaches in order to undertake what-if analysis (Axelrod 
1997a). If these approaches are applied for ethnography observation, it may need 
30-40 years to complete (Watts and Gilbert 2014). 
 Compared to mathematical modelling, ABM has many benefits in social 
science modelling (Axtell 2007; Zenobia et al. 2009); it does not need assumption 
of equilibrium and is able to incorporate the process dynamics and feedback, which 
are essential in analysing an emergent behaviour (Pavón et al. 2008; Robertson and 
Caldart 2009; Farmer and Foley 2009). Thus, simulation has been considered as a 
promising contribution to social science (Louie and Carley 2008). 
 Nonetheless, little mention is made of business competition and collaboration 
in ABM literature. When the issues are considered, most previous work separates 
it into two different research topics. Only a few studies incorporate these problems 
in a single research, such as Axelrod (1997a) who models competition and 
cooperation interaction by adopting game theory. Nevertheless, when competition 
and cooperation are taken into account, the study focuses on the emergence of 
coopetition - a term to define cooperative competition. In reality, this pattern 
typically occurs in horizontal supply chains, such as coopetition among Toyota’s 
suppliers (Wilhelm 2011). 
 For ABM competition models, most previous research combines a traditional 
competition model with other natural models, such as the NK model in Lenox et al. 
(2006) and Caldart and Ricart (2007), and the forest fire model in Robertson and 
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Caldart (2008). The NK model is a biological model introduced by Kauffman 
(1993) to describe adaptive evolution as opposed to Darwinian 'selectionist' theory, 
while the forest fire model is a theoretical physics model. In Lenox et al. (2006), 
the NK model is employed to investigate the coordination of interdependence 
activities among enterprises under competition situation. It is incorporated with a 
classical economic model of competition to generate the competitive behaviour. 
Even though the study model activities coordination beyond a single firm, it does 
not represent particular operations that can be related to SCM. Meanwhile,  Caldart 
and Ricart (2007) adopt the NK model to mainly investigate competition issue, 
particularly in studying exploitation and exploration in corporate strategy. 
Robertson and Caldart (2008) introduce the adoption of the forest fire model to 
simulate firms’ behaviour in business strategy implementation. The forest fire logic 
is employed to represent the effect of advertising or diffusion of innovation as a 
result of a competition strategy implementation. However, these studies tend to 
produce a complex model as it adopts a complicated behavioural rule from the logic 
of natural models. To some extent, it may not be possible to generalise the emergent 
pattern from a simple behaviour in the real problem situation.  
 In ABM platforms, several classical economic models of competition have also 
been developed as a part of the software’s library, such as Hotelling’s competition 
model (Hotelling 1929) developed by Wilensky (2013) in NetLogo. Hotelling’s 
model is often illustrated as a competition between two ice cream stalls located in 
along the street on a beach (i.e. one-dimensional competition). As both stalls always 
attempt to optimise their market share, they keep changing their location until they 
come with the right to each other at the same halfway point (Robertson and Caldart 
2009). However, Wilensky (2013) allows more than two firms to compete, and the 
competition space can be set into two dimensions. 
 There are still many other ABM studies in competition, but they are limited in 
one layer of competition. None of them considers multiple layers of competition, 
such as competition among firms that emerges in each stage of supply chains.  
However, compared to ABM studies in collaboration or cooperation issue, ABM 
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model in business competition is more numerous. ABM research that is related to 
collaboration topic mostly corresponds to SCM context, and cooperation is 
typically attributed to game theory to model coopetition problems. 
 
3.4!ABM validation  
ABM still has a challenge, particularly in terms of validation. This is because the 
resulting emergent result of the agent-based simulation model is sometimes difficult 
to compare with the real world. Several ABM models that are developed based on 
theories, such as the Hotelling’s competition models (Wilensky 2013), are easier to 
validate compared to the non-theory-based models. Nevertheless, no theory is 
precise and complete even though it has been well proven (Gross and Strand 2000; 
Zenobia et al. 2009). 
 Some researchers argue that ABM is not a better approach than mathematical 
models, such as Casti (1997), Louie and Carley (2008), Gross and Strand (2000), 
and Casti (1997). The reason for this is that all variables are still under control in 
simulation, whereas system should not be isolated once developing theory, 
particularly in social science (Louie and Carley 2008). These debates mostly 
emerged in social science domain, including strategic management, where theory 
generation is the main outcome of research. 
 On the other hand, ABM tends to produce theoretical models. With respect to 
this, Heath and Hill (2010) suggest the system dynamics validation approaches to 
determine the plausibility of ABM results. They propose the use of system thinking 
to understand and model the problem situation in ABM. It allows modellers to 
structure the interdependencies, understand the properties and the limitations, and 
analyse the emergent behaviour. The beer game simulation is an example of a 
model that can be validated by this approach. The time delays in receiving and 
responding information, which reflects the human bounded rationality, is 
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considered as the main cause of the ‘misperceptions of feedback’ that causes the 
bullwhip effect (Diehl and Sterman 1995).  
 Gilbert (2008) also proposed two validation methods in ABM: fitting it with the 
theory and with the real-world phenomenon. The first comparison is called as a 
theory-based explanation, and the latter is a case-based explanation. For the case-
based explanation, it corresponds to the comparison of the resulting behaviour with 
the empirical behaviour of the real-world, known as a phenomenon. This test does 
not necessarily need a quantitative match of the model results with the real world; 
the qualitative similarity between model outputs and the real world is sufficient to 
be the basis of model validity. 
There are still many validation approaches that have been employed in 
validating theoretical or hypothetical models in ABM studies. They includes 
biological behaviour explanation as conducted by Levinthal (1997), empirical 
validation through, for example, case studies (Zenobia et al. 2009), parameter 
calibration with the real world (LeBaron 2001; Zenobia et al. 2009), model docking 
by developing two models and comparing the results (Burton 2003), and empirical 
validation for the micro level behaviour (Zenobia et al. 2009). However, these 
validation approaches are difficult to perform when the model is hypothetical and 
not developed to explain a theory or phenomenon. The approaches would also be 
impossible to apply if the ABM study aims to understand and explore several 
behavioural rules as the empirical data is hard to obtain. 
 Validation process in any research should be related to the purpose of the model 
(Robinson 1997; Robinson 2014). The validity of a model should represent 
plausibility related to the related problem domain (Sargent 2013). If the problem is 
hypothetical and does not have a strong relevance with any previous theories, the 
models can be validated only according to its plausibility, such as the Schelling’s 
segregation model, the Hotelling’s competition model, and the beer game.  
Despite these contradictory opinions, ABM still offers some advantages 
compared to other approaches. It can incorporate the concept of complexity to 
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produce and understand an emergent behaviour (Robertson and Caldart 2008). 
Moreover, ABM is known as an effective approach to study simple individual rules 
that lead to an emergent behaviour at the macro level system. Several studies that 
employ this approach have been used as the main reference for other studies, such 
as Schelling’s segregation model and the beer game. It means that the benefit of 
ABM outweighs the challenge in validation. 
 
3.5! Conclusions and summary 
This chapter shows that ABM approach has been well implemented in both SCM 
and strategic management, particularly in modelling competition and collaboration 
in business issues. Although the application of ABM has significantly increased in 
recent years, the ABM studies in SCM are still limited, particularly in modelling 
competition and collaboration issue. No study attempts to benefit the system 
perspective analysis in ABM for analysing the long-term demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains in the market. In other words, there is an opportunity 
to apply ABM in modelling the issue in SCM.  
 Furthermore, compared to other simulation approaches, ABM has a unique 
feature to model and observe a problem. While DES and SD have a top-down 
approach, ABM employs a bottom-up approach. It enables researchers to 
understand an emergent behaviour at macro level by investigating the behaviour at 
the micro level of individual agent. This approach is appropriate to model a 
phenomenon that is difficult to explain empirically and analytically. It is also 
suitable to explore the emergent outcome of what-if experiments on the individual 
agents. In short, ABM is the best approach where the problem situation requires 
analysis from two level of point of views: from the agent-level and the system-level. 
Although ABM still has an issue to validate theoretical models, the advantages of 
the use of ABM still outweigh the drawback, particularly when the problem is not 
possible to study by using an empirical approach. 
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 This research benefits the unique features of ABM to bridge the literature gap 
in the SCM and strategic management. SCM has operations-level perspective, 
which is close to the agent-level view. Meanwhile, strategic management tends to 
employ market-level perspective that can be similar as a system-level standpoint. 
Moreover, according to the literature that is reviewed in this study, ABM has been 
implemented both in SCM and strategic management to model competition and 
collaboration even though the problem is still examined separately. It means that 
ABM is the most appropriate approach to bridge the literature gap in supply chain 
competition and collaboration, as defined in Chapter 2.  
 The use of ABM in this research is essential to provide new insight about 
competition and collaboration in SCM. It also offers a contemporary approach to 
strategic management in modelling and understanding the emergent outcome of 
multi-layer competition driven by decision makings at operations level.  The ABM 
role in bridging the gap that is identified in this study is illustrated in Figure 3.1. A 
rough estimation of the application of quantitative and qualitative approach to each 
research domain (SCM and strategic management) is presented, and the shaded area 
represents the main domain of the problem proposed in this study.  The use of ABM 
also allows operational research (OR) feature to the modelling approach and 
operations management (OM) approach to the analysis. The methodology of the 
ABM application in this Thesis is presented in the next chapter, which is Chapter 
4. 
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Figure 3.1 ABM role in this research: to merge the gap between the related research 
domains. 
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CHAPTER 4!METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1!Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology of this study. It involves the details of the 
research objectives, a description of the modelling approach, and the design of the 
study. The specific objectives of this study are expressed by retrieving the overall 
research aim defined in Chapter 1. The hypotheses, which are constructed based on 
literature gap identified in Chapter 2, are structured according to the related research 
objective. Finally, the methods appropriate to the research and the design of 
research that is relevant to the objectives are also explained. 
 
4.2!Overview of the research aims and objectives 
The main motivation of this Thesis is that the conflicting findings and opinions on 
competition and collaboration in supply chains. In SCM, competition is viewed as 
a source of uncertainty and inefficiency, but it can provide contributions to the 
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improvement of supply chain performance. Meanwhile, strategic management 
considers competition as an important key to the business and economics. On the 
other hand, collaboration has been regarded as the core element of supply chain 
success, while not all experts in strategic management support the benefit of 
collaboration. However, the effectiveness of collaboration strategies suggested in 
SCM literature is still arguably, such as having long-term partnerships, adopting 
single sourcing approach, and establishing trust during collaboration. Therefore, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, this study aims to: 
 “Explore the impact of competition and collaboration strategies on supply 
chains from a market perspective”.  
The research aim of this study is the key driver of the modelling process. It is the 
basis for the development of the modelling objectives and must be maintained 
during the modelling process.  
 This aim is specified to study the interaction between manufacturer and 
supplier, particularly with respect to the suppliers who supply the key components 
of the finished products. Hence, this study focuses on modelling the competitive 
and collaborative behaviour in two-stage supply chains, involving the manufacturer 
and the supplier. This partnership is critical in supply chains that operate in a market 
of innovative products, such as automobile and high technology devices. The scope 
of the behaviour observed is determined based on the gap that is identified in 
Chapter 2. 
 In order to transform the aim into a more measurable context, several objectives 
were developed. The objectives controlled the modelling process, but they were 
also influenced and improved by the process. This reciprocal approach came about 
because the model development was iterative. It started with the simplest 
representation and then detail was added until the key facets of the problem domain 
had been characterised. Moreover, the literature analysis was carried out 
continually during the modelling process. The updated knowledge of this affected 
the definition of the problem situation. This approach made the research to be 
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narrowed into a more specific project scope. Thus, the objectives of this research 
are: 
Objective 1: To develop an agent-based model that explores the effect of 
competition and collaboration on supply chains. 
A theory-driven approach is used as the basis for developing the model to 
explore the impact of competition and collaboration on supply chains. The 
model is described based on the problem situation defined in this study. The 
use of the ABM approach allows a what-if analysis through a bottom-up 
approach in investigating the resulting emergent behaviour. It also enables a 
deduction and induction approach to examine the behaviour generated as a 
result of the intrinsic behaviour of the agents. Instead of observing a single 
supply chain, the model is constructed to enable market-level analysis, taking 
a system perspective. !
Objective 2: To explore the effect of competition on supply chains and market 
structure, with regards to the demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains 
for the long-term. 
This objective is constructed to investigate the generic effect of competition on 
the supply chain as a market. Obtaining the explanations from the overall 
model run, the impact of competition can be generalised, in terms of how 
competition can and/or could not benefit the supply chain. 
Objective 3: To explore the effect of competition and collaboration strategy on the 
market, in terms of demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains over the 
long-term. The following factors are considered to describe the competition and 
collaboration strategies: 
1)! Duration of collaboration 
2)! Number of partnerships 
3)! Trust 
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4)! Individual firm’s survivability 
5)! Strategic movement, considering the strategic mutation 
Most of these factors are observed in isolation. However, several factors are 
investigated in two different situations of the duration of collaboration, with 
respect to the number of partnerships and trust. This is because the issue of 
number of partnerships and trust are often discussed in conjunction with 
duration of collaboration in SCM literature. For instance, it is suggested that 
either single-sourcing or dual-sourcing strategy will be more effective in 
achieving collaboration success when it is applied under the long-term 
collaboration. Similarly, a higher degree of trust will be advantageous when 
long-term collaboration is adopted. The impact of all these competitive and 
collaborative behaviour on the supply chain is investigated at a market-level, 
or from a system perspective.  
The demand fulfilment is adopted to represent the aggregate measure of supply 
chain performance or ability in satisfying demand in the market, and it is 
assessed by calculating the percentage of demand fulfilled relative to all 
demand that exists. Meanwhile, the supply chain survivability reflects the 
ability to survive in competition for overall supply chains in the market. This 
response is measured by counting the number of supply chains which survive 
at the end of the experiment.  
 
4.3!Research hypotheses 
Objective 1 is achieved through the development of the agent-based model into a 
computer model to allow experimentation, whilst objectives 2 and 3 are fulfilled by 
performing the experiments. The experimentation is designed according to the 
hypotheses that are proposed based on the gap found in the previous research, 
reviewed in Chapter 2. The hypotheses are used to specify the scope as well as the 
features required for the simulation model. As with the objectives, the detailed 
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hypotheses defined in this study are also enhanced during the development of the 
model and the process of conducting the literature review. The detailed hypotheses 
of this research are presented in the following subsections. 
 
4.3.1 Hypothesis A aimed to objective number 2: To explore the effect of 
competition on supply chains and market structure, with regards to the 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains for the long-term 
With regards to the literature discussed in Chapter 2, it is indicated that competition 
may not have an adverse impact on supply chains. Several studies find that 
competition can enhance business performance, particularly in supply chains, 
although others have come to the opposite conclusion. However, these studies have 
different perspectives and do not examine the impact of a long-term analysis. 
Therefore, Hypothesis A is proposed for this issue, which is: 
"Competition can be beneficial to supply chains, with respect to long-term 
competition". 
 
4.3.2 Hypotheses B aimed to objective number 3: To explore the effect of firm 
competitive and collaborative behaviour on supply chains, in terms of 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains over the long-term 
Most existing studies regarding SCM assess the collaboration performance based 
on the manufacturer’s standpoint. This is related to the real world situation where 
manufacturers tend to initiate and lead the collaboration practice. However, in 
reality, competition and collaboration involve behaviour in the supply and demand 
market, by considering supplier and customer behaviour. To define and formalise 
the experimental design, the following hypotheses were constructed. They are 
related to the important behavioural factors of the manufacturers in both 
competition and collaboration that are identified in Chapter 2.  
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Hypothesis B.1: Duration of collaboration 
The hypothesis for the issue of the duration of collaboration is that 
"Adopting longer duration of collaboration does not lead to a better long-
term demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
This hypothesis is proposed according to the previous studies that suggest 
long-term collaboration does not consistently benefit the firms (section 
2.4.3.1), such as Porter (1997), Parker and Hartley (1997), Grayson and 
Ambler (1999), Anderson and Jap (2005), Li et al. (2006), and Sun and Debo 
(2014). As the issue of the duration of collaboration is often discussed 
concurrently with the number of partnerships, this hypothesis is applied and 
tested under two different number of supplier’s partnerships. These are: 
a)! single-link supplier, to represent a situation when both the manufacturer 
and the supplier are only allowed to collaborate with one firm (one-to-
one partnerships). 
b)! dual-link supplier, to reflect situations when the manufacturer can only 
collaborate with one supplier, but the supplier can cooperate with up to 
two manufacturers (one-to-many partnerships).  
Hypothesis B.2: Number of partnerships  
The hypothesis of the number of partnerships is: 
"Having a lower number of partnerships does not improve long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
As for Hypothesis B.1, this hypothesis is constructed based on SCM literature 
that presents inconsistent suggestions on the number of partnerships (section 
2.4.3.2). With respect to the close association between the issue of the 
duration of collaboration and the number of partnerships in the literature, this 
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hypothesis is enacted under two situations: when the duration of 
collaboration between the manufacturer and the supplier is short and long. 
Hypothesis B.3: Trust  
This study intends to observe whether the trust which applies at only one side 
of the supply chains affects the supply chains for a long-term period of 
competition. Thus, Hypothesis B.3 is arranged into three hypotheses.  
Hypothesis B.3.1: The manufacturer trust of the supplier 
"Higher manufacturer trust of the supplier does not enhance long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
Hypothesis B.3.2: The supplier trust of the manufacturer 
"Higher supplier trust of the manufacturer does not enhance long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
Hypothesis B.3.3: The customer loyalty towards manufacturer 
"Higher customer loyalty towards manufacturer does not improve long-
term demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
These hypotheses refer to the conclusions of the literature review, which find 
that trust among firms and customer may not be advantageous significantly 
to supply chains (section 2.4.3.3). As the behaviour of the manufacturer and 
the supplier are the main interest of this study, Hypothesis B.3.1 and 
Hypothesis B.3.2 are thus examined with respect to two situations: when the 
duration of collaboration between the manufacturer and the supplier is short 
and long. These situations are considered because trust is popularly 
considered as the enabler of long-term collaboration and single-sourcing 
success in previous research. Therefore, both in Hypothesis B.3.1 and 
Hypothesis B.3.2, the length of the collaboration is highlighted.  
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Hypothesis B.4: Individual firm survivability  
As this research investigates the effect of the individual survivability of the 
manufacturer and the supplier to the supply chains, Hypothesis B.4 is 
arranged into two following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis B.4.1: Manufacturer survivability  
"Higher manufacturer survivability does not enhance long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply". 
Hypothesis B.4.2: Supplier survivability  
“Higher supplier survivability does not improve long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
These hypotheses are based on the gap in the literature that indicates that 
enhancing the firm survivability for supply chain robustness may not improve 
supply chain performance and survivability for the long term (section 2.5). 
Hypothesis B.5: Manufacturer strategic movement (the strategic mutation) 
In section 2.5, it is discussed that strategic move should be taken into account 
to understand the impact of competition strategy on supply chains, with 
respect to strategic mutations. Although no empirical study discusses the 
disadvantage of strategic mutation, the mistake in strategic movement has 
been found to be a cause of business failure, such as the case of Nintendo Wii 
in its early competitive movement (Kim and Mauborgne 2005; Hollensen 
2013). Therefore, the hypothesis of the manufacturer strategic movement (the 
strategic mutation) is: 
"The competition approach suggested in strategic management, 
regarding the strategic mutation, does not improve demand fulfilment 
and survivability of supply chains for the long-term". 
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All of these hypotheses proposed in this study can be summarised by an illustration 
shown in Figure 4.1.  
Supply chain performance in 
fulfilling the demand in the 
market
Supply chain’s ability to survive 
(survivability) for the long term
affects
Duration of 
collaboration 
(B.1)
Number of partnerships 
for both manufacturer 
and supplier
(B.2)
Supplier trust towards 
manufacturer (B.3.2)
Manufacturer  trust 
towards supplier (B.3.1)
Manufacturer’s 
survivability (B.4.1)
Supplier’s survivability 
(B.4.2)
Customer trust/loyalty 
towards manufacturer  
(B.3.3)
Strategic movement 
(B.5)
The goal measured
Th
e 
fa
ct
or
s o
bs
er
ve
d 
in
 th
is 
stu
dy
The higher (or longer):
does not always 
improve reduces
 
Figure 4.1 The structure of Hypotheses B 
 
 Two main performance measures are used in the hypotheses: demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. The first measure is to assess the 
supply chain’s ability to meet the demand, and the latter represents the supply 
chain’s robustness towards competition. Both measures are observed for a long 
duration of the competition. Even though the long-term supply chain profitability 
or demand fulfilment rate in the market is presumed to be influenced by the long-
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term supply chain’s survivability, this relationship does not act as a modelling 
assumption. 
 
4.4!The modelling approach 
This study adopts a theory-driven approach to the modelling instead of empirical 
observations. This is because the complexity level of the problem situation is high 
and difficult to observe using empirical data. Therefore, the problem situation of 
this research was described based on the related literature, which are SCM, social 
science, and ABM. Although three research domains were involved in this research, 
the dominant domains used in this study are SCM and ABM.  
 In general, the modelling process in this study involved the four steps of 
simulation model development suggested by Robinson (2008). The steps are 
conceptual modelling, model coding or computer modelling, experimentation and 
analysis. The output of each stage in this research is, consecutively, a conceptual 
model, a computer model, and a better understanding of the problem situation in the real 
world. The processes were performed in an iterative and repetitive approach as the 
model was developed incrementally; it started with the simplest representation and 
then detail was added until the key facets of the problem domain had been 
characterised.  
 The conceptual modelling was started from abstracting the problem situation 
and research aim into the modelling objectives. Each objective is detailed through 
the hypotheses to make it measurable. The hypotheses led to the description of the 
model, which includes the experimental factors (or inputs), the model contents, and 
the responses (or outputs). The experimental design was also constructed in this 
phase in order to test the hypotheses. These conceptual modelling processes were 
performed in an iterative and repetitive approach.  
The outcome of this conceptual modelling process was a conceptual model. The 
documentation provides the details required for the computer model development. 
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The computer model was verified by comparing the individual agent’s behaviour 
with the conceptual model and then debugging the model. The validation was 
conducted in two approaches: employing a face validation with a simulation expert, 
and explaining the results using several case studies that were obtained from the 
existing literature. 
When the computer model had been verified and validated, the 
experimentations were run. Analyses of the results were then conducted to obtain 
an understanding of the problem situation. The knowledge gained from the model 
was then reflected back into the problem situation defined in this study, to 
understand whether the research aim had been achieved. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the modelling approaches applied in this study. The figure 
is adapted from Robinson (2008) with several modifications to represent the real 
modelling processes performed in this research. The first modifications focused on 
the implementation of the theory-driven approach, which was the essential element 
in defining the problem situation as well as analysing the experimental results. The 
second component added is the part of the hypotheses development, which was 
constructed after describing the modelling objectives. The verification and 
validation of the computer model are also expressed in the diagram; this shows the 
elements that were compared for each test. The double arrows represent the iterative 
process, and the circular diagram reflects the repetition process in the model’s 
development. A brief overview of each modelling step is described in the 
succeeding subsections. 
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Figure 4.2 The modelling approach of this study (adapted from Robinson 2008) 
 
4.4.1 Conceptual modelling  
Robinson (2014) defines conceptual modelling as the process of abstracting a 
problem in the real world into a model. It bridges the problem description of the 
real world and the simulation model. It helps the simulation modeller to 
communicate the research in a simplified way without requiring any technical skill, 
so it is a part of method models, such as agent-based modelling, system dynamics, 
and discrete-event simulation. Conceptual modelling also reflects how the 
simulation model should work (Wang and Brooks 2007). To the author’s 
knowledge, no previous study has made use of the conceptual modelling approach 
for structuring the agent-based modelling process, so the implementation of this 
approach in this study can be considered innovative in conducting ABM research.   
 Meanwhile, a conceptual model is the documentation of the conceptual 
modelling process. It is apart from the programming language and not related to 
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reproducible issues. The elements of the conceptual model consist of the definition 
of the modelling objectives, the inputs or experimental factors, the outputs or 
responses, the content, the assumptions and the simplifications of the model.  The 
experimental factors represent the variables varied in the experimental design or 
the behaviour space. The outputs or responses reflect the measures employed in the 
simulation model. The model content consists of the scope and level of detail. The 
scope is related to ‘what to model’ and determines the component of the real system 
that is considered in the model. Meanwhile, the level of detail, which deals with 
how to model, explains the details for each element defined in the scope (Robinson 
2014). 
 In this study, conceptual modelling was performed by structuring the 
hypotheses into ABM features, which affect the elements of the conceptual model. 
The scope of the model content is defined by the agent, the environment, the 
interaction, the autonomy, and the schedule. The hypotheses are converted by the 
inputs or experimental factors. The outputs or responses were determined based on 
the supply chain perspective on demand fulfilment and survivability, but adjusted 
to enable system perspective analysis.  
 
4.4.2 Computer modelling (coding) 
Building a computer model requires three essential elements: coding, testing, and 
documenting. The coding deals with translating the conceptual model into the 
computer model, the testing is related to verification and validation tests, and 
documenting is the process of preparing and providing the evidence of the model 
building process. The computer code was produced from small or simple behaviour, 
and each phase of additional complexity was tested and documented. This approach 
is employed to ensure that the model is verified thoroughly and avoids unsolved 
errors. 
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The programming language used in this study is NetLogo. This platform is 
selected because it has several advantages. Firstly, it is relatively simple to use 
whilst still providing sufficient features for observing complex problems 
(Railsback, Lytinen, and Jackson 2006; Wilensky 2013). It also has a simplified 
programming language and a graphical interface, which enable the modeller to 
develop an ABM without needing to learn a complex programming language. In 
addition, much publishable research has been carried out with NetLogo. Finally, 
NetLogo is a freeware and can be run on most operating systems.  
 
4.4.2.1 Verification 
Model verification was conducted using several approaches. The first attempt was 
by writing the logic interpretation of each code in NetLogo. Each code was tested 
by inspecting the movement and states of the agent as well as the model output. 
Secondly, the code logic was converted into a simplified representation using flow 
diagrams. The diagrams guided the modeller in following the model logic for each 
event or action of the agent. Finally, the model was confirmed to be free from error 
by running it under several combinations of parameters. The modeller (or the 
present researcher) also joined the official NetLogo mailing list during the 
computer model’s development. The mailing list is useful for confirming the logical 
flow of the code by sharing some parts of the code. 
 
4.4.2.2 Validation 
Two validation approaches were applied to assess the plausibility of the model. The 
first approach was the plausibility test through face validation. This assessment was 
conducted by an expert in simulation. This validity check was performed by 
comparing the simulation result to an available theoretical competition model. In 
this stage, the model was concluded to have a similar resulting pattern to a classical 
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competition model developed by Hotelling (1929). The second validity test was 
attempted by explaining the simulation result with respect to the competition cases 
found in the literature. This attempt is called case-based explanation.   
 
4.4.3 Experimentation 
The experiments were conducted when the model had been verified and validated. 
The experimental design, from now on referred to as the behaviour space, was 
constructed based on the hypotheses of this research. As the basis for the behaviour 
space development, a base run was defined. Each scenario in the behaviour space 
was defined by varying the level of the variable associated with the hypothesis. 
Several experiments in the behaviour space were performed under several supply 
chain strategies, in order to understand the extent of the impact of the competitive 
and collaborative behaviour that was implemented. 
 
4.5! Analysis method 
After the results of the experiments have been obtained, a structured analysis is 
conducted. A different analysis approach was performed to achieve the objectives 
described in section 4.2, particularly in objective 2 (exploring the generic influence 
of competition on the supply chains and market structure) and objective 3 
(exploring the effect of the firm competition and collaboration strategy on the 
supply chains). 
 For objective 3, Hypothesis A is achieved by analysing the overall emergent 
behaviour from the experiments. If the output contained extreme values, visual 
investigations are performed by rerunning the simulation and inspecting the agents’ 
movements during the simulation run on the NetLogo space. The visual 
investigations are conducted by capturing the agents’ movement in several ticks. 
This assisted the modeller in providing an explanation of how the extreme values 
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came about, and this was done by inspecting the changing agent’s distribution on 
the strategic space over time, particularly with respect to the manufacturer and 
supplier positions. The next subsections discuss the detail of method analysis for 
each hypothesis. 
 Meanwhile, objective 3 (Hypotheses B) are answered by comparing and 
interpreting the effect of each behavioural factor. In general, the analysis approach 
is composed of two stages. The first stage describes the outcomes of each scenario 
in the behaviour space. The boxplots analysis is employed to visualise and examine 
the pattern of the data characteristics for each of the demand fulfilment in the 
market and the supply chain’s ability to survive in the market. The demand 
fulfilment is measured by the supply chain fill rate, and the supply chain’s ability 
to survive is assessed by the number of supply chains in the market. The second 
stage is inferential analysis. This approach is used to draw a conclusion about the 
significant difference between the scenarios in each experiment. Having compared 
several inferential methods, the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test with 
Bonferroni corrections is selected for concluding the multiple comparisons. 
  
4.5.1Analysis method for Hypothesis A 
Objective 2 is related to the exploration of the generic influence of competition on 
supply chains. It aims to find an explanation for the contradicting views found in 
the literature, which is associated with the benefit of competition on supply chains. 
In this study, the generic effect of competition is examined by considering the 
generic emergent behaviour of all the experiments. The investigation is conducted 
with two approaches. 
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4.5.1.1 Approach 1: Visual investigation 
The visual investigations were conducted by observing the agents’ movement in 
each tick. The interactions between the agents, which are represented as links that 
connect two agents, were also inspected in each tick. In this case, observations on 
the collaboration link created between the manufacturer and the supplier are more 
highly emphasised than the relationship between the manufacturer and the 
customer. If a behavioural pattern emerges consistently in each run of all the 
experiments, it can be suggested that the emergent pattern is a result of competition.  
 To measure the agent’s movement as well as its collaboration links, a time series 
graph of the average position of the manufacturer and the supplier in their supply 
chains was defined in the model. This enabled the author to record and quantifies 
the emergent behaviour concluded from the visual investigations.   
 
4.5.1.2 Approach 2: Model outputs investigation 
The model outputs used in this study (the supply chain fill rate and the number of 
supply chains which can survive in the market) were also employed to analyse and 
conclude the generic emergent results of competition. These measures were used to 
identify and describe the repeated pattern found in all the experiments. Moreover, 
they were useful to explain the extreme outputs that occurred several times in the 
different experimental factors. They can also be the basis of explaining whether the 
demand fulfilment (supply chain fill rate) depends on the supply chain’s ability to 
survive (the number of supply chains in the market), which is expected in Figure 
4.1. 
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4.5.2 Method of analysis for Hypotheses B 
As explained in the previous section, two analytical approaches were conducted 
with respect to the simulation results: the boxplots analysis and the Mann-Whitney 
U test. Each analysis method is detailed in the following subsections. 
 
4.5.2.1 Stage 1: The boxplots analysis 
The boxplots analysis was performed to visualise the data characteristics of the 
outputs, with respect to the supply chain fill rate and the number of supply chains 
in the market which can survive in long-term competition. The boxplot approach is 
useful for describing the data characteristics of the simulation results. It provides 
visual comparisons between scenarios, particularly when trying to visualise the 
mean, median, range, quartiles, and data distribution. The resulting analyses in this 
stage would support the conclusion obtained in the inferential approach conducted 
in the next stage. 
 If the boxplots show an extreme pattern, particularly when the results are 
extremely narrow, a data proportion is presented to comprehend the detail data 
pattern of the output. Extreme boxplots are likely to occur in the results of the 
number of supply chains in the market. In several experiments, it can lead to only 
two values as the result of the emergent outcomes at the end of several runs. This 
is because the value range of the number of supply chains in the market is far more 
limited than the supply chain fill rate; the maximum value is ten, and the lowest 
scale is zero. When the outputs only consist of two values, the boxplot analysis 
would not be sufficient to visualise and explain the data characteristics. Hence, 
providing a tabulation of the proportion of occurrences of each value provides more 
information in this extreme case. 
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4.5.2.2 Stage 2: Inferential statistics 
Prior to determining the use of Mann-Whitney analysis, the use of t-confidence 
intervals with the Bonferroni correction (also known as the Bonferroni inequality) 
was considered. This approach is commonly used to compare multiple scenarios in 
a simulation study (Robinson 2014). Moreover, the t-confidence interval is 
appropriate when the population standard deviations are not known (Groebner et 
al. 2011). This condition is fitting to analyse the results of a simulation study. 
In addition, an effort to lower the output variation was also performed. Adopting 
the use of common random numbers, as suggested by Robinson (2014), the 
experiments were replicated by controlling the seed numbers for the simulation run. 
Nonetheless, these attempts have been found inappropriate to infer the results. 
Hence, the one-tailed Mann-Whitney U test was selected as the appropriate method 
for drawing the comparisons. The details of the approach selection process are 
given in the following sections. 
 
The use of the parametric approach: the confidence intervals 
Confidence intervals are considered to be a better approach than hypothesis testing 
in comparing multiple scenarios, particularly when the sample size is not large, and 
the variability degree of the observed factor is relatively not small. It provides more 
information than hypothesis testing through the size of the interval. The data size 
of the experiment could be relatively not large and may be statistically insignificant, 
but it has important implications (Gardner and Altman 1986). Furthermore, this 
method was conducted because the number of data points in the results is 
considered to be sufficient for performing a parametric analysis. The number of 
data for each scenario is 50 data points, which can meet the assumption of normality 
for the population. 
 However, the resulting data patterns for both the supply chain fill rate and the 
number of supply chains in the market are not normal. This non-normal pattern was 
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concluded based on normality analysis, which involves an investigation of central 
tendency (mode, median, and mean), data shape (skewness and kurtosis), and 
outliers detection. The normality feature of the population was also inferred in this 
investigation. 
 The shape of the data distribution was inspected by measuring skewness and 
kurtosis. Skewness provides information for the direction of skew, and kurtosis 
indicates the sharpness or peakness (pointiness) relative to a standard bell curve. 
These measures have been used to test data normality and study the robustness of 
normal theory procedures (Joanes and Gill 1998), as adopted by parametric 
confidence intervals. Most of the outcomes of these analyses lead to the conclusion 
that not all outputs of each scenario had normal features for the population. 
 Even though checking the normality assumption of the output is rarely 
conducted in a simulation study, the conclusion obtained from the parametric 
statistics is highly affected by this assumption. Moreover, most boxplots of the 
experimental results indicate that the outputs are likely to be skewed. Significant 
numbers of experiments also have multi-modals, which suggest that the data shape 
is likely not to be normal. 
 The outliers were also investigated in detail. It was assured that they are part of 
true observations. They are caused by the agents’ behaviour and not by error 
measurement, or by unverified or invalid codes in the computer model. They are 
legitimate outputs which require consideration and should be treated similarly to 
other data. Moreover, the outliers are the modes of the experimental variable. They 
help in the explanation of the resulting behaviour, as performed in analysing the 
emergence effect of the manufacturer behaviour when making strategic 
movements. Thus, removing the outliers would potentially lead to a less robust 
analysis. Furthermore, when the outliers were removed, this did not always turn the 
data into a normal shape.  
 Regarding the nature of the outliers, this indicates that the normality assumption 
probably does not correspond to the situation that is simulated. The population 
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distribution of the emergent outcome is still not confidently known even though the 
agents are homogeneous. Moreover, the sample size is not relatively large, so 
removing the outliers would not necessarily improve the analysis and render it to 
be more scientifically robust. Thus, it can be concluded that the use of the 
parametric approach is not appropriate for comparing the scenarios in this study. A 
detailed description and an example of this normality analysis are provided in 
Appendix A. 
 
Common random numbers for variance reduction 
In addition to normality analysis, the attempt to reduce the output variance by 
applying similar streams of random numbers was found to be ineffective. Variance 
reduction was performed by applying a certain range of seed numbers for the 
replication of each scenario. For instance, the number of replication for each 
scenario is fifty, so seeds 1 to 50 were employed to control the random number 
generation of the model. This method is known as the common random approach 
suggested by Robinson (2014).  
 According to the NetLogo guidelines, the process of generating the random 
numbers in NetLogo is based on a deterministic procedure, which is pseudo-random 
(Wilensky 2013). In software engineering, the pseudo-random procedure has been 
developed into many approaches. They have a different mechanism to generate the 
same sequence of random events. This means that the effective use of common 
random numbers is highly dependent on the mechanism of the platform. 
The use of common random numbers affects the construction of the confidence 
intervals. If the variance is reduced, the data produced by each seed would be 
considered as paired data, so the confidence intervals are constructed by using a 
paired t approach. Otherwise, the data of each scenario should be treated as 
independent samples.  Robinson (2014) suggested that the common random 
numbers are considered to be working properly when: 
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  !"# < !%# + !##                                                                     (eq.  4.1) 
where SD is the standard deviations of the mean differences between scenario 1 and 
2, S1 is the standard deviations of the mean of scenario 1, and S2 is the standard 
deviations of the mean of scenario 2.   
 However, the application of common random numbers does not always result 
in a lower output variance. Moreover, controlling the random seed generation does 
not result in a similar sequence for each scenario. NetLogo provides different 
random seed sequences in every different parameter settings. This means that the 
samples of each scenario run with similar seed numbers are generated from 
different populations. In other words, controlling the seed number in NetLogo only 
allows the observer to reproduce the run, but it does not generate a similar sequence 
for the agent's movement. This issue has never been discussed yet in the previous 
work as no ABM studies has considered the use of common random number in 
NetLogo. Therefore, this work does not apply common random number to compare 
the results of multiple scenarios run in NetLogo. The example of the investigation 
of the use of common random numbers is presented in Appendix A.  
   
The Mann-Whitney U test: the selected approach 
Because the outputs are not normal and the approach of common random number 
cannot be adopted in NetLogo, nonparametric analysis was chosen to infer the 
comparisons. Although nonparametric statistics are known to be less sensitive than 
the parametric approach, they are not biased by outliers as well as the shape of the 
data. 
 The Mann-Whitney U test was selected as the samples are from different 
populations. The one-tailed approach is used to infer which scenario has a better 
performance. The alternative hypothesis of this test is that the scenario with a higher 
median (which has a smaller U-value) is significantly different from the other.  
CHAPTER 4 - METHODOLOGY 
96 
 
A normal approximation is applied to the test because the sample size is 
considered to be large, where 50 replications have exceeded 20 (Groebner et al. 
2011). The Bonferroni correction is applied to reduce the likelihood of incorrectly 
concluding the insignificant difference in multiple comparisons (Ludbrook 1998; 
Bender and Lange 2001; Robinson 2014). In other words, the Bonferroni correction 
reduces the risk of rejecting a true null hypothesis. This probability of error in 
normal approximation is known as alpha, or Type 1 error, or level of significance. 
The Bonferroni correction is suggested when at least two statistical tests are 
constructed. Once the Bonferroni correction is used, it is assumed that the 
correlation between the tests is low and this condition conforms to the results of the 
experiments. 
The overall level of significance implemented in the inferential analysis is 10%. 
This means that the likelihood that at least one of the ten comparisons which falsely 
infers the true mean is less than or equal to ten per cent. In order to compare the 
five scenarios in each scenario in the behaviour space, ten comparisons of the 
Mann-Whitney U test are required. With the Bonferroni correction, the level of 
significance for each comparison is adjusted to 1% (the overall level of significance 
/number of comparisons = 10%/10) with a critical value -2.33.  
 The U-statistics are obtained by using the following formulae (see Groebner et 
al. 2011): 
'% = )%)# + *+ *+,%# − .%                             (eq.  4.2) 
'# = )%)# + */ */,%# − .#                             (eq.  4.3) 
where )% and )# are the sample sizes from populations 1 and 2, and .% and .# 
are the sum of ranks from samples 1 and 2. 
The normal approximation is given by: 
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0 = 123+3//3+3/ 3+43/4++/                                            (eq.  4.4) 
where U is a minimum value between '%and '#. If Z is less than the critical value 
(-2.33), the null hypothesis can be rejected. This means that the claim that the 
scenario with the higher median (with a smaller U value) has a significant higher 
output than the other scenarios. Compared to the parametric approach, the Mann-
Whitney U test provides identical conclusions. However, this nonparametric 
analysis results in more reliable conclusions for the non-normal data. Thus, the 
Mann-Whitney U test is applied to compare the supply chain fill rate for all the 
experiments in this study. 
 
4.6!Commentary on the results 
Prior to concluding the overall results of the experiments, a model structure 
investigation was performed to relate the results to the model characteristics. This 
was conducted by recalling the model setup, assumptions, and simplifications. The 
logical flow of each experimental factor was also analysed to understand how the 
emergent outcomes had resulted. The logic flow or mechanism of the experimental 
factor structured the complexity of the model. It framed the interdependencies 
among the experimental factors, outputs, attributes and behaviour of all the agents. 
These relationships could not be explained in the process of model building and the 
conceptual modelling process. An illustration of the factors that are considered in 
commenting on the experiment results is presented in Figure 4.3. 
 Discussions relating the results of the present research to existing literature and 
reality (case studies) were also incorporated to achieve the main aim of this study, 
which is “to understand the effect of competition and collaboration on supply 
chains”. Following the summary of the analysis, further comments were provided 
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to interpret the results in conjunction with business practice, particularly with 
respect to competition and collaboration in upstream supply chains.  
 
Results
Model setup
Logical flow of the 
experimental factor
Model assumptions 
and limitations
 
Figure 4.3 The basis for commentary on the results of this study 
 
4.7! Summary 
According to the literature gap and research opportunity identified in the literature 
review, the current chapter has outlined the research aim of this study, which is to 
understand and explore the effect of competition and collaboration on supply 
chains. Three objectives were set out, and each of them was supported by several 
hypotheses formulated based on the review of previous research given in Chapter 
2. Furthermore, the modelling approach was described, which followed the steps of 
simulation modelling suggested by Robinson (2008). This consists of conceptual 
modelling, computer modelling, experimentation, and analysis. The methods of 
analysis were designed with respect to achieving each of the objectives. Lastly, a 
brief description of how the discussion was performed in this Thesis has been 
expressed. 
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CHAPTER 5!  THE AGENT-BASED MODEL OF 
SUPPLY CHAIN COMPETITION 
AND COLLABORATION 
 
5.1! Introduction 
This chapter explains the agent-based model of supply chain competition and 
collaboration. It presents the conceptual model, followed by the computer model. 
The conceptual model details the inputs, outputs, model contents, simplifications 
and assumptions of the model. Meanwhile, the computer model describes the model 
interface in NetLogo briefly, as well as the verification, validation, and parameter 
setup for the behaviour space. 
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5.2! Conceptual model  
The conceptual model describes the modelling objectives, the inputs or 
experimental factors, the outputs or responses, the content, the assumptions and 
simplifications of the model. The structure is adapted from Robinson (2008), and 
the ABM features are incorporated into the model content. The fundamental ABM 
properties described in the conceptual model are the agent, environment, 
interaction, autonomy, and schedule. These elements are based on the ABM main 
features defined by Macal and North (2013), and Robertson (2003). 
 The objectives of this study have been presented in Chapter 4. They are detailed 
in several hypotheses described in section 4.3. In general, the modelling objectives 
are to explore the extent to which certain competitive and collaborative behavioural 
factors influence long-term demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. 
Due to the problem’s complexity, each factor is isolated during the experiment; the 
interaction or interdependencies among behavioural factors are not considered in 
this study. An overview of the conceptual model is presented in Table 5.1, and the 
details of each element are described in the following subsections.  
 
5.2.1 Model contents: Scope and level of detail 
As previously mentioned, the extent of this research encompasses modelling 
competition and collaboration in supply chains that involve a manufacturer and 
supplier. In doing so, two-stage supply chains are modelled, and a market for 
innovative products is considered, such as for automobile and high technology 
devices. The detail of each scope is presented in the following subsections. 
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Table 5.1 The conceptual model  
Model content 
(Scope and Level of Detail) 
The agent: 
Customers, manufacturers, and suppliers. 
 
The environment: 
Two-dimensional strategic space defined as the degree of efficiency and responsiveness. 
 
The interaction: 
Each customer creates a link with a manufacturer, and each manufacturer makes connection/s 
(collaborations) with one or several suppliers. 
 
The autonomy: 
CUSTOMERS 
Each customer selects a manufacturer in accordance with its preference presented by its position, 
and its degree of willingness to compromise towards its preference, represented as a circular 
radius from its position. 
MANUFACTURERS 
Each manufacturer selects one or several suppliers based on its preference presented by its 
position, and its degree of willingness to compromise towards its preference, represented as a 
rectangle distance from its position. It also always moves to the closest new customer. 
SUPPLIERS 
Supplier competition movement depends on manufacturers' position and its trust to the 
manufacturer. 
 
The schedule: 
The agent’s movement, link creation, life (for manufacturer and supplier to allow them to die), and 
output measurement 
Inputs/Experimental Factors 
Manufacturer behaviour: 
     1. Duration of collaboration between supplier and manufacturer,  
     2. Number of partnerships, 
     3. Trust to supplier (as a representation of manufacturer trust of the supplier), 
     4. Survivability, and 
     5. Strategic movement. 
Supplier behaviour: 
     1. Number of partnerships, 
     2.Trust to manufacturer (as a representation of supplier trust of the manufacturer), and 
     3. Survivability. 
Customer behaviour: customer loyalty. 
 
Outputs/Responses 
     1. The supply chain fill rate, and 
     2. The number of supply chains in the market. 
Main Assumptions and Simplifications 
All agents are homogeneous and have no learning ability. 
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5.2.1.1 The agent  
The agents are defined as the customers, manufacturers, and suppliers. The 
customer agent can be interpreted as a group of customers, retailers, or a warehouse 
(i.e. a large distributor) in an innovative product market. Each customer has a fixed 
preference in buying the product. Meanwhile, suppliers compete to attract 
manufacturers to cooperate with them, and manufacturers try to optimise their 
market share by attracting customers. 
 Each agent has attributes and behavioural features. The attributes characterise 
what the agent is, and the behavioural features describe how the agent acts (North 
and Macal 2007). In this study, the agents are described based on two types of 
attributes, namely fixed and variable. The fixed attributes represent the agent’s 
features which remain the same or constant during the simulation runs. Meanwhile, 
the variable attributes are the agent’s characteristics, which change as the time unit 
ticks. Both attributes affect the agent’s behaviour in making decisions.  
For customers, the fixed attributes are specified by the agent’s type (customer), 
its buying preference towards a product, and the compromise limit to its preference. 
The buying or product preference is represented by the agent’s position in the 
environment, which in the model is fixed (the customers do not move). The 
compromise limit reflects the maximum degree of the customer’s willingness to 
compromise toward their product preference, referred to as the customer’s 
willingness to compromise hereafter.  
Meanwhile, the variable attributes represent the agent’s state, which changes 
during simulation runs. This is explained by the link existence with a manufacturer 
to denote its state of buying a product from that manufacturer. The link is created 
when a customer finds a manufacturer which meets its willingness to compromise 
and is close to its buying preference. However, the customer will not create a link 
if the closest manufacturer has no link with any supplier, or the customer decides 
to maintain its link with another manufacturer. 
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The customer’s behavioural features are characterised by the customers’ action 
in choosing a manufacturer. It selects the closest manufacturer which stays within 
the limit of the customer’s willingness to compromise. This behavioural decision is 
also affected by the customer loyalty towards the manufacturer. When the customer 
decides to be loyal to the company, it will continue buying the product from the 
manufacturer. This can be represented as a situation when a customer keeps buying 
other innovative products that are produced by the similar manufacturer. A 
summary of the customer’s attributes and behaviour is presented in Figure 5.1. 
 
ATTRIBUTES
Fixed attributes 
- Agent’s type: customer
- Product preference
- Compromise limit to its preference
  (customer willingness to 
   compromise)
Variable attributes 
Agent’s state: 
  link existence with a manufacturer
BEHAVIOUR
- Manufacturer selection: 
  closest selection
- Trust/loyalty (customer loyalty)
CUSTOMER
 
Figure 5.1 The attributes and behaviour of the customer agents 
 
For the manufacturers, the fixed attributes are characterised by five features: the 
agent’s type (manufacturer), the fixed limit of compromise towards its supplier 
preference (manufacturer’s willingness to compromise), the lifetime or survivability 
limit, the duration of collaboration with the selected supplier, and the maximum 
number of partnerships with the suppliers. The manufacturer’s willingness to 
compromise represents the tolerable capability gap between the manufacturer and 
the supplier when the manufacturer has to link with less efficient and/or responsive 
supplier/s. This factor also represents the degree of supplier/s’ impact on the 
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manufacturers or supply chain capability. This effect can limit the manufacturers’ 
competition movement because the supply chain capability is the aggregate 
capability of the manufacturer and its suppliers. 
The effect of the manufacturer’s willingness to compromise to the manufacturer 
position adjustment reflects an old saying in SCM that ‘a chain is only as strong as 
its weakest link’ (Simchi-Levi et al. 2000; Chopra and Meindl 2007). In SCM, the 
capabilities of the suppliers are considered to be of the utmost importance to the 
performance of entire supply chain. If a manufacturer, or a company, has suppliers 
with capabilities that are not in accordance with the manufacturer’s requirement, 
the entire chain could collapse, and the customers would immediately feel its 
effects. Reflecting on this situation, in this study, the manufacturer’s capability or 
strategic position was regarded as the representation of the supply chain’s strategic 
position, since it interacts with downstream customers directly. 
The limit of manufacturer life (survivability) is described in two separate 
conditions:  
1.!When it does not manage to find a supplier nor customer to link with. 
2.!When it is working with less efficient and/or responsive (or undesired) 
supplier(s) to represent losses. This situation represents manufacturers with less 
efficient and/or responsive suppliers can survive longer than the other 
manufacturers with no supplier at all. Thus, the minimum value that can be set 
for manufacturer survivability with the undesired supplier is equal to the 
survivability without the supplier. 
Both are defined by a time length in which a manufacturer can exist under each of 
these conditions. 
The variable attributes of the manufacturer agents are described as the 
manufacturer’s state during the simulation and are specified as follows. 
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1.!Manufacturer’s strategic position which changes as it competes with other 
manufacturers, 
2.!The existence of the manufacturer’s link with one or several suppliers, 
depending on the design of the experiment, 
3.!The existence of the manufacturer’s link with the customers, and 
4.!Manufacturer’s life, determined by its connection with the supplier and 
customers. It is limited by its survivability limit as defined in the fixed attributes.  
Meanwhile, the manufacturer behaviour in competition and collaboration is 
characterised as follows. 
1.!Acquisitive, represented by manufacturer movement which is continuously 
searching and changing the supply chain strategy to attract customers as many 
as possible. In other words, the manufacturers move dynamically in the 
simulation space while customers do not move. 
2.!Supplier selection behaviour, by choosing one or several suppliers who are more 
efficient and responsive than the manufacturer. Otherwise, when the desired 
supplier is not available, it would pick one or several suppliers who are less 
efficient and/or responsive than the agent and stay within the manufacturer’s 
willingness to compromise, 
3.!Trust, by keeping the link with the previous supplier when the agent decides to 
be loyal, and 
4.!Strategic movement, to represent competitive movement by changing its 
strategic position gradually to attract more customers. However, the 
manufacturer can choose to make a big leap or create an extreme strategic 
change or mutation. 
A summary of these attributes and behaviour is presented in Figure 5.2. 
 Compared to manufacturers, the attributes of supplier agents are relatively 
simple. The fixed attribute is defined as the agent’s type (supplier), lifetime or 
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survivability limit, and a maximum number of partnerships with the manufacturer. 
The limit of the supplier’s life is determined by the time length in which a supplier 
can exist in the system when it does not have a link with any manufacturer. The 
variable attributes represent the agent’s state described by the strategic position, 
link existence with one or several manufacturers (depending on the experimental 
setting), and the supplier’s life. The supplier would die when it reaches the limit of 
its survivability. 
 
ATTRIBUTES
Fixed attributes 
- Agent’s type: manufacturer
- Compromise limit to its preference
  (manufacturer willingness of 
   compromise) 
- Lifetime or survivability limit
  (manufacturer’s survivability)
- Duration of collaboration
- Maximum number of sourcing
Variable attributes
Agent’s state: 
   - strategic position    
   - link existence with supplier 
   - link existence with customer
   - life
BEHAVIOUR
Manufacturer’s competitive and 
collaborative behaviour:
  - acquisitive
  - supplier selection
  - trust/loyalty (manufacturer 
    loyalty)
  - strategic movement (manufacturer 
    strategic movement)
MANUFACTURER
 
Figure 5.2 The attributes and behaviour of the manufacturer agents 
  
 Meanwhile, the supplier’s competitive and collaborative behaviour is 
represented by its acquisitiveness in having a new manufacturer and its strategic 
movement affected by its trust towards the manufacturer. When a supplier decides 
to be loyal to the manufacturer, it will follow the manufacturer’s strategic change; 
otherwise, it would approach another manufacturer to work with the agent. These 
supplier features are illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
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5.2.1.2 The environment  
The agents act in a two-dimensional environment, which represents their strategic 
position from an SCM perspective. The dimensions are referred to supply chain 
competitive strategy as described by Chopra and Meindl (2007), namely efficiency 
and responsiveness.  
 
ATTRIBUTES
Fixed attributes 
- Agent’s type: supplier
- Lifetime or survivability limit 
  (supplier’s survivability)
- Maximum number of partnerships
Variable attributes
Agent’s state: 
   - strategic position    
   - link existence with manufacturer
   - life
BEHAVIOUR
Supplier’s competitive and 
collaborative behaviour:
  - acquisitive
  - trust/loyalty (supplier loyalty)
  - strategic movement
SUPPLIER
 
Figure 5.3 The attributes and behaviour of the supplier agents 
 
 These dimensions are interpreted differently by each agent. From the 
customers’ viewpoint, it reflects the customer preference. Manufacturers also 
interpret the dimension as manufacturer preference aside from their strategic 
position relatives to the others. From the supplier’s perspective, the dimensions 
only represent their relative strategic position.  
For the customers, the x-axis represents the product’s price as sold by the 
manufacturer. A manufacturer that is further to the right would offer more 
expensive products, but would also provide more value to the customer. Within a 
limit, customers can choose to purchase products that are cheaper or more 
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expensive than their preferred price and value. Meanwhile, the y-axis reflects the 
customers’ perception of the product innovation level.  The perception of 
innovation level increases when moving down the axis.  Again, customers can 
choose to purchase products that are more or less innovative than their preference, 
but within a limit.  
From the firms’ standpoint, the x-axis delineates the operational efficiency 
(further to the left is more efficient), and the y-axis represents operational 
responsiveness (closer to the bottom is more responsive). The efficiency level is 
assumed to be proportional to the material price and value while responsiveness is 
inferred as the innovation level.  
Within the environment, two infeasible areas reflect the limits to the 
competitive landscape. So, for a product with a relatively high level of 
customisation, variety or innovation, it is impossible to have a very low price (or 
cost) and product value, and vice versa.  
Besides this, the feasible area for being a highly efficient and more responsive 
firm, or being a highly responsive and more efficient company (zone b), is narrower 
than the area for having a high responsiveness but a less efficient capability, or 
eminently efficient but less responsive competitiveness (zone a). This uneven size 
represents a situation where it is hard to have highly efficient and more responsive 
operations. A widely held view is that supply chains are likely to perform either in 
high responsiveness but be less efficient, or be very efficient but less responsive. 
Moreover, the feasible area reflects the non-linear relationship between 
responsiveness and efficiency in supply chain practice. As explained in section 
2.3.1 and Figure 2.3, a higher responsiveness level of supply chain operations can 
either enhance or decrease the supply chain efficiency. In contrast, if a supply chain 
decides to be highly efficient, this decision will make the supply chain to be very 
likely less responsive. In short, higher responsiveness levels can lead to a wider 
range of efficiency degree (zone a in Figure 5.4), and higher efficiency levels would 
limit the responsiveness (zone b in Figure 5.4). An illustration of the agents and 
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their environment is presented in Figure 5.4. The agents are scattered on the space 
to depict their positions corresponding to the others. 
Infeasible area
More efficient operations
(from the manufacturer’s and suppliers’ perspective) 
Lower price and perceived product value
(from the customer’s perspective)
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   Figure 5.4 An abstraction of the agents within their environment  
 
5.2.1.3 The interactions 
The interaction between the agents is characterised by the link created between 
different types of agents. Each manufacturer agent creates a connection with one or 
several suppliers, while the customer agent generates a link with a manufacturer 
agent. The customers create links with a manufacturer which represents the decision 
to purchase the manufacturer’s product. However, the customers will only buy a 
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product from a manufacturer which has at least one link with supplier agents. 
Meanwhile, manufacturers create links with suppliers which represent the decision 
to collaborate with one or several suppliers. The creation of these links is ruled by 
each agent’s autonomy.  
 
5.2.1.4 Autonomy 
The autonomy of a customer is indicated by its preference and behaviour in 
selecting a manufacturer within its willingness to compromise. The preference is 
represented by the agent’s position and its degree of willingness to compromise. 
The customers decide which manufacturer is most appropriate for supplying to their 
preference with a particular degree of willingness to compromise (Figure 5.6). The 
circular shape of willingness to compromise reflects a simplification of customer’s 
characteristics in general, where customers will to either reduce or increase their 
standard on buying preference, for both innovation level (y-axis) and price (x-axis).. 
This representation is adopted from the agent-based model of customer-firm 
interaction introduced by Robertson and Caldart (2009). The customers also have 
trust/loyalty, which represents the probability of choosing the same manufacturer 
as previously selected.  
 The manufacturer’s autonomy is characterised by its behaviour in choosing 
supplier/s and in changing the strategic position for the competition. Each 
manufacturer selects one or several suppliers based on its preference presented by 
its position and its degree of willingness to compromise. They collaborate with 
suppliers while they compete to attract the closest new customer. This behaviour 
represents firm’s acquisitiveness in gaining more revenue continuously as most 
companies are hard to feel satisfied with their current achievements. 
 The manufacturers’ preference is to select suppliers who are more responsive 
and efficient than their capability. This enables the manufacturers to supply the 
customers according to their strategy for efficiency and responsiveness. However, 
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if they could not collaborate with the desired suppliers, the manufacturer 
willingness to compromise feature allows the manufacturers to work with the 
suppliers who are less responsive and efficient than their capability (Figure 5.5). 
The manufacturers who could not manage to find suitable suppliers would die after 
they have exceeded their lifetime or survivability limit, defined as a number of time 
units in which the manufacturer can survive without a supplier. 
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Figure 5.5 The abstraction of link direction and border of customer and manufacturer 
preference, with a degree of willingness to compromise 
 
The mechanism of the manufacturer willingness to compromise is illustrated as 
follows. The manufacturer’s position in the model represents its preference in 
selecting supplier/s. For instance, if the manufacturer stays at coordinate (50, 40), 
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it will firstly choose a supplier/s which stay in the coordinates between 0 and 50 for 
the x-axis, and between 0 and 40 for the y-axis. It represents the manufacturer’s rule 
in choosing suppliers which are more efficient and responsive than the 
manufacturer, which are reflected by the x-axis and y-axis respectively. However, 
if the manufacturer cannot manage to find any available supplier inside its 
preference range, it will consider to working with the suppliers which are less 
efficient and/or less responsive than the agent. The less efficient suppliers stay in 
the higher coordinate of x-axis than the manufacturer’s x-axis coordinate, and the 
less responsive suppliers have larger y-axis coordinate than the manufacturer’s 
position. If the degree of manufacturer willingness to compromise is 5%, it reflects 
that the maximum distance of compromise range is:  5%898:ℎ<8=>9?=@=8A?>BC)>D8A?E:>)F<8CG8:ℎ<8E?=@D>:?C)8EH>F< 
If the maximum coordinate of both x-axis and y-axis are 67, the maximum diagonal 
distance of the simulation space will be 67# + 67# = 94.75. Then, the distance 
of the manufacturer willingness to compromise will be 5% x 94.75 = 4.74, 
calculated from the manufacturer’s position. Thus, the area of manufacturer 
willingness to compromise is between 50 and 54.74 for the x-axis (efficiency level), 
and between 40 and 44.74 for the y-axis (responsiveness level).    
 The manufacturer determines the relationship between supplier and 
manufacturer. They set the length of the relationships (duration of collaboration). 
When the manufacturer trusts the current supplier, it will continue the partnership 
with the same supplier when the previous duration of collaboration ends. The 
probability of the manufacturers working with the same supplier for the next 
collaboration is represented by the manufacturer trust.  
 Lastly, supplier autonomy is represented by its movement during the 
competition. The movement direction is affected by the manufacturers’ position 
and the supplier’s trust towards the current manufacturer. An illustration of agent’s 
interactions and movement is presented Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6 Agent’s interactions and movements 
 
5.2.1.5 The schedule  
The schedule is characterised by the agent’s movement for the competition, link 
creation for the relationship between the agents, life (for the manufacturer and 
supplier), and output measurement. These features of the schedule are the events 
executed in sequence at the same time; so when all of these events have been 
performed, the simulation time or time step (known as a tick in ABM) is executed 
in a discrete time unit.  
The tick, hereinafter referred to as time unit, represents a period, which is 
considered sensible to allow a firm to make a slight adjustment to their strategic 
position. Regarding the operations in supply chains, the duration of making a slight 
strategic change can be related to the time bucket used in the sales and operations 
plan (SOP). This plan (SOP) affects other plans and company strategies, such as 
the marketing strategy, the workforce or resources plan, the procurement strategy, 
product development, and the plant expansion plan.  
 The time bucket commonly used in the SOP is between 3 and 18 months. The 
duration is mostly affected by the total production lead time. In the computer model, 
we assume that one time unit represents at least 3 months for making a gradual 
strategic change. A period of 3 months is also considered as the common time unit 
representation for the seasonal demand and supply pattern that is likely to be related 
to the operations along the supply chain of innovative products. 
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5.2.2 Inputs or experimental factors 
The key issues examined in this study are competitive and collaborative behaviour. 
Collaborative behaviour includes the collaboration strategy, which involves the 
duration of collaboration between a supplier and a manufacturer, and the number 
of partnerships for both the manufacturer and supplier. Collaborative behaviour 
also represents the characteristics of the agents, considering trust and survivability. 
Meanwhile, competitive behaviour as represented in this study is the 
acquisitiveness and the distance of the strategic movement. Acquisitive behaviour 
reflects the desire to earn more revenue on an ongoing basis, as a representation of 
competition motives. For instance, manufacturers change their strategy by 
incrementally moving towards nearby customers that are currently not buying from 
them. The manufacturers have no way of assessing the effect of moving towards a 
new customer, but due to acquisitiveness, they would always attempt to gain new 
customers. In doing so, they may lose some of their current customers to another 
manufacturer.  
 In a similar way, suppliers move to try and gain collaborative relationships with 
new manufacturers by moving towards the closest manufacturer with whom they 
do not currently collaborate. However, this study does not explore the supplier’s 
strategic movement as observed for the manufacturers. 
 Taking the type of agents, the inputs or experimental factors considered in this 
research can be classified into three categories. The first group is the classification 
of the manufacturer’s behaviour in competition and collaboration, the second 
represents the behaviour of the suppliers, and the last category reflects the 
customer’s behaviour. The inputs regarded in the first group are manufacturers’ 
strategic movement, the duration of collaboration, the number of partnerships, 
trust, and survivability to work with undesired supplier/s. The second group 
consists of the supplier number of partnerships, trust, and survivability. Meanwhile, 
CHAPTER 5 – THE AGENT-BASED MODEL 
115 
 
the third category only consists of the customer loyalty. A categorisation of the 
inputs is summarised in Table 5.2 and also described in the following subsections. 
Table 5.2 The inputs or experimental factors 
Manufacturer behaviour Supplier behaviour Customer behaviour 
 
!! Duration of 
collaboration 
!! Number of partnerships 
!! Manufacturer trust 
!! Manufacturer 
survivability to work 
with undesired 
supplier/s 
!! Probability of making 
extreme strategic 
changes (manufacturer 
strategic movements) 
 
 
!! Number of 
partnerships 
!! Supplier trust 
!! Supplier survivability 
 
!! Customer loyalty 
 
5.2.2.1 Manufacturer behaviour 
The experimental factors concerning manufacturer behaviour are described in the 
following way: 
1.! Duration of collaboration 
The duration of collaboration represents the manufacturers’ agreement to 
maintain the partnerships. In this study, it is defined as the length of the 
relationships between manufacturer and supplier. 
2.! Number of partnerships 
The number of partnerships is another debatable supply chain collaboration 
approach on the supply side. In the model, this factor is defined as the 
maximum number of suppliers that each manufacturer can have.  
3.! Manufacturer trust 
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The manufacturer trust reflects the degree of manufacturer’s trust towards the 
supplier. In the model, it is assumed that when a manufacturer trusts a supplier, 
which is currently linked to the firm, it will be loyal to the supplier by 
continuing to collaborate with the previous supplier. A high level of trust is 
likely to lead to a similar effect as extreme long term collaboration. The 
probability of manufacturer trust follows random uniform distribution. For 
example, if the manufacturer trust is 75%, and the random number generated 
is 0.6 (below 75%), the manufacturer will maintain its collaboration link with 
the supplier. 
4.! Survivability to work with undesired supplier/s (manufacturer survivability) 
Manufacturer survivability represents the manufacturer’s ability to cope with 
loss when it collaborates with a less efficient and less responsive supplier. It 
can be related to the firms’ adaptability that is supported by the company’s 
tolerance to failure. When a company has a better ability to survive, by having 
a higher tolerance to loss, it would have more opportunities to adjust its strategy 
as well as grow its business (Reeves and Deimler 2011). The variable can also 
be interpreted as a government support or subsidy for helping the companies 
to survive, as practised by the Japanese government in protecting their local 
manufacturers (Dyer and Ouchi 1993). 
5.! Probability of making extreme strategic changes (manufacturer strategic 
movement) 
This factor represents the likelihood that all manufacturers in the market have 
an extreme strategic change in each time unit. It examines whether the big leap 
or strategic mutation strategy applied by the manufacturer affects the supply 
chains in the market.  
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5.2.2.2 Supplier behaviour 
The inputs of this group simulate an environment that is subject to complexity and 
uncertainty in the upstream market. It is characterised by the characteristics and 
bounded-rationality of the suppliers. The inputs of the supplier behaviour are 
explained as follows. 
1.! Supplier’s number of partnerships 
This factor reflects a situation where suppliers can supply more than one 
manufacturer. It is defined as the maximum number of manufacturers with 
whom each supplier can work. This factor is addressed because most SCM 
studies consider the number of partnerships from the manufacturer’s 
perspective only. The reason for this is that collaboration initiators commonly 
come from the manufacturer, not the supplier. However, since SCM considers 
the supplier and the manufacturer as a supply chain rather than individual firms, 
the issue of the number of partnerships for the supplier should be addressed 
from both firms’ perspective.  
2.!  Supplier trust 
Trust represents the probability that the suppliers would follow the 
manufacturer strategic movement so they can maintain their current 
relationships. Once a supplier links with several manufacturers, it has to choose 
the manufacturers to which it would remain loyal. The supplier trust is 
represented by the supplier’s movement, which follows the manufacturer’s 
strategic position. This supplier's movement represents the supplier’s effort to 
minimise the capability gap between the supplier and the manufacturer in the 
supply chain.  
3.!  Supplier survivability 
Supplier survivability reflects a supplier’s robustness or ability to survive when 
it has no collaboration with a manufacturer. Regarding one of the findings of 
Dyer and Ouchi (1993), the suppliers of Japanese car manufacturers supported 
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by the government are regarded as one of the success factors in Japanese car 
supply chains. However, with regards to manufacturer survivability, the 
individual firm survivability does not guarantee long-term supply chain 
success, as proven by the decreasing market share of Japanese electronics firms 
recently.  
Unlike with the manufacturer, it is assumed that there is no negative 
consequence for the supplier who links with a manufacturer who is less 
efficient or responsive than the firm. Thus, supplier survivability only depends 
on the link existing with the manufacturer/s without regards to the 
manufacturer’s position. 
 
5.2.2.3 Customer behaviour: customer trust/loyalty 
The customer behaviour represents the downstream market uncertainty, and one 
popular issue in business competition is customer trust towards the manufacturer. 
This factor is generally addressed as customer loyalty in the literature and found to 
be significant to the business performance through long-term relationships with 
customers. As the increase of trust is found to be linear to the improvement of 
loyalty (O’Cass and Carlson 2012), this Thesis considers customer trust and 
customer loyalty as a single variable, namely customer trust/loyalty.   
 This variable is described as the probability of the customer having cooperation 
with the same manufacturer. The lowest value of customer trust/loyalty (0%) 
represents the likelihood of customers shifting their selection to another 
manufacturer that stays within their willingness to compromise is 100%.  It means 
that when the customers have no trust/loyalty towards manufacturer, the customers 
will always select a different manufacturer which is closest to them and stays within 
the customer willingness to compromise. Meanwhile, the highest percentage of trust 
(100%) reflects the fact that once the customer selects a manufacturer, it will keep 
buying the product from that manufacturer even though the firm has moved away 
from the customer’s willingness to compromise.  
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 The probability follows random uniform distribution and it affects the links 
between the customer and the manufacturer. For example, if the customer loyalty 
is 75%, and the random number generated by NetLogo falls to 0.7 (below 75%), 
the customer will remain connect to the previous manufacturer although the firm’s 
position has shifted to be outside the customer’s willingness to compromise. 
 
5.2.3 Outputs 
Two are the main outputs obtained from this model are the supply chain fill rate 
and the number of supply chains in the market. The supply chain fill rate represents 
the aggregate performance of the supply chains in the market, measured by the 
proportion of demand fulfilled with respect to the total available demand. 
Meanwhile, the number of supply chains in the market indicates the number of 
supply chains which can survive in long term competition. 
 The supply chain fill rate employed in this study is a simplification of the supply 
chains service level as a measure of supply chain performance. Rather than 
measuring the order fulfilment in probability as the real definition of service level, 
the supply chain fill rate is calculated as the percentage demand satisfied relative to 
all the available demand.  
 The definition of the supply chain fill rate has also been simplified from the 
actual definition. In SCM, the metric is described as the fraction of demand satisfied 
from the available inventory, or as the proportion of demand that comes to be sales 
(Chopra and Meindl 2007). However, this study does not regard inventory in 
measuring the supply chain fill rate. Instead, the metric measures the fraction of 
customer demand that is satisfied from the available supply chains in the market. 
This simplification assists the modeller or observer in assessing the supply chains 
performance as a market.  
 In model building, this measure is calculated as the number of customers served 
divided by the total number of customers in the system. For instance, if the available 
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demand in the market is 1000 customers and the available supply chains serve only 
100 customers, the supply chain fill rate is equal to (100 / 1000) x 100% = 10%. 
Meanwhile, the number of supply chains in the market is measured by counting 
the number of manufacturers which have at least one link with suppliers. It does not 
include the manufacturers and suppliers which have no collaboration link, so the 
number of supply chains in the market can be fewer than the number of available 
manufacturers and suppliers. 
The supply chain fill rate and the number of supply chains in the market are 
expected to have a positive relationship, where a higher number of supply chains in 
the market provides a higher supply chain fill rate. The logic is that when more 
supply chains can survive for a long term, more demand or customers can be served. 
This is indicated by a higher supply chain fill rate. In other words, a higher supply 
chain fill rate is an indicator of the better performance of the supply chains in the 
market. This goal is supposed to be achieved when more supply chains can survive 
the competition.  
In addition to these two principal measures, the strategic position of the supplier 
and manufacturer within their supply chain is presented in the graphical outputs of 
the computer model, as presented in the computer model representation in 
Appendix B. These outputs are just additional measures and were employed in 
understanding the generic effect of competition. 
 
5.2.4 Assumptions and simplifications 
The model developed in a simulation study is intended to be a basis for arguing the 
predicted or what-if situation compared to the existing condition. In this sense, 
models might not clearly need to picture the real world (Pidd 1999). In other words, 
all simulation models have limitations which are driven by its assumptions and 
simplifications. Simulation models are developed by employing several 
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assumptions and are simplified from the real system. Model assumptions represent 
uncertainties or beliefs which exist in the actual system. Meanwhile, simplifications 
are made to pace the model development and use, such as removing elements and 
interactions which have no significant influence on model accuracy (Robinson 
2014). There are several ways of simplifying the model: aggregating the model 
elements, deleting elements and interactions, displacing elements with random 
variables, ignoring infrequent events, simplifying the rule, splitting the large model 
into smaller simulation models. Compared to the real world, the model advanced in 
this study holds several assumptions and simplifications. It affects the model 
content proposed in the conceptual model, which consists of the agent, the 
environment, the interaction, the autonomy, and the schedule. 
For the agent, the model considers all agents to be homogeneous. This 
assumption has been widely applied in most strategic competition models 
(Robertson 2004). Also, all agents have no learning ability, so they could not update 
their behavioural rules. The manufacturers have a similar bargaining position to the 
suppliers, so one of them could not pressure another. As for the suppliers, they 
provide critical material to the manufacturer; hence, manufacturers who cannot find 
a supplier with whom they can collaborate with will die.  
Several assumptions and simplifications also compose the model environment. 
First, the dimensions of efficiency and responsiveness are assumed to be 
independent of each other. From the customer’s perspective, product value is 
considered to be linearly proportional to the product cost, whilst the operation 
efficiency is linearly proportional to the product price. 
Most of the assumptions and simplifications prevail over the agent’s interaction 
and autonomy. They affect the agent’s state, link creation, and movement. For the 
customer, they have a consistent preference for all time (i.e. they do not move).  It 
is also assumed that the customer’s willingness to compromise is not affected by 
manufacturer behaviour. This assumption may not represent reality as customer 
preference and willingness to compromise can be influenced by the company’s 
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competitive strategy. The customer also has a simplified trust/loyalty. When it 
decides to trust a manufacturer, it will continue buying a product from the 
manufacturer although the company has moved outside its willingness to 
compromise. This situation also applies to manufacturer trust of the suppliers. 
For the manufacturer, the agent is assumed to offer only one type of product to 
the customers. It does not allow for having product differentiation or more than one 
market segment to serve. It is also assumed that the manufacturer is the leader for 
the collaboration. It decides the duration of collaboration and the number of 
suppliers that can work with them. The agent also has trust towards their supplier 
by continuing to choose the same supplier as previously selected. When a 
manufacturer link with more than one supplier, it would treat the suppliers equally 
(i.e. not loyal) unless it decides to be loyal to one of them. In this case, the 
manufacturer trust and the supplier trust is independent of each other. Hence, the 
manufacturer behaviour does not influence supplier behaviour towards the supplier 
and vice versa. In addition, once a manufacturer links with a supplier, the supplier 
is regarded as being capable of providing a continuous supply without disruption. 
Thus, the supplier would not die when it has a collaboration link with at least one 
manufacturer. 
For the schedule, the decisions of all the agents are assumed to be made at the 
same tick or time unit. Even though in the computer model they are generated based 
on a particular sequence, there is no delay in the decisions, which occurs in reality. 
This is due to the homogeneous agents who act similarly, and they make the 
decision at the same time. Furthermore, as the model does not explain a case study 
of a particular market, the tick could not be defined in an exact period. Instead, the 
ticks in the computer model henceforward will be called as time unit to represent a 
generic representation of a period. As stated in Section 4.3.1.2, the time unit is 
considered to lie between 3 and 18 months, allowing for the firms to make a gradual 
strategic change. A summary of the assumptions and simplifications employed in 
this study is given in Table 5.3. 
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5.3! Computer model  
The model is developed in NetLogo and consists of three parts: setup, outputs, and 
execution buttons. An illustration of the computer interface can be seen in Appendix 
B. This section explains the technical process of model building. It is structured 
into three subsections: the setup, the model testing (verification and validation), and 
the generic emergent outcome. 
 
Table 5.3 Assumptions and simplifications applied in the model scope 
Model scope   Assumptions and simplifications 
 
The agent 
 
1 
 
All agents are homogeneous and have no learning ability. 
 2 The manufacturers and suppliers have an equal bargaining position, so the 
manufacturers cannot pressure the suppliers and vice versa. 
 3 The suppliers supply a critical component to the manufacturer. Thus, when a 
manufacturer could not manage to find a supplier for several periods, it would 
die. 
 
The 
environment 
1 Efficiency and responsiveness are independent of each other. 
2 Product value is linearly proportional to product cost. 
 3 More efficient supply chain operations provide a lower price for customers. 
 
The 
interactions 
and autonomy 
1 Customer preference, willingness to compromise and trust/loyalty are not 
influenced by the behaviour of the manufacturers. 
2 Customers have a consistent preference for all time (i.e. they do not move).  
3 Once a customer decides to be loyal to a manufacturer, it would continue 
buying a product from the manufacturer although the firm has moved outside 
its willingness to compromise. This situation also applies to the manufacturer 
trust towards the suppliers. 
4 Manufacturer behaviour does not affect customer behaviour, and supplier 
behaviour does not influence manufacturer behaviour. 
5 Each manufacturer is only able to offer one type of product to the market so that 
it has only one market segment      
6 Manufacturers lead the supply chain collaboration. 
7 Trust (for the manufacturers and the suppliers), and duration of collaboration 
are independent of each other. 
8 When a manufacturer links with more than one supplier, it selects a supplier to 
be loyal to randomly without considering supplier trust. 
 9 No supply disruption is applied. 
 
The schedule 1 All agents' decisions are made at the same time unit. 
 2 One tick represents a time unit, which may lie between 3 and 18 months. 
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5.3.1 The model setup 
The variables for the setup are characterised into two types; they are non-input 
(fixed/constant) and input (experimental factor).  Both types of variables are 
fundamental in defining the problem situation that is simulated in this study. The 
detailed description on each type of variables is provided in the following 
subsections. 
 
5.3.1.1 Fixed setup (non-input variables) 
The non-input parameters (including the variable name in the computer model) are 
the: 
1.! number of customers (#customer) 
2.! number of manufacturers (#manuf)  
3.! switch for turning on the supplier agent (SupplierOn?)  
4.! switch for turning on the control of the seed number (ControlSeed?) 
5.! seed number (SeedNumber) 
6.! customer’s willingness to compromise (willingness_to_compromise) 
7.! switch for allowing the suppliers to move (SuppMove?) 
8.! switch for allowing the suppliers to die (SuppDie?) 
9.! switch for manufacturer movement (ManufMove?)  
10.! switch for allowing the manufacturer to die (die?) 
11.! limit of the manufacturer survivability with no supplier 
(SurvivabilityWithoutSupplier) 
12.! manufacturer’s willingness to compromise 
(manuf_willingness_to_compromise)   
13.! manufacturer’s position adjustment (AdjustPosition?) 
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The description of each parameter included in the interface is detailed in Appendix 
C. 
 The non-inputs variables characterise the base situation of the problem, 
particularly in representing innovative product markets. In general, it situates a 
market with a limited number of manufacturers which compete. The number of 
suppliers which have the capability to supply the key components of the finished 
products is also highly limited. Hence, the supplier’s operational capability, in 
terms of efficiency and responsiveness, has a significant influence on the 
manufacturer’s strategic position. If a manufacturer is linked with a less efficient 
and/or responsive supplier, its strategic movement would be limited by the 
supplier’s strategic position; in the model, this situation is defined by the procedure 
of manufacturer’s position adjustment. 
In the model setup, the number of customers is set to 1000 customers. It 
represents an unlimited demand that is available in the market. This setup also 
represents a real situation where the size of actual demand in the market is never 
exactly known. Meanwhile, both the number of manufacturers and suppliers are 
adjusted to 10 agents, which is far lower compared to the available demand in the 
market (i.e. the number of customers). It reflects a very limited number of firms 
which can compete in the market of a type of innovative product. These adjustments 
of the number of agents (customer, manufacturer, and supplier) have no significant 
impact (insensitive) on the conclusion of the multiple comparisons analysis, with 
respect to the supply chain fill rate and the number of supply chains in the market. 
 The market is considered to have a relatively low willingness to compromise 
for both customers’ product preference and manufacturers’ preference in selecting 
supplier/s. This is due to the characteristics of the product which could not be 
substitutable easily by competitors’ products. From the customer’s perspective, the 
willingness to compromise represents the product characteristics. If the product 
deals with daily consumption or primary needs, such as consumer goods, the 
willingness to compromise would be very high since customers must have the 
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product. In contrast, if the product is highly innovative, the willingness to 
compromise would be very low. As this study focuses on collaboration between 
supplier and manufacturer in innovative products market, the customer willingness 
to compromise is set to be very low. As a consequence, not all customers interact 
with a manufacturer. This situation represents the main feature of innovative 
product where not all customers have to buy an innovative product. For instance, 
not everyone has a tablet PC. In other words, not all customers’ preference can be 
fulfilled by the available firms in the market. 
 The degree of willingness to compromise is presented as a percentage, which is 
converted to a radius of compromised preference relatives to the diagonal length of 
the square space. The radius is calculated from the customer’s fixed position. The 
lowest degree of willingness to compromise (0%) represents the customers who 
would only buy a product that has the same supply chain features, in terms of 
efficiency and responsiveness, as they wanted. If there is no manufacturer that 
precisely meets their wants, they will not buy any product from the available 
manufacturers. In contrast, if the value of the willingness to compromise is 100%, 
the customer will always purchase a product from any manufacturer although the 
available manufacturer provides a product that is far from their actual preference.  
 With respect to representing innovative product markets, the willingness to 
compromise was set to a constant 10% for the customers and 5% for the 
manufacturers. The constant of customer’s willingness to compromise is an 
approximation of the demand market feature such that the customers only buy an 
innovative product when the product price and value are close enough to its 
preference. This factor is sensitive to the supply chain fill rate, but it is not sensitive 
(i.e. it has no significant impact) to the number of supply chains in the market.  
 Unlike the customer’s willingness to compromise, the manufacturer’s 
willingness to compromise provides more complex interactions and autonomy than 
the customer’s willingness to compromise. In the model, this parameter affects 
manufacturers in two ways. The first is related to the manufacturers' decision in 
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selecting suppliers. Once a manufacturer could not find a supplier who is more 
responsive and efficient than the firm, it would choose a supplier who is less 
efficient and/or responsive than the manufacturer. The tolerable capability gap 
between the manufacturer and the less efficient and/or responsive supplier is 
represented by the value of the manufacturer’s willingness to compromise. 
Secondly, the parameter affects the manufacturer’s strategic movement. Once a 
manufacturer has collaborated with a supplier/s, its strategic position would be 
influenced by its supplier capability, particularly when the supplier/s is less efficient 
and/or responsive. In this situation, the manufacturer’s willingness to compromise 
adjusts the manufacturer’s strategic position once the gap between the suppliers and 
the manufacturer is more than the tolerable capability gap. 
 The constant of the manufacturer’s willingness to compromise illustrates the 
importance of the supplier. As this study focuses on modelling partnerships with 
suppliers who provide strategic or bottleneck items, the 5% willingness to 
compromise is considered as a sensible small compromise level with regards to the 
manufacturer’s strategic position. This factor is insensitive to the result of 
inferential analysis, which employs the Mann-Whitney U multiple comparisons, 
unless the constant is set to an extremely small value (less than 1%). A summary of 
constants and descriptions for each of the non-inputs values is presented in Table 
5.4.  
 
Table 5.4 The non-input variables and the constants for the simulation setup 
Non-input variable Constant  Descriptions 
Global setup   
#customer 1000 Many customers in the market. 
#manuf 10 A limited number of manufacturers are 
available. 
SupplierOn? On Supplier agents are simulated. 
ControlSeed? On The seed number is controlled. 
SeedNumber 1-50 The range of seed number used is from 1 to 50; 
it means the number of replications is 50 for 
each experiment. 
   
Demand setup   
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Non-input variable Constant  Descriptions 
willingness_to_compromise 10% Customers have a relatively limited 
compromised level to their preference. 
   
Supply setup   
SuppMove? On Suppliers are competitive and acquisitive. 
SuppDie? On  Suppliers can die. 
   
Manufacturer behavioural rules 
in competition 
  
ManufMove? On Manufacturers are competitive and acquisitive. 
die? On Manufacturers can die. 
SurvivabilityWithoutSupplier 4 time 
units 
Manufacturers have a relatively short duration 
to survive when they could not manage to find 
a supplier to link with. 
   
Manufacturer behavioural rules 
in collaboration 
  
manuf_willingness_to_compromise 5% Manufacturers have a very limited compromise 
level to select the appropriate supplier/s. 
AdjustPosition? On  Manufacturers' position is affected or adjusted 
by their suppliers' position, when they link with 
less efficient and/or responsive suppliers. 
     
 
The mechanism of willingness to compromise (a non-input variable) is 
sometimes interchangeable with trust/loyalty (an input variable). For the customer 
agent, a customer would not automatically switch to another manufacturer when it 
decides to be loyal to a manufacturer, even if the manufacturer moves away from 
the customer. The customer would stay with the manufacturer until the next time 
they decide to be disloyal and look for another manufacturer. This mechanism also 
applies to manufacturer agents with respect to supplier agents. As such, willingness 
to compromise is set only to come into play when an agent (a customer or a 
manufacturer) decides to be disloyal and choose a new manufacturer. The details 
of the logic flow of the computer model are provided in Appendix E. The NetLogo 
code can also be found in Appendix H. 
  
CHAPTER 5 – THE AGENT-BASED MODEL 
129 
 
5.3.1.2 Input variables: the experimental design or the behaviour space  
The input variables play important roles in the behaviour space, particularly in 
achieving objective 3 – exploring the effect of firm competition and collaboration 
strategy on supply chains. They include the: 
1.! customer loyalty,  
2.! manufacturer survivability to work with undesired supplier/s 
3.! duration of collaboration 
4.! maximum number of partnerships 
5.! manufacturer trust 
6.! manufacturer strategic movement 
7.! supplier survivability 
8.! supplier trust  
 The idea of behaviour space construction is by varying the agent’s attributes 
and behaviour. However, the agent’s attributes and behaviour are not only 
characterised by the input parameters, but also by the non-input variables in the 
model setup. The non-input defines the agent’s attributes and behaviour that have 
a fixed or constant value in all experiments, while the input refers to the 
experimental factor. A list of the variables in the simulation setup which affect the 
agent’s attributes and behaviour is provided in Table 5.5. 
 The experimental design is set into two parts: the base run and the behaviour 
space. The base run represents the default behaviour when most of the experimental 
factors are adjusted to their lowest value to represent the conventional business 
relationships, except the manufacturer survivability to work with undesired 
supplier/s. In the base run, the manufacturer survivability is set at medium value or 
level because this factor is sensitive to the outputs, so the medium level of this 
experimental factor is considered to be the realistic point to represent the average 
manufacturer’s ability to survive when it works with the undesired suppliers. 
Meanwhile, the behaviour space characterises the what-if analysis to test the 
hypotheses proposed in this study. Each experiment in the behaviour space consists 
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of 5 scenarios to represent 5 levels of expected influence of each experimental 
factor on the model outputs. 
 
 
Table 5.5 Variables’ feature in the simulation setup 
Agent’s attributes or behaviour 
Setup type 
Non-input  
(fixed/ constant) 
Input  
(experimental factor) 
Customer   
1.  Customer’s willingness to   
     compromise 
!  
2.  Customer loyalty  ! 
Manufacturer   
1.  Manufacturer’s willingness to  
     compromise 
!  
2.  Manufacturer survivability:   
      -  without supplier !  
      -  to work with undesired 
         supplier/s 
 ! 
3.  Duration of collaboration  ! 
4.  Maximum number of sourcing  ! 
5.  Manufacturer trust  ! 
6.  Manufacturer strategic movement  ! 
Supplier   
1.  Supplier’s maximum number of  
     partnerships 
 ! 
2.  Supplier survivability  ! 
3.  Supplier strategic movement  !  
4.  Supplier trust  !   
 
 Each scenario of the experiment is described as the following:  
-! the lowest extreme level of the experimental factor (scenario 1) 
-! the low level of the experimental factor (scenario 2) 
-! the medium level of the experimental factor (scenario 3) 
-! the high level of the experimental factor (scenario 4)  
-! the highest extreme level of the experimental factor (scenario 5) 
 The values of each experimental factor are determined hypothetically according 
to the practical experience towards the implementation of the experimental factor. 
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In other words, empirical judgement is adopted to set the experiments in the 
behaviour space. These experiments are run after the computer model had been 
verified and validated.   
 Driven by the main hypothesis in each research objective, the exploration 
process for each experimental factor was conducted dynamically. It means that the 
behaviour space was also defined in a dynamic approach. For example, for the 
duration of collaboration, it was presumed that the results would be different when 
the suppliers could link with more than one manufacturer, so the duration of 
collaboration was run under two levels of the supplier number of partnerships: 
single-link supplier and dual-link-supplier.  A discussion of behavioural space is 
presented in the next chapter. Each scenario in the behaviour space was run for 
1000 time units with 50 replications. A description of the experimental factor setup 
for the base run and the behaviour space is provided in Table 5.6. A detail of 
experimental design or behaviour space is presented in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.6 The base run and the behaviour space 
Experimental factor Base run Behaviour space 
 
1 
 
Duration of 
collaboration 
 
The shortest duration, to 
represent the no collaboration 
approach. 
 
5 scenarios, including the base run, 
with 2 levels of supplier number of 
partnerships:  
     - single-link suppliers, and  
     - dual-link suppliers. 
 
2 Number of 
partnerships 
The fewest number of 
partnerships  
(one-to-one relationships). 
5 scenarios, including the base run. The 
level of each scenario is varied 
proportionally and combined with the 
behaviour space of the supplier number 
of partnerships.  
Each scenario was run under 2 levels of 
duration of collaboration:  
     - extremely short duration, and 
     - extremely long duration. 
 
3 Trust   
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Experimental factor Base run Behaviour space 
 3.1 Manufacturer 
trust 
No trust. 5 scenarios, including the base run. The 
scenarios were run under 3 levels of 
duration of collaboration: 
     - extremely short duration, 
     - extremely long duration. 
 
 3.2 Supplier trust No trust. 5 scenarios, including the base run, with 
2 levels of duration of collaboration 
     - extremely short duration, and 
     - extremely long duration. 
 
 3.3 Customer 
trust/loyalty 
No trust/loyalty. 5 scenarios, including the base run. 
    
4 Individual firm 
survivability 
  
 4.1 Manufacturer 
survivability to 
work with 
undesired 
supplier/s 
The medium level of 
survivability. 
5 scenarios, including the base run, 
with several low levels of manufacturer 
strategic movements. 
 
 4.2 Supplier 
survivability 
The medium level of 
survivability. 
 
5 scenarios, including the base run. 
5 Probability of making 
extreme strategic 
changes 
(manufacturer 
strategic movements) 
No extreme strategic change. 5 scenarios, including the base run. 
    
 
 
Table 5.7 The scenarios for the manufacturer collaborative and competitive behaviour 
Experimental 
factor Scenario Computer setup Scale representation 
Duration of 
collaboration (D) 
D-1 4 time units Extremely short duration 
D-2 20 time units Short-medium duration 
D-3 40 time units Medium-long duration 
D-4 60 time units Long duration 
D-5 80 time units Extremely long duration 
Number of 
partnerships (P) 
P-1 1 link Single sourcing with a 
single-link supplier 
 P-2 2 links Dual sourcing with dual-
link suppliers 
 P-3 3 links Multi sourcing with 3-link 
suppliers 
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Experimental 
factor Scenario Computer setup Scale representation 
 P-4 4 links Multi sourcing with 4-link 
suppliers 
 P-5 5 links Multi sourcing with 5-link 
suppliers 
Manufacturer 
trust (TM) 
TM-1 0% Extremely disloyal 
TM -2 25% Disloyal 
TM -3 50% Moderately loyal 
TM -4 75% Loyal 
TM -5 100% Extremely loyal 
Supplier trust 
(TS) 
TS -1 0% Extremely disloyal 
TS -2 25% Disloyal 
TS -3 50% Moderately loyal 
TS -4 75% Loyal 
TS -5 100% Extremely loyal 
Customer loyalty 
(TC) 
TC-1 0% Extremely disloyal 
 TC -2 25% Disloyal 
 TC -3 50% Moderately loyal 
 TC -4 75% Loyal 
 TC -5 100% Extremely loyal 
Manufacturer 
survivability (SM) 
SM-1 12 time units Extremely low survivability 
SM -2 16 time units Low survivability 
SM -3 20 time units Average survivability 
SM -4 24 time units High survivability 
SM -5 28 time units Extremely high survivability 
Supplier 
survivability (SS) 
SS -1 1 time unit Extremely low survivability 
SS -2 2 time units Low survivability 
SS -3 4 time units Average survivability 
SS -4 6 time units High survivability 
SS -5 8 time units Extremely high survivability 
Probability of 
manufacturer 
strategic 
mutation 
M-1 0% No mutation 
M-2 2% Very less likely to mutate 
M-3 5% Less likely to mutate 
M-4 7% Likely to mutate 
M-5 10% Very likely to mutate 
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The main goal of the experimental design is to analyse the level of experimental 
factors (the scenario) that result in a better market performance than the base run. 
Despite the complexity caused by the agents’ interactions, a higher level of most of 
the experimental factors is expected to improve the supply chains performance, as 
observed from the market-level perspective. In particular, higher levels of the 
duration of collaboration, the maximum number of manufacturer’s partnerships, 
the manufacturer trust, the manufacturer survivability to work with undesired 
supplier/s, the supplier number of partnerships, the supplier trust, the supplier 
survivability, and the customer loyalty are expected to improve the agent’s 
existence in the long-term; whereas a higher likelihood of the manufacturers 
making big leaps (represented by higher manufacturer strategic movement) would 
lead to a shorter agent’s life. When each firm can exist longer – regarding the 
manufacturer and supplier agents, the number of supply chains in the market which 
can survive would be higher for a long run competition. As a result, the more 
customers able to be served by the available supply chains and the market 
performance (indicated by the supply chain fill rate) would be higher. Nonetheless, 
as previously discussed in Chapter 2, this expectation is difficult to realise due to 
the complexity in the real world. Hence, most of the hypotheses of this study are 
constructed against this static expectation. An illustration of the expected static 
effect is presented in Figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.7 The expected effect of the individual experimental factor to the outputs 
 
5.3.2 Model testing 
In the early stage of model building, one layer of the competition (manufacturer 
competition) was modelled. Once the interaction and the autonomy of the 
customers and the manufacturers had been verified, the supplier agent was then 
added. This section explains the process of verification and validation for the 
finished or completed model. The verification was attempted first; followed by the 
validation. Two validation approaches were employed to the base run of the model: 
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face validation and case-based explanation. The following sections provide details 
of the mechanism of verification and validation. 
 
5.3.2.1 Verification 
Verification is performed not only to ensure that the model is free from error, but 
also to demonstrate that the logic has been coded properly. This is the basis for 
concluding that the computer model has represented the conceptual model 
correctly. To inspect the code, the modeller’s logic is expressed in a single flow 
chart, and each process has to be explained by related parameters, for both the fixed 
setup (non-input) variables and the experimental factors (input). Several examples 
of the verification process are provided in Appendix G. 
 Figure 5.8 gives an overview of the logic flow of the computer model. This is 
expressed by relating it to the input variables for each process. The simulation starts 
from moving the manufacturer, which is influenced by the manufacturer strategic 
movement. This experimental factor determines the probability of the manufacturer 
creating a big leap. Then, the suppliers’ move depends on the degree of their trust 
to the manufacturers; they would follow the manufacturers’ competitive movement 
when they decide to be loyal to the company. After that, the manufacturers have to 
select a number of suppliers that suit their preference. The collaboration link 
between the manufacturer and the supplier is affected by the duration of 
collaboration, the maximum number of manufacturer’s partnerships, the 
manufacturer trust, and the maximum number of supplier’s partnerships. The 
customers can create a link to a manufacturer which has at least one link with a 
supplier. If the customer is loyal to the manufacturer, it will not switch its link to 
another manufacturer. As manufacturers and suppliers have a survivability limit, 
the life of each agent is evaluated, and the agents that have exceeded their 
survivability limit are removed. At the end of the simulation iteration, the model 
performance is measured. 
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Figure 5.8 The simulation procedure with the related experimental factors in each step 
 
Besides being influenced by the experimental factors, these steps in the model’s 
logic are also affected by the fixed setup. The process followed by the customers in 
creating links is controlled by the customer’s willingness to compromise. It also 
applies to the manufacturers when they have to select relevant suppliers with whom 
to collaborate; their criteria for supplier selection are ruled by the manufacturer’s 
willingness to compromise. Lastly, the supplier strategic movement affects the 
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supplier competitive movements and the manufacturer’s life is influenced by 
manufacturer survivability without a supplier. 
 
5.3.2.2 Face validation: Hotelling’s competition model 
The first validation approach conducted was face validation. By observing the 
emergent behaviour of the base run with different seed numbers, it was concluded 
that the result is plausible. The outcome resembles the result of the classical 
competition model developed by Hotelling (1929). As a consequence of 
competition, the competing agents (manufacturer and supplier) moved closer to 
each other and finished with an almost identical strategic position or almost overlap 
with the others.  
 In Hotelling’s competition model, also known as Hotelling’s law, the 
competition is presented in spatially-based terms. The model is often illustrated as 
a competition between two ice cream stalls which are located along the street. As 
both stalls continually attempt to optimise their market share, they keep changing 
their location until they come closer to the halfway point of the street (Robertson 
and Caldart 2009). In this model, the customers are assumed to have uniform 
preferences and always buy a product from one of the shops. The Hotelling’s 
competition model can be illustrated by the picture presented in Figure 5.9. 
 
 
Figure 5.9 An illustration of Hotelling's competition model  
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Compared to Hotelling’s model, the model developed in this study involves a 
higher complexity level. This is for the reasons outlined below. The model includes 
two layers of competition: competition among the manufacturers and among the 
suppliers. The supply chain perspective is applied to the model, such as the position 
adjustment for the manufacturer when it is linked with a less efficient and/or 
responsive supplier; thus, the manufacturer competition movement is limited by the 
supplier’s strategic position in the model. Moreover, the model allows the 
manufacturer and supplier to die, while in Hotelling's model, the firms continue to 
compete. Also, the customers in this study do not buy a product when none of the 
manufacturer stays within their willingness to compromise, whilst Hotelling’s 
model considers that the customers are always buying and select a firm to satisfy 
their demand. Lastly, this study assumes that the agents are bounded-rational, while 
Hotelling’s model assumes rational firms and customers. The only assumption in 
this study which similarly applies to Hotelling’s model is the fixed customer’s 
preference. 
The emergent behaviour that corresponds to Hotelling’s model is illustrated in 
Figure 5.10. This simulation result is obtained from the base run with a random 
number seed 10. At the initial condition (time unit 1, Figure 5.10.a), 10 
manufacturers, which represent 10 supply chains, are dispersed on the space and 
form eight clusters. Next, they converge to several particular locations and create 
fewer clusters while they are moving to explore new customers. This situation can 
be seen in Figure 5.10.b (time unit 1000), where the 5 remaining supply chains 
concentrate on two strategic locations. This convergence pattern applies to both 
manufacturers and supplier. 
Given the similarity of outcomes to Hotelling’s law, it can be concluded that 
the behaviour presented can be considered accurate in modelling competition 
behaviour. This also indicates that the model in this study produces a similar 
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outcome to Hotelling’s prediction even though the modelling assumptions are 
different.  
 
Figure 5.10 The convergence of the firms’ positions, which is similar to Hotelling’s 
prediction 
 
5.3.2.3 Case-based validation: the shakeout phenomenon 
The second validation approach performed in this study is case-based validation. 
This validity test explains the emergent pattern of the model by using a real case 
study found in the literature. The case that was confirmed by this approach is the 
decreasing number of supply chains in the market, which can reflect the supply 
chain failures. This outcome emerged consistently from the simulation run, not only 
in the base run but also in the behaviour space. Hence, it can be interpreted as the 
general effect of long-term competition - without considering new entrants to the 
market.  
 The model shows that competition reduces the number of firms both in extreme 
and non-extreme ways, and the extreme way is known as a shakeout. Shakeout is a 
term popularly used in business and management analysis to describe a 
phenomenon whereby there are massive exits of a number of companies in a market 
due to competition (Bonaccorsi and Giuri 2000). The failures of firms can be an 
effect of profit loss, declining demand, or acquisition by a competitor. This situation 
is very likely to intimidate all the firms in a market (Day 1997). It is also often 
CHAPTER 5 – THE AGENT-BASED MODEL 
141 
 
interpreted as the decline of industries due to decreasing demand, or the decline of 
interest of the customers in buying the product (Lieberman 1990). 
However, the results of the simulation indicate that a decrease in the number of 
supply chains and the supply chain fill rate in the market are solely caused by the 
competition, not by the customer. Assuming that the customer’s preference is fixed, 
the demand seems to decrease because the firms (the manufacturers) converge in 
particular strategic locations. When the strategic position of the manufacturers is 
similar to that of each other, the manufacturers serve a similar market segment; so 
the manufacturers share the market with each other. Moreover, as explained in 
section 6.2, the number of market clusters or market concentrations is very likely 
to decline during the competition. This leads to a lower supply chain fill rate as the 
firms become more similar to each other. In reality, this behaviour may often be 
interpreted as declining demand, as explained by Lieberman (1990). 
In this model, the firms who exit from the market are represented by the dead 
agents. A manufacturer agent will die if it has one of these following states: 
-! it does not have any link with the customer until it overs a particular time limit, 
which is assumed to be similar as manufacturer survivability without supplier. 
it does not have a supplier until it reaches the end of the length of the manufacturer survivability 
without supplier. 
-! it links with less efficient and/or responsive supplier for several ticks until it 
spans the limit of the manufacturer survivability to work with an undesired 
supplier.  
The first condition is much less likely to occur in the base run as the customer is set 
to be not loyal to the manufacturers; so the customers always choose the closest 
manufacturer to them as long as the manufacturer has a supplier. In other words, 
the manufacturers in the base run always have customers as long as they have links 
with a supplier. Meanwhile, a supplier agent would die if it cannot manage to find 
a manufacturer to collaborate with before it reaches the limit of the supplier 
survivability period.
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An example of an extreme shakeout resulted by the model is illustrated in Figure 
5.11. The figure shows the emergence of a monopoly obtained from the base run. 
The monopoly occurs in just 88 time units of the simulation. As 1 time unit can be 
interpreted as between 3 and 18 months (see section 5.2.1.5), the 88 time units can 
be implied to be between 22 and 132 years. Hence, it can be considered as a very 
short duration of the competition period.  
 
 
a)                           b) 
Figure 5.11 Competition can lead to one supply chain moving to domination:  
a) 10 supply chains exist at the initial condition (time unit 1);  
b) monopoly emerges at the end (time unit 88). 
 
The monopoly occurs when most manufacturers, who stay in less efficient and 
responsive positions, select suppliers who are far more efficient and responsive than 
them; whereas, these suppliers approach manufacturers who stay in more efficient 
and responsive locations. This means that these manufacturers (who are in more 
efficient and responsive positions) could not manage to find an appropriate supplier 
with whom they can collaborate. On the other hand, the other suppliers, who are in 
less efficient and responsive positions, move closer to the manufacturers. However, 
they fail to attract the target manufacturers as the firms have been linked with other 
suppliers who are far more efficient and responsive than them. These less efficient 
and responsive suppliers also stay too far beyond the willingness to compromise of 
the manufacturers who stay in in more efficient and responsive region and still have 
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no supplier to work with them. If this situation occurs continuously for a long time, 
it would potentially lead to a monopoly. Moreover, this situation would be likely to 
emerge when most of the suppliers are far more efficient and/or responsive than the 
manufacturers. 
In the base run, the occurrence of a monopoly is in 6 out of 50 cases (12%) of 
the results. The dominant result of the number of supply chains in the market at the 
end of the simulation is two supply chains (13 out of 50 replications), followed by 
three supply chains (12 out of 50 replications). The other results for the number of 
supply chains in the market are 5 and 6 supply chains, which for each of them occurs 
5 times out of 50 replications. These numbers resulting from the base run are 
presented in Figure 5.12.   
However, most simulation outcomes in this study very likely result in a high 
reduction in the number of supply chains in the market, which can be interpreted as 
the potential occurrence of a shakeout. This shakeout phenomenon reflects several 
case studies in business competition. This is likely to occur in an innovation-based 
competition strategy (Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 2000; Klepper and Simons, 2005).  
 
Figure 5.12 The number of supply chains in the market of the base run  
(9 = 3.18, s = 3.01) 
 
Several shakeout cases have been documented in the academic literature. In the 
PC industries, the number of PC manufacturers decreases from 832 to 435 firms in 
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the late 1950s. This figure is estimated to be as few as five firms for the long-term 
winners. For the television picture-tube industries, 40 television manufacturers 
existed and 74 picture-tube manufacturers operated in 1955. In 1959, 52 picture-
tube manufacturers remained, and this decreased to 7 picture-tube manufacturers in 
1997. In Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) equipment, 28 MRI manufacturers 
operated in 1982 and 20 MRI manufacturers remained in 1993. It is predicted that 
only two manufacturers would survive in the future (Day 1997). The UK steel 
casting industry also experienced the shakeout phenomenon; about 60 firms 
operated with about 90 plants in 1975, but 70,100 tonnes of capacity had been 
closed by the end of 1983 (Baden-Fuller 1989). 
 Shakeout also emerged to an extreme degree in innovation or technology-based 
competition. As reviewed by Klepper and Simons (2005), the manufacturers of 
automobile, tyres, televisions, and penicillin have experienced extreme shakeouts. 
The number of manufacturers of each product fell by 70% to 97% over three 
decades or more after it reached the peak. For automobile industries, the highest 
number of producers was in 1909 with about 270 automobile manufacturers. Then, 
it dramatically decreased to about ten manufacturers in 1967. For the tyre industries, 
the number of manufacturers peaked at about 275 firms in 1922 and then fell 
sharply to about 30 manufacturers in 1980. Meanwhile, for the television and 
penicillin industries, the highest number of manufacturers occurred in 1951 with 
about 90 manufacturers and in 1952 with about 30 firms respectively. Both 
industries then fell dramatically, with 20 manufacturers in 1989 for the television 
industries and 10 manufacturers in 1992 for the penicillin producers. Regarding the 
conformity of the results with real case studies, it can be suggested that the model 
developed in this study is valid to represent the real world. The declining number 
of firms in the market in the model can be seen in the actual cases.  
 Nevertheless, these shakeout cases can hardly be explained from the supply 
chain perspective. This is because the existence of the SCM paradigm is still 
relatively new compared to the period required for understanding the shakeout 
phenomenon. It has only been known for 34 years since it first appeared in the 
CHAPTER 5 – THE AGENT-BASED MODEL 
145 
 
academic literature in 1982 (Gibson et al. 2005). Moreover, most studies and 
analysis in SCM are conducted for analysing a particular supply chain, not for 
market analysis. Most of them only address the issue of the supply chain failures 
that occur in particular companies.  
On the other hand, the recent phenomenon of declining companies, such as 
Japanese electronics firms (Sony, Sharp, and Panasonic), is generally considered 
not to be related to supply chain failures. A widely held view is that this 
phenomenon regards marketing failure as the main causes rather than viewing the 
problem from the SCM perspective. For example, many business news stories point 
out that the reasons for the profit loss in Japanese electronics companies are the 
uncompetitive marketing approach (Fingleton 2012; Morris 2012; Wingfield-
Hayes 2013), which is considered the result of a mistake in taking a strategic 
movement (Hall 2009), and the rigidity of Japanese corporate culture which hinders 
the response speed of the firm (Ihlwan 2009; Hall 2009). The weakening Japanese 
economy is also regarded as a cause of rising costs in innovation and the 
manufacturing processes (Ihlwan 2009; Wakabayashi 2012). Even though their 
market share is decreasing, their supply chain practices are still regarded as 
successful. They even also have an excellent supply chain risk management which 
prevents them from suffering from supply disruptions, as caused by disasters or 
earthquakes.  
In addition to this, Nokia was also seen to experience lower market shares. It is 
widely understood that the factor that led Nokia to its past successes was its supply 
chain (McCray et al. 2011). Nokia was referred to as having the best supply chain 
practices by Reeves and Deimler (2011). It even won the Supply Chain 
Management Award for Excellence in Supply Chain Operations at the 
EXCHAiNGE conference in 2015 (Fourtane 2015). Nevertheless, Nokia was 
overtaken by its competitors, e.g. Apple and Samsung. 
Regarding its competition with Apple, Nokia was deemed to be in crisis by 2011 
(McCray et al. 2011). While Nokia claimed that their supply chain was strong, by 
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contrast, Satariano and Burrows (2011) found that Apple’s relationships with its 
supplier were not really congenial; the suppliers experienced high pressure in 
supporting Apple’s success.  
These findings imply that collaboration success may not guarantee the long-
term survivability of a supply chain. It also indicates that supply chain failures may 
not be solely caused by the inappropriate implementation of supply chain 
collaboration strategies. Because there is still no literature which incorporates the 
supply chain perspective in analysing industry shakeouts, this study initiates a new 
insight into understanding the issue, which considering SCM and strategic 
management perspective. 
 
5.3.3 The generic emergent outcomes: formation of the market structure 
In general, the simulation results indicate that competition can drive the formation 
of the market structure. The convergence pattern of the firms’ strategic positions, 
which appears like market clusters, tends to change during the competition. The 
changes apply not only to the number of market clusters created but also for the 
location of the clusters. The clusters are created because manufacturers and 
suppliers move dynamically whereas the customer preference or position remains 
fixed in the strategic space. This outcome emerges consistently in both the base run 
and the behaviour space. Thus, it indicates that the market structure is solely driven 
by the competition, not by customers.  
 An example of this situation is illustrated in Figure 5.13. The structure is 
illustrated as clusters formed by the competing firms. The cluster of the market is 
simply defined based on the visual interpretation of the simulation run. If two or 
several firms appear to share similar customers which can be served by these 
companies, these firms are considered to stay in a same market segment/clusters. 
In other words, if several customer links towards manufacturers create a circular 
shape, this circular configuration is considered to be one market cluster. 
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a)                                              b)                                           c) 
 
Figure 5.13 The market structure driven by the competition: 
a) Eight market concentrations at time unit 1;  
b) Four market concentrations at time unit 100;  
c) Two market concentrations at time unit 1000. 
 
 As can be seen in Figure 5.13, the market structure changed during the 
competition. At the initial condition (time unit 1, Figure 5.13.a), the supply chains 
are located randomly and create approximately seven to eight clusters. Then, both 
the manufacturers and the suppliers converge and create fewer clusters while they 
move continuously to explore new customers. In Figure 5.13.b, it is shown that the 
market clusters are reduced from eight clusters to four clusters at time unit 100. At 
the end of the simulation run presented (Figure 5.13.c, time unit 1000), the number 
of clusters reduces to two clusters or concentrations.  
 From this illustration, it is shown that a longer duration of competition tends to 
lead to a lower number of market clusters. The number of clusters decreases when 
the number of supply chains in the market which can survive in the long-term 
competition is fewer. As the firms are becoming more concentrated in a lower 
number of market clusters, as a consequence, the supply chain performance in 
fulfilling the demand, represented as supply chain fill rate, decreases over the 
simulation run. However, when the researcher tried not to allow the agents 
(manufacturer and supplier) to die during simulation, this pattern is still produced; 
both the number of clusters and supply chain fill rate decrease over the competition 
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period. This means that the pattern is solely driven by the competition, not by the 
customers. 
 In economic studies, the formation of the market structure is often related to 
innovation and firm size, as in the work of Scherer (1965), Loury (1979), and Acs 
and Audretsch (1987). The firms’ innovation level can be explained by the firms’ 
strategic position, particularly in those relating to the y-axis.  Nevertheless, this 
study assumes a homogeneous size for both manufacturers and suppliers; this 
suggests that the firm’s size may not be an essential driver for the formation of the 
market structure. Instead, the strategic positions of manufacturers and suppliers in 
the market determine this emergent pattern. This issue has not been discussed in the 
literature, particularly when it is addressed by regarding the supply chain context.  
 
5.4! Summary 
The agent-based model of supply chain competition and collaboration is shown in 
two forms of representation: a conceptual model and a computer model. The 
technical description of the problem situation is represented in the conceptual 
model, and the computer or simulation model was coded in NetLogo. The code was 
verified, and the emergent results were validated by employing two validity tests: 
face validation and case-based validation. The generic emergent output of the 
model is also presented, which is the formation of the market structure, which is 
followed by the decreasing demand fulfilment rate (the supply chain fill rate) over 
the competition period. This outcome has not been addressed in previous research, 
so the model provides a new perspective for understanding the effect of competition 
on the market structure. A further investigation of the model results is provided in 
the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6!   MODEL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
6.1!Introduction 
This chapter provides the results of the experiments. The experiments are designed 
based on the hypotheses proposed in this study, which is constructed in section 
5.3.1.2 (Chapter 5). The results are presented in two main sections: effect of 
competition on supply chains, and effect of firm strategy on supply chains. Both 
effects are examined at market-level. 
 
6.2! Effect of competition on supply chains and market structure 
(Hypothesis A) 
Hypothesis A is constructed to explore whether competition is beneficial to supply 
chains from market perspective. This hypothesis aims to obtain insights on the 
effect of competition on supply chains, which has conflicting opinions in the 
literature (section 2.3.2). This hypothesis is not tested using a statistical approach. 
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Instead, this hypothesis is concluded by investigating the generic results of all 
experiments. Two emergent effects are found to consistently appear in the overall 
experiments. One pattern shows the positive impact of the competition, while the 
other one reflects the negative effect. The detailed discussion of the positive and 
negative effect of competition is provided in the following subsections. 
 
6.2.1 Positive effect: Strategic alignment within supply chain 
The model shows that competition can narrow the strategic gap between the 
manufacturer and the supplier in a supply chain. The gap is measured by taking the 
average distance between the manufacturer and the supplier within their supply 
chain for all supply chains at the end of the simulation run. The distance is measured 
by the level of efficiency (x-axis) and responsiveness (y-axis). This gap is not 
related to the face validation (with Hotelling’s model) discussed in section 5.3.2.2. 
In the face validation, the gap discussed is focused on the distance between similar 
types of agents, while this section concentrates on the distance between different 
types of agents, with regards to the supplier and the manufacturer. 
To understand the emergence of this outcome, observation to the relationship 
between the strategic gap in the simulated supply chains and the number of supply 
chains in the market is performed. Figure 6.1 shows an example of the time series 
relationship pattern of the base run. The gap is presented in averaged Euclidean 
distance between the linked manufacturer and supplier for all supply chains. An 
illustration of how the gap between firms in supply chains measured in the 
Euclidean distance is shown in Figure 6.2. 
From Figure 6.1, it can be seen that the average gap between the manufacturer 
and the supplier in their supply chains tends to be smaller as the number of firms in 
the market decreases, although the pattern is not linear. The gap is relatively large 
in the first time unit of simulation, where the number of supply chains in the market 
is still ten; the average distance between the manufacturer and the supplier is 
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between 8.39 and 7.22 grids. As the competition “kills” the firms, the number of 
supply chains in the market drops gradually as well as the number of supply chains 
in the market. Even though the gap tends to fluctuate each time the number of supply 
chains in the market decreased (as can be seen in between time unit 57 and 72, 141 
and 155, 169 and 183, 197 and 211, and 239 and 253), these fluctuations occur only 
briefly before the gap is reduced again to smaller values than the previous time unit. 
It suggests that a higher rate of supply chains failures can assist better strategic 
alignment for supply chains during competition. 
 
Figure 6.1 The relationship between the gap between firms in supply chains and the 
number of supply chains in the market 
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Figure 6.2 An illustration of measuring the gap between firms in a supply chain in 
Euclidean distance 
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Nevertheless, the strategic alignment does not apply to all supply chains in the 
simulation. Although the gap decreases at market-level, several supply chains still 
have a significant capability gap between the manufacturer and supplier until the 
simulation ends, as shown in Figure 6.3. Moreover, the strategic alignment at 
market-level does not consistently occur in each experiment. This pattern is caused 
by the distribution of manufacturers and suppliers in the system during the 
simulation. When the suppliers highly concentrate on the strategic area which is far 
more efficient and responsive than most of the manufacturers, competition would 
very likely not be able to assist the strategic alignment of the supply chains in the 
market. 
 
The strategic alignment 
between the manufacturer and 
the supplier does not apply to 
this supply chain as the distance 
between the collaborating 
agents is large
 
Figure 6.3 Competition does not assist strategic alignment for all supply chains  
 
 Regarding these outcomes, it can be suggested that competition can be useful 
for supply chains. It can benefit supply chains in the market regardless the 
collaboration strategy which is implemented. It minimises the strategic gap between 
the manufacturer and the supplier within their supply chain. The gap reduction 
presented in the simulation result can be represented as a strategic compromise 
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improvement in aligning supply chain capability between firms in a supply chain. 
However, this benefit would not apply when most suppliers in the market are highly 
more efficient and responsive than the manufacturers. 
 In addition, an effective strategic alignment occurs when the number of supply 
chains in the market is lower than the initial state, it reflects that competition with 
a fewer number of firms does not always indicate an unfavourable situation for the 
market. This issue has not been studied in detail both empirically and theoretically, 
so this discussion has led to a new insight on the effect of competition on supply 
chains. 
 
6.2.2 Negative effect: Extreme shakeouts  
The extreme is represented by the extreme number of supply chains in the market, 
which can survive in the competitive market. The results can be classified into two 
categories; they are monopoly (one supply chain) and zero supply chain. These 
outcomes as well as the effect on the supply chain fill rate are discussed in the 
following subsections. 
 
6.2.2.1 Monopoly or one supply chain 
The first resulting extreme pattern of the simulation is the emergence of monopoly. 
It reflects a situation where only one supply chain remains in the system. Compared 
to zero supply chain, the occurrence of this outcome is slightly more frequent. 
Almost all scenarios of each experimental factor have the possibility to end with a 
monopoly. 
 The high occurrence of monopoly emerges in the highlighted values. They 
emerge in the extremely low level of individual manufacturer survivability, most 
probabilities of manufacturer's strategic leap, and high degrees of customer loyalty. 
All of these factors result in more than 70% event of monopoly – which is 
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considered as an extreme occurrence rate of monopoly. The extremely low level of 
individual manufacturer survivability (scenario 1) results in 76% of total 
occurrence or 38 out of 50 results. The strategic leap movements (represented by 
scenario 2, scenario 3, scenario 4, and scenario 5) also provide a high frequency of 
occurrence, which is between 56% (28 of 50 results) and 90% (45 of 50 results). 
Lastly, the high levels of customer loyalty provide 72% (36 of 50 results) and 96% 
occurrences for the high and extremely high level of loyalty respectively.   
 The emergence of monopoly is also addressed as a part of model validation, 
which is case-based validation (section 5.3.2.3). This situation is considered as an 
extreme shakeout, and it is likely to occur when most of the suppliers are far more 
efficient and responsive than the manufacturers. 
 
6.2.2.2 Zero supply chain  
The zero supply chain represents a situation where one manufacturer and one 
supplier remain in the market. However, they could not collaborate with each other 
as their strategic position does not allow the manufacturer to create a link with the 
supplier. Even though the occurrence of this event is far less frequent than the other 
emergent outputs, this resulting situation may occur in reality if no new firms enter 
the market during the competition. 
 This state emerges in several scenarios of several experimental factors. The 
factors that have high percentages of zero supply chain on the simulation results are 
the number of partnerships in long-term collaboration, and manufacturer strategic 
movement (strategic mutation, or big leap). For the number of partnerships, the 
zero supply chain occurs when the number of partnerships of both the 
manufacturers and the suppliers is more than one link. The proportion of this event 
is considerably significant: 52% (26 out of 50) in scenario 2 and scenario 5, and 
48% (24 out of 50) in scenario 3 and scenario 4. Meanwhile, the strategic leap leads 
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the zero supply chain emerges as much as 10%. This proportion increases 
significantly to 44% as the probability of manufacturer strategic mutation rises. 
An example of the emergence of zero supply chain is illustrated in Figure 6.4. 
It is obtained when the manufacturers allow making strategic leaps, with a 
probability of mutation 2%. At the initial condition (Figure 6.4.a), ten supply chains 
are located in random positions on the strategic space. At time unit 115 (Figure 
6.4.b), two supply chains left in the market and their strategic positions are close to 
each other. This situation makes them share their market. Then, at time unit 116 
(Figure 6.4.c), a manufacturer mutates to a new strategic space. However, as the 
mutated manufacturer has no loyalty to its supplier and its partnership with the 
previous supplier ends at time unit 117 (Figure 6.4.d). No supplier is suitable with 
the manufacturer’s preference and all suppliers stay outside its radius of willingness 
to compromise. The manufacturer could not be back to the previous strategic 
position, so it remains to have no supplier.  
At time unit 119 (Figure 6.4.e), the other manufacturer also mutates and being 
away from its current supplier. It mutates to a location that is close to the other 
manufacturer. Finally, at time unit 120 (Figure 6.4.f), the first mutated manufacturer 
and one supplier are died, since they have reached their survivability limit. At the 
same time, the other manufacturer has reached the end its collaboration with the 
remaining supplier. They could not create a collaboration link because the distance 
of all suppliers exceeds the manufacturer’s willingness to compromise.  
This resulting behaviour shows that if firms who remain in the market mutate 
at a relatively close period, it can threaten their existence in the market. This risk 
becomes apparent when the manufacturers decide to be far more efficient or 
responsive than their supplier, while they are not loyal to their supplier and the 
supplier has no ability to follow their strategic mutation.  
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Figure 6.4 Illustration of the occurrence of zero supply chain in the manufacturer 
strategic mutation – with 2% manufacturer probability of mutation. 
  
 
a) Time unit: 1 
The initial condition. 
b) Time unit: 115  
Two supply chains remain, and they stay in 
the same market concentration. 
c) Time unit: 116  
A manufacturer mutates to a new strategic 
position, while the other stays at the same 
market segment. 
d) Time unit: 117  
The manufacturer who mutated has lost its 
supplier. However, it still survives as it has 
survivability for a year. 
e) Time unit: 119  
The other manufacturer also mutates. 
f) Time unit 120  
One manufacturer and one supplier remain in the 
market. However, the supplier position is too far 
from the manufacturer, so no collaboration link is 
created. 
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6.2.2.3 Effect of extreme shakeouts on demand fulfilment rate  
As the number of supply chains which can survive during long-term competition 
decreases, the demand fulfilment rate in serving customer demand also reduces. 
This pattern can be measured from the deterioration of supply chain fill rate during 
simulation.   
 However, the model does not measure the deterioration rate of supply chain fill 
rate. As an approximation, the average of the initial value of supply chain fill rate 
in the base run, which is 45.4%, is used as a basis for measuring the decay rate of 
demand fulfilment for all experiments in the behaviour space. This initial value is 
compared to the median value of final supply chain fill rate to estimate the decay 
rate of demand fulfilment of each experimental factor. The median value of demand 
fulfilment is adapted because the measure is more reliable to use when the data 
distribution is potentially skewed and contains outliers. The decay rate of demand 
fulfilment for each behavioural factor is presented in Appendix I.  
 The most extreme decay rate occurs because the emergence of zero supply chain 
in these scenarios is extremely high, which is 53%. On the other hand, the highest 
occurrence rate of more than one supply chains, which occurs when the 
manufacturer trust of the supplier is extremely high (scenario 5 of the manufacturer 
trust), provides the lowest decay rate of demand fulfilment, which is 67.8%. 
However, this relationship does not consistently emerge to all experimental factors.  
 With regards to all of these results, it can be suggested that Hypothesis A is 
supported, which is: 
"Competition can be beneficial to supply chains, with respect to long-term 
competition". 
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6.3!Effect of competition and collaboration strategy on supply 
chains (Hypotheses B) 
 The competitive and collaborative behaviour that are examined in this study are 
the duration of collaboration, the number of partnerships, the trust, the individual 
firm's robustness (survivability), and the manufacturer strategic mutation. The 
hypothesis of each factor, along with information of the related section, is listed in 
Table 6.1. The detailed setup of each scenario of each experimental factor in the 
behaviour space is provided in Appendix D. As described in section 5.3.1.2 
(Chapter 5), the scenarios for each experimental factor are determined based on 
empirical judgement to represent the practical experience towards the 
implementation of the experimental factor. A summary and analysis of sensitive 
experimental factors are presented in the last part of this section. 
 
Table 6.1 The experimental design and the hypothesis 
Experimental factor Hypothesis Section 
1. Duration of 
collaboration 
Hypothesis B.1:  
Adopting longer duration of collaboration does not lead to 
a better long-term demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains. 
 
6.3.1 
2. Number of 
partnerships 
Hypothesis B.2: 
Having a lower number of partnerships does not improve 
long-term demand fulfilment and survivability of supply 
chains. 
 
6.3.2 
3. Trust   
3.1 Manufacturer 
trust of the supplier 
Hypothesis B.3.1: 
Higher manufacturer trust of the supplier does not enhance 
long-term demand fulfilment and survivability of supply 
chains. 
 
6.3.3.1 
3.2 Supplier trust 
of the 
manufacturer 
Hypothesis B.3.2: 
Higher supplier trust towards manufacturer does not 
improve long-term demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains. 
 
6.3.3.2 
3.3!Customer 
trust/loyalty 
towards 
manufacturer 
 
Hypothesis B.3.3: 
Higher customer loyalty towards manufacturer does not 
improve long-term demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains. 
6.3.3.3 
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Experimental factor Hypothesis Section 
4. Individual firm 
survivability  
  
4.1 Manufacturer 
survivability  
Hypothesis B.4.1: 
Higher manufacturer survivability does not enhance long-
term demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. 
6.3.4.1 
 
4.2 Supplier 
survivability  
 
Hypothesis B.4.2: 
Higher supplier survivability does not improve long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. 
 
 
6.3.4.2 
5. Manufacturer 
strategic mutation 
Hypothesis B.5: 
The competition approach suggested in strategic 
management, regarding the strategic mutation, does not 
improve demand fulfilment and survivability of supply 
chains for the long-term. 
 
6.3.5 
 
 
6.3.1 Hypothesis B.1: Duration of collaboration 
The duration of collaboration represents the length of the relationship between the 
supplier and the manufacturer. This factor is observed in five scenarios: extremely 
short duration, short-medium duration, medium-long duration, long duration, and 
extremely long duration. In the computer model, these duration levels are 
represented in 4 time units, 20 time units, 40 time units, 60 time units, and 80 time 
units. If the time unit is interpreted in the shortest possible period, which is 3 months 
(see Section 5.2.1.5); each scenario can be explicated as 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, 
15 years, and 20 years. A summary of the scenarios is presented in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2 The scenarios for the duration of collaboration 
  Duration of collaboration Scale representation 
Scenario D-1 4-time units Extremely short duration 
Scenario D-2 20 time units Short-medium duration 
Scenario D-3 40 time units Medium-long duration 
Scenario D-4 60 time units Long duration 
Scenario D-5 80 time units Extremely long duration 
 
CHAPTER 6 – MODEL RESULTS 
160 
 
 These experimental levels are selected empirically since the definition of the 
length of collaboration depends on the detail characteristics of the innovative 
products, particularly in relation to supply and demand markets. For instance, ten-
year collaboration for a supply chain (40 time units, in scenario D-3) can be 
considered as a medium duration, while other supply chain may regard it as a long 
duration. The analysis of the results for each situation of collaboration (with single-
link and dual-link suppliers) is presented in the following subsections. 
 
6.3.1.1 Collaboration with single-link suppliers 
In this section, the duration of collaboration is simulated under a situation where 
both manufacturers and suppliers only allow having one collaboration link (one-to-
one relationship). The boxplots of the supply chain fill rate in this situation is 
presented in Figure 6.5. A prominent feature is a longer duration of collaboration 
that does not improve the supply chain fill rate when the suppliers are linked with 
only one manufacturer. Only the medium-long-term collaboration (40 time units, 
scenario 3) has a slightly better supply chain fill rate than other scenarios, but it 
does not seem significant compared to the other scenarios. 
  
 
Figure 6.5 Boxplots of the supply chain fill rate with a line of mean values for all 
scenarios of duration of collaboration with single-link firms 
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 To assess the significant difference among these scenarios, a Mann-Whitney U 
test is performed and presented in Table 6.3. Ten comparisons with normal 
approximation are constructed, and Bonferroni correction is applied with 10% 
overall level of significance (the critical value is -2.33). Based on the comparison, 
it is suggested that the supply chain fill rate resulted in scenario D-3 is significantly 
higher than scenario D-5, but it is insignificant when it is compared with the 
remaining scenarios. Meanwhile, the results of other comparisons are suggested to 
be similar. In other words, only one comparison results in a significant difference 
from 10 comparisons created. 
 A similar pattern is resulted for the number of supply chains in the market. The 
duration of collaboration does not affect the number of supply chains in the market, 
which can be seen in Figure 6.6. The result of the Mann-Whitney U test (Appendix 
J, Table J.2) also suggests that all comparisons have no significant difference. 
 
Table 6.3  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of the 
duration of collaboration with single-link firms (with critical value -2.33 for Zstat) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(20 time units) (40 time units) (60 time units) (80 time units) 
1 Z stat = -0.25 Z stat = -1.05 Z stat = -0.89 Z stat = -1.5 
(4 time units) 
  
Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
2   Z stat = -1.59 Z stat = -0.75 Z stat = -1.39 
(20 time units) 
  
  Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
3     Z stat = -1.93 Z stat = -2.38 
(40 time units) 
  
    Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
    No significant 
difference 
Scen.3 > Scen.5 
4       Z stat = -0.67 
(60 time units) 
  
      Do not reject H0 
      No significant 
difference 
  
CHAPTER 6 – MODEL RESULTS 
162 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market with a line of mean 
values for all scenarios of duration of collaboration with single-link firms 
 
6.3.1.2 Collaboration with dual-link suppliers 
In this experiment, the duration of collaboration is simulated under the similar 
levels defined in Table 6.2. However, the scenarios are run under a setting in which 
the suppliers can link with up to two manufacturers at the same time. As the 
manufacturers are assumed to collaborate with one supplier only, the number of 
suppliers is set to be half of the number of manufacturers. The hypothesis of this 
experiment is that a longer duration of collaboration is not required to enhance the 
performance of all supply chains in the market when the suppliers link with more 
than one manufacturer. 
 Figure 6.7 illustrates the boxplots of the supply chain fill rate for the duration 
of collaboration with dual-link suppliers. The collaboration with dual-link suppliers 
can result in zero percent for the supply chain fill rate in most scenarios, which does 
not apply when the suppliers are only able to have a single-link. This situation 
occurs in the scenario D-1, scenario D-2, and scenario D-3. 
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Figure 6.7 Boxplots of the supply chain fill rate with a line of mean values for all 
scenarios of duration of collaboration with dual-link suppliers 
  
 For the mean and the median, the boxplots indicate that the longer duration of 
collaboration does not lead to a better supply chain fill rate. Surprisingly, the 
extremely short duration (scenario D-1) provides the highest supply chain fill rate, 
with 9.68% and 9.05% for the mean and the median respectively. Meanwhile, the 
extremely long duration results in the lowest supply chain fill rate, with 7.73% for 
the mean and 7.15% for the median.  
 When these results are assessed by using the Mann-Whitney U test, it is 
concluded that only scenario D-1 has a significantly higher supply chain fill rate 
than scenario D-2 and scenario D-5 (Appendix J Table J.3). The difference is 
insignificant when it is compared to scenario D-3 and scenario D-4. Meanwhile, 
scenario D-2, scenario D-3, scenario D-4 and scenario D-5 are considered to be not 
different significantly, in terms of supply chain fill rate. In other words, only 2 out 
of 10 comparisons have a significant difference for supply chain fill rate.  
 Figure 6.8 illustrates the feature of the number of supply chains in the market 
for this experiment. It can be seen that scenario D-1 results in the highest number 
of supply chains in the market. The mean of this scenario is 3.2 supply chains, and 
the median is 3 supply chains. Thus, it can be interpreted that a longer duration of 
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collaboration tends to reduce the number of supply chains in the market for the long 
run.  
 
 
Figure 6.8 Boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market with a line of mean 
values for all scenarios of duration of collaboration with dual-link firms 
 
 Meanwhile, the Mann-Whitney U test shows that scenario D-1 provides the 
most significant difference compared to other scenarios, but it is not different 
significantly from scenario D-2 (Appendix J, Table J.4). Scenario D-1 has a higher 
number of supply chains in the market compared to scenario D-3, scenario D-4, and 
scenario D-5. It means that only 3 of 10 comparisons have a significant difference 
for the number of supply chains in the market. Moreover, in the boxplots, the longer 
duration of collaboration represented by scenario D-4 and scenario D-5 is shown 
to prevent the market from ending with zero supply chains. Nonetheless, it is 
statistically considered insignificant when these scenarios are compared with 
scenario D-2 and scenario D-3. The logical explanation of these results is discussed 
further in section 7.4.1. 
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6.3.1.3 Comparison of results between the single-link suppliers and dual-link 
suppliers 
Figure 6.9 shows the comparison of supply chain fill rate between the output of 
collaboration with single-link suppliers and dual-link suppliers, for The scenarios 
for the duration of collaboration. The median is employed because the measure is 
more reliable than mean when the data does not follow a normal distribution. As 
can be seen in Figure 6.9, it indicates that collaboration with single-link suppliers 
(one-to-one relationships) seems to provide a higher supply chain fill rate than 
collaboration with dual-link suppliers. This feature increases as the duration of 
collaboration rises to medium-long duration (scenario D-3). Then, the difference 
declines when the duration of collaboration is set to be longer than scenario D-3. 
  
 
Figure 6.9 The supply chain fill rate comparison between single-link suppliers and dual-
link suppliers with various duration of collaboration 
 
 The comparison of the number of supply chains in the market of these 
experiments is shown in Figure 6.10. In scenario D-2, the collaboration with dual-
link suppliers has a higher median of the number of supply chains in the market 
than the result of collaboration with the single-link supplier. The difference between 
these medians is one supply chain. By contrast, the output of collaboration with 
single-link suppliers is higher than the output of collaboration with dual-link 
suppliers in scenario 3, and the difference between these values is 0.5 supply chain. 
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The remaining scenarios (scenario D-1, scenario D-4, and scenario D-5) have no 
difference median between these two situations. 
 
 
Figure 6.10 The comparison of the number of supply chains in the market between 
single-link suppliers and dual-link suppliers with different duration of collaboration 
  
 With respect to this outcome, in general, it can be suggested that the results 
confirm the hypothesis proposed (Hypothesis B.1), which is: 
"Adopting longer duration of collaboration does not lead to a better long-
term demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
When both the manufacturer and the supplier have one collaboration link (the one-
to-one relationships in the single-link supplier scenarios), the duration of 
collaboration has no significant impact on both demand fulfilment rate (the supply 
chain fill rate) and survivability (the number of supply chain in the market) for the 
long-term. Meanwhile, when the suppliers are allowed to collaborate with up to two 
manufacturers (the dual-link supplier scenarios), the extremely short-term 
collaboration provides a significant better demand fulfilment rate as well as the 
supply chain survivability. When these outcomes of single-link and dual-link 
supplier experiment are compared, the collaborations with the single-link supplier 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
1 2 3 4 5
Nu
m
be
r&o
f&s
up
pl
y&c
ha
in
s
in
&th
e&
m
ar
ke
t
Scenario D
Single/link1suppliers Dual/link1suppliers
CHAPTER 6 – MODEL RESULTS 
167 
 
(or the one-to-one relationships) tend to provide better demand fulfilment rate in all 
scenarios, although this does not apply to the supply chain survivability.  
 
6.3.2 Hypothesis B.2: Number of partnerships  
The number of partnerships is described as the maximum number of collaboration 
links for both manufacturers and suppliers. In the experiment, the number of 
supplier’s partnerships is defined as proportional to the manufacturer’s number of 
sourcing. For instance, when the number of partnerships is defined as 2 links, both 
the manufacturers and the suppliers are allowed to collaborate with up to two 
agents. 
 This experimental factor is observed in five scenarios: single-sourcing with a 
single-link supplier (1-link collaboration), dual-sourcing with dual-link suppliers 
(2-link collaboration), multi-sourcing with 3-link suppliers (3-link collaboration), 
multi-sourcing with 4-link suppliers (4-link collaboration), and multi-sourcing with 
5-link suppliers (5-link collaboration). The first scenario (1-link collaboration) is 
the most suggested collaboration approach in SCM, which also refers to one-to-one 
relationships, despite it can be regarded as an extreme approach for several firms in 
the real world. Scenario P-2 (dual-sourcing strategy) is also regarded as a 
recommended strategy in SCM as it minimises the risk of single-sourcing approach 
while taking advantage of having multi-sourcing. Meanwhile, when the number of 
partnerships is more than 2 agents, the scenarios are considered as multi-sourcing 
approach for the manufacturers, under a situation of many-to-many partnerships. 
Lastly. scenario P-5 (5-link collaboration) is considered as another extreme strategy 
of multi-sourcing because the number of suppliers and manufacturers are set to be 
highly limited in the market. These scenarios are summarised in Table 6.4, and the 
results of the simulation are presented in the next subsections. The logical 
explanation of these following results is presented in Chapter 7.  
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Table 6.4 The scenarios for the number of partnerships 
  Number of partnerships Scale representation 
Scenario P-1 1 link Single sourcing with a single-link supplier 
Scenario P-2 2 links Dual sourcing with dual-link suppliers 
Scenario P-3 3 links Multi-sourcing with 3-link suppliers 
Scenario P-4 4 links Multi-sourcing with 4-link suppliers 
Scenario P-5 5 links Multi-sourcing with 5-link suppliers 
 
6.3.2.1 In short-term collaboration  
Figure 6.11 presents the boxplots of the supply chain fill rate for all The scenarios 
for the number of partnerships. The results are generated under a situation of short-
term collaboration, set by 4 time units. The figure shows that the dual-sourcing 
with dual-link suppliers (scenario P-2) provides the lowest mean and median of the 
supply chain fill rate, which is 8.31% and 8.15% respectively. The highest mean 
(11.33%) and median (9.75%) are resulted in the scenario of multi-sourcing with 
4-link suppliers (scenario P-4). Another prominent feature of this boxplots is only 
single-sourcing with a single-link supplier (scenario P-1) does not result in the 
lowest extreme supply chain fill rate, which is 0%, while the others have the 
possibility to end with this undesirable output. However, the conclusions in the 
Mann-Whitney U test suggest that all scenarios have no significant different results 
(Appendix J, Table J.5).  
  
Figure 6.11 Boxplots of the supply chain fill rate with a line of mean values for all 
scenarios of the number of partnerships in short-term partnerships 
1 2 3 4 5 6
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1 2 3 4 5
Su
pp
ly
!c
ha
in
!
fil
l!r
at
e!
(%
)
Scenario P
CHAPTER 6 – MODEL RESULTS 
169 
 
 A similar pattern is also shown for the number of supply chains in the market 
of these scenarios, as presented in Figure 6.12. It can be seen that dual-sourcing 
with dual-link suppliers (scenario P-2) provides the fewest number of supply chains 
in the market, which is 2.58 supply chains for the mean and 3 supply chains for the 
median. Meanwhile, the multi-sourcing strategies (scenario P3, scenario P-4, and 
scenario P-5) have the highest number of supply chains in the market, which are 4 
supply chains for its median. Lastly, the single-sourcing with a single-link supplier 
(scenario P-1) is the only scenario that does not result in zero supply chain at the 
end of the simulation. However, the Mann-Whitney U test concludes that only 
scenario P-2 has a significant difference with other scenarios (Appendix J, Table 
J.6). Scenario P-2 has the significant lowest number of supply chains in the market, 
even though it is insignificant when it is compared to scenario 1. The significant 
difference, nevertheless, only applies to 30% of the total number of comparisons. 
It indicates that the level of significant difference is low.  
 
Figure 6.12 Boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market with a line of mean 
values for all scenarios of number of partnerships in short-term partnerships 
  
 These results suggest that collaborations with dual-link firms (scenario P-2) 
seem to provide less benefit to supply chains in the market than other cooperation 
approach, particularly in terms of supply chain survivability represented by the 
number of supply chains in the market. Surprisingly, the single-sourcing with a 
single-link supplier (scenario P-1) seem not to have significant differences in 
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outcome compared to multi-sourcing strategies or many-to-many partnerships. 
These results are counterintuitive with the common belief in SCM that suggests 
single-sourcing with a single-link supplier (one-to-one relationship) and dual-
sourcing as the best strategies to achieve supply chain success.   
   
6.3.2.2 In long-term collaboration  
Figure 6.13 illustrates the boxplots of the supply chain fill rate for all The scenarios 
for the number of partnerships in long-term collaboration (adjusted by 80 time 
units). It is clearly shown that single-sourcing with a single-link supplier (scenario 
P-1) results in higher supply chain fill rate. The mean of this scenario is 9.45%, and 
the median is 7.6%. Meanwhile, the dual-sourcing with dual-link suppliers 
(scenario P-2) and multi-sourcing with 5-link suppliers (scenario P-5) provide the 
lowest median of supply chain fill rate; both of them results in 0% for the median 
of supply chain fill rate. However, the lowest mean of supply chain fill rate is not 
resulted in these scenarios; it is generated by multi-sourcing with 3-link suppliers 
(scenario P-3), which is 3.83% for the mean. 
  
Figure 6.13 Boxplots of the supply chain fill rate with a line of mean values for all 
scenarios of number of partnerships in long-term partnerships 
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remaining scenarios are not considered significantly different with each other, with 
respect to the supply chain fill rate. 
Meanwhile, Figure 6.14 illustrates the boxplots of the number of supply chains 
in the market for the number of partnerships, under the long duration of 
collaboration. The pattern of the output shown in this figure is similar to the supply 
chain fill rate presented in Figure 6.9. The highest number of supply chains is 
resulted in scenario P-1 with 2.66 supply chains as the mean and 2 supply chains as 
the median. The mean tends to decline as the number of partnerships increases, 
while the median tends to be slightly more dynamic at between zero and one supply 
chain. Based on the assessment results of the Mann-Whitney U test, it is suggested 
that the highest number of supply chains in the market is resulted in scenario P-1 
(Appendix J, Table J.8). Meanwhile, the results in scenario P-2, scenario P-3, 
scenario P-4 and scenario P-5 are considered to be not different significantly from 
each other. 
 
Figure 6.14 Boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market with a line of mean 
values for all scenarios of number of partnerships in long-term partnerships 
 
6.3.2.3 Output comparison of the number of partnerships between short-term 
and long-term collaboration 
Figure 6.15 presents the comparisons of the median of the number of partnerships, 
between short-term collaboration and long-term collaboration. Surprisingly, it is 
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shown that short-term collaboration result in the higher median of supply chain fill 
rate for all scenarios of number of partnerships compared to the results in long-
term collaboration (section 6.2.2.2). In short-term collaboration, the median of 
supply chain fill rate is between 8% to 10% percent, while the range of this value 
is much wider in the long-term collaboration, which is between 5% and 7.8%. 
Moreover, the dual-sourcing strategy with dual-link suppliers (scenario P-2) under 
long-term collaboration provides an unexpected outcome. This scenario is 
considered as an alternative collaboration approach that is suggested in SCM 
instead of single-sourcing strategy. 
 
 
Figure 6.15 The comparison of supply chain fill rate between short-term and long-term 
collaboration, with different levels of duration of collaboration 
 
 A similar pattern is also resulted in the comparisons of the number of supply 
chains in the market (Figure 6.16). All scenarios with short-term collaboration 
provide a higher number of supply chains in the market than when they are run 
under long-term. The higher values occur consistently in multi-sourcing scenarios 
(scenario P-3, scenario P-4, and scenario P-5) with short-term collaboration. 
Nonetheless, as explained in section 6.2.2.1, these multi-sourcing scenarios are not 
different significantly from single-sourcing approach (scenario P-1) when short-
term collaboration is applied to all firms.  
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Figure 6.16 The comparison of the number of supply chains in the market between short-
term and long-term collaboration, with different levels of duration of collaboration 
   
 Based on these results, it can be suggested that the Hypothesis B.2 is supported, 
which is:  
"Having a lower number of partnerships does not improve long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
In general, the issue of the number of partnerships can be considered insignificant 
to the demand fulfilment rate, particularly when all firms implement short-term 
collaboration. However, it becomes significant when both manufacturer and 
supplier only collaborate with one firm (one-to-one relationship) in long-term 
partnerships. In other words, only one-to-one relationships with long-term 
collaboration provide significant benefit to both demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains. Nevertheless, the degree of the significant difference 
of this result is low. It suggests that this finding could turn to be insignificant when 
different model setup is applied, with respect to the initial number of manufacturers 
and suppliers. 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5N
um
be
r&o
f&s
up
pl
y&c
ha
in
s
in
&th
e&
m
ar
ke
t
Scenario P
In1short/term1collaborations In1long/term1collaborations
CHAPTER 6 – MODEL RESULTS 
174 
 
6.3.3 Hypothesis B.3: Trust 
The model represents trust as a degree of loyalty that applies to the manufacturer 
and supplier agents. It is examined by regarding the manufacturer trust of the 
supplier (the manufacturer trust), supplier trust of the manufacturer (the supplier 
trust), and customer loyalty towards manufacturer (the customer trust/loyalty). 
Each of these factors is examined under two collaboration situations: short-term 
and long-term collaboration. The simulation results of trust for each manufacturer, 
supplier, and customer are analysed in the following subsections. 
 
6.3.3.1  Hypothesis B.3.1: The manufacturer trust of the supplier  
The manufacturer trust is simplified as a probability of loyalty that the 
manufacturer agents would choose the same supplier agent as selected previously. 
The trust value is determined at five levels (or scenarios) of probability: 0%, 25%, 
50%, 75%, and 100%. These values are selected to represent these following 
degrees of manufacturer trust: extremely disloyal (extremely distrustful - 0%), 
disloyal (distrustful - 25%), moderately loyal (moderately trustful - 50%), loyal 
(trustful - 75%), and extremely loyal (extremely trustful - 100 %). These scales are 
chosen empirically to observe the effect of different levels of manufacturer trust on 
the model outputs. The variation of the variables for the scenarios is summarised in 
Table 6.5.  
 The expected outcome of this experiment is defined based on the duration of 
collaboration applied, with respect to short-term collaboration (4-time unit 
partnership) and long-term collaboration (80-time unit partnership). In short-term 
collaboration, it is expected that a higher manufacturer trust does not enhance the 
demand fulfilment rate when the firm prefers to have a short-term collaboration. In 
contrast, a higher manufacturer trust is expected to improve the performance of a 
single supply chain when the firm prefers to collaborate in long duration. 
Nevertheless, with regards to the gap of the existing work, these expectations 
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should turn to be opposite at market-level when all firms apply a similar trust 
strategy. The simulation results are provided in the next sections. 
 
Table 6.5  The scenarios for the manufacturer trust 
  
Probability of the 
manufacturer trust Scale representation 
Scenario TM-1 0% Extremely disloyal/distrustful 
Scenario TM-2 25% Disloyal/distrustful 
Scenario TM-3 50% Moderately loyal/trustful 
Scenario TM-4 75% Loyal/trustful 
Scenario TM-5 100% Extremely loyal/trustful 
 
In short-term collaboration 
Figure 6.17 shows the boxplots of the supply chain fill rate of manufacturer trust 
that is simulated under short-term collaboration (4-time unit partnership). As shown 
in the figure, both median and mean of supply chain fill rate have a slight U pattern 
as the probability of the manufacturer trust increases. Furthermore, the boxplots 
indicate that the 100% manufacturer trust (scenario 5) generates the highest supply 
chain fill rate and number of supply chains in the market, and the 0% manufacturer 
trust (scenario TM -1) provides the second highest outputs. Meanwhile, scenario TM-
2 (25%), scenario TM-(50%), and scenario TM-4 (75%) provide no significant 
difference effect, particularly on the supply chain fill rate. 
 The inferential analysis of the results also concludes that scenario TM-5 (100%) 
is significantly different from other scenarios. It provides the highest value of 
supply chain fill rate (Appendix J, Table J.9). Scenario TM-1 (0%) also has a 
significant difference from the others, but it is not different significantly with 
scenario TM -2 (25%). It has higher supply chain fill rate comparing to scenario TM-
3 (50%) and TM-4 (75%), but it is lower than scenario TM-5. Scenario TM-2 (25%) 
is significantly different from scenario TM-4 and scenario TM-5, but it is 
insignificant with scenario TM-1 and scenario TM-3. It provides higher supply chain 
fill rate than scenario 4, but it is lower than scenario TM-5. Scenario TM-3 (50%) is 
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only significantly different from scenario TM-1 and scenario TM-5. It has lower 
supply chain fill rate than scenario TM-1 and scenario TM-5. Lastly, the supply chain 
fill rate in scenario TM-4 (75%) is significantly lower comparing to scenario TM-1, 
scenario TM-2, and scenario TM-5. 
 
 
Figure 6.17 Boxplots of the supply chain fill rate with a line of mean values for all 
scenarios of the manufacturer trust  
 
 Meanwhile, the median and the mean of the number of supply chains in the 
market also depict a slight U shape, as shown in Figure 6.18. Both the median and 
the mean of the output decrease from 3 supply chains to 2 supply chains, from 
scenario TM-1 to scenario TM-2 (the manufacturer trust is 25%). The values do not 
change until the manufacturer trust is 75% in scenario TM-4. In the last scenario, 
both values increase to 4 supply chains. 
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Figure 6.18 Boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market with a line of mean 
values for all scenarios of the manufacturer trust with short-term collaboration 
 
 The Mann-Whitney U test concludes that scenario 5 (100%) provides a 
significantly higher number of supply chains in the market compared to other 
scenarios, particularly when it is contrasted to scenario TM-2, scenario TM-3, and 
scenario TM-4 (Appendix J, Table J.10). It is considered to be not different 
significantly when it is compared to scenario TM-1. Scenario TM-1 (0%) is only 
significantly different from scenario TM-3. It generates number of supply chains in 
the market than scenario TM-3. Finally, an insignificant difference between 
scenarios is concluded for the remaining comparisons. 
 
In long-term collaboration 
The data characteristics of the supply chain fill rate for this experiment is presented 
in Figure 6.19. In the long-term collaboration, which is set to 80 time units, the 
pattern of the mean and the median of supply chain fill rate for all scenarios of the 
manufacturer trust are no longer similar to a U-shaped. In this situation, the 0% 
manufacturer trust (scenario TM-1) results in the lowest supply chain fill rate, with 
a mean of 9.75% and median of 7.6%. Meanwhile, scenario TM-5 is consistent 
resulting in the highest outcome; its mean is 14.52%, and the median is 14.6%. The 
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Mann-Whitney U test also concludes that only scenario TM-5 is significantly 
different from other scenarios (Appendix J, Table J.11). It has a significantly higher 
supply chain fill rate, while the remaining scenarios are concluded to be not 
different significantly with each other.  
 
   
Figure 6.19 Boxplots of the supply chain fill rate with a line of mean values for all 
scenarios of the manufacturer trust with long-term collaboration 
 
 
 As for the supply chain fill rate, the number of supply chains in the market of 
this experiment also shows an almost similar pattern. The highest output is obtained 
in scenario TM-5, where the mean and median are 4.1 supply chains and 4 supply 
chains respectively. The lowest mean and median are generated by scenario TM-1 
and scenario TM-4; both scenarios have a mean of 2.66 supply chains and median 
of 2 supply chains. However, the analysis resulted from the Mann-Whitney U test 
concludes that only scenario TM-5 is significantly different from other scenarios 
(Appendix J, Table J.12).  It significantly provides the highest number of supply 
chains in the market compared to other scenarios. The boxplots of this output is 
presented in Figure 6.20. 
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Figure 6.20 Boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market with a line of mean 
values for all scenarios of the manufacturer trust with long-term collaboration 
  
Output comparison of the manufacturer trust between short-term and long-
term collaboration 
Figure 6.21 presents the comparison of the manufacturer trust in different levels of 
duration of collaboration, with respect to short-term and long-term partnership. 
Overall, the extremely loyal manufacturers (scenario TM-5 - the 100% trust) 
provide the highest supply chain fill rate. Surprisingly, the extremely disloyal 
manufacturers (scenario TM-1 - the 0% trust) results in the second highest supply 
chain fill rate in short-term. However, when the long-term collaboration is applied, 
scenario TM-1 provides the lowest supply chain fill rate, while scenario TM-5 still 
results in the highest outcome for this measure. 
 The intermediate levels of manufacturer trust (the 25%, 50%, and 75% trust) 
are not significantly different from the other scenarios, in terms of supply chain fill 
rate in short-term. Only when the manufacturers are disloyal (scenario TM-2 - the 
25% loyalty) in long-term collaboration can result in a better supply chain fill rate 
than the zero manufacturer trust. However, this result is insignificant when it is 
assessed by using the Mann-Whitney U test. 
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Figure 6.21 The comparison of supply chain fill rate between short-term collaboration 
and long-term collaboration, with different levels of duration of collaboration   
 
 Meanwhile, the comparison of the number of supply chains in the market in 
different levels of duration of collaboration is illustrated in Figure 6.22. As can be 
seen from the figure, the extreme manufacturer trust (scenario TM-5) consistently 
results in the highest number of supply chain in the market, while the extremely 
disloyal manufacturers (scenario TM-1) provides the second highest output for this 
measure. However, the value decreases when the long-term collaboration is 
applied. As for the supply chain fill rate, the intermediate levels of manufacturer 
trust do not provide a different number of supply chains in the market compared to 
extreme scenarios (scenario 1 and 5). Only the scenario of disloyal manufacturers 
(scenario TM-2 - the 25% loyalty) in long-term collaboration has a higher median 
than scenario TM-1, scenario TM-3, and scenario TM-4. However, this pattern is not 
significant when it is assessed by the Mann-Whitney U test. 
 Based on these output comparisons, it can be suggested that the manufacturer 
trust can only leverage the supply chains performance and survivability as a market 
when it is applied to the extreme high level of trust. The in-between levels of 
manufacturer trust do not seem to be beneficial to the supply chain over the long-
term, particularly when they are compared to the situation where all manufacturers 
have no trust towards the supplier. Thus, the hypothesis of this experimental factor 
is supported by the simulation results, which is: 
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"Higher manufacturer trust of the supplier does not enhance long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains ". 
 
 
Figure 6.22 The comparison of the number of supply chains in the market between the 
short-term collaboration and the long-term collaboration, with different levels of 
duration of collaboration 
  
6.3.3.2 Hypothesis B.3.2: The supplier trust towards supplier (supplier trust) 
Similar to the manufacturer trust, the supplier trust is a simplified representation 
of supplier trust to the manufacturer. In the computer model, this factor is defined 
as a probability of the suppliers to follow the manufacturer’s movement. When a 
supplier decides to be loyal to the manufacturer whom it links with, it will move 
closer to the manufacturer strategic position. This factor is also simulated under two 
levels of the duration of collaboration: short-term collaboration (4 time units) and 
long-term collaboration (80 time units). 
 Five scenarios are defined in this experiment. The first is the 0% supplier trust 
to reflect extremely disloyal (distrustful) suppliers. The second scenario is 25% 
trust to represent low trust or disloyal suppliers. The third scenario is defined as 
50% trust to present moderately loyal suppliers with a medium level of trust. Lastly, 
scenario TS-4 and scenario TS-5 are defined as, respectively, the 75% trust to 
represent loyal suppliers and the 100% trust to reflect extremely trustful/loyal 
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suppliers. These scenarios are summarised in Table 6.6, and the results are provided 
in the following subsections. 
Table 6.6 The scenarios for the supplier trust 
  Probability of the supplier trust Scale representation 
Scenario TS-1 0% Extremely disloyal/distrustful 
Scenario TS-2 25% Disloyal/distrustful 
Scenario TS-3 50% Moderately loyal/trustful 
Scenario TS-4 75% Loyal/trustful 
Scenario TS-5 100% Extremely loyal/trustful 
 
In short-term collaboration  
From Figure 6.23, it can be seen that there is no different outcome between the 
scenarios for the supplier trust, in terms of supply chain fill rate. The mean is 
relatively consistent at between 9.4% and 10.8%, and the median is at between 
9.15% and 9.85%. A similar conclusion is also drawn by the result of the Mann-
Whitney U test, summarised in Appendix J, Table J.13. The test shows that all 
scenarios are not different significantly with each other. It means that the supplier 
trust has no significant influence on the supply chain fill rate in the market. 
 
 
Figure 6.23 Boxplots of the supply chain fill rate with a line of mean values for all 
scenarios of the supplier trust, with short-term collaboration 
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 The number of supply chains in the market also has an identical interpretation. 
As shown in Figure 6.24, the boxplots indicate that there is no different between 
the scenarios. This is confirmed by the conclusion of the Mann-Whitney U test, 
which results in no significant difference for all scenarios (Appendix J, Table J.14). 
It suggests that when short-term collaboration is preferred in the market, having 
loyal suppliers would provide no benefit to the supply chains when this is observed 
from a market-level perspective. 
 
 
Figure 6.24 Boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market with a line of mean 
values for all scenarios of the supplier trust, with short-term collaboration 
 
In long-term collaboration 
Figure 6.25 illustrates the boxplots of the supply chain fill rate of supplier trust in 
a long-term collaboration. In the short-term collaboration, there is no prominent 
feature which shows any significant effect of supplier trust on the supply chain fill 
rate. The Mann-Whitney U test also suggests that the resulting supply chain fill 
rates are not different significantly among the scenarios (Appendix J, Table J.15). 
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Figure 6.25 Boxplots of the supply chain fill rate with a line of mean values for all 
scenarios of the supplier trust with long-term collaboration 
 
 
 Meanwhile, the boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market is 
presented in Figure 6.26. It is shown that the 25% supplier trust (scenario TS-2) 
provides the highest mean of the number of supply chains in the market, but its 
median (2 supply chains) is relatively not different from the other scenarios. This 
interpretation is then inferred using the Mann-Whitney U test, which confirms that 
scenario TS-2 generates a higher number of supply chains in the market at the end 
of the simulation (Appendix J, Table J.16). Nonetheless, it is only different 
significantly from scenario TS-3 (the 50% supplier trust) and scenario TS-5 (the 
100% supplier trust), whereas scenario TS-3 and scenario TS-5 are considered to be 
not different significantly from scenario TS-1 (the 0% supplier trust) and scenario 
TS-4 (the 75% supplier trust). It means that the supplier trust has a very low 
significant impact on supply chains. 
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Figure 6.26 Boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market with a line of mean 
values for all scenarios of the supplier trust with long-term collaboration 
  
Comparison of the supplier trust results in short-term and long-term 
collaboration 
Figure 6.27 compares the median of the supply chain fill rate of the supplier trust 
resulted in short-term and long-term collaboration. It can be seen that short-term 
collaboration provides higher supply chain fill rate than long-term collaboration 
for most scenarios of the supplier trust, particularly with respect to scenario TS-1, 
scenario TS-2, scenario TS-3, and scenario TS-5. This feature also emerges in the 
comparison of the number of supply chains in the market shown in Figure 6.28. 
  
 
Figure 6.27 The comparison of supply chain fill rate between short-term collaboration 
and long-term collaboration, with different levels of duration of collaboration 
1 2 3 4 5 6
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 2 3 4 5
Nu
m
be
r!o
f!s
up
pl
y!
ch
ai
ns
!
in
!th
e!
m
ar
ke
t
Scenario TS
0
5
10
15
0 25 50 75 100
Su
pp
ly
&ch
ai
n&
fil
l&r
at
e&
(%
)
Supplier(trust((%)
Short/term1collaborations Long/term1collaborations
CHAPTER 6 – MODEL RESULTS 
186 
 
  
 
Figure 6.28 The comparison of supply chain fill rate between short-term collaboration 
and long-term collaboration, with different levels of duration of collaboration 
 
 Based on these results, it can be interpreted that there is no significant 
interaction between the supplier trust and the duration of collaboration. This is 
shown by the limited intersections between the resulting outcomes. This is 
unexpected as a higher supplier trust is supposed to be more beneficial to supply 
chains when a longer duration of collaboration is applied.  
 With respect to this result, it can be suggested that Hypothesis B.3.2 is 
supported, which is: 
"Higher supplier trust towards manufacturer does not improve long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
Even though in the long-term collaboration, the non-extreme level of low supplier 
trust (scenario TS-2) has a better result in the number of supply chains in the market 
than the other scenarios, this conclusion does not apply to all the comparison results. 
This is because all simulation results indicate that the supplier trust has insignificant 
influence on both supply chain fill rate and number of supply chains in the market. 
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6.3.3.3 Hypothesis B.3.3: The customer loyalty towards manufacturer (the 
customer trust/loyalty) 
The customer trust/loyalty is employed to represent demand market behaviour that 
provides uncertainties to supply chains. In the computer model, it is defined as the 
probability that a customer will select the same manufacturer as previously chosen. 
The experiment considers five levels of customer loyalty. It represents extremely 
disloyal customers (0%), disloyal customers (25%), moderately loyal customers 
(50%), loyal customers (75%), and extremely loyal customers (100%). The 
scenarios are provided in Table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.7 The scenarios for the customer loyalty 
  Probability of the customer loyalty 
Scale 
representation 
Scenario TC-1 0% Extremely disloyal 
Scenario TC-2 25% Disloyal 
Scenario TC-3 50% Moderately loyal 
Scenario TC-4 75% Loyal 
Scenario TC-5 100% Extremely loyal 
 
 The boxplot shown in Figure 6.29 compares the supply chain fill rate for all 
scenarios of the customer trust/loyalty. Overall, scenario TC-5 (the 100% customer 
loyalty) has the highest mean and median of supply chain fill rate, and scenario TC-
4 (the 75% customer loyalty results in the lowest mean and median. In scenario 5, 
the mean is 15.4%, and the median is 13.9% while scenario TC-4 provides 7.7% 
and 7.5% for the mean and the media consecutively.  
As it can be seen in Figure 6.29, the mean and the median of the scenarios 
follow a flat u-shaped pattern. From scenario 1 (the 0% customer loyalty) to 
scenario TC-4 (the 75% customer loyalty), there is a slight downward trend for both 
the mean and the median of supply chain fill rate as the degree of customer loyalty 
rises. Then, the trend is reversed when customer trust/loyalty is extremely high 
(scenario TC-5 - 100%). Even though scenario TC-5 has a higher outcome than other 
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scenarios, 96% results end with monopoly (one supply chain). Scenario TC-5 also 
has an extreme value of supply chain fill rate (43.4%) that is obtained from 
monopoly outcome. It suggests that when the monopoly comes when the customers 
are extremely loyal to the firm, it can enhance the supply chain fill rate in the 
market. 
 
 
Figure 6.29 Boxplots of the supply chain fill rate with a line of mean values for all 
scenarios of the customer trust/loyalty 
 
 The results of the Mann-Whitney U test point that scenario TC-5 has the most 
significant difference compared to the other scenarios (Appendix J, Table J.17). It 
provides the highest supply chain fill rate, and the result is significant compared to 
the other scenarios. Meanwhile, the lowest supply chain fill rate results by scenario 
TC-4, but it is not different significantly from scenario TC-3.  
Meanwhile, the number of supply chains in the market has a downward trend 
as loyalty increases. The highest mean and median of the number of supply chains 
in the market is 3.14 and three supply chains respectively obtained in scenario TC-
1 (the 0% customer loyalty). The mean decreases to 2.44 supply chains and the 
median is three supply chains in scenario TC-2 (the 25% customer loyalty). In 
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scenario TC-3 (the 50% customer loyalty), the mean is 1.94 supply chains, and the 
median is two supply chains. It drops again to 1.32 supply chains and one supply 
chain for the mean and the median in scenario TC-4 (the 75% customer loyalty). 
Lastly, the mean decreases to 0.96 supply chains and the median remains the same 
in scenario 5 (the 100% customer loyalty). The figure also indicates that the data 
distribution of the output, shown by the size of the boxplot, also tends to be smaller 
as the degree of customer loyalty increases. It is shown in the boxplots presented in 
Figure 6.30. 
 
 
Figure 6.30 Boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market with a line of mean 
values for all scenarios of the customer loyalty 
 
This decreasing pattern for the supply chain fill rate and the number of supply 
chains in the market indicates that the occurrence of monopoly tends to be more 
frequent as customer trust/loyalty increases. Moreover, scenario TC-5 results in only 
two values: zero and one supply chains. Therefore, a proportion presentation is 
required to obtain more detail information for comparing the scenarios. 
The analysis of the Mann-Whitney U test of this experiment concludes that no 
loyal customers (scenario TC-1 – 0%) provide a significantly higher number of 
supply chains in the market for a long-term than customers with any degree of 
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loyalty (Appendix J, Table J.18). It has a consistent conclusion of significant 
difference between the outputs of the number of supply chains in the market with 
all other levels of customer loyalty. The Mann-Whitney test also indicates that all 
scenarios of the customer trust/loyalty are different significantly with each other, 
but scenario TC-2 and scenario TC-3 are considered to have no significant 
difference. 
Based on the results of supply chain fill rate and the number of supply chains 
in the market, it indicates that no loyal customers can lower the number of supply 
chain failures in the market than customers with any degree of loyalty. However, it 
does not provide the highest supply chain fill rate and is considered to be not 
different significantly from several intermediate levels of customer loyalty 
(scenario TC-2 and scenario TC-3).  
 Considering the hypothesis stated about customer loyalty (Hypothesis B.3.3), it 
can be suggested that the result confirms the hypothesis that 
"Higher customer loyalty towards manufacturer does not improve long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
In fact, the results show that the higher customer loyalty strongly affects the supply 
chain survivability (represented by the number of supply chains in the market) in a 
negative way unless the loyalty does not exist at all.  
 
6.3.4 Hypothesis B.4: Individual firm survivability  
This factor aims to investigate the effect of the manufacturer survivability and the 
supplier survivability during long-term competition. Each observation refers to 
Hypothesis B.4.1 and Hypothesis B.4.2 respectively. 
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6.3.4.1 Hypothesis B.4.1: Manufacturer survivability  
The manufacturer survivability described in the experiments is the manufacturer’s 
ability to cope with losses when it collaborates with less efficient and/or responsive 
supplier/s. In the computer model, the variable is denoted as 
SurvivabilityWithUndesiredSupplier and defined as the number of time units that 
the manufacturer can survive to work with undesired supplier/s. 
 The factor is simulated under five conditions: extremely low survivability (12 
time units), low survivability (16 time units), average survivability (20 time units), 
high survivability (24 time units), and extremely high survivability (28 time units). 
The interpretation of these scenarios is described by considering time unit as the 
possible shortest time in allowing the firms to create a slight strategic change. 
Hence, each scenario can be implied at least 3 years, 4 years, 5 years, 6 years, and 
7 years consecutively. A summary of these scenarios is presented in Table 6.8. 
Scenario SM-3 is empirically considered as the base run of the experiment as 5 years 
is assumed to be a moderate degree of survivability.  
 
Table 6.8 The scenarios for the manufacturer survivability 
  
Level of the 
manufacturer 
survivability  
Scale representation 
Scenario SM-1 12 time units Extremely low survivability 
Scenario SM-2 16 time units Low survivability 
Scenario SM-3 20 time units Average survivability 
Scenario SM-4 24 time units High survivability 
Scenario SM-5 28 time units Extremely high survivability 
 
 
 The results of this experiment indicate that scenario SM-1 (12 time units) 
provides most significant difference against other scenarios, except with scenario 
SM-2 (16 time units). It has the significant lowest supply chain fill rate in this 
experimental set, particularly when it is compared with scenario SM-2 (16 time 
unit), scenario SM-3 (20 time units), scenario SM-4 (24 time units), and scenario SM-
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5 (28 time units). These scenarios (SM-2, SM-3, SM-4 and SM-5) are also considered 
not significantly different.  
 Figure 6.31 shows the boxplots presentation of the simulation results for supply 
chain fill rate. It can be seen that scenario SM-1 (12 time units) provides the lowest 
supply chain fill rate both for the mean and median. The mean of this scenario is 
8.03% and the median is 7.2%. It also has the densest output distribution compared 
to the other scenarios. Meanwhile, scenario SM-2 (16 time units), scenario SM-3 (20 
time units), scenario SM-4 (24 time unit), and scenario SM-5 (28 time units) seem to 
be similar. The distribution of the output is also relatively not different in these 
scenarios.  
 
 
Figure 6.31 Boxplots of the supply chain fill rate with a line of mean values for all 
scenarios of the manufacturer survivability 
 
 However, compared to the others, scenario SM-2 and scenario SM-3 are 
considered to be different because there is no 0% in supply chain fill rate, while 
others are possible to end with zero supply chain fill rate. The occurrence of zero 
supply chain in scenario SM-1 is 4% (2 out of 50 results), while in both scenario 
SM-4 and scenario SM-5 is 2% (1 out of 50 results). Meanwhile, the results of the 
Mann-Whitney U test suggest that the manufacturers with an extremely low 
survivability to work with a less efficient and/or responsive supplier will lead to a 
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lower the supply chain fill rate in the system (Appendix J, Table J.19). Meanwhile, 
the higher manufacturer survivability (scenario SM-2 to scenario SM-5) does not 
seem to affect supply chain fill rate. 
Similarly, as shown in Figure 6.32, the lowest mean and median of the number 
of supply chains in the market are given by scenario SM-1, while the highest 
outcome is in scenario SM-5. The values have an upward trend as the manufacturer 
survivability increases, although the result of the Mann-Whitney U test for the 
number of supply chains in the market of manufacturer survivability suggests that 
only scenario SM-1 and scenario SM-2 are significantly different from other 
scenarios (Appendix J, Table J.20). Scenario 1 provides the lowest result, followed 
by scenario SM-2 as resulting in the second lowest value for the number of supply 
chains in the market. Scenario SM-3, scenario SM-4, and scenario SM-5 are 
considered provides no difference output with each other. It suggests that a higher 
manufacturer’s individual survivability does not consistently result in higher supply 
chain’s survivability; a medium to high level of manufacturer’s individual 
survivability would provide a not different effect to the supply chain’ survivability.  
 
 
Figure 6.32 Boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market with a line of mean 
values for all scenarios of the manufacturer survivability 
 
 With respect to this outcome, the hypothesis of this study is supported by the 
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"Higher manufacturer survivability does not enhance long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
The manufacturer survivability is not significant to the supply chains when it is 
evaluated at medium to high level, whereas the extremely low survivability has a 
significant impact on both supply chain fill rate and the number of supply chains in 
the market. 
 
6.3.4.2 Hypothesis B.4.2: Supplier survivability  
The supplier survivability is defined as the supplier’s ability to cope with 
uncertainties in supply chains. One source of uncertainties for suppliers comes from 
the demand side, including failure to maintain the manufacturer as their customer. 
Thus, the supplier survivability examined in this study focuses on the supplier’s 
ability to survive with the loss when it does not establish a partnership with the 
manufacturer. In the computer model, it is defined as the length of the supplier to 
survive in time unit when it does not have a link with the manufacturer agent at all. 
In the base run, the supplier survivability is set to 4 time units or one year. Five 
levels of supplier survivability are considered, which form the scenarios presented 
in Table 6.9.  
 
Table 6.9 The scenarios for the supplier survivability 
  The level of supplier survivability  Scale representation 
Scenario SS-1 1 time unit Extremely low survivability 
Scenario SS-2 2 time units Low survivability 
Scenario SS-3 4 time units Average survivability 
Scenario SS-4 6 time units High survivability 
Scenario SS-5 8 time units Extremely high survivability 
 
 The boxplots presented in Figure 6.33 shows that no particular pattern emerges 
for the mean and the median of supply chain fill rate of these scenarios. Even 
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though the mean has a slight increase as the supplier survivability rises, the 
difference between the results is not significant. The conclusions in the Mann-
Whitney U test also indicate that there is no significant difference between the 
scenarios, unless between scenario SS-1 and scenario SS-5 (Appendix J, Table J.21). 
The supply chain fill rate in scenario SS-1 is only significantly lower than scenario 
SS-5, but it is not different significantly from other scenarios.  Meanwhile, as 
shown in Figure 6.34 the mean of the number of supply chains in the market 
increases as the supplier survivability rises, while the median only increases from 
scenario SS-1 to scenario SS-3. The mean and median of scenario SS-1 are the lowest 
values compared to other scenarios. It suggests that the extreme low survivability 
can lead to more supply chain failures in the market. However, the maximum value 
for this scenario is 7 supply chains, which is higher than the maximum value in 
scenario SS-2 and scenario SS-3.  
 
 
Figure 6.33 Boxplots of the supply chain fill rate with a line of mean values for all 
scenarios of the supplier survivability 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1 2 3 4 5
Su
pp
ly
!c
ha
in
!
fil
l!r
at
e!
(%
)
Scenario SS
CHAPTER 6 – MODEL RESULTS 
196 
 
 
Figure 6.34 Boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market and a line 
representing mean values for each scenario of the supplier survivability 
  
 The Mann-Whitney U test of the supplier survivability for the number of supply 
chains in the market confirms the conclusion, which is only scenario SS-1 has the 
most significant difference compared to other scenarios, although it is not different 
significantly from scenario SS-2 (Appendix J, Table J.22). Scenario SS-1 is 
concluded to be significantly lower than scenario SS-3, scenario SS-4, and scenario 
SS-5 the number of supply chains in the market. Regarding these results, Hypothesis 
B.4.2 is considered supported, which is: 
"Higher supplier survivability does not improve long-term demand fulfilment 
and survivability of supply chains". 
 
6.3.5 Hypothesis B.5: Manufacturer strategic mutation 
The competition approach suggested in strategic management, regarding the big 
leap or strategic mutation, does not consistently enhance demand fulfilment rate 
and survivability for a long term; it can lead the supply chains to be more vulnerable 
in the market. 
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 The manufacturer strategic mutation reflects a manufacturer competitive 
behaviour in changing its strategic position. This factor is presented as the 
probability of the manufacturer agents in making a big leap when they move on the 
NetLogo space, and defined as MutationProbability in the computer model. This 
variable can also be represented as the risk attitudes of manufacturers in the market 
in changing their strategy.  
 The hypothesis of this experimental factor is that the performance of all supply 
chains in the market is lower when all manufacturers are more likely to create a big 
leap in their strategic change. This expectation is intuitively judged based on many 
doubts from supply chain practitioners on the benefits of this strategy to the supply 
chain stability and sustainability.   
 This variable is observed by varying the value into five levels or scenarios of 
probability: 0%, 2%, 5%, 7%, and 10%. These values are considered as a 
representation of these following manufacturer characteristics: no mutation (0%), 
very less likely to mutate (2%), less likely to mutate (5%), likely to mutate (7%), 
and very likely to mutate (10%). These scales are chosen empirically to obtain 
intuitions for testing Hypothesis B.5, which is  
“The competition approach suggested in strategic management, regarding the 
strategic mutation, does not improve demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains for the long-term.”  
The detail of the scenarios is summarised in Table 6.10.  
 The interpretation of the scales used is illustrated as follows. The 2% 
manufacturer strategic mutation probability, for example, represents the likelihood 
of a manufacturer decides to mutate. As a simple illustration, a manufacturer is 
expected to mutate at least twice within 100 time units. As one time unit is assumed 
to represent at least 3 months, the mutation is supposed to be twice within (at least) 
75 years. 
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Table 6.10 The scenarios for the manufacturer strategic mutation 
  
Probability of 
manufacturer strategic 
mutation 
Scale representation 
Scenario M-1 0% No mutation 
Scenario M-2 2% Very less likely to mutate 
Scenario M-3 5% Less likely to mutate 
Scenario M-4 7% Likely to mutate 
Scenario M-5 10% Very likely to mutate 
  
 Meanwhile, the 10% manufacturer strategic mutation probability reflects the 
very high or extreme probability for a company to change its strategic position 
dramatically. By the probability, as a simple illustration, the manufacturer is 
expected to mutate ten times within 100 time units, or once within 10 time units. If 
one time unit is described as 3 months, a mutation is supposed to occur in a 
manufacturer within 7.5 years. The probabilities defined in between 0% and 10% 
are considered to represent the intermediate probability between the extreme 
situations (the 0% and 10% probability of manufacturer strategic mutation). 
 The boxplots presented in Figure 6.35 illustrate that both the mean and the 
median of the supply chain fill rate decreases as the probability of manufacturer 
strategic mutation increases. However, the comparison analysis obtained from the 
Mann-Whitney U test concludes that only scenario M-1 and scenario M-5 are 
significantly different from others (Appendix J, Table J.23). The supply chain fill 
rate of scenario M-1 is significantly higher than other scenarios, whilst scenario M-
5 has the lowest supply chain fill rate. Scenario M-2, scenario M-3, and scenario 
M-4 are regarded to be no different significantly with each other. 
  As can be seen in Figure 6.36, the probability of manufacturer strategic 
mutation significantly affects the number of supply chains in the market. When the 
manufacturers do not mutate or change their strategic position in an extreme way 
(scenario M-1 – 0%), the behaviour provides the highest mean and median for the 
number of supply chains in the market, which are 3.18 and 3 respectively. The 
median of scenario M-2 (the 2% probability of manufacturer strategic mutation), 
scenario M-3 (the 5% probability of manufacturer strategic mutation), scenario M-
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4 (the 7% probability of manufacturer strategic mutation), and scenario M-5 (the 
10% probability of manufacturer strategic mutation) are consistent with one supply 
chain.  
 
  
Figure 6.35 Boxplots of the supply chain fill rate with a line of mean values for all 
scenarios of manufacturer strategic mutation 
 
 
  
Figure 6.36 Boxplots of the number of supply chains in the market with a line of mean 
values for all scenarios of manufacturer strategic mutation 
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 The data distribution, shown by the size of the box, also shrinks significantly 
from scenario M-1 to scenario M-2. Then, the data distribution remains the same 
until the box size extends in scenario M-5. Scenario M-2, scenario M-3, scenario 
M-4 and scenario M-5 only have two values that emerge in these scenarios for the 
number of supply chains in the market; they are zero and one. The one supply chain 
appears more often than zero supply chain. The extreme manufacturer strategic 
mutation (scenario M-5) has a taller box size than scenario M-2, scenario M-3 and 
scenario M-4. This is because the occurrence of zero supply chains in the market in 
scenario M-5 is more likely than the other scenarios. 
 The Mann-Whitney U test is performed to infer the conclusion of the number 
of supply chains in the market of The scenarios for manufacturer strategic 
movement (Appendix J, Table J.24). Scenario M-1 has the most significant 
difference with other scenarios. It provides the highest number of supply chains in 
the market. In contrast, scenario M-5 significantly has the lowest number of supply 
chains in the market, but it has no significant difference with scenario M-4. Lastly, 
the result of scenario M-2, scenario M-3, and scenario M-4 are considered not 
different significantly with each other. 
 Due to the limited values of the number of supply chains in the market resulted 
in scenario M-2, scenario M-3, scenario M-4, and scenario M-5, which only have 
two values (one and zero), a proportion graph (Table 6.11) is incorporated to add 
the confidence of the analysis. However, the conclusions of the Mann-Whitney U 
test are relatively consistent with the visual representation in both figures. All these 
analysis approaches conclude that scenario M-1 (no mutation - 0%) significantly 
results in higher number of supply chains in the market, scenario M-5 significantly 
has the lowest output of this measure, and the remaining scenarios are not different 
significantly with each other. 
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Table 6.11 The proportion of extreme numbers of supply chains in the experiment of the 
manufacturer strategic mutation 
Scenario 
  Number of supply chains in the market 
  0   1   > 1 
M-1   0 (0%)   6 (12%)   44 (88%) 
M-2   6 (12%)   44 (88%)   0 (0%) 
M-3   5 (10%)   45 (90%)   0 (0%) 
M-4   10 (20%)   40 (80%)   0 (0%) 
M-5   22 (44%)   28 (56%)   0 (0%) 
 
With respect to these outcomes, it can be suggested that the competition 
approach suggested in strategic management, regarding the big leap or strategic 
mutation, does not consistently enhance supply chains ability to meet the demand 
and robustness for the long term; it can lead the supply chains to be more vulnerable 
in the market. Therefore, Hypothesis B.5 is supported, which is that 
"The competition approach suggested in strategic management, regarding the 
strategic mutation, does not improve demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains for the long-term ". 
 
6.3.6 Results summary for Hypotheses B 
A summary of scenarios that leads to better outcomes for each experimental factor 
is provided in Table 6.12. A degree or level of significance of each factor is 
presented to represent the overall conclusions of the Mann-Whitney analysis. The 
term ‘significance’ does not refer to the statistical level of significance, but to a 
general belief in the model results. If a factor has significant differences for more 
than equal to 50% of total number of comparisons (5 out of 10) for each demand 
fulfilment rate (supply chain fill rate) and supply chain survivability (the number 
of supply chains in the market), it will be considered to have a high degree of 
significance.  
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Table 6.12 Summary of the resulting experiments for Hypotheses B 
Experimental factor Degree of significance Scenario with better results 
  Affected outputs 
  
Demand 
fulfilment 
rate 
 
Supply 
chain 
survivability 
1 Duration of collaboration             
  when manufacturers work with one supplier at one 
time, 
            
  1.1 as well as the suppliers.  Not 
significant 
 -         
  1.2 and the supplier can link to more than one 
manufacturer. 
Low Short-term collaboration   !   ! 
2 Number of partnerships             
  2.1 when short-term collaboration applies. Low Not dual-sourcing for manufacturer when 
the suppliers can link with more than one 
manufacturer 
      ! 
  2.2 when long-term collaboration applies. Low Single-sourcing with one-to-one 
partnerships. 
  !   ! 
3 Trust             
  3.1 Manufacturer trust of the suppliers             
    3.1.1 when short-term collaboration applies. High Extremely high loyalty or no loyalty at all   !   ! 
    3.1.2 when long-term collaboration applies. Low Extremely high loyalty   !   ! 
  3.2 Supplier trust of the manufacturers             
  
  
3.2.1 when short-term collaboration applies. Not 
significant 
-         
  
  
3.2.2 when long-term collaboration applies. Low Somewhat disloyal, by not consistently 
following manufacturer strategic movement 
      ! 
  3.3 Customer trust/loyalty towards manufacturers High No loyalty at all       ! 
4 Survivability             
  4.1 Manufacturer survivability High Not extremely low survivability   !   ! 
  4.2 Supplier survivability Low Not extremely low survivability       ! 
5 Manufacturer strategic movement High No big leap at all   !   ! 
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 If the number of differences is between 20% (2 out of 10) and 40% (4 out of 
10), the factor will be regarded to have low significance degree or low sensitivity, 
while the remaining proportion (≤ 10%) represents not significant (or not sensitive 
at all) factor to maintain supply chain long-term performance and survivability. If 
a factor is highly significant or sensitive only to one model output, the average 
number of significant differences of both model outputs (supply chain fill rate and 
the number of supply chains in the market) will be used. 
 The results indicate that not all popular issues in competition and collaboration 
are highly significant to the supply chains in terms of maintaining demand 
fulfilment rate (the supply chain fill rate) and survivability (the number of supply 
chains in the market) for a long-term competition. The factors that have significant 
impacts are manufacturer trust toward supplier (the manufacturer trust), 
manufacturer’s individual survivability (the manufacturer survivability), the 
manufacturer strategic movement or mutation, and the customer loyalty towards the 
manufacturer. These factors result in high numbers of significant differences in the 
Mann-Whitney U test. 
  
6.4! Summary 
The results and analysis of this study have been presented in this chapter. Overall, 
all proposed hypotheses provided in Methodology (Chapter 4) are supported by the 
outcomes. The competitive and collaborative behaviour recommended in SCM and 
strategic management does not seem to guarantee a better demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains. Also, competition can have both positive and 
negative impacts on supply chains. It can assist strategic alignment within the 
supply chain although no particular collaboration approach is implemented. 
Nevertheless, a long-term competition can lead to an extreme shakeout. A 
discussion of all of these findings is presented in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 7!   DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
 
7.1!Introduction 
Discussions of the resulting emergent outcomes presented in Chapter 6 are 
presented in this chapter. The discussions are structured based on the three 
objectives of this study. Then, limitations of the interpretations of the results are 
also addressed at the end of this chapter. 
 
7.2! The agent-based model of competition and collaboration in 
supply chains (Objective 1). 
An agent-based model of competition and collaboration in supply chain has been 
developed in this study. The model is designed to bridge the gap in the literature of 
supply chain competition and collaboration, which is related to the debate on the 
effect of competition and collaboration strategies to supply chains, as described in 
Chapter 2. The main issues examined by the model are the duration of 
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collaboration, number of partnerships, trust, individual firm survivability, and 
manufacturer strategic mutation. All of these issues are the main attributes of the 
model and explored from market-level perspective.  
 The use of theory-driven approach has assisted the determination of the study 
objectives to achieve the aim of this study, which is: 
“To explore the impact of competition and collaboration strategies on supply 
chains from a market perspective”. 
The approach is also the foundation of the construction of research hypotheses 
defined in section 4.3. The hypotheses help the present researcher to explain the 
dynamic behaviour as ‘endogenous consequences’ of the model, which leads to the 
emergent behaviour of the agent’s interactions.  
 Based on the existing theories and findings found in the literature, the research 
Hypotheses B are deployed into the experimental design to represent business 
situations with particular levels of market adoption towards competition and 
collaboration strategies recommended in SCM and strategic management. Some 
experiments are relevant to the reality, particularly to reflect the trend of the 
implementation of a strategy that has been successfully practised by large 
companies. Meanwhile, the other scenarios may not describe the current reality, but 
they are possible to occur in the real world, such as the extremely high probability 
of strategic mutation. 
 The model shows that a simple micro behaviour of an individual agent leads to 
the emergence of market-level behaviour. This emergent pattern is resulted from 
the agent interactions that create feedback to each agent, particularly for the 
manufacturer and supplier. This feedback mechanism generates complexity to the 
system that could not be interpreted explicitly from the code. In this sense, the 
"emergent properties” resulting from the model is generated as the macro or system 
implications of local agent’s interactions, as described by Axelrod (1997). It also 
conforms to Onggo (2016) who explains that the market behaviour is created as a 
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result of interaction between individuals, such as customers and companies.  Hence, 
the model developed in this study is able to investigate the problem situation of 
competition and collaboration in supply chains, taking from market-level 
perspective.  
This model capability also shows that the model has been able to elaborate a 
better understanding of competition and collaboration in supply chains. The 
exploration of the effect of competitive and collaborative behaviour has been 
performed as intended, as described in the conceptual model (section 5.2 - Chapter 
5). The generic effect of competition can also be investigated by the model, which 
denotes that the developed agent-based model is capable to assist the present 
researcher to obtain intuitions, in terms of understanding the effect of competition 
and collaboration strategy in supply chains. This feature corresponds to North and 
Macal (2007) who suggested ABM as an appropriate method to acquire intuitions 
of a problem, instead of proving theorems. In addition, this study verifies the 
perspective of Zenobia et al. (2009) and LeBaron (2000), who find that an efficient 
model is a simple model that is useful to gain insights. In this study, the intuitions 
and insights are related to the interpretation of competition and collaboration impact 
on supply chains. Overall, this study indicates that a long-term competition has 
positive and negative emergent impacts on the market, and what is good for a single 
company is not always beneficial for others, even it could be detrimental for the 
market if it applies to all firms for the long-term. 
An illustration to describe the complex relationships between the agents that 
lead to a market-level behaviour is presented in Figure 7.1. This illustration is not 
the agent-based model developed in this study, but it is a representation of the causal 
link of the resulting interactions between the agents in the model during the 
simulation. The elements presented in the figure are also useful to provide 
explanations on the model results in the next sections. 
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Figure 7.1 The model mechanism that makes micro behaviour emerge as system level behaviour 
Customer's
POSITION
LINK between
customer and
manufacturer
Manufacturer's
MOVEMENT
Manufacturer's
POSITION
Supplier's
MOVEMENT
Supplier's POSITION
LINK between
manufacturer and
supplier
Manufacturer's LIFE
Supplier's LIFEThe number
of supply
chains in the
market
(MODEL
OUTPUT)
The supply
chain fill rate
(MODEL
OUTPUT)
Customer loyalty
Manufacturer
survivability
Supplier
survivability
Supplier loyalty
Manufacturer
loyalty
Manufacturer
strategic mutation
Duration of
collaboration
Manufacturer
number of sourcing
Supplier number of
partnerships
Manufacturer's
existence
Supplier's existence
CHAPTER 7 - DISCUSSION 
208 
 
From Figure 7.1, it can be seen that the interaction is produced based on the 
feedbacks that are generated during the simulation run. Each feedback changes each 
agent’s state, which is listed as variable attributes in section 5.2.1.1. The 
investigated competitive and collaborative strategies (the experimental factors) are 
illustrated as rectangular variables, and the model outputs are presented inside the 
circle shape. The solid lines represent the direct effect of the changes, and the 
dashed lines reflect indirect effect to a variable. For example, the arrow from 
customer’s position to manufacturer’s movement means that the position of the 
customer agents has a direct effect on the direction of the manufacturer’s movement. 
If a customer links with a manufacturer, the manufacturer will move away from that 
customer to approach a new customer. Meanwhile, the indirect effect between the 
agent’s attributes is illustrated by the following example. The manufacturer’s life 
has an indirect effect on manufacturer’s position by lengthening the manufacturer’s 
existence in the system. Consequently, if the manufacturer is still “alive”, it will 
stay in a particular strategic position; otherwise, the manufacturer agent disappears 
(die) from the model. This mechanism of indirect interaction also applies similarly 
to the supplier agents. 
 Figure 7.1 also demonstrates that each experimental factor has a different 
impact on the agent’s attributes. The manufacturer strategic mutation affects the 
manufacturer’s movement, which affects the manufacturer’s position. The 
customer trust/loyalty influences the duration of customer’s interaction with a 
manufacturer, which is represented as a link between customer and manufacturer. 
This link also has a direct impact on the direction of manufacturer’s movement 
because the manufacturers are acquisitive to attract another customer who has not 
being linked with them. The manufacturer’s survivability impacts on 
manufacturer’s life, which is also influenced by the existence of the link between 
customer and manufacturer and the position of the collaborating agents 
(manufacturer’s position and supplier’s position).  The supplier’s survivability 
influences the supplier’s life, which affects the supplier’s existence in the system. 
The link between manufacturer and supplier is influenced by the duration of 
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collaboration, the manufacturer trust, the manufacturer number of sourcing, and 
the supplier number of partnerships. Each factor has a different mechanism in 
changing the link between the manufacturer and the supplier, as explained in the 
conceptual model (Chapter 5). Lastly, the supplier trust influences the supplier’s 
movement, which affects the supplier’s strategic position in the system.  
As for the model outputs, even though it is expected that a higher number of 
supply chains in the market results in a higher supply chain fill rate (as presented 
in Figure 5.6 - Chapter 5), these measures are assessed in a different approach. As 
shown in Figure 7.1, the supply chain fill rate is measured by counting the number 
of links between customer and manufacturer, while the number of supply chains in 
the market is quantified based on the number of links between manufacturer and 
supplier. These measures have been found effective in assessing the resulting 
emergent pattern of each competitive and collaborative factor addressed in this 
study. 
 
7.3!The long-term impact of competition on supply chains and 
market structure (Objective 2 – Hypothesis A). 
The model results indicate that competition has both positive and negative effects 
on supply chains for a long-term despite the collaboration approach implemented. 
For the benefit, competition seems to be able to assist the process of strategic 
alignment between firms in the supply chain, while the drawback of competition is 
the potential occurrence of shakeouts. These findings support a conclusion in 
Chapter 2 that suggests not all studies support the benefits of competition (section 
2.3.2.1). However, previous studies that are reviewed in Chapter 2 do not consider 
the issue for a long term competition period. Thus, the strategic alignment and 
shakeouts are not addressed in association with competition impact. The following 
subsections detail these competition impacts, with respect to strategic alignment 
and extreme shakeouts. 
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7.3.1 Strategic alignment within supply chain 
In general, the model shows that competition can assist strategic alignment in 
supply chains, despite competitive and collaborative behaviour. It indicates that 
competition can benefit supply chains in the market although no particular 
collaboration strategy is implemented. It minimises the strategic gap between 
manufacturer and supplier within their supply chain. The gap reduction presented 
in the simulation result can be represented as a strategic compromise improvement 
in aligning supply chain capability between firms in a supply chain.  
 This finding supports the belief of Parker and Hartley (1997), Forker and 
Stannack (2000), Humphreys et al. (2001), Li et al. (2010), and Wang and Shin 
(2015), who suggest that supplier competition is beneficial to the supply chain. 
However, these previous studies address this issue in a particular type of supply 
chain; they do not view this issue from system or market-level perspective. 
Moreover, their suggestion is not based on the strategic alignment factor. 
This emergent outcome of competition on gap reduction also confirms the 
extent view in strategic management, such as Porter (1990; 1998). In this research 
domain, competition has been considered as an effective mechanism to enhance the 
quality of cooperation. This is because competition encourages better mutual 
understanding between collaborated firms. Therefore, this perspective argues that 
having long-term partnerships with a single supplier can hinder the occurrence of 
competition in the market. 
The strategic alignment is also regarded as a fundamental aspect of supply chain 
success in SCM. The alignment is represented by operations synchronisation along 
the supply chain that can maximise the overall value of the finished product. 
However, it is generally understood that this alignment or synchronisation can only 
be achieved well by applying a close relationship through collaboration (Rich and 
Hines 1997; Spekman et al. 1998; Simatupang and Sridharan 2004; Choudhary et 
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al. 2006; Ha et al. 2011; Ramanathan and Gunasekaran 2014). In SCM, 
collaboration with suppliers has been regarded to be the crucial enabler to improve 
the understanding between firms by reducing the uncertainties in the supply side. 
In other words, the collaboration approach in SCM is proposed to reduce the 
emergence of competition, particularly on the supply side.  
However, the simulation results presented in section 6.2.1 shows that strategic 
alignment can be achieved even if no collaboration approach is applied, such as 
presented in Figure 6.1. It means that even though there is no attempt in reducing 
the uncertainty in the supply side, supplier and manufacturer can align their 
strategic capability through competition. The result of this study conforms with 
Hamel (2013); he finds that collaboration does not consistently help the 
collaborating firms to reduce the gap in their capability. The gap emerges as each 
firm has different learning capability. Even though the relationship between firms 
is stable and has been developed for a long time, Hamel (2013) suggests that it 
could not be considered an indicator of collaboration success.  
Nevertheless, the strategic alignment does not apply to all supply chains. 
Although the gap decreases at the market-level, several supply chains still have a 
significant capability gap between the manufacturer and supplier until the 
simulation ends. Moreover, the strategic alignment at a market-level does not 
consistently occur in each experiment. This pattern is significantly caused by the 
distribution of manufacturers and suppliers in the system during the simulation, as 
presented in Figure 6.3. When most suppliers in the market are highly more efficient 
and responsive than the manufacturers, competition would very likely not be able 
to assist the strategic alignment of the supply chains in the market. However, in 
reality, it is hard to manage the firms’ strategic position in the market.  
 In addition, as a strategic alignment occurs when the number of supply chains 
which can survive in the market is fewer than the initial state, it reflects that 
competition with a fewer number of firms does not represent an undesirable 
situation for the market. This issue has not been studied in detail both empirically 
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and theoretically, so this discussion has led to a new insight on the effect of 
competition on supply chains. 
 
7.3.2 Extreme shakeouts 
Besides strategic alignment, the model also shows that competition can lead to 
shakeouts (massive reductions in the number of firms in the market), which can 
happen in any competitive and collaborative approach. The shakeouts can result in 
extreme cases, such as monopoly (section 6.3.2.2) and zero supply chain which can 
survive in the market (section 6.3.2.1). Although the zero supply chain is difficult 
to explain based on the existing literature, this emergent output may occur if no new 
firms enter the market during the competition. It may also be relevant to represent 
a specific monopoly situation where one of the collaborating firms has to adjust its 
strategic position extremely in order to enable the company to collaborate with the 
available collaborating partner. Compared to the occurrence of other number of 
supply chains in long-term competition, these extreme outcomes (monopoly and 
zero supply chains) does not emerge frequently. 
 A shakeout emerges when most companies share similar target customers with 
competitors. Also, when most manufacturers select suppliers who are more efficient 
and/or responsive than the firms, it can also lead to a shakeout. This is because the 
selected suppliers could not collaborate with the other manufacturers who have a 
more urgent requirement to be supplied by the suppliers. 
 As a shakeout phenomenon is relevant to several cases in the real world, it has 
been used as a basis for validating the model (section 5.3.2.3). It confirms several 
case studies in business competition, such as in industries of television, Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (MRI) equipment (Day 1997), the UK steel casting industry 
(Baden-Fuller 1989), automobile, tires, and penicillin (Klepper and Simons 2005). 
The detail discussions of shakeouts can be referred to the validation of the model 
presented in section 5.3.2.3. 
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 In addition, the results show that the extreme shakeouts can occur when all 
manufacturers implement a strategy suggested in the literature, such as the strategic 
mutation or big leap. This indicates that a good strategy could be catastrophic when 
all enterprises adopt it. This situation confirms the opinion suggested by Mintzberg 
et al. (2005) who tend not to support the deliberate strategies recommended in the 
management literature. They suggest that emergent strategies, which are developed 
informally inside the organisation, are more appropriate to implement. 
 It should be noted that the model developed in this study does not allow new 
firms to enter the market during the competition, which is not possible in reality. 
This assumption may be the reason for the emergence of extreme shakeouts 
(monopoly and zero supply chain) in the model. Moreover, in the real world, the 
extreme shakeouts are often prevented in advance by the market or trading regulator 
or government. One of the prevention attempts is by enacting a policy to allow or 
encourage new firms to enter the competition. This attempt, for example, practised 
by FCC (Federal Communications Commission) in the U.S. when AT&T (an 
American multinational telecom company) dominated the telecom equipment 
market prior to 1960s (Melody 1999). This regulation, or intervention, has been 
found to be vital to prevent the market from the political interests of major players 
in the market.  
 Assessing demand fulfilment rate, surprisingly, the extreme shakeouts 
(particularly in monopoly) do not significantly affect the demand fulfilment rate. 
As analysed in section 6.2.3, the decay rate of demand fulfilment in extreme 
shakeouts is not different from the non-extreme shakeout situations. The number of 
enterprises which can survive in competition does not influence the form of the 
market structure, which reflects the market segment of supply chains in the market. 
Although more than one supply chain can survive during the competition, if they 
serve the same customers (i.e. similar market segments), the total demand 
fulfilment would be similar as a monopoly supply chain. A better demand 
fulfilment for non-extreme shakeout situations can only be achieved when most 
supply chains in the market serve completely different market segment during the 
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competition. Nevertheless, this ideal situation is difficult to attain in reality as firms 
are acquisitive in increasing income or performance. This competitive behaviour 
could lead the market segment of each firm to overlap with the other companies 
that were previously not its competitor. Once a supply chain shares a similar 
customer, the supply chains would likely end with a relatively similar strategic 
position in the long-term. An illustration of non-extreme shakeout can be referred 
to Figure 6.3, where six supply chains can survive and each market cluster does not 
intersect with the other clusters during the competition. 
 
7.4!The exploration of competition and collaboration strategy on 
supply chains (Objective 3) 
As explained in the methodology chapter, particularly in section 4.3, the hypotheses 
of this study are constructed based on the literature gap reviewed in Chapter 2. The 
gap, which is formalised into detailed hypotheses, is tested through the experiments 
on the agent-based model, and statistically verified by using multiple comparison 
approach, with regards to the Mann-Whitney U test. Each hypothesis is observed 
by applying 5 levels of experiments or scenarios, which means that each hypothesis 
is tested and concluded based on the results of 10 paired-comparisons.  
 As presented in Chapter 6, all hypotheses proposed in this study are supported 
by the simulation results. It indicates that the suggested competition and 
collaboration strategies in SCM and strategic management do not always lead to 
business success, with respect to demand fulfilment and survivability of supply 
chains over the long term. Table 7.1 summarises the results of the experiments as 
well as the degree of significance of each result.  
 As explained in section 6.3.6, the term of “significance” in Table 7.1 is not 
related to statistical level of significance, but to overall confidence in the model 
results. The term represents the extent of the robustness of the statistical test 
conclusion. This robustness is related to the ability of the findings to remain 
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effective under different situations, with respect to the simulation settings. The 
discussions of the model results provided in the following subsections. 
Table 7.1 Summary of the results  
Competition and collaboration issue Scenario with better outputs Degree of significance 
1 Duration of collaboration   
  with single-link suppliers (one-to-one 
relationship). 
- Not 
significant 
 with dual-link suppliers. Short-term collaboration Low 
2 Number of partnerships     
    when short-term collaboration applies. Not dual-sourcing for the 
manufacturer when the 
suppliers can link with more 
than one manufacturer 
Low 
   when long-term collaboration applies. One-to-one partnerships for 
both the manufacturer and the 
supplier 
Low 
3 Trust    
  a Manufacturer trust of the suppliers    
    when short-term collaboration applies. Extremely high trust or no 
trust  at all 
High 
    when long-term collaboration applies. Extremely high trust Low 
  b Supplier trust of the manufacturers   
  when short-term collaboration applies. - Not 
significant 
  when long-term collaboration applies. No trust, but not in an 
extreme way, by not 
consistently following the 
manufacturer strategic 
movement 
Low 
  c Customer trust/loyalty towards 
manufacturers 
No trust/loyalty at all High 
4 Survivability    
  a Manufacturer survivability Not extremely low 
survivability 
High 
  b Supplier survivability Not extremely low 
survivability 
Low 
5 Manufacturer strategic movement No big leap at all High 
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7.4.1  The effect of the duration of collaboration (Hypothesis B.1) 
As explained in the conceptual model in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.1.2, Figure 5.6), a 
longer duration of collaboration is expected to improve the “life” of both the 
manufacturer and the supplier. However, the results indicate that when both the 
manufacturers and the suppliers are allowed to collaborate with one firm only at a 
time (or under one-to-one relationship), this factor does not provide significant 
changes to demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. On the other hand, 
when the supplier can work with up to two manufacturers (the dual-link supplier) 
while the manufacturers can only collaborate with one supplier, the extremely short 
duration of collaboration seems to provide better demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains for a long-term. This indicates that adopting a longer 
duration of collaboration does not lead to a better long-term demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains.  
 Although this conclusion is restricted to the setting of the simulation model 
(e.g. considering homogeneous agents while in the real world they are not exactly 
homogeneous), this finding is considered relevant when the issue is observed from 
a market perspective. This finding also conforms several empirical work in SCM 
literature that contradicts the benefit of long-term collaboration, as presented in 
section 2. Having a very close partnership with long-term collaboration is not more 
advantageous than having shorter partnerships with less close relationship (Parker 
and Hartley 1997). The long-term partnerships can also lead suppliers to be more 
vulnerable as they tend to have lower control on prices. Moreover, Leeuw and 
Fransoo (2009) find that a close collaboration through long-term partnerships 
reflects an analogy that is "one size does not fit all". This means that a successful 
collaboration practice of a company does not fit all enterprises. Squire et al. (2009) 
also suggest that although the duration of collaboration can improve 
manufacturer’s responsiveness, the overlong duration of collaboration turns the 
manufacturer to be dependent on the supplier. This situation could result in an 
adverse impact on the overall supply chain performance. A similar finding is also 
provided by Wagner (2011), and Sun and Debo (2014), who suggest that the length 
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of collaboration does not affect supply chain performance. This perspective is 
supported by several experts in strategic management, such as Porter (1990; 1997), 
Grayson and Ambler (1999), and Anderson and Jap (2005). They suggest that long-
term partnership with supplier could hinder the benefit of competition, which is 
encouraging innovation in business. These studies provide evidence that not all 
firms in the real world obtain advantages from longer duration of collaboration even 
though they have not considered a market perspective yet. 
 With respect to the model mechanism, this emergent outcome can be explained 
as follows. In the experiment, the suppliers have no trust towards their collaborating 
manufacturer, so this feature makes the supplier move away from its current 
manufacturer to attract another manufacturer. This movement is continuously 
performed until the simulation time reaches the end of duration of collaboration. 
Thus, a longer duration of collaboration leads the distance between the 
collaborating agents (supplier and manufacturer) to be larger than a shorter term of 
collaboration. This large distance causes supplier to have a higher risk to lose the 
opportunity to re-establish collaboration with the previous manufacturer, 
particularly when the supplier does not manage to find another manufacturer to 
collaborate. This situation represents a reality when suppliers will tend to be less 
cautious in making decision for their strategic move because they believe the longer 
partnerships have secured their business for the future long run. In addition, a longer 
term of collaboration will limit manufacturer strategic movement as well as 
manufacturer's life, if the supplier turns to be less efficient and/or less responsive 
during the collaboration period. It reflects a circumstance where long-term 
collaboration leads the manufacturer to become dependent on the supplier.  
 In contrast, the short duration of collaboration can prevent the supplier from 
moving further from the current manufacturer (i.e. preventing from being too 
different from the manufacturer, in terms of supply chain capability). This occurs 
when the supplier cannot find another manufacturer with whom to collaborate and 
the previous manufacturer is still the closest agent to the supplier. In this situation, 
when the duration of collaboration ends, the supplier will move back to the previous 
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strategic position to attract the previous linked manufacturer to rebuild the 
collaboration link.  
 This effect of shorter duration of collaboration becomes prominent to demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains when the supplier can collaborate with 
more than one manufacturer. In this situation, the extremely short-term 
collaboration is found to provide improved demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains compared to the longer duration of collaboration. The reason for this 
is that although the suppliers have a longer “life” to exist in the system when they 
work with more than one manufacturer, this expected advantage is not significant 
when a longer duration of collaboration is applied.  
 To our knowledge, no study has attempted to compare demand fulfilment rate, 
as a representation of aggregated supply chain performance, by varying the duration 
of collaboration. These findings provide a new perspective in understanding the 
significance of the long-term effect of the longer duration of collaborations. 
Companies which currently consider establishing long-term partnerships with their 
suppliers may require rethinking the plan. This is because maintaining long-term 
collaboration involves investment as well as changes in the working culture that 
can be significant to the supply chain whereas it cannot guarantee the supplier to be 
always more efficient and/or responsive than the manufacturer. In addition, when 
massive firms adopt a long period of collaboration with the supplier, it may also 
lead to the emergence of the anticompetitive environment, even though this possible 
effect is not specifically investigated in this research. These findings may also 
confirm the view of strategic management, which regards operational effectiveness 
is not a strategy to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage (Porter 2006). 
Meanwhile, most SCM work observes collaboration issue from an operational 
perspective – without taking into account the emergent behaviour of the market. 
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7.4.2 The effect of number of partnerships of both manufacturer and supplier 
(Hypothesis B.2) 
Similar to the results of the duration of collaboration, the experimental outcomes 
show that the number of partnerships tends to have no significant effect on both 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains for the long term. When the 
short duration of collaboration applies, the lowest outputs of supply chain 
survivability are resulted under two-to-two or dual relationships (i.e. both the 
manufacturer and the supplier can collaborate with two firms at the same time), 
although this scenario has no significant effect on demand fulfilment rate for the 
long-term (Table I.5 and Table I.6 in Appendix I). It suggests that dual-sourcing is 
not suggested for the manufacturer when the suppliers can link with more than one 
manufacturer. Meanwhile, when the long duration of collaboration is implemented, 
one-to-one relationships provide better demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains (Table I.7 and Table I.8 in Appendix I).  
 However, this experimental factor has a low sensitivity to the model outputs 
(demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains). It is shown by the number 
of significant difference in the comparison test for each experiment is no more than 
40% difference from the total comparisons, with respect to the inferential 
assessment with Mann-Whitney U test (Table I.5, Table I.6, Table I.7, and Table 
I.8 in Appendix I). Moreover, with regards to the boxplots presented in Figure 6.7 
and 6.8, the dual-sourcing strategy with two-to-two relationships (dual-
partnerships – scenario P-2) tends to have a slight difference with single-sourcing 
with one-to-one relationships (or single-partnerships – scenario P-1) in short-term 
collaboration. The multi-sourcing strategies with many-to-many relationships 
(scenario P-3, scenario P-4, and scenario P-5) seem to have a tendency to result in 
higher supply chain survivability than the other scenarios (Figure 6.8). This pattern 
appears to be plausible because multi-sourcing strategies allow manufacturers to 
“live” longer. When a manufacturer loses one supplier, it would still stay alive, 
unless all of the remaining suppliers that collaborate with the manufacturer turn to 
be less efficient and/or less responsive. 
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 To test the robustness of the analysis results, particularly when short-term 
collaboration is implemented, the experiment of the number of partnerships were 
rerun with a different number of agents at the initial setup. The resulting outcomes 
suggest that dual-sourcing strategy has no different impact on supply chains when 
it is compared to single-sourcing strategy. Also, the multi-sourcing strategies with 
multi-partnerships (scenario P-3, scenario P-4, and scenario P-5) tend to have 
higher supply chain survivability significantly. This slight inconsistent conclusion 
with the formal experiments defined in this study (section 5.3.1.2) confirms that the 
degree of significance (or the sensitivity) of the experimental factor (number of 
partnerships) is low. It means that the effect of this factor tends to be insignificant 
to the supply chains as a market. 
 As the variable sensitivity tends to be low, it can also be suggested that having 
multi-partnership (many-to-many relationship, including multi-sourcing) may have 
a similar effect to either single-partnership (single-sourcing with the one-to-one 
relationship) or dual-partnership (dual-sourcing) on the long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. This finding contradicts the current 
belief in SCM literature, which suggests single and/or dual-sourcing to improve 
supply chain performance. The reason for this is that less number of partnerships 
reduces the variation of product quality and lead time, particularly in single-
sourcing strategy (Christopher 2000; Chopra and Meindl 2007; Vereecke and 
Muylle 2006). Meanwhile, compared to single-sourcing approach, some research 
finds that dual-sourcing strategy is considered to be more efficient (Ramasesh et al. 
1991; Lyon 2006) and leads to better supply chain performance (Chiang and Benton 
1994). Nonetheless, other findings suggest that single-sourcing outweighs the 
benefit of dual-sourcing, such as Tyworth and Ruiz-Torres (2000). They show 
analytically that dual-sourcing in logistics practice results in lower efficiency than 
single-sourcing. Through an analytical approach, Yu et al. (2009) also show that 
dual-sourcing only provides more benefit than single-sourcing when the material 
price is sensitive to the partnerships and supply disruption can be predicted.  
However, both studies do not take into consideration the duration of collaboration 
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in examining the problem. Nevertheless, these studies do not address the issue with 
regards to the duration of collaboration. 
In addition, most research on number of partnerships focuses on comparing the 
supply chain performance of single and dual-sourcing strategy, which suggests that 
these two strategies have dominated SCM perspective in setting up the number of 
partnerships. Studies which discuss multi-sourcing strategies are not as much as 
research of single and dual-sourcing although several studies find that multi-
sourcing strategies lead to better supply chain performance than single and dual-
sourcing approaches, such as Burke et al. (2007).  
All of these studies regard the issue of number of partnerships only from the 
manufacturer’s perspective, despite the supplier’s viewpoint. This perspective leads 
to the use of the term number of sourcing in SCM, instead of number of 
partnerships in supplier-manufacturer relationships. Moreover, these work do not 
take competition and market perspective into the analysis. This suggests that the 
partial perspective provided in SCM literature may only be true for the particular 
situation defined in the study, but it could not apply to achieve the overall company 
performance and survivability for the long-term.  This finding tends to have a 
similar perspective to Mintzberg et al. (2005) who suggest that strategy should not 
be viewed partially. This partial view is often demonstrated in most literature in 
business strategy. The partial perspective of strategy is also often practised in SCM 
research, which commonly ignores supplier’s point of view in examining the supply 
chain strategies. This SCM view of operational effectiveness as a strategy also 
opposes to a suggestion proposed by Porter (2006).  
 Despite the complexity of the agent’s interactions illustrated in Figure 7.1, a 
higher number of partnerships of both manufacturers and suppliers are expected to 
enhance the agent’s survivability for a long-term, as presented in Figure 5.6. The 
logic for this is that both manufacturers and suppliers would not easily lose their 
ability to survive (the manufacturer's life and supplier's life in Figure 7.1) as they 
have more opportunities to create collaboration with many firms. However, with 
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respect to the model mechanism, as manufacturer and supplier are not loyal to each 
other (i.e. do not trust), the higher number of partnerships leads to a risk that makes 
supplier moves more dynamically to approach another manufacturer which has not 
linked with the agent. However, this negative side of this factor only affects supply 
chains significantly when the number of partnerships of manufacturer and supplier 
is two firms, particularly when the applied duration of collaboration is short. This 
is a novel finding as this result is examined from a market perspective. Thus, no 
empirical literature perfectly fits this outcome. 
 Meanwhile, when long-term collaboration is applied to all agents, the one-to-
one relationships provide better performance and survivability for the supply 
chains. This result conforms with most collaboration suggestions, such a 
Christopher (2000), Vereecke and Muylle (2006), and Chopra and Meindl (2007). 
These studies recommend that single-sourcing for long-term collaboration would 
benefit supply chain, and the supplier is also expected to intensively collaborate 
with the manufacturer. 
With respect to the model mechanism, the long-term collaboration is more risky 
for the manufacturer to profit loss as the suppliers have no trust. The no loyal 
suppliers would continuously move away from the manufacturer with whom they 
currently link to attract another manufacturer during the collaboration period. If the 
suppliers turn to be less efficient and/or less responsive than the manufacturer, the 
supplier movement will not only limit the manufacturer’s strategic change but also 
reduce the manufacturer’s “life”. This drawback is significant when the 
manufacturer links with more than one supplier in a long time period. Furthermore, 
the higher number of supplier’s partnerships makes the suppliers consistently move 
further from their current manufacturers and previously-linked manufacturers 
without returning to the previous position. This continual movement leads the 
supplier to be more aggressive in approaching another manufacturer and makes 
most suppliers in the market tend to be less efficient and/or less responsive than the 
manufacturers. This means that this emergent behaviour will reduce the 
manufacturer’s “life”. As most of the manufacturers cannot survive for long-term, 
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most supply chains in the market are also easier to collapse. Thus, when the long 
duration of collaboration is applied, the one-to-one partnerships can reduce the 
emergence of this risk significantly because manufacturer’s strategic movement 
and manufacturer’s life are affected by one supplier only. 
To sum up, the results of this experiment indicates that companies may not need 
to spend much investment to maintain a single or two suppliers to sustain or boost 
their supply chain competitiveness for the long-term. Establishing partnerships with 
many-to-many partnerships could be not as disadvantageous as suggested by most 
SCM literature, particularly when the duration of collaboration is extremely short. 
However, maintaining one-to-one partnerships seems to be more beneficial to 
supply chains than other scenarios of number of partnerships when the duration of 
partnerships is extremely long even though. 
 
7.4.3 The effect of trust (Hypothesis B.3)  
The expected positive effect of trust, which is represented as loyalty in the model, 
is to minimise the risk of losing the relationships. The manufacturer trust and the 
supplier trust are supposed to be an effective approach to maintain the partnerships 
as well as improve the demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains over 
the long-term. This presumption also applies to the customer loyalty towards 
manufacturer, where the higher customer trust/loyalty assists the long-term 
performance and survivability for the supply chains. Nevertheless, the model shows 
that this expected outcome does not always emerge in a higher degree of trust. The 
manufacturer trust seems to have more significant impact on supply chains rather 
than supplier trust, and this finding is counterintuitive to SCM focus, which more 
concentrates on improving supplier trust towards manufacturer than vice versa. 
Moreover, customer loyalty is found to be sensitive to demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains. This finding is novel as this factor has not been 
considered yet in SCM literature. The discussion of this factor for each agent’s type 
(manufacturer, supplier, and customer) is presented in the following subsections. 
CHAPTER 7 - DISCUSSION 
224 
 
 
7.4.3.1   Hypothesis B.3.1: Manufacturer trust of the supplier (the manufacturer 
trust) 
The higher manufacturer trust is intended to improve the long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. Nevertheless, with respect to the 
model mechanism, it also has a risk to the manufacturer. When the manufacturer 
collaborates with less efficient and/or responsive supplier, higher manufacturer 
trust not only limits the manufacturer strategic movement but also manufacturer’s 
“life” or survivability. This is the reason why the higher manufacturer trust of the 
supplier does not always lead to better impacts to the supply chain, with regards to 
long-term survivability and performance.  
 When short-term collaboration applies, the extremely loyal manufacturers 
(when the manufacturer trust is 100% - scenario TM-5) can lead to better demand 
fulfilment rate, as a representation of supply chain performance in the market, as 
well as better long-term survivability for supply chains. This outcome is consistent 
with the concept of achieving supply chain collaboration success suggested by most 
supply chain experts, such as Chopra and Meindl (2007), Christopher (2000), Lee 
(2004), Simchi-Levi et al. (2000). They claim that a firm’s trust is critical to support 
collaboration in supply chains to achieve better performance and resilience. 
 However, the extreme cautious, such as no trust or disloyal manufacturers 
(when the manufacturer trust is 0% - scenario TM-1), also provide a better demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains, as opposed to the intermediate 
degrees of manufacturer trust. This result is counterintuitive with the current SCM 
concept of achieving supply chain success through trust during collaboration 
period. A possible explanation for this is that when all manufacturers in the market 
are disloyal (i.e. do not trust) with the suppliers, it can support a perfect competition 
environment that benefits the supply chain as a system. In other words, extreme 
levels of trust (0% and 100%) can enhance the demand fulfilment rate, as a 
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representation of supply chain performance, to serve the market. These extreme 
situations are resulted by assuming the suppliers do not trust to the manufacturers. 
 With regards to the model mechanism, the extreme level of manufacturer trust 
makes the manufacturers find a new supplier easier. When the 0% manufacturer 
trust is applied, all manufacturers continuously change the collaboration link in 
each time unit. It leads the supplier to be available to select in each time unit. 
Meanwhile, the extreme high trust (100%) can guarantee manufacturer to have a 
supplier forever. It means that the extreme levels of manufacturer trust can create 
the manufacturers to have greater opportunity to find or collaborate with a supplier 
which fits their preference.  
 In contrast, the intermediate levels of trust lead the supplier availability to be 
selected by a manufacturer, who is looking for collaboration partners, to become 
more uncertain. This uncertain situation of supplier availability makes it more 
difficult for the manufacturers to find a supplier to collaborate with. Supplier 
availability tends to be more limited as the probability of the manufacturer trust is 
higher. When a manufacturer decides to be not loyal to its previous supplier, the 
manufacturer will also find it difficult to have a new supplier as other suppliers are 
likely to continue collaborating with their competitors.  
 On the other hand, when the long-term collaboration is implemented to the 
supply chains, only the extremely high degree of manufacturer trust provides 
benefits to the supply chain. The no-trust and somewhat-trust/loyal manufacturers 
have no different effect on the demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains 
significantly. This result supports the popular suggestion of supply chain 
collaboration in the literature, which suggests the implementation of a long-term 
collaboration with very high trust in achieving supply chain success, such as in 
Christopher (2000), Vereecke and Muylle (2006), and Chopra and Meindl (2007). 
However, none of the previous work has discussed manufacturer trust in supply 
chain collaboration. The existing literature emphasises trust issues from supplier 
side instead, such as Dyer and Ouchi (1993) and Kannan and Tan (2003). 
CHAPTER 7 - DISCUSSION 
226 
 
 
7.4.3.2 Hypothesis B.3.2: Supplier trust towards supplier (the supplier trust) 
Several studies suggest that supplier trust is critical in achieving supply chain 
success. Dyer and Ouchi (1993) find that supplier trust of the manufacturer plays a 
significant role to supply chain success. The suggestion is concluded based on 
comparisons between the U.S. and Japanese car manufacturers. The study finds that 
Japanese suppliers are more cooperative than U.S. firms. Kannan and Tan (2003) 
also suggest that the supplier trust is the key success of supply chain collaboration. 
However, these studies have drawn the conclusions when the manufacturer also 
trusts to the supplier. 
 By observing the model run, the supplier trust can result in a risk to supply 
chains. The logical explanation of this emergent impact is when the loyal supplier 
has no collaboration with a manufacturer and decides to keep attracting the 
manufacturer who previously links with them (although another manufacturer is 
closer and available to attract, the supplier will remain having no collaboration link 
with a manufacturer. This situation will make the supplier suffered continual losses.  
 The model results indicate that the supplier trust does not have a significant 
effect on maintaining demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. Even 
though in the long-term collaboration, the low level of supplier trust can lead to a 
better supply chain survivability, the effect is not always significant when it is 
compared to other degrees of manufacturer trust. This finding is contradicting with 
the existing literature, particularly in Dyer and Ouchi (1993) and Kannan and Tan 
(2003).  
 However, the outcomes of this research are limited by the assumption employed 
in the model and the behaviour space. One assumption is that the manufacturers do 
not have any trust to the supplier. Moreover, the value of supplier trust is set as a 
constant probability - it could not be updated during competition. Nevertheless, 
despite the model limitations, this study does not analyse the result under different 
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model setup. The last limitation is regarded as the essential limitations of the 
resulting findings of this behavioural factor. 
 
7.4.3.3 Hypothesis B.3.3: Customer loyalty towards supplier (the customer 
loyalty) 
According to the resulting behaviour, it can be suggested that higher customer 
loyalty towards does not consistently have a positive impact on demand fulfilment 
and survivability of supply chains for the long-term. It potentially leads to more 
supply chain failures in the long term. It suggests that the reluctance of customers 
to switch to another manufacturer may lead competition among firms to be of 
limited benefit. 
With regards to demand fulfilment rate – represented as supply chain fill rate, 
a 100% customer loyalty results in the highest demand fulfilment rate, following by 
the 0% customer loyalty as the second highest demand fulfilment rate. However, 
the 0% customer loyalty results in significantly better survivability for the supply 
chains, whereas the 100% customer loyalty leads to the lowest supply chain 
survivability. Meanwhile, the intermediate levels of customer loyalty do not benefit 
the supply chains significantly, both for demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains. These findings are contradictory to the common belief that customer 
loyalty can maintain long-term business profitability, such as suggested by Irmen 
and Thisse (1998), Turnbull et al. (2000), and Reeves and Deimler (2011).  
 Concerning the mechanism of the model, the manufacturers are prone to 
compete more intensely when customers are less likely change their buying 
decisions to a new manufacturer. Higher customer loyalty makes the manufacturer 
moves further to attract another customer. This behaviour causes manufacturer 
position become less overlaps with the other manufacturers although it is still 
relatively close to the others. Although the less-overlap market structure enhances 
the demand fulfilment rate (indicated by higher supply chain fill rate), it enlarges 
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the supply chain strategic gap between manufacturer and supplier. The larger gap 
is created because the suppliers follow the manufacturer’s aggressive movements. 
As a result, the supplier positions become more disperse in the market and reduce 
manufacturer’s opportunity to find a supplier with whom the manufacturer can 
collaborate. This no-collaboration situation can reduce both manufacturer’s and 
supplier’s “life”. 
 Although this conclusion is limited due to the assumptions made in the model, 
considering customer loyalty in understanding the impact of competition and 
collaboration on supply chains has provided a new insight in SCM. In this study, 
the customer trust/loyalty is defined as an independent factor that is not related to 
the manufacturer performance, as suggested by Hallowell (1996). However, this 
simplification is considered appropriate to obtain intuitions on customer loyalty 
towards supply chains in the market. 
 
7.4.4 The effect of individual firm survivability (Hypothesis B.4) 
Supply chain robustness has been a critical issue in SCM to maintain supply chain 
survivability. However, as addressed in Chapter 2, all literature in supply chain 
robustness only associates the issue with supply disruption. Instead of making the 
supplier “collapse” or “die”, this study has simulated how the individual firm’s 
ability to cope with loses (i.e. survivability) affects supply chain robustness, in 
terms of supply chain survivability. 
 The model results show that the manufacturer survivability has a high 
sensitivity to supply chain survivability, but it is not significant in improving 
demand fulfilment rate. Moreover, only the extremely low level of manufacturer 
survivability has a significant impact on the lower demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains. A higher level of manufacturer survivability does 
not significantly influence demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. 
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 On the other hand, compared to the manufacturer survivability, the supplier 
survivability has a low sensitivity on both demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains. The extremely low level of supplier survivability has a significant 
impact on the supply chain, but the higher degree of supplier survivability does not 
provide better demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. In general, 
these results support the generic SCM suggestion that considers both supplier and 
manufacturer survivability to cope with loses in supporting supply chain 
robustness. However, this suggestion is frequently raised as a critical part of coping 
with supply failures, such as discussed by Dyer and Ouchi (1993), Rice and Galvin 
(2006), and Yu et al. (2009). 
With regards to the experimental design, the higher level of individual 
survivability does not always enhance the model outputs because the collaboration 
length applied in the experiment is short-term. Moreover, both the manufacturer 
and the supplier are not loyal to each other. Higher individual survivability may be 
beneficial when the manufacturer and/or supplier are loyal, and the duration of 
collaboration is long. It can minimise the risk of “life reduction” of the agents, 
particularly for the manufacturers which collaborate with less efficient and/or less 
responsive supplier.  
In summary, this finding contradicts the current SCM focus in the literature. 
This finding suggests that the manufacturer survivability has a high sensitivity on 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains whereas most studies pay 
more attention on supplier robustness or survivability rather than manufacturer 
survivability to secure the supply flow of supply chain. Even the factor of supplier 
survivability can be an essential element in the process of supplier selection. The 
factor is commonly represented as supplier’s financial stability and staying power 
(Kannan and Tan 2003), financial strength (Çebi and Bayraktar 2003), and other 
measures of financial and commercial competencies (Cox 2004). Improving the 
supplier survivability also often becomes the main focus of government policy to 
protect the nation’s economy, such as practised by the Japanese government in 
protecting firms which stay in the upstream level of supply chains (Dyer and Ouchi 
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1993). None research investigates and compares the effect of manufacturer and 
supplier survivability on supply chains over the long-term. 
  
7.4.5 Manufacturer strategic mutation (Hypothesis B.5) 
The idea of this experimental factor is making a manufacturer have an ability to 
“jump” to a strategic space to fulfil demand that has not been served by competitors. 
In social science, this strategic movement is discussed as a part of strategic 
flexibility. This approach is generally understood to assist an enterprise to win the 
competition by being completely different from the competitor, such as described 
by Kim and Mauborgne (1997; 2005; 2008). Meanwhile, this approach has not been 
discussed much in SCM. Instead, strategic flexibility in SCM has more operational 
scope than in social science. For example, Chopra and Meindl (2007) describes 
supply chain flexibility as a part of being a responsive supply chain. 
 This study finds that the strategic mutation is highly sensitive to the both 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. Based on the experimental 
results, the highest outcomes are achieved when no strategic mutation applies to 
the system. The reason for this is that the extreme strategic movement taken by the 
manufacturer does not consider the supplier availability in the new strategic 
position. The movement is determined only based on the position of the unserved 
customer. Therefore, the strategic mutation modelled can lead the manufacturer to 
have no supplier when it decides to move to a new position which is relatively far 
from its previous position.  
 When a manufacturer moves to a new strategic position, the gap between the 
manufacturer and the available suppliers in the market becomes extremely big. This 
situation makes the manufacturer hard or not possible to establish a collaboration. 
This suggests that the strategic mutation is only beneficial to the manufacturer 
when it can find an appropriate supplier to support its strategic position. It also 
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means that manufacturer strategic mutation may be worth if the suppliers follow 
the manufacturer strategic movement and have the similar ability to mutate.  
 However, it should be noted that creating a blue ocean through strategic 
mutation cannot guarantee a company’s position in the market to be inimitable or 
unreachable by its competitors for the long-term. A firm can be considered 
successful in making a strategic mutation if there is more than one supplier which 
is available in the new strategic position and not possible to serve the firm’s 
competitors. If there is only one supplier is available in the new strategic position 
of the manufacturer mutated, and the supplier is difficult to be loyal and maintain a 
consistent performance, the strategic mutation would risk the manufacturer. 
However, this situation is hard to achieve as when the strategic mutation is made, 
the supply market generally has been concentrated in a strategic area where many 
manufacturers stay. In other words, the mutation should not only consider the 
competitor’s position in the market but also the distribution of the supply market. 
 
7.4.6 Summary of the results and input characteristics for Hypotheses B 
With respect to the degree of significance in the model result (or the sensitivity 
level of the experimental factor), only four experimental factors have been found to 
have a high degree of significance on the model outputs, regarding long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. They are the manufacturer 
trust of the suppliers – particularly when the short duration of collaboration is 
applied, the customer loyalty towards manufacturers, the manufacturer 
survivability to work with less efficient and/or less responsive supplier, and the 
manufacturer strategic mutation. These factors are considered sensitive to supply 
chains as it produces statistical significant differences consistently.  
 This finding contrasts with the common suggestions in SCM, which believe that 
the duration of collaboration, the number of partnerships, and trust are critical to 
supply chain success. In this study, duration of collaboration and number of 
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partnerships are found not to be significant to the demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains in the long-term. The supplier trust of the 
manufacturer is also suggested as an insensitive factor to maintain demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains, whereas the manufacturer trust is 
considered significant to support performance and survivability of supply chains in 
the market. It means that manufacturer companies may require to performing self-
assessment which can lead them to maintain the firm performance and survivability 
for the long-term. 
 Contrary to the expectations, the other aspects that are hardly considered in 
SCM literature are shown to be important to sustain long-term performance and 
survivability for supply chains; these factors are customer loyalty, manufacturer 
survivability, and manufacturer strategic movement. Low customer loyalty, the 
intermediate-high level of manufacturer survivability, and no strategic mutation in 
manufacturer strategic movement can assist supply chains in a market to perform 
and survive better under a competitive environment. This outcome provides a new 
insight to SCM analyst to consider as these factors have not been considered yet in 
the current SCM literature. 
 Furthermore, these findings strengthen strategic management view that 
considers operational effectiveness is not a strategy to maintain competitive 
advantage (Porter 2006). This view contradicts with SCM literature, which regards 
operational strategies as the key driver of business success. Nevertheless, it does 
not mean that SCM suggestions on collaboration approach are not precise and 
inapplicable. The recommended collaboration approach is true, but it may be 
limited to a particular situation or perspective. The partial scope of view is often 
employed in SCM analysis, and this fragmentary analysis results in conflicting 
findings in the literature. As suggested by Mintzberg et al. (2005), strategy should 
not be viewed partially, which is often demonstrated in most literature in business 
strategy – with regards to SCM and strategic management. 
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 A summary of the main aspects discussed in section 7.3, with regards to 
Hypotheses set A, is presented in Table 7.2. It encapsulates the effect of each 
experimental factor or input on demand fulfilment and survivability of supply 
chains. The effect is categorised into two possible aspects: the positive effect (the 
benefit) which has been expected during the modelling process, and the negative 
effect (the risk) that is resulted through simulation run. The positive effect can 
enhance the supply chain survivability, which is expected to be an enabler to 
maintain a better demand fulfilment in the market. Meanwhile, the negative effect 
will decrease the survivability of the supply chains, which leads to a lower rate of 
demand fulfilment.  
 
 
  Table 7.2 Summary of the effect of each experimental factor for Hypotheses set A  
Strategic approach: 
A Higher level of... 
The effect 
Positive 
(the benefit expected) 
 Negative 
(the resulting risk) 
1. Duration of collaboration Prevent the manufacturer and the 
supplier from having no firm to 
collaborate with. 
 Cause the supplier to move more 
aggressively to approach a new 
manufacturer.  
 
2. Number of partnerships, 
for manufacturer and 
supplier 
 
Same as in the duration of 
collaboration. 
 Same as in the duration of 
collaboration. 
3. Trust      
  a. Manufacturer trust 
of the supplier 
Same as in the duration of 
collaboration. 
 Same as in the duration of 
collaboration. 
  
b. Supplier trust of the 
manufacturer 
Same as in the duration of 
collaboration. 
 If a supplier has no collaboration link 
and decides to keep attracting the 
manufacturer who previously links 
with it, while another closer 
manufacturer is available to attract, 
the supplier would keep suffering 
losses. 
 
  
c. Customer 
trust/loyalty towards 
manufacturer 
Prevent manufacturer from having 
no customer to buy its product. It also 
can improve demand fulfilment rate 
as more demand is fulfilled. 
 
 
 Cause the manufacturer to move more 
aggressively to approach a new 
customer. This behaviour causes 
manufacturer positions becomes less 
similar/concentrated/overlaps but still 
relatively close to the others. This 
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Strategic approach: 
A Higher level of... 
The effect 
Positive 
(the benefit expected) 
 Negative 
(the resulting risk) 
pattern enlarges the gap between the 
collaborating supplier and 
manufacturer. The gap can reduce 
manufacturer’s profitability and, as a 
consequence, its survivability.  
 
4. Survivability 
a.! Manufacturer 
survivability 
 
 
 
b.! Supplier survivability 
  
Can improve manufacturer 
survivability to work with less 
efficient and/or less responsive 
supplier. 
 
Can improve supplier survivability 
to cope with loses in finding a 
manufacturer to collaborate. 
 
   
No negative effect is resulted. 
 
 
 
 
No negative effect is resulted. 
 
5. Manufacturer strategic 
mutation 
Can improve demand fulfilment rate 
in fulfilling the unmet customer 
demand. 
 
 Gap between manufacturer and 
supplier becomes larger, so it is 
difficult or not possible to establish 
collaboration. 
 
  
 When all of these effects are viewed from a less specific perspective, all the 
experimental factors have a similar resulting influence on the supply chains. The 
scenarios with better outputs, presented in Table 7.1, lead the firms to be more 
available for partnerships. These scenarios make both the manufacturers and the 
suppliers exist and stay in the strategic positions that are required by the market, so 
the supply chain collaboration can be continuously established, or maintained for a 
long-term. This pattern suggests that the agent’s behaviour, with regards to 
collaboration strategies and customer trust/loyalty, affects the competitive 
movement of the firms. The company competitive movement, with respect to the 
manufacturer strategic mutation, also has an impact on the collaboration decision 
in the supply chains. 
 However, all these findings are influenced by model and/or experimental design 
limitations. Table 7.3 addresses the main limitation of the resulting analysis for 
achieving objective 2. Most limitations are driven by limited experiments to allow 
interaction analysis. Several behavioural factors that are found to be not sensitive 
in this study may have a significant effect on supply chains under different model 
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setup. However, supplier survivability is considered to have no limitation that can 
affect the results. Furthermore, the resulting finding of manufacturer strategic 
mutation is regarded to be mainly caused by the model assumption; the mutation 
movement is only driven by the unserved customer, without considering supplier 
availability in the new strategic position. 
 
Table 7.3 Main limitation of each experiment for Hypotheses set A  
Experimental factor Findings Main limitation 
1. Duration of collaboration It tends to be not significant to 
supply chains. 
No interaction analysis with other 
factors. 
 
2. Number of partnerships, for 
manufacturer and supplier 
This factor has a low 
significant impact on supply 
chains. 
Limited interaction analysis with 
other factors. 
3. Trust    
  a. Manufacturer trust of 
the supplier 
 Limited interaction analysis with 
other factors. 
 
  
b. Supplier trust of the 
manufacturer 
 Limited interaction analysis with 
other factors. 
  
c. Customer 
trust/loyalty towards 
manufacturer 
 Limited interaction analysis with 
other factors. 
4. Survivability 
c.! Manufacturer 
survivability 
 
 
 
 
d.! Supplier survivability 
   
Limited interaction analysis with 
other factors, particularly with 
duration of collaboration; the longer 
collaboration period would enable 
further investigations on this factor. 
 
Limited interaction analysis with 
other factors. 
 
5. Manufacturer strategic 
mutation 
 The mutation movement does not 
consider supplier availability in the 
new strategic position. 
 
 
 
7.5! Study limitations  
Having considered the findings of this study and the way of achieving the research 
objectives, several limitations of this study should be taken into account. Besides 
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the limitations driven by the modelling assumptions and simplifications expressed 
in section 5.2.4, the model outcomes and conclusions are also significantly 
influenced by the model setup or experimental design limitations, and model 
outputs used. However, these limitations indicate opportunities for further work. 
The detail of the study limitations is discussed in the next subsections. 
 
7.5.1 Modelling approach limitations 
With respect to the modelling approach, the competition and collaboration in two-
stage supply chains is modelled in a simplified way. All agents are homogeneous, 
bounded-rational, and do not have learning ability to change their behaviour. They 
have no intelligence for learning from the previous actions and are acquisitive. Both 
manufacturers and suppliers do not have an ability to create a backup plan when 
they are difficult to find a new firm with whom they can collaborate. The suppliers 
are assumed to supply a critical component to the manufacturer, so when a 
manufacturer could not find a supplier to collaborate, it would die. When a 
manufacturer decides to be loyal to a supplier, it will maintain the collaboration link 
with the supplier despite the supplier trust. For the customer agents, they have a 
fixed preference that could not be influenced by manufacturer behaviour. They have 
a willingness to compromise to their preference, but it would be not applicable when 
the customer decides to be loyal to a manufacturer. The competitive strategic 
landscape is also defined in two dimensions, with respect to efficiency and 
responsiveness. The model has incorporated the relationship between efficiency 
and responsiveness by defining the applicability zone of supply chain strategy 
(section 2.3.2.1 and Figure 2.3), but it does not affect customer’s perspective on 
price and product value.  
 These characteristics have been listed as a part of modelling assumptions and 
simplifications in the conceptual modelling process (section 5.2.4). These features 
have a significant effect on the agent's behaviour, particularly on how the agents 
make decisions. Moreover, these assumptions and simplifications leads the model 
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developed to be simple. However, it was adequate to study the phenomena 
discussed and useful to separate the impact of factors due to simplicity of the model. 
 
7.5.2 Model setup limitations 
Secondly, the experimental design of this research is restricted to a limited number 
of scenarios.  Each experimental factor is examined under 5 different levels of 
inputs, or 5 scenarios, which have been empirically chosen. More scenarios with 
more incremental values may provide information to the findings of this study.  
 Furthermore, most experimental factors are investigated in isolation. Even 
though several factors or inputs have been examined in two situations of the 
duration of collaboration (short-term and long-term collaboration), this was 
designed to assist the author in considering future research that looks at interactions 
between behaviour factors. The results indicate that the emergent pattern of several 
experimental factors (regarding the number of partnerships and trust) is distinctive 
between different duration of collaboration. Hence, allowing multi-factorial 
analysis between the experimental factors could be a potential future research  
 
7.5.3 Analysis limitations 
The third limitation is related to the model outputs. This study employs supply chain 
fill rate (or demand fulfilment rate) as a simplification of supply chain performance, 
and the number of supply chains in the market to assess the number of supply chains 
that can survive for long period of competition. Adding several performance 
measurements, such as collaboration cost and revenue may offer better analysis in 
understanding the effect of competition and collaboration. For example, having a 
long term relationship is generally understood to be more efficient than the shorter 
duration of relationship, since it can reduce the cost of transaction, supplier 
selection process, and may also reduce the variability of lead time and product 
CHAPTER 7 - DISCUSSION 
238 
 
quality (Kraljic 1983; Matthyssens and Van den Bulte 1994). However, to develop 
an effective long-term collaboration needs very high investments. In other words, 
costs of collaboration are very complicated to measure as it highly depends on more 
detail characteristics of supply and demand market. One reason for this is that most 
risks and benefits of partnerships are intangible and do not turn up explicitly in a 
firm financial report (Gadde and Snehota 2000). 
In addition, with regards to interpreting the results, it is considered that a higher 
demand fulfilment rate (the supply chain fill rate) is better for the market because 
it indicates more demand is fulfilled. Meanwhile, the more supply chains that can 
survive in the competition (the number of supply chains in the market) is also 
preferred as it reflects more supply chains with long-term survivability. However, 
a higher number of supply chains that can survive in the market are not always 
advantageous for the market, particularly when many supply chains can survive in 
a business competition share the market segment. This situation could limit the 
surviving companies to optimise their revenue. 
Lastly, for the analysis, the sample size used in this study is 50. It may affect 
the normality pattern of the outputs. However, the nonparametric approach has been 
applied to minimise the biased interpretation of the non-normal outcome. 
 
7.6! Summary 
With regards to the objectives of this Thesis, all objectives designed in Chapter 4 
have been achieved. An agent-based model of competition and collaboration in 
supply chains has been developed. The model shows that micro behaviour of 
individual firms affects performance and survivability of all supply chains in the 
system. The model also enables the researcher to explore the impact of competition 
in supply chains. Moreover, explorations into the effect of firm’s competitive and 
collaborative behaviour on supply chain are performed in this study. Overall, it can 
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be suggested that this study provides a new insight both to SCM and strategic 
management. 
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CHAPTER 8!  CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1!Introduction 
This study was set out to understand the effect of competition and collaboration on 
supply chains. It focuses on the influence of competitive and collaborative 
behaviour of the individual firms on the overall supply chains, taking from a 
market-level perspective. With respect to this issue, the overall summary and 
conclusions of this Thesis are presented in this chapter. 
 
8.2!Research objectives, hypotheses, and the findings 
The findings of this study are objectives specific which is detailed in several 
hypotheses described in section 4.2 and section 4.3 of Chapter 4. This section 
synthesises the findings to achieve the research’s three objectives.  
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8.2.1 Summary of research objectives 
This study is performed with the aim to understand the effect of competition and 
collaboration on supply chains. The following objectives, as well as the related 
hypotheses, have been expressed to achieve that aim. 
Objective 1:  
To develop an agent-based model that explores the effect of competition and 
collaboration on supply chains. 
Objective 2:  
To explore the effect of competition on supply chains and market structure, 
with regards to the demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains for 
the long-term. 
Objective 3:  
To explore the effect of competition and collaboration strategy on the market, 
in terms of demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains over the 
long-term. The following factors are considered to describe the competition 
and collaboration strategies: 
1)! Duration of collaboration 
2)! Number of partnerships 
3)! Trust 
4)! Individual firm’s survivability 
5)! Strategic movement, considering the strategic mutation 
The first objective focuses on the development of the agent-based model, which 
is described in Chapter 5. The model development adopts a theory-driven approach 
based on the literature of competition and collaboration in supply chain, which is 
reviewed in Chapter 2. The experimental factors or the behaviour space is defined 
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subject to the gap found in the literature. The second objective aims to observe the 
impact of competition on supply chains, in terms of market demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chain. This objective is set because the literature suggests 
different opinions on this issue. Lastly, the third objective highlights the 
competitive and collaborative behaviour of individual firms. Five behavioural 
elements are simulated in this study: the duration of collaboration, the number of 
partnerships, trust, individual firm’s robustness or survivability, and manufacturer 
strategic mutation (or strategic leap). These behavioural factors are defined based 
on the gap found in the reviewed literature (Chapter 2).  
 
8.2.2 Summary of hypotheses 
As objective 2 and objective 3 require model explorations, the following hypotheses 
represent the expected outcomes on the results of the model. 
 
Objective 2: The influence of competition 
Hypothesis A: 
"Competition can be beneficial to supply chains, with respect to long-term 
competition". 
Objective 3: The effect of firm competitive and collaborative behaviour 
Hypothesis B.1: Duration of collaboration 
“Adopting longer duration of collaboration does not lead to a better long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
Hypothesis B.2: Number of partnerships of both manufacturer and supplier 
“Having a lower number of partnerships does not improve long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
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Hypothesis B.3: Trust  
Hypothesis B.3.1: The manufacturer trust of the supplier 
"Higher manufacturer trust of the supplier does not enhance long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
Hypothesis B.3.2: The supplier trust of the manufacturer 
"Higher supplier trust towards manufacturer does not improve long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
Hypothesis B.3.3: The customer’s trust/loyalty towards manufacturer 
"Higher customer trust/loyalty towards manufacturer does not improve long-
term demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
Hypothesis B.4: Individual firm survivability 
Hypothesis B.4.1: Manufacturer survivability 
"Higher manufacturer survivability does not enhance long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
Hypothesis B.4.2: Supplier survivability 
"Higher supplier survivability does not improve long-term demand fulfilment 
and survivability of supply chains". 
Hypothesis B.5: Manufacturer strategic movement (the strategic mutation) 
"The competition approach suggested in strategic management, regarding the 
strategic mutation, does not improve demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains for the long-term". 
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8.2.3 Summary of findings 
The findings of each above research objective are summarised as follows. 
 
Objective 1:  To develop an agent-based model that explores the effect of 
competition and collaboration on supply chains. 
1.! An agent-based model of competition and collaboration in supply chains has 
been developed in this research. The theory-driven approach adopted in the 
modelling approach helps the author to lead the study as well as obtaining 
insights from the results. The model has been found effective in elaborating 
a contemporary insight in understanding the conflicting conclusions exist in 
the previous study, by observing the competition and collaboration issue from 
market-level perspective. 
 
2.! A generic emergent pattern of the model is competition can lead to the form of 
the market structure (section 5.3.3). The firm strategic positions converge to 
particular strategic location and create several market concentrations. These 
market concentrations can be represented as market segments with different 
target customers. This resulting emergent pattern is similar to a classical 
competition model proposed by Hotelling (1929), who predicts that competing 
companies would end on the same or very close strategic locations. As the 
results match Hotelling’s model, this generic outcome is considered as a part 
of model validation in section 5.3.2.2 (Chapter 5). As the firms tend to become 
more concentrated or overlaps during the competition, overall demand 
fulfilment rate also has a tendency to decrease over the competition period.  
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Objective 2: To explore the influence of competition on supply chains, in terms 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains for a long-term. 
3.! Competition can have both positive and negative impacts on supply chains. 
The positive effect of competition is that competition can assist strategic 
alignment within supply chains, while the drawback is that competition can 
lead to extreme shakeouts, particularly in monopoly. Thus, it can be suggested 
that Hypothesis A is supported, which is 
"Competition can be beneficial to supply chains, with respect to long-term 
competition". 
Nevertheless, surprisingly, the extreme shakeouts (the monopoly) do not 
worsen the demand fulfilment rate significantly. This suggests that shakeouts 
do not affect the level of demand fulfilment in aggregate. In addition, supply 
chain strategic alignment is hard to emerge when most suppliers in the system 
are highly more efficient and responsive than the manufacturers. The extreme 
shakeouts could also be less likely to appear when supply chains in the market 
stay in completely different market clusters; yet, it is difficult to control the 
competition as companies are trying to grow larger and increase profits through 
competition.  
 
Objective 3: To explore the effect of firm competition and collaboration strategy on 
supply chains, in terms of demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains over the long-term. 
4.! Overall, only four experimental factors have a significant effect on the model 
outputs, which are demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. They 
are: 
a.! the manufacturer trust of the supplier – particularly when it is run under 
the short duration of collaboration,  
b.! the customer loyalty towards manufacturer,  
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c.! the manufacturer survivability to work with less efficient and/or less 
responsive supplier, and  
d.! the manufacturer strategic movement (strategic mutation).  
The extremely low and high manufacturer trust towards the supplier assists the 
supply chains to have a better performance and survivability for the long-term. 
Meanwhile, the customer loyalty, the manufacturer strategic mutation, and the 
extremely low manufacturer survivability lead to negative results in the 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. These factors lead the 
competition tension to be higher by encouraging the firms to have further 
strategic movements. 
5.! Most of the suggestions of this research contradict the popular 
recommendations in SCM, which commonly focuses on the duration of 
collaboration, the number of partnerships, the trust of both supplier and 
manufacturer, and the supplier stability (represented as supplier survivability) 
in the supply chain. These findings indicate that companies that currently have 
a plan on investing a long-term partnership with their supplier should rethink 
this program because it may not worth for the long-term performance and 
survivability improvements. The number of partnerships also does not improve 
the demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains significantly for the 
long-term, unless the long duration of collaboration applies to the supply 
chains. Under the adoption of long-term collaboration strategy, the one-to-one 
partnerships seem to be beneficial to demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains.  
Meanwhile, the manufacturer trust, the customer loyalty, and the manufacturer 
strategic mutation are sensitive to demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains, which have not been considered in the existing literature. It 
suggests that manufacturer enterprises may require to assessing their current 
behaviour towards their supplier (or self-assessment) which can assist them to 
maintain their long-term performance and survivability. SCM research also 
necessitates to considering customer loyalty in supply chain decisions and 
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analysis as well as the extreme decision in strategic change in supply chain (the 
strategic mutation). 
These unexpected findings obtained in this study approve analysis in both SCM 
and strategic management should cover more comprehensive scope to avoid 
fragmentary inference in strategy. 
 
6.! Hypothesis B.1 is supported, which is  
“Adopting longer duration of collaboration does not lead to a better long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains”. 
When one-to-one partnerships apply to the system, the length of collaboration 
does not provide a significant effect on both long-term demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains. Meanwhile, when manufacturers are only able 
to collaborate with one supplier at one time and suppliers can link to more than 
one manufacturer, the short-duration of collaboration results in better demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. However, this result seems to 
have low sensitivity to influencing supply chains performance and 
survivability over the long-term competition. 
 
7.! Hypothesis B.2 is supported, which is  
"Having a lower number of partnerships does not improve long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
When the short-term duration of collaboration applies, better demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains can be achieved in single-
sourcing and multi-sourcing strategy. The dual-sourcing is found to result in 
the lowest supply chain survivability, but it has no significant effect on demand 
fulfilment rate. However, the significance degree of this negative impact of 
dual-sourcing on supply chains seems to be low. When this result was 
investigated with different experiment setup, the dual-sourcing seems to be not 
different significantly from other sourcing strategies. 
Meanwhile, when the long-term duration of collaboration applies to the market, 
single-sourcing strategy with one-to-one relationships generates better results 
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in both long-term demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. 
However, the significance degree of this one-to-one relationships’ positive 
effect is low. It suggests that the benefit of single-sourcing strategy under long-
term collaboration may not be significant under different model setup.  
 
8.! Hypothesis B.3.1 is supported, which is  
"Higher manufacturer trust of the supplier does not enhance long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
Compared to the intermediate level of manufacturer trust, both the extremely 
high loyalty (the 100% loyalty) and the extremely low loyalty (i.e. no loyalty at 
all or 0% loyalty) result in better demand fulfilment rate and long-term 
survivability. The 100% manufacturer trust generates the highest demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains, while the 0% loyalty results in 
the second highest performance and survivability for supply chains. Both 
extreme loyalty levels provide a high degree of significance difference 
compared to the non-extreme levels of the manufacturer trust.  This situation 
applies when short-term collaboration is operated.  
However, when long-term collaboration is adapted, only the 100% 
manufacturer trust provides a better long-term demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains. The other degrees of loyalty are found to provide 
no significant difference. 
 
9.! Hypothesis B.3.2 is supported, which is  
"Higher supplier trust towards manufacturer does not improve long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
The supplier trust is found to be insignificant to overall supply chain long-term 
profitability/performance and survivability when the short duration of 
collaboration is implemented to the system. Nevertheless, this factor seems to 
be important when the long-term duration of collaboration is applied. A 
somewhat disloyal degree of supplier trust, surprisingly, appears to be 
beneficial to maintain supply chain survivability for long-term, even though it 
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has no effect on demand fulfilment rate. However, this supplier trust level has 
a low significance degree in affecting demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains. It suggests that this loyalty level may not essentially support the 
long-term survivability for the supply chains. 
 
10.!Hypothesis B.3.3 is supported, which is  
"Higher customer loyalty towards manufacturer does not improve long-term 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
No loyal customers are shown beneficial in maintaining long-term 
survivability for all supply chains in the market although the no loyal customers 
do not assist supply chains to the highest demand fulfilment rate in the 
experiment. The highest demand fulfilment rate is resulted by the extremely 
high customer loyalty (100% loyalty), but it potentially leads to an extreme 
shakeout. Thus, it can be suggested that the no loyal customers seem to be 
beneficial to supply chains, particularly in maintaining long-term survivability 
for supply chains without degrading their performance over the long-term. 
With regards to its degree of significance, the customer loyalty has high 
significance levels both to the demand fulfilment and survivability of supply 
chains. It indicates that customer loyalty is sensitive to supply chains. 
 
11.!Hypothesis B.4.1 is supported, which is  
"Higher manufacturer survivability does not enhance long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains". 
Manufacturer ability to cope with loss when it collaborates with less efficient 
and/or responsive suppliers, represented as manufacturer survivability in this 
study, affects both demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. It has 
a high degree of significance effect, which suggests that the factor is sensitive 
to supply chains.  
However, higher manufacturer survivability does not always lead to a better 
demand fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. Intermediate levels to 
the extremely high level of survivability do not seem to be advantageous to 
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supply chains for the long-term. The only extremely low level of survivability 
provides the significant lowest demand fulfilment rate. Meanwhile, higher 
manufacturer survivability seems to be more sensitive to enhance supply chain 
survivability, even though this impact is not linearly proportional to the level 
of survivability.  
 
12.!Hypothesis B.4.2 is supported, which is  
"Higher supplier survivability does not improve demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains over the long-term ". 
Supplier survivability represents supplier ability to tackle losses when it could 
not find an appropriate manufacturer to collaborate. The results indicate that 
this factor has a low degree of significance in maintaining long-term supply 
chain survivability, and it seems to have no impact on demand fulfilment rate. 
Moreover, only the extremely low level of survivability has a significant effect 
on supply chains, particularly in supply chain survivability. The intermediate 
levels and extremely high level of supplier survivability do not appear to be 
sensitive to supply chains.  
 
13.!Hypothesis B.5 is supported, which is  
"The competition approach suggested in strategic management, regarding the 
strategic mutation, does not improve demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains for the long-term ". 
The strategic mutation of the manufacturer is shown to be detrimental to supply 
chains. This effect has high significance degree on both demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains. Thus, no strategic mutation is expected to be a 
better approach to maintain the long-term performance and survivability for all 
supply chains in the operated market. 
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8.2.4 Achievement of objectives  
Having summarised the objectives as well as the findings of this study, the 
achievement of each objective of this Thesis can be encapsulated as follows.  
 
8.2.4.1 The development of agent-based model of competition and 
collaboration in supply chains (objective 1) 
The agent-based model developed in this study has shown to be able to model and 
simulate competition and collaboration in supply chains. The agent-based 
modelling approach enables the researcher to investigate several issues of supply 
chain competition and collaboration found in the literature. The theory-driven 
approach adopted in the model also enriches model ability to incorporate supply 
chain strategic decisions in collaboration, in terms of defining the agent’s 
competitive environment and behavioural rules described in Chapter 5. 
 The model is simplified, yet the interactions between the agents create high 
complexity relationships - as illustrated in Figure 7.1. A state of an agent changes 
dynamically as the agent receives feedback or information from other agent’s 
action. However, each agent’s is rationally bounded in understanding the feedback 
or information from the other agents. When all agents have similar limitations on 
bounded rationality, it creates system-level behaviour, with respect to market-level 
perspective. The emergent outcomes may have been predicted intuitively in 
business, but it is hard to explain empirically. The complex relationships occur in 
competition and collaboration may be the reason for the emergence of conflicting 
findings and suggestions in the previous studies. 
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8.2.4.2 To explore the competition influence on supply chains and market 
structure, in terms demand fulfilment and survivability of supply 
chains for a long-term (objective 2) 
The agent-based model developed in this study has examined the generic impact of 
competition on supply chains as a market. By observing the generic emergent 
patterns in all experiments - including the base run and the behaviour space, it is 
found that competition results in two effects on supply chains: strategic alignment 
within supply chains as a positive impact, and shakeouts as the negative impact. 
 However, competition also creates other generic emergent patterns that are not 
considered in Hypothesis A. Assuming the customer preference is fixed, the model 
indicates that competition can be a significant driver to the form of the market 
structure; all firms in the system tends to have almost similar strategic position with 
their competitors within long run of competition. This emergent behaviour also 
seems to have a similar outcome as Hotelling’s model, which predicts that 
equilibrium state is achieved when company’s strategic position is relatively not 
different from others. This similar resulting pattern is produced although the 
modelling assumption used in this study is different from Hotelling’s model. These 
results denote that the model is reliable to use as a base in understanding and 
observing the impact of competition on supply chains, particularly in innovative 
product markets. 
 
8.2.4.3 To explore the effect of firm competition and collaboration strategy on 
supply chains, in terms of demand fulfilment and survivability of 
supply chains over the long-term (objective 3).  
The model has assisted the researcher to observe and explore competitive and 
collaborative behaviour, which are identified as important issues in the literature 
gap (Chapter 2). The competitive and collaborative that are considered are the 
duration of collaboration, the number of partnerships of manufacturer and supplier, 
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trust, individual firm survivability (or robustness), and strategic mutation. The 
exploration of each behavioural element is performed in isolation. It enables the 
researcher to obtain explanation and intuition on the independent effect of each 
factor, which could not be explored in an empirical approach.  
 On the other hand, isolated exploration provides limited interpretations to relate 
it with real supply chain practices. Therefore, several issues, considering the 
number of partnerships and trust, have been run under several levels of the duration 
of collaboration: short-term and long-term collaboration. This is because these 
factors are occasionally considered as unseparated elements in achieving 
collaboration success, with regards to a long-term collaboration with single-
sourcing (one-to-one partnership) and high trust between collaborating firms. In 
short, this study has performed the exploration for understanding the impact of firm 
competitive and collaborative behaviour on long-term demand fulfilment and 
survivability of supply chains. 
 
8.3!Thesis contributions  
A central theme of this Thesis is “to explore the impact of competition and 
collaboration on supply chains from a market perspective”. This theme involves 
three research disciplines: supply chain management (SCM), strategic 
management, and agent-based modelling (ABM). This research also implicates 
operational research (OR) through the use of ABM for the modelling process and 
operations management (OM) for the analysis. With respect to the findings and the 
modelling approach, this Thesis provides two main contributions. They are related 
to implications to knowledge and practice, and the agent-based model of 
competition and collaboration in supply chains. The following subsections 
summarise the detail of these contributions. 
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8.3.1 Implications to knowledge and practice 
This study has two contributions to knowledge and practice. They are insight on 
competition and collaboration, and the fundamental for supply chain collaboration, 
which are explained in the following sections. 
 
Insights on competition and collaboration 
In strategic management, competition can be considered as a barrier creation to 
prevent new firms to enter the market (Porter 1990). However, in fact, competition 
always naturally emerges in business, despite the threat of new entrants. When 
companies operate in the same market, they will compete to be the strongest firm 
and tend to 'destroy' their competitors. This study simulates this situation, where 
competition exists without allowing new firms to penetrate the market. 
 The use of market-level analysis in this study provides a contemporary 
approach to view and evaluate competition and collaboration strategy, taking a 
system perspective. It offers a new insight in SCM, particularly to think about the 
impact of particular supply chain strategies for the long-term. This is a novel 
approach that has not been considered by previous studies in the SCM literature. 
An essential insight obtained from the application of market-level perspective in 
this study is that “what is good for a single company may not be rewarding for the 
market”. It indicates that a supply chain strategy may have led a firm to be a market 
leader, but it could be detrimental once it applies to all firms. If this situation is not 
immediately predicted by policy makers, an extreme shakeout could emerge in the 
market, such as monopoly. This critical finding corresponds to the real SCM 
practices because only a few companies can benefit the supply chain strategies 
recommended in the literature. 
 The simulation results also suggest that the manufacturer's strategy or behaviour 
in collaboration affects the supplier’s competitive movements, and vice versa. This 
CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSIONS 
255 
 
is because the manufacturer's strategic position affects the manufacturer's decision 
to select the appropriate supplier to collaborate, while, at the same time, the 
supplier's competitive movement influences the manufacturer's strategic position is 
highly affected by the supplier’s capability during the collaboration period. These 
mean that competition and collaboration strategy has a reciprocal impact which 
affects the tension level of competition in the market. An extremely high tension of 
competition will lead to an extreme shakeout, which results in monopoly. In other 
words, the less aggressive competitive movements of companies could maintain the 
market stability, in terms of market demand fulfilment and survivability of supply 
chains. This long-term stability is possible to acquire when most of the suppliers 
are not far more efficient and/or responsive than the manufacturers. 
In addition, this study provides some initial analysis that explains the occurrence of 
shakeout phenomenon. Most discussions of shakeouts are often discussed in 
strategic management, but none of them has tried to explain it by considering SCM 
point of view. The results of the model show that the extreme shakeout (monopoly) 
can be more likely to occur when most suppliers are far more efficient and/or 
responsive than the manufacturers. However, it is hard to control the distribution of 
firm strategic position in reality. It indicates that an advance strategic management 
approach to regulate the market is required to prevent it from extreme shakeouts. 
 With respect to the effect of competition and collaboration strategy, this Thesis 
contributes a new insight on strategy in both SCM and strategic management 
context. In strategic management, strategy is viewed in many different perspectives. 
Strategy can be considered as, for example, an action plan, an adaptation process, 
and a prescription to a business problem (Mintzberg et al. 2005).  However, in 
reality, none of these perspectives is able to provide the best strategy that leads to a 
consistent outcome to any company. All of these views are correct, but each of them 
has limited scope to explain and discuss strategy in a complete and perfect 
perspective. This situation makes the discussion on strategy seem never ends, and 
various suggestions on the most ‘correct’ and ‘powerful’ strategy emerges in the 
literature and business practices. This also deals with the nature of human being 
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that different people always look the same thing differently. This ‘natural’ 
limitation could be a reason why the ‘most logical’ strategy is not consistently 
effective and does not fit all firms. This situation could be simply illustrated by 
using analogy of a wrong medication prescription from the ‘most logical’ diagnosis 
approach.  
 Conforming to these conflicting opinions on strategy in strategic management 
and SCM, the result of this study shows that most suggested strategies in both 
research fields do not provide benefit to supply chains for a long-term. For instance, 
experts in strategic management regard strategies to improve operational 
effectiveness are not the real strategy for competition (Porter 2006), while SCM 
believes that operational strategies are critical to business success. Both opinions 
are supported by case studies that prove the arguments of both perspectives are true. 
However, each of them applies in different situations. This study shows that when 
a good strategy is applied by all firms, it could be detrimental to the market, 
indicated by the occurrence of extreme shakeouts. This means that a strategy that 
leads a single or several companies to success might have an adverse effect to other 
enterprises.  
 In other words, this study could remind academics and strategy makers that no 
strategy is superior in business. It does not mean that the available strategies in the 
literature are impractical, but selecting a strategy requires not only logical approach 
but also intuitions. The intuition can be enhanced by observing the market 
behaviour and identifying its characteristics, with respect to the supply and demand 
market. Even though a perfect perspective to obtain the 'whole look of the elephant' 
of strategy would be hard to achieve, considering different perspectives would be 
worthwhile to obtain a better knowledge and intuitions in strategy selection.   
 Moreover, market regulators may need to create a policy if most firms in a 
market show a tendency to apply a similar strategy that can increase the uncertainty 
of the market, such as practising strategic mutation or big leap strategy or imposing 
a customer loyalty program in a massive scale. When one of these strategies is 
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implemented by all firms in the market, it could lead the companies to be extremely 
aggressive and increase the tension of competition. One of the consequences of this 
circumstance is the occurrence of extreme shakeouts.  
 
Insights on the fundamental factors for supply chain collaboration  
This research indicates that several behavioural factors, which have never been 
discussed in SCM literature, are found to be sensitive to maintaining demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains (or robustness) for a long-term. The 
manufacturer trust is suggested to be a sensitive behaviour to supply chains, whilst 
the supplier trust is insensitive. This finding contradicts current discussions on 
trust, which focus more on improving supplier trust towards the manufacturer 
rather than vice versa. Meanwhile, surprisingly, no loyal customers provide a 
significant enhancement for the better long-term supply chain survivability. 
Although high degrees of customer loyalty can increase demand fulfilment rate or 
profitability, it significantly costs supply chain survivability as a consequence.  
Lastly, the manufacturer strategic mutation can potentially lead to more supply 
chain failures in the market if the movement is determined without considering the 
competition in the supply market.  
 In contrast, the popular collaboration issues raised in SCM literature do not 
provide significant support to explain the resulting impact on the long-term demand 
fulfilment and survivability of supply chains. The popular collaboration issues here 
refer to considering the duration of collaboration and number of partnerships. 
Although this study has limitations described in section 7.5, all these findings are 
worthwhile to consider in making supply chain strategic decisions for business 
managers. 
 Moreover, the isolation analysis provides a better understanding of the 
independent effect of competitive and collaborative behaviour to supply chains. 
Even though experiments in isolation can cause limited analysis on comprehending 
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the interaction between behavioural factors, the biased of the findings has been 
reduced by performing several experiments with different duration of 
collaboration, with regards to the factor of the number of partnerships and trust.  
 
8.3.2 Agent-based model of competition and collaboration with an 
advancement of the Hotelling’s model 
The use of ABM in this study offers an effective approach to consolidate the 
different perspective between SCM and strategic management. The bottom-up 
modelling approach enables exploration and analysis for a macro-level behavioural 
pattern that emerges from micro-level behaviour. It demonstrates that ABM has the 
capability to be a new approach to both SCM and strategic management to study 
the business dynamic, particularly in comprehending competition and collaboration 
impacts in a more comprehensive perspective. 
This study also provides a further advancement of Hotelling’s competition model 
that has been studied in ABM literature. By allowing two layers of competition 
(competition in manufacturer level and supplier level), the agent-based model 
developed in this study enriches the development of dynamic competition model in 
ABM. Also, the SCM perspective incorporated into the model enhances the 
competition model in offering more comprehensive analysis to the business 
dynamics. The use of competition dimensions of efficiency and responsiveness are 
new, and the rules of competition and collaboration are coeval.  
In short, this research provides a high originality of the contribution for ABM 
model. Although the model employed in this study is still highly simplified, it can 
be a basis of the use of ABM as an alternative approach to studying conflicting 
issues in SCM and strategic management. This study also demonstrates that the use 
of ABM in consolidating SCM and strategic management is contemporary and 
promising. Moreover, the findings of this Thesis suggest that Hotelling’s model is 
generally reliable to provide intuitions in predicting the long-term effect of 
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competition on innovative product markets. This indicates that the modelling and 
simulation of supply chain competition and collaboration are useful and important. 
Hence, there is merit modelling the issue through ABM. 
   
8.4!Research limitations  
As addressed in section 7.5 (Chapter 7), this study has three sources of limitations: 
modelling approach limitations, model setup limitations, and analysis limitations. 
These limitations can be considered as the potential improvements for the future 
research. 
 The modelling approach limitations are driven by the model contents. The 
feature of the model that may significantly contribute to the experimental results is 
that the interactions are defined in a very simplified way. All agents are 
homogeneous, and they do not have learning ability to change their behaviour. Also, 
the agent’s rules described in the experimental factors are assumed to be 
independent. These characteristics have been listed as a part of modelling 
assumptions and simplifications in the conceptual modelling process (section 5.2.4). 
 The study limitation also comes from the behaviour space, or model setup. The 
scenarios defined in this study are limited to only 5 levels, and most experiments 
are undertaken in isolation. Although several inputs have been undertaken under 
two different levels of the duration of collaboration, analysis to understand the 
effect of interactions between the experimental factors is still limited.  
 The analysis limitations deal with model outputs used in this study. 
Incorporating costs, such as collaboration cost and strategic change cost, may 
provide better interpretations to the results. Nevertheless, adding more output 
measures may also increase complexity to the model.  
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8.5!Future work 
While this study provides a novel approach and insights to understand competition 
and collaborations in supply chains, the model offers potential extensions to 
generate further valuable comprehensions and intuitions in this topic. Moreover, 
the findings of this study can lead to further hypotheses that enhance current 
knowledge in SCM and strategic management. The improvements of this research 
could be addressed by elaborating the unused features that are available in the 
current computer model, and/or relaxing the current limitation studies mentioned in 
section 8.4 
 
8.5.1 Optimising the use of current model feature 
Possible further research that could be undertaken in the nearest time is by 
optimising the features of the present agent-based model. The detail unexplored 
features in the computer model are provided in Appendix F.  
1.! Investigating the interactions between competition and collaboration factors 
with multi-factorial analysis to provide more comprehensive insights into 
competition and collaboration effect in supply chains.  
2.! The computer model used in this study also has several features to allow the 
agents to be heterogeneous, by applying different duration of collaboration 
in each manufacturer agent.  
3.! The current computer model has been coded to allow an agent, either 
manufacturer or supplier, to behave differently, in terms of competitive and 
collaborative behaviour. This approach could provide a basis for 
recommending an appropriate strategy of supply chain collaboration that 
incorporates business competition.  
4.! The last available unused feature of the computer model is that the model 
can be used to examine whether allowing new entrants to the competition 
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would change the emergent behaviour and prevent the market from 
shakeouts.  
 
8.5.2 Relaxing the current study limitations 
Future work could be performed by addressing the limitations of this study, with 
regards to the modelling limitations, model setup limitations, and analysis 
limitations. Potential studies that could be considered are: 
1.! Defining the agents to act heterogeneously by adding a learning capability 
and intelligence in making decisions. This meta-behavioural rule can allow 
several experimental factors to be less independent and dynamically 
adjusted during the simulation run. 
2.! Elaborating costs of collaboration and strategic change to improve the 
assessment of the current model output of demand fulfilment rate.  
3.! Considering the position of suppliers to the rule of manufacturer strategic 
mutation. This additional logic will provide a more comprehensive insight 
in exploring the effect of strategic mutation on supply chains in the market. 
 
8.6!Summary and final comments 
There is a vast body of literature in collaboration and competition strategies to 
improve business performance and survivability, yet contradicting opinions 
continuously appear and remain unexplained. The issue is related to the duration of 
collaboration, the number of partnerships, trust, survivability of individual firm, 
and the manufacturer strategic mutation. Many studies suggest these factors are 
critical to improve supply chain’s competitiveness, while other work finds that not 
all of them are significant. When the factor is concluded significant, different 
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suggestions emerge to the literature. The gap in the literature becomes more explicit 
when this issue is viewed from strategic management perspective.  
The agent-based model developed in this study offers a new approach to SCM 
and strategic management to bridge the gap in the previous work. The approach 
provides new insight into understanding the effect of competition and 
collaborations on supply chains, where several findings are counterintuitive with 
what it is generally understood in SCM and strategic management. This research 
initiates a contemporary perspective to connect SCM and strategic management to 
sharpen academics, policy makers, business manager’s intuitions about competitive 
and collaborative behaviour that are happening in the market. Further research 
opportunities are widely available for improvements to answer further complex 
relationships in this issue. 
This study has made the present researcher realised that science begins as 
parable and ends as a probability. Simplified models are often found to be more 
useful and easier to explain a complex system that involves real and imaginary 
elements. The real elements are likely measurable and observable through 
quantitative and/qualitative information, but the imaginary aspects remain hard to 
explore and explain. Moreover, people tend to see things and understand problems 
in different ways. This makes a real issue for one person may look imaginary for 
the others, and vice versa. These characteristics represent a complex system that 
may drive the conflicting suggestions in much research, including in SCM, strategic 
management, and ABM. This feature is also the reason why a simple model is 
frequently more useful to assist complex analysis for learning and obtaining 
insights. Furthermore, the constraints of competition and collaboration success 
could be as a result of the system-level emergence of individual firm behaviour. In 
short, the researcher feels a great excitement during this study. The researcher is 
also highly motivated to improve and encourage other scholars to enhance this 
study for more comprehensive perspective and analysis.    
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APPENDIX A:  THE INEFFECTIVE USE OF 
PARAMETRIC STATISTICS AND 
COMMON RANDOM NUMBERS IN 
INFERENTIAL ANALYSIS  
(An example of the supply chains fill rate of manufacturer strategic mutation) 
 
 
 
A.1 THE CONFIDENCE INTERVALS WITH BONFERRONI 
CORRECTIONS, BY CONSIDERING THE USE OF COMMON 
RANDOM NUMBERS 
Table A.1 summarises the test for the use of common random numbers. It compares 
the variance of difference (SD) in the left hand side with the sum of variances ("#$ +"$$) in the right hand side (Robinson, 2014). If the conclusion proves the variance is 
“Reduced” (SD < "#$ + "$$), the paired-t confidence interval is conducted to compare 
the scenarios; when it is concluded as “Not Reduced”, it means that the standard t 
confidence intervals is suggested. As shown by the table, paired-t confidence 
interval would be used to compare: scenario 1 with scenario 3, scenario 1 with 
scenario 5, scenario 2 with scenario 3, scenario 2 with scenario 4, and scenario 3 
with scenario 5. The rest comparisons would be constructed by using standard t 
confidence intervals; they are the comparison between: scenario 1 and scenario 2, 
scenario 1 and scenario 4, scenario 2 and scenario 5, scenario 3 and scenario 4, and 
scenario 4 and scenario 5. 
 
 
Table A.1 The conclusion of the common random numbers check through variance 
reduction analysis for supply chain fill rate of manufacturer strategic mutation 
Scenario 2 3 4 5 (2%) (5%) (7%) (10%) 
1 27.67 > 25.01 22.93 < 24.74 32.15 > 29.82 30.61 < 31.1 
(0%) Not Reduced Reduced Not Reduced Reduced 
2   17.04 < 18.75 21.03 < 23.82 25.63 > 25.1 
(2%)   
Reduced Reduced Not Reduced 
3     24.53 > 23.56 19.74 < 24.84 
(5%)     Not Reduced Reduced 
4       36.37 > 29.91 
(7%)       Not Reduced 
 
 
According to this table, the parametric confidence intervals with overall level 
of significance 10% for ten comparisons were constructed, as summarised in Table 
A.2. If the interval includes zero, it concludes insignificant difference between the 
scenarios. If the confidence interval is completely less than zero, it is concluded 
that the first scenario significantly provides lower output than the second scenario. 
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The same concluding approach is applied when the confidence interval is 
completely more than zero; the conclusion would be that the first scenario has 
significant higher output than the second scenario. 
From the table, it is shown that scenario 1 (0% - no mutation) provides higher 
supply chain fill rate than other scenarios, while scenario 5 (10%) results in lowest 
supply chain fill rate. Other scenarios, which are scenario 2 until scenario 4, are 
statistically considered to have no significant difference with each other. These 
conclusions are consistent with the Mann-Whitney U test provided in Appendix I. 
 
Table A.2  Confidence interval comparison of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios 
of probability manufacturer strategic mutation  
(with overall confidence level ≥ 90%) 
Scenario 2 3 4 5 (2%) (5%) (7%) (10%) 
1 (1.86, 5.57) (1.57, 5.2) (2.11, 6.17) (4.21, 8.4) 
(0%) Scen.1 > Scen.2 Scen.1 > Scen.3 Scen.1 > Scen.4 Scen.1 > Scen.5 
2   (-1.89, 1.24) (-1.31, 2.17) (0.73, 4.45) 
(2%) 
  
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
Scen.2 > Scen.5 
3     (-1.05, 2.56) (1.23, 4.6) 
(5%) 
    
No significant 
difference 
Scen.3 > Scen.5 
4       (0.13, 4.19) 
(7%)       Scen.4 > Scen.5 
  
 
 
A.2 NORMALITY ANALYSIS ON SIMULATION OUTPUTS 
1. Central tendency 
The central tendency analysis for the supply chain fill rate of each scenario of 
manufacturer strategic position is summarised in Table A.3. Only scenario 1 has 
nine modals; they are 5.4%, 6.4%, 7.3%, 7.8%, 8.5%, 9%, 9.3%, 9.6%, and 12.8%. 
Each modal appears twice in the data set. These modal makes the data distribution 
relatively broad, or not normal.  
 
2. Data shape 
A normal distributed data is defined by zero skewness, and any symmetric data 
should be made up of skewness near zero. Negative skewness indicates the data are 
right-skewed, that means the longer tail is at the right side. Similarly, positive 
skewness represents left-skewed distribution that the left tail is relatively longer 
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than the right tail. The sign of skewness is affected by multi-modal if it exists 
(NIST/SEMATECH 2003). 
 
Table A.3 The central tendency measures for the supply chain fill rate of each scenario of 
manufacturer strategic position 
Central tendency 
measures 
Scenario 
1 (0%) 2 (2%) 3 (5%) 4 (7%) 5 (10%) 
  Mean  10.47 6.76 7.09 6.33 4.17 
  Median 9.3 6.9 7.15 6.65 5.6 
  Modal:           
unimodal/ 
multimodal/ 
no modal? 
multimodal unimodal unimodal unimodal unimodal 
value 
(if unimodal) - 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 As well as skewness, a normal bell-shaped data should have zero excess 
kurtosis, known as mesokurtic. A data distribution with excess kurtosis less than 
zero is called platykurtic and data with kurtosis more than zero known as 
leptokurtic. A platykurtic distribution has a lower central peak, fatter size, and 
shorter and thinner tails; whereas leptokurtic distribution represents higher and 
sharper peak with longer and fatter tails. 
 An inferential approach for population skewness and kurtosis is performed to 
conclude whether the population is very likely normal, especially when the sample 
does not have normal shape. A two-tailed test of skewness and kurtosis are 
implemented at 0.05 level of significant, so the critical value is ± 1.96 as suggested 
by Ghasemi and Zahediasl (2012).  
 The skewness is inferred as follows. 
"! If the Z value of population skewness (&'() is less than -1.96, it indicates 
that the population is significantly or very likely left-skewed.  
"! If &'(is more than 1.96, it suggests that the population is significantly or 
very likely right-skewed.  
"! If &'( is between -1.96 and 1.96, population of the data is insignificantly 
skewed, or probably symmetric.  
Meanwhile, the kurtosis is measured as this following. 
"! If the Z value of population kurtosis (&')) is less than -1.96, it indicates 
that the population is significantly or very likely platykurtic.  
"! If &')is more than 1.96, it suggests that the population is significantly or 
very likely leptokurtic.  
"! If &') is between -1.96 and 1.96, population of the data is probably 
mesokurtic (zero kurtosis, or normal bell-shaped).  
 
 The result of the normality shape is presented in Table A.4. Only scenario 4 
likely has symmetric and mesokurtic shape, which is close to normal distribution 
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shape. Scenario 1, 2, and 3 of manufacturer strategic movement are very likely 
skewed (asymmetric), while scenario 5 is probably symmetric. For the kurtosis, 
scenario 1, 2, and 3 probably have mesokurtic shape (normal bell curve) and 
scenario 5 is very likely platykurtic.  
 
 
Table A.4 The shape measures for the supply chain fill rate of each scenario of 
manufacturer strategic position 
Shape measures 
Scenario 
1 (0%) 2 (2%) 3 (5%) 4 (7%) 5 (10%) 
  - Skewness           
       Coeff.(G1) 0.74 -0.95 -0.93 -0.48 0.09 
       Std. error 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
       Z statistics 2.19 -2.81 -2.76 -1.44 0.27 
       Conclusion* very likely 
right-
skewed 
very likely 
left-skewed 
very likely 
left-skewed 
possibly 
symmetric 
possibly 
symmetric 
  - Kurtosis           
       Coeff.(G2) -0.17 0.56 0.90 -0.68 -1.62 
       Std. error 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 
       Z statistics -0.26 0.84 1.36 -1.02 -2.44 
       Conclusion* possibly 
mesokurtic 
possibly 
mesokurtic 
possibly 
mesokurtic 
possibly 
mesokurtic 
very likely 
platykurtic 
*This is a two-tailed test at 0.05 level of significance (the critical value is ±1.96) 
 
 
3. Outliers 
As presented in Table A.5, scenario 2 and 3 has six and five weak outliers 
respectively. All of these outliers are the modal of the scenarios; the value of the 
modal is 0%. The 0% for the supply chain fill rate represents no customer demand 
is fulfilled in the market. This output occurs when the remaining manufacturer and 
supplier could not create a supply chain. These outliers can distort the conclusion 
of the parametric approach constructed in Table A.2. 
. 
 
 
Table A.5 The outliers of the supply chain fill rate for each scenario of manufacturer 
strategic position 
Measures Scenario 1 (0%) 2 (2%) 3 (5%) 4 (7%) 5 (10%) 
Any outliers? no yes yes no no 
  Strong outliers - 0 0 - - 
  Weak outliers - 6 5 - - 
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 In scenario 2, for example, the supply chain fill rate ends with zero per cent in 
seed number 10, 27, 29, 38, 46, and 49. In these seeds, the number of supply chains 
in the market is also zero. It means that the supply chain fill rate comes with zero 
because no supply chain exists in the market. To observe how these seeds lead to 
zero outputs, the model is rerun under these seed numbers. 
  
 
A.3 TESTING THE USE OF COMMON RANDOM NUMBERS 
To check the extent of controlling the seed number in NetLogo to lower the output 
variance, two simple inspections are performed. The first check is observing the 
setup behaviour, by investigating how the platform sets up the agents. The second 
check is observing the agent’s movement. Both tests apply the same seed number 
while the experimental factors are varied. 
1.! Observing the mechanism of NetLogo setup 
 The first inspection is testing whether the agents should be arranged in similar 
positions although the setup parameters are varied. In this test, three different setups 
are performed for seed number 10. The variable to define the seed number is 
represented as SeedNumber in the computer model. The first setup is conducted by 
setting up the number of customers to 1000, the number of manufacturers to 10, the 
number of suppliers to 10, and both manufacturers and suppliers have maximum 
number of partnerships only up to one link (represented as MaxSource for the 
manufacturers, and MaxLinks for the suppliers). The initial condition (at time unit 
0) of this setup is shown by Figure A.1.a. The second setup is set by changing the 
number of manufacturers to five and the maximum number of manufacturer 
partnership (MaxSource) to two, as illustrated by Figure A.1.b. The third setup is 
setting up the model as the first setup, but the number of customers is adjusted to 
999, as presented in Figure A.1.c.  
 As can be seen in the Figure, it is clearly shown that changing the number of 
the agents as well as the maximum number of partnerships provides different 
agents’ distribution on the NetLogo space. A change of the quantity and/or the 
maximum number of partnerships of an agent type affects agents’ position. Even 
though the control of the seed number is coded at the early stage of setup procedure 
(see appendix G), it does not always lead to a consistent setup.  
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a)                                  b)                                  c) 
Figure A.1 Visual setup testing of the use of common random number in NetLogo: 
a) Setup 1 – the base setup ; b) Setup 2 – the number of manufacturers is reduced and the 
maximum number of manufacturer partnerships is increased; 
c) Setup 3 – the number of customers is reduced 
 
2.! Observing the NetLogo mechanism in running the simulation 
To obtain more confidence about the failure of the use of common random numbers 
in the previous check, observation on agents’ movement under a same seed number 
with a different input level is conducted. Instead of changing the values of the 
number of agents, the variables that control the agents' movement are altered. The 
base run with seed number 10 is employed as the basis of comparison and the 
resulting agents’ movement is compared with other parameter setting run. 
 Figure B.2 illustrates the comparison of this check between the base run 
(scenario 1) and scenario 2 of manufacturer strategic movement. As the number of 
all agents’ types and the number of partnerships are not different in both runs, the 
agents’ positions are identical at the initial condition or time unit = 0. Even though 
all agents’ movement are compared in each time unit, the figure only focuses on 
two particular agents to simplify the illustration. In the figure, supplier agent 
number 1010 and 1014, which are inside the circle, are selected for this illustration. 
These agents are collaborated with similar manufacturers in both scenarios. They 
also have similar closest manufacturers (the target manufacturer) to be approached 
or attracted in both scenarios at the early stage of simulation run. 
 From the figure, it can be seen that since time unit 1, both agents have different 
steps or moves in these runs. It means that even though the agents’ position is 
identical at the initial condition or time unit zero, controlling the seed number does 
not mean producing the same agents’ movements when a parameter is varied.  
 Based on both checks of agent setup and movement, it can be concluded that 
the common random numbers approach could not be adopted in NetLogo. 
Controlling the seed number in NetLogo only allows observer to reproduce the run, 
but it does not generate a similar sequence of agent's movement. In other words, 
even though some experiments show variance reduction, it does not necessarily 
mean that the common random numbers work properly in NetLogo. 
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Figure A.2 Visual testing of common random number in NetLogo through agents’ 
movement observation.  
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APPENDIX B:  THE COMPUTER MODEL  
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Figure B.1 The interface 
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The interface of the computer model is shown in Figure B.1. It consists of three 
main parts: setup, outputs, and execution buttons. The setup is composed of inputs 
or experimental factors, and non-inputs or constant setup. The definition of inputs 
and non-inputs has been provided in Chapter 5. The outputs provide visualisation 
of the results, which covers the NetLogo world or space, and graphical 
representation of the outputs. The last part of the computer model interface is the 
execution buttons.  
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APPENDIX C:  VARIABLE DESCRIPTION IN 
NETLOGO 
 
 
 
C.1. The setup 
As illustrated in Figure B.1, the interface for setting up the model is organised 
into five groups. They are classified as global setup, demand setup, supply setup, 
manufacturers’ behavioural rules in competition, and manufacturers’ behavioural 
rules in collaboration.  
 
C.1.1 Global setup 
#customer : the number of customer agents. 
#manuf : the number of manufacturer agents. 
SupplierOn? : ON, if supplier agents are simulated, or 
  OFF, if supplier agents are not simulated. 
#supplier : the number of supplier agents. 
ControlSeed? : ON, if the value of random seed is determined by user, or 
  OFF, if the value of random seed is determined by NetLogo 
based on the current date and time. 
SeedNumber : the value of random seed, if random seed is determined by 
user. 
 
C.1.2 Demand setup: Customers' behavioural rules 
willingness_to_compromise : the selection radius of customer agents to decide 
a manufacturer agent that is closest to their 
position. The radius is represented as a 
percentage of diagonal length of NetLogo world 
(the simulation space). 
cust_loyalty : the probability that customer agents would 
choose the same manufacturer agent as selected 
previously.  
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C.1.3 Supply setup: Suppliers' behavioural rules of competition and 
collaboration 
MaxLinks : the maximum number of collaboration links that 
supplier agents can have. 
SuppMove? : ON, if supplier agents move (competitive), or 
  OFF, if supplier agents do not move (not 
competitive).  
Supp_loyalty : the probability that supplier agents would follow 
the manufacturer strategic movement to maintain 
their current relationships. 
SuppDie? : ON, if supplier agents are allowed to die, or 
  OFF, if supplier agents are always alive. 
SurvivabilityWithoutManuf : the length of supplier to survive in time unit when 
it does not have a link with manufacturer agent at 
all. 
 
C.1.4 Manufacturers’ behavioural rules in competition 
ManufMove? : ON, if manufacturer agents move 
(competitive), or 
     OFF, if supplier agents do not move (not 
competitive).  
MutationProbability : the probability of manufacturer agents 
to create a big leap in changing their 
position. 
die? : ON, if manufacturer agents can die, or 
     OFF, if supplier agents are always alive. 
SurvivabilityWithoutSupplier : the length of manufacturer to survive in 
time unit when it does not have a link 
with supplier agent at all. 
SurvivabilityWithUndesiredSupplier : the length of manufacturer to survive in 
time unit when it collaborates with less 
efficient and/or responsive supplier/s.  
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C.1.5 Manufacturers’ behavioural rules in collaboration  
MinDuration_of_collaboration : the minimum duration of collaboration 
between linked manufacturers and 
suppliers, defined in time unit. 
MaxDuration_of_collaboration : the maximum duration of collaboration 
between linked manufacturers and 
suppliers, defined in time unit. 
MaxSource : the maximum number of collaboration 
links that manufacturer agents can create. 
manuf_loyalty : the probability that manufacturer agents 
would choose the same supplier agent as 
selected previously. 
manuf_willingness_to_compromise : the selection radius of manufacturer 
agents to decide which supplier/s who are 
closest to their position. The radius is 
represented as a percentage of diagonal 
length of NetLogo world (the simulation 
space). 
AdjustPosition? : ON, if manufacturers' position is affected 
by their suppliers' position, or 
  OFF, if manufacturers' position is not 
affected by their supplier/s. 
 
C.2. The outputs  
Main outputs 
Supply chain fill rate (%) : the percentage of served customers, to represent 
the market service level generated by the existing 
supply chains. It is presented in a time series plot. 
Number of existing firms : the number of existing firms (manufacturer and 
supplier agents) and supply chains in the system 
at the current time unit. It is presented in a time 
series plot. 
#SC : the number of existing supply chains at the 
current time unit. 
#Manuf : the number of existing manufacturer agents at the 
current time unit. 
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#Suppliers : the number of existing supplier agents at the 
current time unit. 
Supporting outputs 
Firms' position (x-axis) : the position of firms (manufacturer and supplier 
agents) in x-axis to represent efficiency level at 
the current time unit. It is presented in a time 
series plot. 
Firms' position (y-axis) : the position of firms (manufacturer and supplier 
agents) in x-axis to represent responsiveness 
level at the current time unit. It is presented in a 
time series plot. 
 
As explained in the conceptual model (Chapter 5), the higher coordinate of x-axis 
represents less efficient operations and the higher y-axis reflects the less responsive 
supply chains. The manufacturer agent’s position in the supporting outputs is 
normalised into a dimensionless value between 0 and 1, where the lowest efficiency 
and responsiveness is represented by 0, and the highest efficiency and 
responsiveness is converted to 1. 
 
67
(max)
Coordinate value 
in NetLogo
0
(min)
1
(max)
0
(min)
Normalised value
Manufacturer’s 
position in NetLogo Normalised level
Lowest efficiency 
or responsiveness 
level
Highest efficiency 
or responsiveness 
level
 
Figure C.1 Illustration on how to normalize the position of an agent in the level of efficiency and 
responsiveness relative 
 
 
 *+,-./01234/252/4+641788/94:ℎ.0<42660:02<:9= (-.?4:++,30<.@24+64? − .?01) − (-.<76.:@7,2,C148+10@0+<40<4?4.?01)(-.?4:++,30<.@24+64? − .?01)  
 *+,-./01234/252/4+641788/94:ℎ.0<4,218+<1052<211= (-.?4:++,30<.@24+649 − .?01) − (-.<76.:@7,2,C148+10@0+<40<494.?01)(-.?4:++,30<.@24+649 − .?01)  
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Where the maximum coordinate of both x-axis and y-axis in the NetLogo space is 
67.  
 
C.3. The execution buttons 
The last part of the computer model interface is the execution buttons. It is arranged 
by 5 main commands: setup, go once, go continuously, mouse?, create one new 
entrant (supplier), and create one new entrant (manufacturer). They were useful to 
perform verification and visual investigation for the descriptive analysis. 
setup  : to setup the agents. 
  (keyboard shortcut: 1)    
go once  : to execute the simulation once. 
  (keyboard shortcut: 2)     
go continuously  : to execute the simulation over and 
over. 
  (keyboard shortcut: 3)     
mouse?  : to move an agent to a  new  location  
for  a  
  (keyboard shortcut: A)      manual intervention. 
create one new entrant (supplier)  : to add a new supplier agent to the 
NetLogo  
  (keyboard shortcut: B)  space.  
create one new entrant (manufacturer)  : to  add  a  new  manufacturer  agent  to  
the  
  (keyboard shortcut: C)  NetLogo space.  
 
   In this study, the function of creating a new entrant of supplier or manufacturer 
was not investigated even though the last two buttons of new entrants had been 
verified. The reason for this is that the scope of this study does not consider the 
situation where interventions on adding one or several new entrants are allowed. 
However, this feature can be used for further experiments in supply chain 
competition and collaboration. 
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APPENDIX D:  BASE RUN AND BEHAVIOURAL SETUP 
 
 
D.1. The base run setup 
Global setup 
#customer : 1000 
#manuf : 10 
SupplierOn? : true 
#supplier : 10 
ControlSeed? : true 
SeedNumber : from 1 to 50 (50 replications) 
 
Demand setup: Customers' behavioural rules 
willingness_to_compromise : 10% 
cust_loyalty : 0% 
 
Supply setup: Suppliers' behavioural rules of competition and collaboration 
MaxLinks : 1 
SuppMove? : ON (or "true")   
Supp-loyalty : 0% 
SuppDie? : ON (or "true")  
SurvivabilityWithoutManuf : 4 time unit (equals to one year) 
 
Experimental factor for competition: Manufacturers' competitive behavioural rules 
ManufMove? : ON (or "true")   
MutationProbability : 0 
die? : ON (or "true") 
SurvivabilityWithoutSupplier : 4 time units (equals to one year) 
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SurvivabilityWithUndesiredSupplier : 20 time units (equals to 5 years) 
 
Experimental factor for collaboration: Manufacturers' collaborative behavioural 
rules 
MinDuration_of_collaboration : 4 time units (equals to one year) 
MaxDuration_of_collaboration : 4 time units (equals to one year) 
MaxSource : 1 
manuf_loyalty : 0% 
manuf_willingness_to_compromise : 5% 
AdjustPosition? : ON (or "true") 
 
D.2. The behavioural space setup 
The behavioural setup is the base run with one or several variables set into several 
values as The scenarios for the hypothesis. The varied variables are described 
below. 
 
1.! Investigating the competitive behavioural rules 
1.1! Manufacturer strategic mutation 
  MutationProbability    : 0, 2, 5, 7, 10 (%) 
1.2! Manufacturer survivability 
  SurvivabilityWithUndesiredSupplier    : 12, 16, 20, 24, 28 (time units) 
1.3! Supplier survivability 
  SurvivabilityWithoutManuf    : 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 (time units) 
1.4! Manufacturer strategic mutation and survivability 
  MutationProbability   : 0, 1, 2, 5 (%) 
  SurvivabilityWithUndesiredSupplier  : 12, 16, 20, 24, 28 (time units) 
2.! Investigating the collaboration strategy 
2.1 Duration of collaboration 
 2.2.1 With single-link suppliers 
 MinDuration_of_collaboration   :  4, 20, 40, 60, 80 (time units) 
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 MaxDuration_of_collaboration   :  4, 20, 40, 60, 80 (time units) 
 2.2.2 With dual-link suppliers 
 #supplier  : 10 
 MaxLinks  : 2 
 MinDuration_of_collaboration    : 4, 20, 40, 60, 80 (time units) 
 MaxDuration_of_collaboration    :  4, 20, 40, 60, 80 (time units) 
2.2 The number of partnerships 
 2.2.1 In short-term collaboration 
 - Single sourcing with a single-link supplier:  the base run setup 
 - Dual sourcing with dual-link suppliers 
 MaxSource  : 2  ;  MaxLinks : 2 
 - Multi sourcing with 3-link suppliers 
 MaxSource  : 3  ;  MaxLinks : 3 
 - Multi sourcing with 4-link suppliers 
 MaxSource  : 4  ;  MaxLinks : 4 
 - Multi sourcing with 5-link suppliers 
 MaxSource  : 5  ;  MaxLinks : 5 
2.2.2 In long-term collaboration 
 MinDuration_of_collaboration   : 80  
 MaxDuration_of_collaboration   : 80 
 - Single sourcing with a single-link supplier  
 MaxSource  : 1  ;  MaxLinks : 1  
 - Dual sourcing with dual-link suppliers 
 MaxSource  : 2  ;  MaxLinks : 2 
 - Multi sourcing with 3-link suppliers 
 MaxSource  : 3  ;  MaxLinks : 3 
 - Multi sourcing with 4-link suppliers 
 MaxSource  : 4  ;  MaxLinks : 4 
 - Multi sourcing with 5-link suppliers 
 MaxSource  : 5  ;  MaxLinks : 5 
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3.! Investigating the collaboration behaviour 
 3.1 Manufacturer trust 
  manuf_loyalty   :  0, 25, 50, 75, 100 
  3.1.1 In short-term collaboration 
 MinDuration_of_collaboration   : 4  
 MaxDuration_of_collaboration   : 4  
  3.1.2 In ten-year collaborations 
 MinDuration_of_collaboration   : 40  
 MaxDuration_of_collaboration   : 40 
  3.1.3 In long-term collaboration 
 MinDuration_of_collaboration   : 80  
 MaxDuration_of_collaboration   : 80 
 3.1 Supplier trust 
  Supp_loyalty   :  0, 25, 50, 75, 100 
  3.1.1 In short-term collaboration 
 MinDuration_of_collaboration   : 4  
 MaxDuration_of_collaboration   : 4  
  3.1.2 In long-term collaboration 
 MinDuration_of_collaboration   : 80  
 MaxDuration_of_collaboration   : 80 
4.! Investigating customer trust/loyalty 
 cust_loyalty   :  0, 25, 50, 75, 100 
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APPENDIX E:  THE LOGIC FLOW FOR EACH 
PROCEDURE IN NETLOGO 
 
E.1. Initial condition (setup procedure) 
The idea of setting up the model is explained as follows. At the initial condition or 
time unit 0, both manufacturers and suppliers are set in scattered positions in the 
feasible regions. All manufacturers have to be linked with suppliers and vice versa. 
It makes the positions of suppliers and manufacturers are not completely random; 
the supplier’s position is driven by manufacturer’s position and vice versa. 
To model this initial condition, the setup procedure was coded as this following 
logic sequence. First of all, all agents, patches, and links are cleared or reset. Then, 
all the initial values for the global variables given by the setup parameters are set, 
including the seed number used (ControlSeed? and SeedNumber), the manufacturer 
maximum number of sourcing (MaxSource) and supplier maximum number of 
partnerships (MaxLinks). This step is followed by setting up the layout or the 
environment of the agents. After that, customers are created placed randomly in the 
feasible patches in the NetLogo space. It is followed by creating manufacturers and 
locating them randomly in the feasible patches. Then, if suppliers are simulated, 
they are generated and placed within the range of manufacturer’s willingness to 
compromise by randomly selecting a manufacturer who is targeted by each supplier. 
After that, the manufacturers decide which suppliers they want to collaborate with, 
by creating links with the selected supplier/s. After the collaboration links between 
manufacturers and suppliers are created, manufacturers adjust their strategic 
position based on their willingness to compromise if they link with less efficient 
and responsive suppliers. This code is to ensure the distance between manufacturer 
and the less efficient and/or responsive supplier/s is not more than manufacturer’s 
willingness to compromise.  
 To make all manufacturers and suppliers are linked since the beginning, the 
parameters must be set proportionately. The sensitive parameters for this initial 
condition are the number of manufacturers (#manuf), number of suppliers 
(#supplier), and the number of allowable links for each agent (MaxLinks for 
suppliers and MaxSource for manufacturers).  
The following example illustrates a situation of an imbalance setting. The 
setting for the number of manufacturers (#manuf) is 15, the number of suppliers 
(#supplier) is 10, and the maximum number of links for both manufacturers 
(MaxSource) and suppliers (MaxLinks) are 1. With this setup, all firms would create 
no link when the setup button is clicked. This is because to enable a simulation with 
15 manufacturers, it requires 15 suppliers in the model while only 10 suppliers are 
set. At the same time, the Command Center would also show a message or 
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suggestion to add 5 more suppliers to make the supply side meet the required supply 
of the manufacturer.  
Another case of inappropriate setting is when the model requires more 
manufacturers to setup the simulation. For instance, the number of manufacturers 
(#manuf) is set to 15, the number of suppliers (#supplier) is 10, the maximum 
number of partnerships for manufacturers (MaxSource) is 1 and suppliers 
(MaxLinks) is 2. When the setup button is pressed, the Command Center would 
show a message or instruction to add 5 more manufacturers. This suggestion is 
based on the supply capacity, which is 10 supplier x 2 link/supplier = 20 link, is 5 
link more than the manufacturer demand, which is 15 manufacturer x 1 
link/manufacturer = 15 link. Alternatively, the simulation would be able to run if 
10 manufacturer agents with MaxSource of 2 are assigned. The flowchart of the 
setup logic is presented in Figure E.1a and E.2b. 
 
Start
Clear all agents, 
links, patches, 
and variables
Reset ticks
Control the 
seed number?
Set the seed 
number 
manually
Let the platform 
decides the seed 
number
Set up the 
patches
Yes
No
E"1
 
Figure E.1a The setup procedure 
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Create customer 
agents
Create 
manufacturer 
agents
Are suppliers 
simulated?
Create supplier 
agents
Is the supply 
market capacity less than 
the manufacturers’ 
requirement?
Show the instruction/
message to add more 
suppliers
Is the 
supply market capacity 
more than the 
manufacturers’ 
requirement?
Show the instruction/
message to add more 
manufacturers
Finish
E"1
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Create link between 
manufacturers and suppliers
(section E.5) 
and 
Adjust manufacturers’ position if 
it is required
(section E.9)
 
Figure E.1b The setup procedure 
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E.2.  Parent or go procedure to run the simulation  
 
Start
Move 
manufacturers
(section E.3)
Move suppliers
(section E.4)
E"2.1 E"2.2
Is the supply 
market capacity equal to the 
manufacturer demand or 
supply requirement?
Yes
No
Is the number 
of manufacturers more 
than one 
manufacturer?
Is the number 
of suppliers more than 
one supplier?
Clear the links between 
customers and 
manufacturers
Yes
No
Yes
No
 
Figure E.2a The parent procedure for running the experiments 
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Create link between 
manufacturers and suppliers
(section E.5) 
and 
Adjust manufacturers’ position if 
it is required
(section E.9)
Create links between 
customers and manufacturers 
which have link/s with 
supplier/s
Remove the manufacturers  
which have exceeded their 
survivability limit 
(manufacturer die –
 section E.6)
E"2.1
Does the current 
length of collaboration link 
exceed the duration of 
collaboration?
Clear the link between 
manufacturer and 
supplier 
Keep the link between 
manufacturer and 
supplier
E"2.3
Yes
No
 
Figure E.2b The parent procedure for running the experiments 
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Are each number of 
manufacturers and suppliers 
more than 1 firms?
Remove the suppliers which 
have exceeded their 
survivability limit 
(supplier die – section F.7)
Measure the 
performance
(section F.8)
Finish
No
Yes
E"2.2
Stop
E"2.3
Continue the simulation
(if the continuous 
command is run)
 
Figure E.2c The parent procedure for running the experiments 
 
 
E.3. Procedure to move manufacturers 
Start
Identify the closest customer 
who has not been linked 
with the manufacturer
Set the customer 
target
E"3.1
 
Figure E.3a The procedure to move manufacturers 
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Do the 
manufacturer agents 
move?
Yes
No
Do the 
manufacturer want 
to mutate?
Set the movement 
distance randomly
Identify the farthest customer who 
has not been served yet by any 
manufacturer within the 
movement distance previously set
Any feasible 
customer target?
Update the customer 
target as previously 
identified
Set the new manufacturer 
position to a neighbour 
feasible grid that is closest 
to the customer target
E"3.2 E"3.3
Set the new 
manufacturer position to 
a patch that is closest to 
the customer target
Yes
Move the 
manufacturer to 
the new position
E"3.4
No
Yes
No
E"3.1
 
Figure E.3b The procedure to move manufacturers 
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E"3.2
Adjust the position so as not 
to overlap with the position 
of customer’s target
Finish
E"3.3 E"3.4
 
Figure E.3c The procedure to move manufacturers 
 
E.4. Procedure to move suppliers 
Start
Do the 
supplier agents 
move?
Identify the closest 
manufacturer who has not 
been linked with the supplier
Yes
No
Set the identified 
manufacturer as 
manufacturer target
Does the 
supplier loyal to the current 
manufacturer which is linked 
with the agent?
Does the supplier have no 
manufacturer to be loyal with at 
the previous time unit?
Set the new supplier 
position to a neighbour 
feasible grid that is closest 
to the manufacturer target
Keep the new supplier 
position previously 
identified
E"4.1 E"4.2 E"4.3 E"4.4
Yes
No
Yes
No
 
Figure E.4a The procedure to move suppliers 
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Select a manufacturer randomly 
who are currently link with the 
supplier and update the 
manufacturer target
Does the supplier 
have no link both at the 
current time unit and the 
previous time unit?
Decide to be loyal with the 
updated manufacturer 
target
Record the manufacturer target as the 
next manufacturer to be loyal with in 
the following time unit
Does the manufacturer 
target have linked with
 the supplier?
Do not update the  
manufacturer target
Update the manufacturer target 
with another manufacturer who 
has not linked with the supplier 
randomly
Cannot find the 
feasible manufacturer 
to be the target?
E"4.1 E"4.2
E"4.5 E"4.6
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
 
Figure E.4b The procedure to move suppliers 
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Set back the manufacturer 
target to the closest 
manufacturer who has not 
been linked with the 
supplier
Move the manufacturer to 
the new supplier position
Adjust the position so it is 
not overlap with the position 
of the manufacturer target
Finish
Update the new supplier 
position 
E"4.5 E"4.6 E"4.3
Record the manufacturer target 
as the next manufacturer to be 
loyal with in the following time 
unit
E"4.4
 
Figure E.4c The procedure to move suppliers 
 
 
F.5. Procedure to create manufacturer-supplier links 
Start
Convert the value of manufacturer 
willingness to compromise to a 
radius of supplier selection
E"5.1
 
Figure E.5a The procedure to create links between manufacturer and supplier 
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Any feasible 
suppliers which fit with 
the criterias?
Time unit < 1?
Apply the setting of duration of 
collaboration and number of 
partnerships to the manufacturer 
agent
Keep the duration)of)
collaboration)and$number)of)
partnerships$as$defined$at$time$
unit$1 
Count the current 
length of 
collaboration
Identify suppliers which are more 
efficient, responsive, have not been 
linked with the manufacturer, and the 
manufacturer still has capacity to create 
collaboration/s
Is the manufacturer 
still able to survive?
Identify available suppliers 
within the radius of willingness 
to compromise and create the 
feasible set of suppliers
E.5.2
Yes
No
E.5.3
Yes
No
No
Yes
E.5.1
 
Figure E.5b The procedure to create links between manufacturer and supplier 
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Does 
the manufacturer 
decide to be loyal?
or
Does the manufacturer 
have no supplier in the 
previous time 
unit?
E"5.2
Select the closest 
supplier/s defined 
in the feasible set
Create a link/s with 
the selected 
supplier/s
Finish
Die
(it it is enabled)
E"5.3
No
Yes
Select the 
previously linked 
supplier/s
Count the average 
suppliers’ position 
in x-axis and y-axis
Adjust the position if it links 
with supplier/s who are less 
efficient and/or responsive
(section E.9)
 
 
Figure E.5c The procedure to create links between manufacturer and supplier 
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E.6. Procedure of manufacturer die 
Start
Add the manufacturer 
survival period without 
having supplier by one
Are supplier 
simulated?
Does the 
manufacturer have no 
supplier and 
customer?
Is manufacturer 
survival period without having 
supplier still less than the 
manufacturer survivability 
without suppliers?
Can the 
manufacturer 
agents 
die?
Die
Set the manufacturer 
survival period without 
having supplier to zero
Are the suppliers 
less efficient or responsive 
than the manufacturer on 
average?
Add the manufacturer 
loss period with 
undesired supplier by 
one
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
E"6.1 E"6.2 E"6.3
 
Figure E.6a The procedure to allow manufacturers to die 
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Set the manufacturer loss 
period with undesired 
supplier to zeroIs manufacturer 
loss period with undesired 
supplier more than the manufacturer 
survivability with undesired suppliers?
and 
Can the manufacturer agents 
die?
Die
Finish
Yes
E"6.1 E"6.2 E"6.3
No
 
Figure E.6b The procedure to allow manufacturers to die 
 
E.7. Procedure of supplier die 
Start
Does the 
supplier have no 
link with 
manufacturer?
Is supplier survival period 
without having manufacturer still less 
than the supplier survivability?
Add the supplier survival 
period without having 
manufacturer by one
Can the 
supplier agents 
die?
Die
Yes
No
Set the manufacturer 
survival period without 
having supplier to zero
Finish
Yes
No
Yes
No
 
Figure E.7 The procedure to allow suppliers to die 
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E.8. Procedure to measure the performance 
 
Start
Does the 
manufacturer link 
with at least one 
supplier?
Yes
Normalise the average 
supplier efficiency stated in x-
axis to a scale of 0 to 1 for 
each supply chain
No
Normalise the average 
supplier responsiveness stated 
in y-axis to a scale of 0 to 1 
for each supply chain
Measure the average supplier 
efficiency for all supply 
chains
Measure the average supplier 
responsiveness for all supply 
chains
Measure the supply chain fill 
rate by counting the number 
of customers served by the 
existing supply chains
Finish
 
 
Figure E.8 The procedure of performance measurement 
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E.9. Procedure to adjust manufacturers’ position 
 
Start
Are 
suppliers simulated?
and
Does the supply chain 
adjustment 
apply?
Yes
Set the new manufacturer’s x-coordinate 
to a point within the radius of 
manufacturer willingness to compromise, 
considered from the centre of gravity of 
the suppliers’ efficiency
No
Is the average 
supplier/s efficiency is lower 
than the compromised supplier 
efficiency level of the 
manufacturer?
Does the new x 
coordinate fall in 
infeasible region?
Select a patch in infeasible 
region that is closest to the 
suggested new x coordinate
Update the new x-coordinate
E"9.1 E"9.2 E"9.3
Yes
No
Yes
No
 
Figure E.9a The procedure of position adjustment for manufacturers 
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Is the average 
supplier/s responsiveness is lower 
than the compromised supplier 
responsiveness level of the 
manufacturer?
E"9.1 E"9.2 E"9.3
Finish
Set the new manufacturer’s y-coordinate 
to a point within the radius of 
manufacturer willingness to compromise, 
considered from the centre of gravity of 
the suppliers’ responsiveness
Adjust the y-coordinate based 
on the new x-coordinate
Move to a new x-coordinate 
and y-coordinate
 
 
Figure E.9b The procedure of position adjustment for manufacturers 
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APPENDIX F:  UNEXPLORED FEATURES IN THE 
COMPUTER MODEL - A FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
F.1. New entrant analysis 
The model can be used to analyse the effect of new entrants to the market. This 
feature is represented by these following buttons in the NetLogo interface. 
- create one new entrant (supplier)  : to add a new supplier agent to the 
NetLogo  
   (keyboard shortcut: B)  space.  
- create one new entrant (manufacturer)  : to  add  a  new  manufacturer  agent  to  
the  
  (keyboard shortcut: C)  NetLogo space.  
 
F.2. Individual agent analysis 
The model enables us to play with agent/s by making them behave differently 
from others. The parameters of this features can be found by inspecting the 
selected agent. It is performed by pointing the agent, then pressing the right click, 
and select "inspect agent". The variables that can be adjusted during simulation 
run are as follows.  
- Manufacturer agents  
1.! duration_of_collaboration
The length of collaboration created between manufacturer and supplier 
linked.  
2.! #Intended_source
The number of sourcing of each manufacturer.  
3.! followGlobalmanuf_loyalty?  
The default string for this variable is ”yes“, which means the agent's loyalty 
would follow the global setup of manufacturer trust. Otherwise, any string 
other than ”yes“, such as ”no“, would activate the individual loyalty 
adjustment, by changing the value in individual_manuf_loyalty.  
4.! individual_manuf_loyalty
The probability of the manufacturer trust/loyalty that can be set 
individually.  
5.! %ProbabilityOfJumping
A probability set individually to each manufacturer to make a jump to 
different market segment that has not been served by competitors.  
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Each manufacturer agent also has an individual demand fulfilment rate measure 
represented by %sc_marketshare. It represents the percentage of customers who 
are underserved relative to the total number of customers who are served by all 
supply chains in the market. 
 
- Supplier agents  
1.! followGlobalsupp_loyalty?
The default string is “yes”, which means the agent's loyalty would follow 
the global setup of supplier trust. Otherwise, any string other than “yes”, 
such as “no”, would activate the individual loyalty adjustment, by 
changing the value in individual_supp_loyalty.  
2.! individual_supp_loyalty
The probability of the supplier trust/loyalty that can be set individually.  
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APPENDIX G:  EXAMPLE OF VERIFICATION 
PROCEDURE 
 
 
 
1.! Customer’s willingness to compromise 
 
1.1 Verification procedure. 
a.! Setting up any number of customers, manufacturers, and suppliers. 
Supplier can be switched “on” or “off”.  In this example, the number 
of customers is 1000, the number of manufacturers is 3, and the 
number of supplier is 3. 
b.! Checking the length of the links carefully, by clicking “go once” 
button to enable observation in each time unit. While observing the 
simulation run in a controllable click, the value of willingness to 
compromise is slightly changed from the minimum value (0 %) to the 
maximum value (100%). 
c.! Repeating step (a) and (b) several times with different combination of 
number of agents. 
1.2!Result: verified. 
    Description:  
Higher customer’s willingness to compromise produces longer links from 
customer to supplier. Figure G.1.a illustrates a lower customer’s willingness 
to compromise (10%) limits firms revenue significantly, in terms of unit of 
customer. Meanwhile, Figure G.1.b illustrates 50% willingness to 
compromise and it shows that the links customers who stay further generate 
links to the manufacturers in Figure G.1.a. 
 
a) 15% customer willingness to 
    compromise
b) 50% customer willingness to 
    compromise  
 
Figure G.1. Verification of customer’s willingness to compromise 
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2.!Customer loyalty 
 
2.1 Verification procedure. 
a.! Setting up any number of customers, manufacturers, and suppliers. Supplier 
can be switched “on” or “off”, but it would be easier for the observation if it 
is turned “off”. In this example, the number of customers is 1000, the 
number of manufacturers is 3, and the supplier agents are switched 
“off”. 
b.! The manufacturer movement (“ManufMove?”) can be switched “off” to 
make them static and easier for observing the behaviour. 
c.! Checking the frequency of changing link, by clicking the “go once” button, 
or clicking “go” button with a very slow speed, while slightly changing the 
value of loyalty, from the minimum value (0 %) to the maximum value 
(100%).  
d.! Enabling the manual intervention by clicking the “mouse?” button. The 
intercession is required to move a manufacturer to a different coordinate. 
Reiterating step (c) several times while observing the customer links. 
e.! Repeating step (a) to (d) several times with different combination of number 
of agents. 
f.! Repeating step (a), (c), and (d) by switching the manufacturer movement 
“on”.  
2.2!Result: verified. 
Description:  
The generated behaviour conform to the expectation since the frequency of 
changing the link is getting fewer once the loyalty is getting higher. At the 
extreme values of loyalty, the model also produces behaviour as it is expected. 
The zero loyalty results in most frequent of link changes, and the highest loyalty 
(100%) results in consistent link or constant connections between customer and 
manufacturer.  
Figure G.2 represents an example of simulation outputs of customer 
loyalty with 10% customer’s willingness to compromise. In Figure G.2.a 
and G.2.b show the behavioural results of 0% customer loyalty. When a 
manufacturer is moved manually from position a (Figure G.2.a) to b 
(Figure G.2.b), the previous customers are no longer linked with the 
manufacturer. In contrast, when customer trust/loyalty is set into 50%, 
and a manufacturer is moved from c (Figure G.2.c) to d (Figure G.2.d), 
several customer links that are previously generated are stay connected to 
the manufacturer. 
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0% customer loyalty
The observer moved 
the manufacturer by 
using a manual 
intervention
a) 
time 
unit: 1
b)
time%
unit:%2
50% customer loyalty
The observer moved 
the manufacturer by 
using a manual 
intervention
c) 
time 
unit: 1
d)
time%
unit:%2
 
Figure G.3 Verification of customer loyalty. 
 
3. Manufacturer’s willingness to compromise. 
3.1 Verification procedure. 
a.! Setting up two manufacturers, many customers, and several suppliers. Then, 
clicking “setup” button. 
b.! Switching both the manufacturer and supplier movement (“ManufMove?” and 
“SuppMove?”) “off”. 
c.! Using “mouse?” button for doing manual intervention. Selecting a 
manufacturer and locating one or several suppliers in more efficient and 
responsive space than the manufacturer. Meanwhile, surrounding another 
manufacturer with remaining suppliers which are set in less efficient and/or 
responsive than the manufacturer.  
d.! Checking the links between manufacturers and suppliers, by clicking the “go 
once” button, or clicking “go” button with a very slow speed, while slightly 
changing the value of Manufacturer’s willingness to compromise from the 
minimum value (0 %) to the maximum value (100%). 
e.! Repeating step (a) to (d) several times with different combination of number 
of agents. 
f.! Repeating step (a), (c), and (d) by switching the manufacturer movement 
“on”.  
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3.2!Result: verified. 
Description:  
Manufacturers always try to find suppliers who have better supply chain capability 
than theirs. If they could not find any supplier who is more efficient and/or 
responsive, they would select suppliers who are less efficient and/or responsive 
than theirs within their willingness to compromise. Figure 6 is the illustration of 
the concept of logic of manufacturer’s willingness to compromise. Figure H.3 is 
an example of simulation run for verifying manufacturer’s willingness to 
compromise. It implements 5% of manufacturer’s willingness to compromise. 
 
 
The manufacturers 
selects a supplier who 
are more responsive and 
efficient than them
The manufacturers 
selects a supplier who 
are more responsive and 
efficient than them  
Figure G.3 Verification of manufacturer’s willingness to compromise 
  
 
 
APPENDIX H 
324 
 
APPENDIX H:  COMPUTER CODE 1 
breed [ customers customer ] 2 
breed [ manufacturers manufacturer ] 3 
breed [ suppliers supplier ] 4 
 5 
customers-own [ 6 
  nearestmanuf ; Closest manufacturer, from the customer 7 
preference's perspective. 8 
  manufcandidateset ; A set of manufacturers that can be chosen 9 
by customer. 10 
  ] 11 
 12 
manufacturers-own [ 13 
  ;;The adjustable variables of individual behaviour setup, which 14 
allowing a supplier behaves differently. 15 
  duration_of_collaboration ; The length of collaboration created 16 
between manufacturer and supplier linked. 17 
  #Intended_source  ; The number of sourcing of each 18 
manufacturer. 19 
                    ; The value of this variable can be adjusted 20 
individually during simulation run to make manufacturer behaves 21 
differently. 22 
  followGlobalmanuf_loyalty? ; A string variable to activate the 23 
manual adjustment of "individual_manuf_loyalty". 24 
                             ; The default string is "yes", which 25 
means "individual_manuf_loyalty" follows the global value of 26 
manufacturer trust. Otherwise, any string but "yes" (such as 27 
"no") means "individual_manuf_loyalty" can be individually 28 
adjusted. 29 
  individual_manuf_loyalty   ; The probability of the 30 
manufacturer trust/loyalty that can be set individually. This 31 
enables the observer to see whether behave differently is 32 
beneficial to the selected manufacturer. 33 
  %ProbabilityOfJumping ; A probability set individually to each 34 
manufacturer to make a jump to different market segment that has 35 
not been served by competitors. 36 
 37 
  ;;The performance variables of individual manufacturer. 38 
  each_manuf_servedcustomers ; The number of served customers by 39 
the manufacturer. 40 
  ;;The performance variables of individual SUPPLY CHAIN. 41 
   ; Supply chain is defined based on the point of view of 42 
manufacturer since manufacturers have direct interaction with 43 
customers. Thus, the variables of single supply chain performance 44 
belong to manufacturer agent. 45 
  each_sc_servedcustomers   ; The number of served customers by 46 
the supply chain. 47 
  %sc_marketshare ; The marketshare of each supply chain, 48 
compared to competitor. 49 
  each_sc_fillrate% ; The fill rate contributed by the supply 50 
chain. 51 
  #Real_source ; This variable reflects the number of links of a 52 
manufacturer. The more links a manufacturer results in higher 53 
transactional cost with the suppliers. 54 
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               ; However, since this model do not define the 1 
amount of transactional cost, this variable 2 
               ; only provides the fluctuation of the 3 
transactional cost. 4 
 5 
  ;;The control variables for monitoring individual manufacturer. 6 
These variables are used not only to keep 7 
   ;the information of individual manufacturer but also to verify 8 
the rules. 9 
  nearestsupp ; A supplier that has closest supply chain 10 
capabilities with manufacturer preference. 11 
  possiblesupp ; A list of possible suppliers. 12 
  manufsurvivalperiod   ; A dummy variable to count the period 13 
of having no supplier for each manufacturer. 14 
  manuflossperiod   ; A dummy variable to count the period of 15 
having less efficient or/and less responsive suppliers. 16 
                    ; If the manufacturer linked with more than 17 
one supplier, the efficiency and responsiveness level of the 18 
                    ; suppliers are considered in average axis 19 
value of suppliers. 20 
  manufperiod  ; A dummy variable to count the cooperation period 21 
that has been running. 22 
  StepDistance ; Variable to show the step distance for the 23 
MUTATION strategy. 24 
 25 
  ;;The control variables for monitoring supply chains 26 
individually. 27 
  MeanXcorSuppliers ; The mean efficiency of suppliers linked 28 
with the manufacturer, in units of x-axis. 29 
  MeanYcorSuppliers ; The mean responsiveness of suppliers linked 30 
with the manufacturer, in unit of y-axis 31 
  MySupp_efficiency ; The mean efficiency of suppliers linked 32 
with the manufacturer. The value is dimensionless 33 
                    ; and normalised between 0 (lowest degree of 34 
efficiency) and 1 (highest degree of efficiency). 35 
  MySupp_responsiveness ; The mean responsiveness of suppliers 36 
linked with the manufacturer. The value 37 
                        ; is dimensionless and normalised 38 
between 0 (the lowest degree of responsiveness) and 39 
                        ; 1 (the highest degree of 40 
responsiveness). 41 
  each_sc_responsiveness   ; Each supply chain responsiveness. 42 
The value is dimensionless and between 0 (the 43 
                           ; lowest degree of responsiveness) 44 
and 1 (the highest degree of responsiveness). 45 
  each_sc_efficiency ; Each supply chain efficiency, in a 46 
dimensionless value of between 0 (the lowest 47 
                     ; degree of responsiveness) and 1 (the 48 
highest degree of responsiveness). 49 
  previousMarketShare ; The total market share of previous agents 50 
who are calculated by NetLogo before 51 
                      ;calculating this agent. 52 
  ] 53 
suppliers-own [ 54 
  ;;The variables of individual behaviour setup, which allowing 55 
a manufacturer behaves differently. 56 
APPENDIX H 
326 
 
  followGlobalsupp_loyalty? ; A string variable to activate the 1 
manual adjustment of "individual_supp_loyalty". 2 
                            ; The default string is "yes", which 3 
means "individual_supp_loyalty" follows the 4 
                            ; global value of supplier trust. 5 
                            ; Otherwise, any string but "yes" 6 
(such as "no") means "individual_supp_loyalty" 7 
                            ; can be individually adjusted. 8 
  individual_supp_loyalty ; The probability of loyalty that is 9 
set individually. This enables the observer to see 10 
                          ; whether behave differently is 11 
beneficial to the selected supplier. 12 
 13 
  ;;The control variables for monitoring suppliers individually. 14 
  each_supp_servedcustomers   ; The number of served customers 15 
by the supplier. 16 
  each_supp_responsiveness   ; Each supplier responsiveness, in 17 
a dimensionless value, which is between 0 (the lowest degree 18 
                             ; of responsiveness) and 1 (the 19 
highest degree of responsiveness). 20 
  suppsurvivalperiod  ; A dummy variable to count the period of 21 
having no manufacturer linked for each supplier. 22 
  previouschoosenmanuf ; the previous choosen manufacturer to be 23 
approached (if the supplier decides to be not loyal) or follow 24 
                       ; (if it decides to be loyal to a 25 
particular manufacturer) 26 
  ] 27 
 28 
undirected-link-breed [ cmlinks cmlink ] 29 
undirected-link-breed [ smlinks smlink ] 30 
globals [ 31 
  ;;;THE MAIN MEASURES FOR THE SYSTEM 32 
     %SCs_fillrate   ; Supply chains fill rate, to represent the 33 
whole service level in the market 34 
                     ; It is delineated by the percentage of 35 
served customers. 36 
     mean_sc_servedcustomers ; The mean of number of served 37 
customers by all supply chains. 38 
     #sc ; The number of existing supply chains. 39 
     mean_manuf_servedcustomers ; The mean of number of served 40 
customers by all manufacturers. 41 
     mean_supp_servedcustomers ; The mean of number of served 42 
customers by all suppliers. 43 
     mean_sc_responsiveness ; Mean of all supply chain 44 
responsiveness. 45 
     mean_supp_responsiveness ; Mean of all suppliers 46 
responsiveness, in dimensionless values. 47 
     mean_sc_efficiency ; Mean of all supply chain efficiency. 48 
     mean_supp_efficiency ; Mean of all supplier responsiveness, 49 
in dimensionless values. 50 
     gap_supp_manuf_responsiveness ; The mean of responsiveness 51 
gap between supplier and manufacturer in supply chains. 52 
     gap_supp_manuf_efficiency ; The mean of efficiency gap 53 
between supplier and manufacturer in supply chains. 54 
 55 
  ;;:TO PLOT THE OUTPUT OF ALL MANUFACTURERS PERFORMANCE;; 56 
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     list_manuf_revenue ; The list of all manufacturers revenue, 1 
in units of customer. 2 
     #manuf_die ; Number of died manufacturers in a particular 3 
period or time unit. 4 
 5 
  ;;;TO PLOT THE OUTPUT OF ALL SUPPLIERS PERFORMANCE;; 6 
     list_supp_revenue ; The list of all suppliers revenue, in 7 
units of customer. 8 
     list_supp_responsiveness ; The list of all suppliers 9 
responsiveness, in dimensionless values. 10 
     list_supp_efficiency ; The list of all supplier efficiency, 11 
in dimensionless values. 12 
 13 
  ;;;TO PLOT THE OUTPUT OF ALL SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE;; 14 
     total_sc_revenue ; The total revenue of all existed supply 15 
chains. 16 
     list_sc_Revenue ; A list of all supply chains revenue, in 17 
units of customer. 18 
     list_sc_responsiveness ; A list of all supply chains 19 
responsiveness. 20 
     list_sc_efficiency ; Mean of all supply chain efficiency. 21 
     MeanLengthCustManuf ; A variable to measure the mean length 22 
of cmlinks. This variable is only useful for verification, 23 
                         ; to ensure whether the simulated links 24 
are generated as expected. 25 
     previous%SCs_fillrate ; Variable to record the 26 
"%SCs_fillrate" in the previous time unit. 27 
     accumdecay_rate ; Variable to accumulate the decay rate of 28 
"%SCs_fillrate". 29 
     meanaccumdecayrate ; Variable to calculate the rate of 30 
decline of supply chains fill rate. 31 
 32 
   ;;;TO SET GLOBAL SETUP FOR THE MODEL 33 
     maxpreference ; Diagonal distance of the NetLogo world, it 34 
affects the distance of preference of customers and 35 
                   ; manufacturers in selecting their trading 36 
partner. 37 
     mincor ; Minimum coordinate, this is a fixed variable to 38 
setup the layout. 39 
     divider ; A fixed variable to setup the layout. 40 
     DummyForTime unit  ; A dummy variable to control the initial 41 
distribution of agents during setup. 42 
     MY ;; The maximum willingness to compromise which represents 43 
in radius of preference 44 
  ] 45 
patches-own [ 46 
  pvalue ; The value of the patch. This variable is used to 47 
identify the active patch as feasible area. Value "1" 48 
         ; (one) represents the feasible area for placing and 49 
simulating the agents, and "0" (zero) reflects 50 
         ; the infeasible area. 51 
  ] 52 
;;============================================================= 53 
;;TO SETUP THE SIMULATION 54 
 55 
to setup 56 
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  ca 1 
  reset-time unit 2 
 3 
  if ControlSeed? [ random-seed SeedNumber] 4 
  ; We can keep the same random seed or using common random 5 
numbers 6 
 7 
  ;; COUNTING THE 'WIDTH' OF THE 'WORLD' 8 
  set maxpreference sqrt ( (max-pxcor ^ 2) + (max-pycor ^ 2) ) 9 
    ; Maximum distance of the preference is defined as the 10 
diagonal length of the NetLogo space. 11 
 12 
  set MY (( manuf_willingness_to_compromise / 100) * 13 
maxpreference) 14 
    ;To set the maximum willingness to compromise which 15 
represents in radius of preference. 16 
    ;"Maximum willingness to compromise" is defined as the 17 
maximum adjustment distance that is calculated from the 18 
    ; maximum patch coordinate 19 
 20 
    set mincor 15 set divider 2.5 21 
    ask patches [ 22 
    ; The logic is based on the basic straight line equation : Y 23 
= a + bX. 24 
    ; Since the line is going down (i.e. the slope or gradient, 25 
b, is negative), so the equation becomes: Y = A - bX. 26 
    ; The "divider" in the code refers to the negative slope. 27 
    ifelse (( pycor < (max-pycor - mincor) ) and ( pxcor < (( 28 
max-pycor - mincor - pycor ) / divider ) )) 29 
    ; To define the lower infeasible area, which is based on this 30 
logic: Y < ( max-Y - mincor ) and 31 
    ;X < (( max-Y - mincor - Y ) / divider). 32 
    [ set pvalue 0 set pcolor black ] 33 
    [ ifelse (( pxcor > mincor ) and ( pycor > ( max-pxcor + ( 34 
(mincor - pxcor ) / divider )  ) )) 35 
      ; To define the upper infeasible area, which is based on 36 
the following logic: pycor > mincor + ( divider*pxcor ), 37 
      ; or Y > mincor + (divider*X). 38 
      [ set pvalue 0 set pcolor black] 39 
      ; The infeasible area is black, 40 
      [ set pvalue 1 set pcolor white ] ] 41 
      ; The feasible area is white. 42 
  ] 43 
  ;;CREATING AGENTS;; 44 
  create-customers #customer [ 45 
    set shape "person" set size 1.1 46 
    setxy random-xcor random-ycor 47 
    ; The customers are set with human-shape and randomly 48 
distributed on the strategic space. 49 
    let closestposition min-one-of (patches with [ pvalue = 1] ) 50 
[distance-nowrap myself] 51 
    move-to closestposition 52 
    set color 53 move-to patch-here] 53 
    ; The customers are set in a blue-person shape and randomly 54 
distributed in the strategic space. 55 
 56 
APPENDIX H 
329 
 
  create-manufacturers #manuf [ setupManuf ] 1 
 2 
  ;;The following command is to enable "suppliers" in the model. 3 
  if SupplierOn? [ 4 
    create-suppliers #supplier [setupSupplier ] 5 
 6 
    ;; TO CONTROL THE NUMBER OF AGENTS DURING 7 
SETUP.................................................... 8 
    if ((MaxLinks * count suppliers) < (MaxSource * count 9 
manufacturers) ) [ 10 
      print (word "Please add " ((MaxSource * count 11 
manufacturers) - (MaxLinks * count suppliers) ) 12 
           " more suppliers.") 13 
      stop ] 14 
 15 
    if ((MaxSource * #manuf) < (MaxLinks * #supplier) ) [ 16 
      print (word "Please add " ((MaxLinks * #supplier) - 17 
(MaxSource * #manuf)) 18 
           " more manufacturers.") 19 
      stop] 20 
    21 
;;............................................................. 22 
    set DummyForTime unit 0 23 
    ask manufacturers [ CreateLinksManufSupp] 24 
    set DummyForTime unit 1 25 
    set #sc ( count (manufacturers with [count my-smlinks > 0 ] 26 
) ) 27 
  ] 28 
end 29 
 30 
; The logic sequence of the setup is described as follows. 31 
; First of all, the initial values for the global variables, such 32 
as the random-seed used, "maxpreference", 33 
; and MY, are set. 34 
; Then, the layout is set based on the selected layout in the 35 
"GLOBAL SETUP" in the model interface. 36 
; After that, customers are created placed randomly in the 37 
feasible area of the NetLogo space. 38 
; It is followed by creating manufacturers and located randomly 39 
in the feasible patches. 40 
; Then, suppliers are generated and placed within radius of 41 
"manufacturer’s willingness to compromise", 42 
; by randomly selecting a manufacturer who is targeted. 43 
; After that, manufacturers decide which suppliers they want to 44 
collaborate with, by creating links with 45 
; the selected supplier/s. 46 
; After the collaboration links between manufacturers and 47 
suppliers are created, 48 
; manufacturers adjust their strategic position based on their 49 
willingness to compromise. 50 
 51 
; The duration of collaboration and intended number of sourcing 52 
has been decided in this stage, but these 53 
; variables have not run yet. 54 
; This procedure ensures that all created firms have collaborated 55 
with other agents since the beginning 56 
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; of simulation. 1 
 2 
;;============================================================= 3 
;;TO RUN THE SIMULATION 4 
to go;this procedure is VERIFIED 5 
  ;; TO CONTROL SETUP 6 
    if ((MaxLinks * #supplier) < (MaxSource * #manuf)) [ 7 
      print (word "Please add " ((MaxSource * #manuf) - (MaxLinks 8 
* #supplier) ) 9 
           " more suppliers in the Global Setup.") 10 
      stop ] 11 
 12 
    if ((MaxSource * #manuf) < (MaxLinks * #supplier) ) [ 13 
      print (word "Please add " ((MaxLinks * #supplier) - 14 
(MaxSource * #manuf)) 15 
           " more manufacturers in the Global Setup.") 16 
      stop 17 
      ] 18 
    ; We allow to set the number of supplier more than it should 19 
be 20 
    21 
;;............................................................. 22 
  if count manufacturers > 1 [ MoveManufacturers ] 23 
  ; Manufacturers would be moving for competition if there is at 24 
least 2 manufacturers exist. 25 
 26 
  if count suppliers > 1 [ MoveSuppliers ] 27 
  ; Suppliers would be moving for competition if there is at 28 
least 2 suppliers exist. 29 
 30 
  ask cmlinks [die] 31 
  ; the links between customers and manufacturers are reseted, 32 
or deleted. 33 
 34 
  ask manufacturers [ 35 
    if ( manufperiod >= ( duration_of_collaboration ) ) 36 
    [ ask my-smlinks [die] ] ] 37 
      ; the previous collaboration link set to die. 38 
 39 
  set maxpreference maxpreference 40 
  ; This code is to keep the value of the variable constant during 41 
simulation run. 42 
  SetSCPerformance 43 
  ; To reset all values in SC performance in every time unit. 44 
 45 
  ;;The following command is to enable "suppliers" in the model. 46 
  if SupplierOn? 47 
  [ ask manufacturers [ 48 
      CreateLinksManufSupp] ] 49 
    ; If suppliers are enabled, the link between manufacturers 50 
and suppliers are generated. 51 
 52 
  CreateLinksManufCustomer 53 
  ; To create links between manufacturers and customers. 54 
  manuf_die 55 
APPENDIX H 
331 
 
  ; To make manufacturers who have no supplier for more than 1 
"SurvivabilityWithoutSupplier" period, 2 
  ; or manufacturers who have less responsive or/and efficient 3 
supplier for more than 4 
  ; "SurvivabilityWithUndesiredSupplier" period die. 5 
  supplier_die 6 
  ; To make suppliers who have no manufacturer for more than 7 
"SurvivabilityWithoutManuf" period die. 8 
  CountMarketFillRate 9 
  ; To count market fill rate. 10 
  CountManufPerformance 11 
  ; To count manufacturers performance. 12 
  CountSuppPerformance 13 
  ; To count suppliers performance. 14 
  count_AveragePosition 15 
  ; To count the average position of each manufacturer's 16 
suppliers, in terms of efficiency and 17 
  ; responsiveness. 18 
  CountIndividualSCPerformance 19 
  ; To count supply chains performance 20 
 21 
    if (count manufacturers < 2  and count suppliers < 2 ) or 22 
     (count manufacturers = 0) or (count suppliers = 0) [stop] 23 
     ;If there is only one manufacturer and one supplier exist, 24 
the simulation would be stopped. 25 
 26 
  set DummyForTime unit 2 27 
 28 
  time unit 29 
end 30 
;;============================================================= 31 
;; SUPPORTING PROCEDURES FOR "SETUP" AND "GO" 32 
;;============================================================= 33 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 34 
;; SETTING UP THE DETAIL OF MANUFACTURERS AND SUPPLIERS ;; 35 
verified 36 
;;----------------------------------------------------------- 37 
;; 1. TO SET UP MANUFACTURERS 38 
to setupManuf 39 
    set shape "house" set size 1.8 setxy random-xcor random-ycor 40 
    ; The manufacturers are set in red-house shape and randomly 41 
allocated in the space 42 
    let closestposition min-one-of (patches with [ pvalue = 1] ) 43 
[distance-nowrap myself] 44 
    move-to closestposition 45 
    findposition set color 16 move-to patch-here 46 
    set individual_manuf_loyalty manuf_loyalty 47 
    set %ProbabilityOfJumping MutationProbability 48 
    set StepDistance 1 49 
; The manufacturers are represented in a red-house shape and 50 
randomly allocated in the strategic space. 51 
end 52 
 53 
;; 2. TO SET UP SUPPLIERS 54 
to setupSupplier 55 
    set shape "truck" set size 1.8 setxy random-xcor random-ycor 56 
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    ; The suppliers are set in brown-truck shape and randomly 1 
distributed in the space. 2 
    let closestmanufacturer min-one-of manufacturers [distance-3 
nowrap myself] 4 
    let possiblepositions [patches in-radius MY ] of 5 
closestmanufacturer 6 
    let closestposition one-of (possiblepositions with [ pvalue 7 
= 1] ) 8 
    move-to closestposition 9 
    ; The suppliers are located within radius of manufacturer’s 10 
willingness to compromise, 11 
    ; by selecting a manufacturer randomly to approach. 12 
    findposition set color 115 move-to patch-here 13 
    set individual_supp_loyalty Supp_loyalty 14 
    set previouschoosenmanuf nobody 15 
    ; The suppliers are set in a brown-truck shape. 16 
end 17 
 18 
;; 3. THE PROCEDURE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE POSITION OF THE FIRMS 19 
IS NOT OVERLAPPING WITH EACH OTHER 20 
      ; This procedure allows all firms to stay unique in the 21 
strategic space, even they are really 22 
      ; close with each other. 23 
to findposition 24 
  if any? other manufacturers-here or any? other suppliers-here 25 
  [ move-to one-of neighbors with [ pvalue = 1] 26 
    findposition] 27 
end 28 
 29 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 30 
;;LINKS GENERATION PROCEDURES;; 31 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 32 
;; 4. TO CREATE LINKS BETWEEN CUSTOMERS AND MANUFACTURERS. 33 
to CreateLinksManufCustomer ;;VERIFIED! 34 
  ask customers [ 35 
    let CY ( ( willingness_to_compromise / 100) * maxpreference 36 
) 37 
    ;To set the maximum willingness to compromise that is 38 
represented in radius of preference. 39 
    set manufcandidateset nobody 40 
 41 
    ;;The following command is to enable suppliers in the model. 42 
    ifelse SupplierOn? 43 
    [ set manufcandidateset manufacturers with [ count my-smlinks 44 
> 0] in-radius CY ] 45 
    ;;Customers are only able to link with manufacturers who have 46 
suppliers. 47 
    [ set manufcandidateset manufacturers in-radius CY ] 48 
    ;;If suppliers are ignored, so the customer just select a 49 
manufacturer using the previous conditional logic. 50 
 51 
   ifelse  ( (random-float 1) > (cust_loyalty / 100) ) or ( time 52 
unit < 1 ) or ( nearestmanuf = nobody ) 53 
   ; Once a customer decides to not being loyal in the end of 54 
duration of relationship, 55 
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   ; it changes their preference based on its willingness to 1 
compromise. 2 
   [ 3 
     set nearestmanuf min-one-of manufcandidateset [distance-4 
nowrap myself] 5 
     ; The customer would select a firm which is nearest to their 6 
initial preference. 7 
    ] 8 
   [ set nearestmanuf nearestmanuf ] 9 
 10 
   ifelse SupplierOn? 11 
   [ if nearestmanuf != nobody and [count my-smlinks] of 12 
nearestmanuf > 0 13 
     ;Customers are only able to link with manufacturers who have 14 
suppliers and meet the minimum number of 15 
     ;required supplier. 16 
     [ create-cmlink-with nearestmanuf [ set thickness 0.1 set 17 
color sky ] ] ] 18 
   [ if nearestmanuf != nobody 19 
     [ create-cmlink-with nearestmanuf [ set thickness 0.1 set 20 
color sky ] ] ] 21 
       ; Customer can only create connection with a firm who stay 22 
inside their willingness to compromise 23 
  ] 24 
end 25 
 26 
;; 5. TO CREATE LINKS BETWEEN MANUFACTURERS AND SUPPLIERS 27 
to CreateLinksManufSupp ;VERIFIED! 28 
 29 
    set MY (( manuf_willingness_to_compromise / 100) * 30 
maxpreference) 31 
    ;To set the maximum willingness to compromise which 32 
represents in radius of preference. 33 
    ;"Maximum willingness to compromise" is defined as the 34 
maximum adjustment distance that is calculated 35 
    ; from the maximum patch coordinate. 36 
    ; This variable (MY) is updateable during simulation run. In 37 
other words, MY is set as adjustable constant. 38 
   39 
;;............................................................. 40 
    ;;TO SET THE DURATION OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANUFACTURER 41 
AND SUPPLIERS 42 
 43 
      ifelse time unit < 1 and DummyForTime unit = 0 44 
      [ set #Intended_source MaxSource 45 
        ; This code determines the number of sourcing uniformly 46 
to all manufacturers. 47 
        ; This rule is set to understand how sourcing strategy, 48 
in terms of deciding the number of sourcing, 49 
        ; affects supply chain collaboration. 50 
        ; In SCM, it is believed that having single-sourcing for 51 
the main material can significantly support 52 
        ; supply chain collaboration (..., ..) 53 
        ; However, other research argue that single-sourcing does 54 
not always enhance supply chainperformance ( .., ..). 55 
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        ; This rule also represents sourcing limitation for the 1 
firm. 2 
        ; When the "minimum number of sourcing" is applied, 3 
manufacturers would only be able to link with 4 
        ; customers if their suppliers is at least the "minimum 5 
number of sourcing". 6 
        ; In this model, the number of sourcing would not affect 7 
the manufacturer capacity. 8 
        ; Once the manufacturer set their strategy of number of 9 
sourcing, it would be applied constantly 10 
        ; as the time progressing. 11 
        set duration_of_collaboration random 12 
(MaxDuration_of_collaboration - MinDuration_of_collaboration + 13 
1) 14 
                                         + 15 
MinDuration_of_collaboration ;verified 16 
        ; To determine the length of collaboration based on 17 
random function 18 
        ; It implements the "random between" logic >> random 19 
between by: random ( max - min +  1) + min, for min < x <= max. 20 
        set followGlobalmanuf_loyalty? "yes" 21 
      ] 22 
      [ set duration_of_collaboration duration_of_collaboration 23 
        set #Intended_source #Intended_source 24 
        set followGlobalmanuf_loyalty? 25 
followGlobalmanuf_loyalty?] 26 
        ; the length of collaboration and intended number of 27 
sourcing would remain the same once it is set up at time unit 1, 28 
        ; unless it is adjusted manually for selected 29 
manufacturer. 30 
 31 
           ;FOR VERIFICATION..................(checking the code 32 
behaviour) 33 
                ;show duration_of_collaboration 34 
                ;show [duration_of_collaboration] of 35 
manufacturers 36 
           ;.................................. 37 
;;.............................................................  38 
 39 
  ifelse followGlobalmanuf_loyalty? = "yes" 40 
  [ set individual_manuf_loyalty manuf_loyalty ] 41 
  [ set individual_manuf_loyalty individual_manuf_loyalty] 42 
 43 
  ifelse ( manufperiod >= ( duration_of_collaboration ) ) 44 
         ; once the duration of collaboration has reached its end 45 
         or manufsurvivalperiod > 0 or (time unit < 1) 46 
         ; or manufacturer has no supplier in previous time unit. 47 
  [ set manufperiod 1 48 
    ; the manufacturer renew their collaboration agreement 49 
    support_CreateLinksManufSupp 50 
    if DummyForTime unit = 0 51 
    [ set nearestsupp min-n-of (min list (#Intended_source) 52 
(count possiblesupp)) possiblesupp [distance-nowrap myself]] 53 
 54 
    ifelse ( ((random-float 1) > (individual_manuf_loyalty / 55 
100)) 56 
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      ; And once manufacturer decides to not being loyal to the 1 
previous linked supplier 2 
      or nearestsupp = nobody ) 3 
      ;or count nearestsupp = 0) 4 
      ; or manufacturer has no supplier in previous time unit. 5 
      and ( DummyForTime unit != 1) 6 
      ; and the simulation state is not in the setup stage. 7 
 8 
    [ set nearestsupp min-n-of (min list (#Intended_source) 9 
(count possiblesupp)) possiblesupp [distance-nowrap myself] ] 10 
      ; If the Selection_Mode is "Closest firm", manufacturers 11 
would select n suppliers 12 
      ; that are closest to their initial preference. 13 
    [  set nearestsupp nearestsupp 14 
    ] 15 
     ; If manufacturer decides to be loyal to the previous 16 
suppliers, 17 
     ;it would keep linking with the previous suppliers. 18 
  ] 19 
  [ set manufperiod manufperiod + 1 ] 20 
 21 
       ;VERIFIED..!! 22 
       ;FOR VERIFICATION..................(checking the code 23 
behaviour) 24 
            ;show duration_of_collaboration 25 
            ;show [duration_of_collaboration] of manufacturers 26 
       ;.................................. 27 
;;............................................................. 28 
    ;; TO CREATE LINKS 29 
 30 
    if nearestsupp != nobody 31 
    [ create-smlinks-with nearestsupp with [count my-smlinks < 32 
MaxLinks] [ set thickness 0.1 set color magenta ] 33 
      ; Similar as customer, the manufacturer can only create 34 
connection with a firm who stay inside their 35 
      ; willingness to compromise. 36 
       ] 37 
 38 
    if time unit < 1 and (count my-smlinks < #Intended_source ) 39 
    [ set possiblesupp (suppliers with [count my-smlinks < 40 
MaxLinks] ) 41 
      create-smlinks-with n-of (min list ( #Intended_source - 42 
(count my-smlinks )) (count possiblesupp)) 43 
                          possiblesupp [ set thickness 0.1 set 44 
color magenta ] ] 45 
    ; this logic is to adjust manufacturers' initial strategic 46 
position. They would be located in a space 47 
    ; where a supplier is available. 48 
   49 
;;............................................................. 50 
   ; This logic is to measure the level of efficiency and 51 
responsiveness of the suppliers. 52 
    let set_ofsupp suppliers with [link-with myself != nobody] 53 
    ifelse count set_ofsupp > 0 54 
    [ set MeanXcorSuppliers round (mean [xcor] of set_ofsupp) 55 
      set MeanYcorSuppliers round (mean [ycor] of set_ofsupp) ] 56 
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    [ set MeanXcorSuppliers 0 1 
      set MeanYcorSuppliers 0 ] 2 
 3 
    set nearestsupp set_ofsupp 4 
 5 
    Adjustposition 6 
end 7 
 8 
;; 6. PROCEDURE TO SUPPORT "CreateLinksManufSupp" 9 
to support_CreateLinksManufSupp 10 
  let suppcandidateset nobody 11 
 12 
    set suppcandidateset suppliers with [ 13 
      ; To set a set of suppliers (as a local agentset) who 14 
        xcor <= [xcor] of myself and 15 
        ; are more efficient and 16 
        ycor <= [ycor] of myself and 17 
        ; responsive, 18 
        count my-smlinks < MaxLinks and 19 
        ; still have available capacity (represented by number 20 
of links) 21 
        link-with myself = nobody 22 
        ; and have not linked with the manufacturer. 23 
        ] 24 
 25 
      ; VERIFIED!! -- By checking the length of the generated 26 
links and link directions. 27 
 28 
      if (count suppcandidateset = 0 ) or (manufsurvivalperiod > 29 
0 ); and count suppcandidateset = 0) 30 
 31 
       ; If there is no available supplier that is suitable with 32 
manufacturer's preference, 33 
       ; which is indicated by "manufsurvivalperiod", 34 
       ; they would relax their preference and would to have 35 
supplier which is less efficient or less responsive. 36 
 37 
       [ set suppcandidateset suppliers with [ 38 
           link-with myself = nobody 39 
           and count my-smlinks < MaxLinks 40 
           ] in-radius MY 41 
         ] 42 
     set possiblesupp suppcandidateset 43 
 44 
       ;FOR VERIFICATION ...................... (VERIFIED!) 45 
       ;show list suppcandidateset possiblesupp 46 
       ;show manufsurvivalperiod 47 
       ;....................................... 48 
end 49 
 50 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 51 
;;DIE PROCEDURES;; 52 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 53 
 54 
;; 7. TO MAKE MANUFACTURERS THAT HAVE NO CUSTOMERS, WHICH ALSO 55 
MEANS HAVING NO SUPPLIERS, FOR CERTAIN PERIODS DIE 56 
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to manuf_die ;VERIFIED! 1 
  ask manufacturers [ 2 
    ifelse count my-smlinks = 0 3 
    ; If a manufacturer has no customer, 4 
    [ ifelse manufsurvivalperiod < ( 5 
SurvivabilityWithoutSupplier ) 6 
      ; and if the length of manufacturer's existence is still 7 
less than the allowed duration of survival without 8 
      ; having supplier, 9 
      [ set manufsurvivalperiod manufsurvivalperiod + 1 ] 10 
      ; it would exist in the next time unit 11 
      [ if die? [die] ] ] 12 
      ; Otherwise, once the duration of manufacturer's existance 13 
without supplier exceeds the maximum 14 
      ; duration allowed, the manufacturer would die. 15 
    [ set manufsurvivalperiod 0 ] 16 
     ; Once a manufacturer has customer, it does not need to 17 
count the survival period. 18 
 19 
    ;;TO MAKE MANUFACTURERS THAT HAVE LESS RESPONSIVE OR 20 
EFFICIENT SUPPLIERS DIE AFTER CERTAIN PERIODS 21 
    ifelse ( MeanYcorSuppliers > ycor ) or ( MeanXcorSuppliers > 22 
xcor ) 23 
    ; If the mean of suppliers' responsiveness or efficiency is 24 
less than the manufacturer, 25 
    [ set manuflossperiod manuflossperiod + 1 26 
      ; the period of being loss working with the undesired 27 
supplier would be counted. 28 
      if manuflossperiod > SurvivabilityWithUndesiredSupplier 29 
and die? [ die ] ] 30 
      ; If the period exceeds the tolerable period defined 31 
    [ set manuflossperiod 0 ] 32 
    ; the period of being loss working with the undesired supplier 33 
would be reset to zero. 34 
     ] 35 
end 36 
 37 
;; 8.TO MAKE SUPPLIERS THAT HAVE NO MANUFACTURERS TO WORK WITH 38 
FOR CERTAIN PERIODS DIE. 39 
to supplier_die  ; VERIFIED! 40 
  ask suppliers [ 41 
    ifelse count my-smlinks = 0 42 
    ; if a supplier do not manage to have a manufacturer 43 
    [ ifelse suppsurvivalperiod < ( SurvivabilityWithoutManuf ) 44 
      ; before it reaches the "survival ability without 45 
manufacturer" set, 46 
      ;( the "survival ability without manufacturer" is the 47 
allowed duration to survive without manufacturer) 48 
      [ set suppsurvivalperiod suppsurvivalperiod + 1 ] 49 
      ; its survival period would be counted and accumulated. 50 
      [ if SuppDie? [die] ] ] 51 
    ; However, if its survival period has reached the "survival 52 
ability without manufacturer" 53 
    ; the supplier would die. 54 
    [ set suppsurvivalperiod 0 ] ] 55 
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  ; If a supplier has collaborated with a manufacturer, its 1 
survival period would be reset to zero. 2 
end 3 
 4 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 5 
;;FIRMS MOVEMENT (CHANGING STRATEGY);; 6 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
 8 
;; 9. TO MOVE THE MANUFACTURERS IN TERMS OF CHANGING THEIR 9 
STRATEGY 10 
to MoveManufacturers ;VERIFIED! 11 
  ask manufacturers [ 12 
    let nextclosestcust min-one-of (customers with [ link-with 13 
myself = nobody] ) [distance-nowrap myself] 14 
    let nextcust nextclosestcust 15 
    ; The default selection of new customer target is the closest 16 
customer who is not served yet by the manufacturer 17 
 18 
    let positioncandidate patch-here 19 
    let new_manuf_position patch-here ;nobody 20 
;;............................................................. 21 
    ; Started in the line below, we enable the "Jumping Strategy" 22 
or "MUTATION" for the selected manufacturer. 23 
 24 
    set %ProbabilityOfJumping %ProbabilityOfJumping 25 
 26 
    if nextcust != nobody and ManufMove? ;VERIFIED 27 
    ;It represents if the manufacturers want to change their 28 
strategy and they have a customer target, 29 
    ;the manufacturers would move around the space. 30 
     [ ifelse ( ( %ProbabilityOfJumping > 0 ) and ( (random-float 31 
1) < ( %ProbabilityOfJumping / 100 )  )) 32 
       ; Each manufacturer has "probability of jumping" expressed 33 
in percentage to represent the probability of the 34 
       ; firm to "jump" into a new market segment. 35 
       ; We can adjust the value of the variable for each 36 
individual agent. 37 
       [ let MovementDistance_%ofWorld ( (random-float 1) * 100 38 
) 39 
         set StepDistance ((MovementDistance_%ofWorld / 100) * 40 
maxpreference) 41 
 42 
         set nextcust max-one-of (customers in-radius ( 43 
StepDistance ) with 44 
                                 [ count my-cmlinks = 0 ] ) 45 
[distance-nowrap myself] ;VERIFIED! 46 
         ; If a manufacturer is set to have a willingness to jump 47 
into a new market segment (with a certain probability), 48 
         ; it needs defining the distance of the leap. 49 
         ; We assume that onve the manufacturer "jump", they 50 
approach the customer who has not been served yet by its 51 
competitors. 52 
         if nextcust != nobody 53 
         [ set positioncandidate min-one-of (patches in-radius 54 
((MovementDistance_%ofWorld / 100) * maxpreference) 55 
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                                 with [ pvalue = 1]) [ distance-1 
nowrap nextcust ] ] 2 
       ] 3 
      [ set positioncandidate min-one-of neighbors with [ pvalue 4 
= 1] [ distance-nowrap nextcust ]] 5 
        ; If the "Jumping strategy" is not applied to the 6 
manufacturer 7 
        ; the manufacturer would move around in the space by one 8 
grid. 9 
      set new_manuf_position positioncandidate  ] 10 
 11 
    if ManufMove? and new_manuf_position != nobody 12 
    [ move-to new_manuf_position ] ;VERIFIED 13 
 14 
    findposition 15 
  16 
;............................................................. 17 
  ] 18 
end 19 
 20 
;; 10. TO MOVE THE SUPPLIERS IN TERMS OF CHANGING THEIR STRATEGY 21 
to MoveSuppliers ;VERIFIED! 22 
  ask suppliers [ 23 
    let nextclosestmanuf nobody 24 
    let supppositioncandidate patch-here 25 
    let new_supp_position nobody 26 
         ;;; Supplier moves like manufacturers ;;VERIFIED 27 
    set nextclosestmanuf min-one-of (manufacturers with [ link-28 
with myself = nobody]) [distance-nowrap myself] 29 
    ; "nextclosestmanuf" is the closest manufacturer who has no 30 
link with the supplier. 31 
 32 
    if nextclosestmanuf != nobody 33 
    ;It represents the suppliers can change their strategy, by 34 
moving around in the space with at least one grid movement. 35 
    [ set supppositioncandidate min-one-of neighbors with [ 36 
pvalue = 1] [ distance-nowrap nextclosestmanuf ] 37 
 38 
    ifelse time unit < 1 39 
    [ set followGlobalsupp_loyalty? "yes"] 40 
    [ set followGlobalsupp_loyalty? followGlobalsupp_loyalty? ] 41 
 42 
    ifelse followGlobalsupp_loyalty? = "yes" 43 
    [ set individual_supp_loyalty supp_loyalty ] 44 
    [ set individual_supp_loyalty individual_supp_loyalty] 45 
 46 
    ifelse SuppMove? 47 
    [ if (random-float 1) < (individual_supp_loyalty / 100) 48 
      ; Once the supplier decides being loyal to the manufacturer 49 
linked with it 50 
      [ let choosenmanuf nobody 51 
        if (previouschoosenmanuf = nobody ) 52 
        ; If the supplier had no manufacturer to link with before 53 
, 54 
        ; (which happens in the early model run) 55 
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        [ set choosenmanuf one-of manufacturers with [ link-with 1 
myself != nobody ] 2 
          ; but it has linked with manufacturer/s, 3 
          ; it would select a manufacturer who is currently 4 
linked with the firm. 5 
          if choosenmanuf = nobody [ set choosenmanuf 6 
nextclosestmanuf ] 7 
          ; if at the moment the supplier has no manufacturer to 8 
collaborate with, it would follow the closest 9 
          ; targeted manufacturer to attract the manufacturer to 10 
link with it. 11 
          set previouschoosenmanuf choosenmanuf ] 12 
          ; If there is no manufacturer has no link with the 13 
supplier ("nextclosestmanuf" is nobody, 14 
          ; it would not move. It means that all manufacturers 15 
have been linked with the supplier. 16 
 17 
        ifelse ( [count my-smlinks ] of previouschoosenmanuf > 0 18 
) 19 
        ; If the supplier has a link with the selected previous 20 
manufacturer to be loyal to 21 
        [ set choosenmanuf previouschoosenmanuf ] 22 
          ; the "chosenmanuf" is the previous manufacturer who 23 
the firm loyal to. 24 
        [ set choosenmanuf one-of manufacturers with [ link-with 25 
myself != nobody ] ] 26 
          ; if the supplier is not linked with the previous manuf, 27 
it would be loyal to one of 28 
          ; manufacturers who is collaborating with the firm. 29 
 30 
        if choosenmanuf = nobody [ set choosenmanuf 31 
nextclosestmanuf ] 32 
        ; if the supplier has no link with any manufacturer, it 33 
would approach the a targeted manufacturer. 34 
        set supppositioncandidate min-one-of (patches in-radius 35 
([StepDistance] of choosenmanuf) with [pvalue = 1]) 36 
                                  [distance-nowrap choosenmanuf 37 
] 38 
        ; once the supplier decides to be loyal to the selected 39 
manufacturer, regardless whether it has collaborated with 40 
        ; the manufacturer, it would follow the manufacturer's 41 
movement. 42 
        set previouschoosenmanuf choosenmanuf 43 
        ; updating the "previouschoosenmanufacturer" 44 
         ] 45 
        set new_supp_position supppositioncandidate] 46 
 47 
    [ set new_supp_position patch-here ] 48 
    ;; If suppliers are not able to move 49 
 50 
 51 
    if SuppMove? 52 
    ; This conditional function enables us to treat a particular 53 
supplier agent to stay or not move. 54 
    [ move-to new_supp_position 55 
    findposition ] 56 
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  ] ] 1 
end 2 
 3 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
;; FIRMS REVENUE;; 5 
;;-------------------------------------------------------------  6 
;; 11.TO CALCULATE MANUFACTURER'S PERFORMANCE, IN THE NUMBER OF 7 
SERVED CUSTOMERS 8 
to CountManufPerformance ; VERIFIED! 9 
  ask manufacturers [ 10 
    set each_manuf_servedcustomers (count my-cmlinks) 11 
    ; Each link from customer contributes one unit Revenue to the 12 
firm 13 
 14 
       ;FOR VERIFICATION............... 15 
         ;show each_manuf_servedcustomers 16 
       ;............................... 17 
 18 
    set list_manuf_Revenue (lput each_manuf_servedcustomers 19 
list_manuf_Revenue ) 20 
    set mean_manuf_servedcustomers mean list_manuf_Revenue 21 
    ;; Showing these variables below, it lets me know that the 22 
'mean' considers the zero Revenue as well before averaging 23 
       ;;FOR VERIFICATION................... 24 
         ;show mean_manuf_servedcustomers 25 
         ;show list_manuf_Revenue 26 
       ;; .................................. 27 
    ] 28 
end 29 
 30 
;; 12.TO CALCULATE SUPPLIER'S PERFORMANCE, IN NUMBER OF SERVED 31 
CUSTOMERS. 32 
to CountSuppPerformance ; VERIFIED! 33 
  ask suppliers [ 34 
    let set_ofmanuf manufacturers with [link-with myself != 35 
nobody] ; verified 36 
    ; Creating a list of manufacturers linked with the supplier. 37 
We can say this an agentset. 38 
    let A 0 39 
 40 
    if set_ofmanuf != nobody 41 
    [ set A sum [count my-cmlinks / ( count my-smlinks )] of 42 
set_ofmanuf ] 43 
 44 
    set each_supp_servedcustomers A 45 
    ; The assumption is each supplier has similar contribution 46 
to the manufacturer 47 
    ; "each_supp_servedcustomers" is the variable Revenue, the 48 
more unit sold by manufacturer, the more unit sold by the supplier 49 
    ; A is the sum of the number of unit sold by each manufacturer 50 
(linked with the supplier) divided by 51 
    ; the number of suppliers supplied the manufacturer. The 52 
division calculation is counted for each manufacturer 53 
    ; (linked with the supplier) 54 
    ; A = sigma [ ( the number of unit sold by manufacturer / the 55 
number of suppliers of manufacturer) of 56 
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    ; each manufacturer that is linked with the supplier ] 1 
       ;FOR VERIFICATION............ 2 
         ;show each_supp_servedcustomers 3 
       ;............................ 4 
    set list_supp_Revenue (lput each_supp_servedcustomers 5 
list_supp_Revenue ) ; >> if each_supp_servedcustomers = 0, the 6 
do not count it 7 
    set mean_supp_servedcustomers mean list_supp_Revenue 8 
      ;FOR VERIFICATION............... 9 
        ;show mean_supp_servedcustomers 10 
      ; .............................. 11 
  ] 12 
end 13 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
;;SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE;; 15 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
;; 13. TO RESET THE PREVIOUS CALCULATION 17 
to SetSCPerformance 18 
  set list_manuf_Revenue [] 19 
  set list_supp_Revenue [] 20 
  set list_sc_Revenue [] 21 
  set list_supp_responsiveness [] 22 
  set list_sc_responsiveness [] 23 
  set list_supp_efficiency [] 24 
  set list_sc_efficiency [] 25 
end 26 
 27 
 28 
;; 14. TO CALCULATE THE MEAN EFFICIENCY AND RESPONSIVENESS FOR 29 
EACH AND ALL SUPPLY CHAINS 30 
to count_AveragePosition ;VERIFIED!! HAPPYYY!! 31 
; It’s an old saying, but it’s true: a chain is only as strong 32 
as its weakest link. So does the supply chains. 33 
; The capabilities of the suppliers are considered as the utmost 34 
importance to the entire supply chain performance. 35 
; If a manufacturer, or a company, has suppliers that have 36 
irrelevant capabilities with its business strategy, 37 
; which refers to supply chain strategy in this case, 38 
; the entire chain could lapse and the customers immediately feel 39 
its affects. 40 
; Representing this situation, in this study, the manufacturer's 41 
responsiveness reflects the supply chain responsiveness 42 
; since it interacts with downstream customers directly. 43 
 44 
ask manufacturers [ 45 
  ;; Manufacturers who have no suppliers or less than minimum 46 
requirement are not considered. 47 
  set #Real_source count my-smlinks 48 
  ifelse count my-smlinks >= 1 49 
  [ 50 
    ;; Counting aggregated supplier responsiveness (Y) and 51 
efficiency (X) of each manufacturer relative to the world 52 
    ; We only consider suppliers who have links with manufacturer 53 
    set MySupp_responsiveness (max-pycor - MeanYcorSuppliers) / 54 
max-pycor 55 
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    set MySupp_efficiency (max-pxcor - MeanXcorSuppliers) / max-1 
pxcor 2 
    set list_supp_responsiveness (lput MySupp_responsiveness 3 
list_supp_responsiveness ) 4 
    set list_supp_efficiency (lput MySupp_efficiency 5 
list_supp_efficiency ) 6 
    set mean_supp_responsiveness mean list_supp_responsiveness 7 
    set mean_supp_efficiency mean list_supp_efficiency 8 
 9 
    ;; SC responsiveness (which is similar manufacturer's 10 
responsiveness) 11 
    set each_sc_responsiveness (max-pycor - ycor ) / max-pycor 12 
    set list_sc_responsiveness (lput each_sc_responsiveness 13 
list_sc_responsiveness ) 14 
    set mean_sc_responsiveness mean list_sc_responsiveness 15 
 16 
    ;; SC efficiency (which is similar manufacturer's efficiency) 17 
    ;; we do not consider manufacturers who have no suppliers 18 
    set each_sc_efficiency (max-pxcor - xcor) / max-pxcor 19 
    set list_sc_efficiency (lput each_sc_efficiency 20 
list_sc_efficiency ) 21 
    set mean_sc_efficiency mean list_sc_efficiency 22 
 23 
    ;; However, we consider manufacturers who have no supplier 24 
(since "each_manuf_servedcustomers" has been 25 
     ; calculated in procedure number 11. 26 
    set each_sc_servedcustomers each_manuf_servedcustomers 27 
    set list_sc_Revenue (lput each_sc_servedcustomers 28 
list_sc_Revenue ) 29 
 30 
    set total_sc_revenue sum list_sc_Revenue 31 
  ] 32 
  [ set MySupp_responsiveness 0 33 
    set MySupp_efficiency 0 34 
    set each_sc_responsiveness 0 35 
    set each_sc_efficiency 0 36 
    set each_sc_servedcustomers 0 37 
    set list_sc_Revenue (lput each_sc_servedcustomers 38 
list_sc_Revenue ) 39 
    ; If the manufacturer has no collaboration with any supplier, 40 
its efficiency and responsiveness are not 41 
    ; considered in the system or market. 42 
  ] 43 
  ; The average of efficiency and responsiveness gap between 44 
manufacturer and supplier 45 
  set gap_supp_manuf_responsiveness (mean_supp_responsiveness - 46 
mean_sc_responsiveness) 47 
  set gap_supp_manuf_efficiency (mean_supp_efficiency - 48 
mean_sc_efficiency) 49 
] 50 
end 51 
 52 
;; 15. TO CALCULATE THE PERFORMANCE OF EACH SUPPLY CHAIN 53 
INDIVIDUALLY 54 
to CountIndividualSCPerformance 55 
ask manufacturers [ 56 
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  ifelse total_sc_revenue > 0 [ 1 
    set %sc_marketshare precision ( (each_sc_servedcustomers * 2 
100) / total_sc_revenue ) 3 ] 3 
  [ set %sc_marketshare 0 ] 4 
  set each_sc_fillrate% precision (( each_sc_servedcustomers / 5 
#customer ) * 100) 3 6 
  set mean_sc_servedcustomers mean list_sc_Revenue ] 7 
set #sc ( count (manufacturers with [count my-smlinks > 0 ] ) ) 8 
end 9 
 10 
 11 
;; 16.TO CALCULATE THE MARKET FILL RATE 12 
to CountMarketFillRate 13 
  set %SCs_fillrate (count customers with [count my-cmlinks > 0] 14 
/ #customer ) * 100 15 
end 16 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 17 
;; POSITION ADJUSTMENT FOR MANUFACTURERS ;; 18 
;-------------------------------------------------------------- 19 
;; 17. TO ADJUST MANUFACTURERS' POSITION BASED ON ITS SUPPLIERS' 20 
CAPABILITY 21 
to AdjustPosition 22 
  ; This procedure represents suppliers affect the capabilities 23 
of supply chains through 24 
  ; manufacturers strategic position. 25 
  ; The tolerated degree of this effect is determined by 26 
"manuf_willingness_to_compromise". The variable is defined as 27 
  ; a percentage of diagonal distance of the NetLogo space to 28 
reflect the allowed capability gap between manufacturers 29 
  ; and suppliers. 30 
  ; This effect limits manufacturers' strategic movement for the 31 
competition. 32 
 33 
  ; The mechanism of this procedure is illustrated as follows. 34 
  ; For example, a manufacturer stays in a coordinate of (20,25). 35 
  ; It has 10% of "manuf_willingness_to_compromise", which means 36 
it is able to select less responsive or/and less 37 
  ; efficient suppliers within radius or distance 9.475 grids. 38 
  ; The radius or the distance is obtained by these calculations: 39 
  ; - The diagonal distance of the NetLogo space = sqrt ( (maximum 40 
x-axis)^2 + (maximum y-axis)^2 )) 41 
  ;                                              = sqrt ( (67)^2 42 
+ (67)^2 ) = 94.75 43 
  ;   (then, we call this value as "maxpreference" on the NetLogo 44 
code). 45 
  ; - The tolerated or allowed capability gap = 46 
"manuf_willingness_to_compromise" x "maxpreference" 47 
  ;   We note this variable as "MY" on the NetLogo code. 48 
  ;   If "manuf_willingness_to_compromise" is 10%, so MY = 10% x 49 
94.75 = 9.475 grids 50 
 51 
  ; Then, the manufacturer decides to collaborate with a supplier 52 
who stays in coordinate (15,34) 53 
  ; for 4-period collaboration length. This supplier is selected 54 
because it stays within the manufacturer's willingness 55 
  ; to compromise. 56 
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  ; In terms of efficiency, the supplier has a better efficiency 1 
than the manufacturer, since X-value of the supplier (15) 2 
  ; is less than X-value of manufacturer (20). Then, the 3 
manufacturer do not need to adjust its efficiency capability. 4 
  ; However, the responsiveness of its supplier is lower than the 5 
manufacturer, 6 
  ; since the Y-value of the supplier (34) is higher than 7 
manufacturer (25). 8 
 9 
  ; In the next time unit, the supplier moves to a patch in 10 
coordinate (15,35) and the manufacturer moves to coordinate 11 
(20,24). 12 
  ; With the new position, the responsiveness gap between the 13 
manufacturer and supplier is 35 - 24 = 11 grids, which falls 14 
  ; outside allowed capability gap (9.475 grids). 15 
  ; Since the manufacturer still collaborates with the supplier, 16 
its strategic movement is affected by the supplier. 17 
  ; In other words, even though the manufacturer has decided to 18 
move to patch (15,35), it is not able to stay in the desired 19 
  ; patch due to its supplier position. 20 
  ; Thus, the manufacturer has to adjust its strategic position 21 
by round (11 - 9.475) = round (1.525) = 2 grids. 22 
  ; As a result, the manufacturer's new position is in coordinate 23 
(20,26), which is 2 grids, or 2 degrees less responsive 24 
  ; than its desire. 25 
 26 
  if SupplierOn? and AdjustPosition? [ 27 
    let newxcor round xcor 28 
    let newycor round ycor 29 
 30 
    let newxcorShouldBe ( MeanXcorSuppliers - MY ) 31 
    ; "newxcorShouldBe" represents suppliers' influence on 32 
efficiency towards manufacturers or supply chains 33 
    ; efficiency. 34 
    let newycorShouldBe ( MeanYcorSuppliers - MY ) 35 
    ; "newycorShouldBe" represents suppliers' influence on 36 
responsiveness towards manufacturers or supply chains 37 
    ; responsiveness. 38 
 39 
    if MeanXcorSuppliers > ( xcor + MY) 40 
    [ set newxcor round newxcorShouldBe 41 
      ; If, on average, the supplier/s are less efficient than 42 
manufacturer, the manufacturer would move to 43 
      ; the efficiency level of the supplier. 44 
      ; If the suppliers, on average, are more responsive than 45 
the manufacturer, manufacturer would maintain the current 46 
      ; level of responsiveness. 47 
      ; The "newxcorShouldBe" only applies once the manufacturer 48 
is on the left of the supplier, which means once the 49 
      ; manufacturer is more efficient than its supplier. 50 
      ; Thus, tere is a possibility that the manufacturer would 51 
end-up in the infeasible area. 52 
      ; If it is happen, the manufacturers would move to the 53 
nearest point of efficiency (x-axis) possible on 54 
      ; the edge of the infeasible area. 55 
     ] 56 
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 1 
    ; If the suppliers are less efficient than the manufacturer, 2 
they would make the manufacturer less efficient 3 
    ; than its real capability. 4 
    ; However, if the manufacturer is less efficient than the 5 
suppliers, the suppliers capability would not 6 
    ; affect manufacturer capability. 7 
    ; This logic represents 'the strength of a supply chain is 8 
the weakest firm in that supply chain. 9 
 10 
    let YPatchesCandidate1 nobody 11 
    let YcorCandidate1 0 12 
 13 
    if ([pvalue] of (patch newxcor newycor) = 0) 14 
    ; if the new suggested location falls in infeasible area, 15 
    [ let xcorcandidate1 max [pxcor] of patches with [pvalue = 1 16 
and pycor = newycor  ] 17 
      if xcorcandidate1 = nobody [set xcorcandidate1 max-pxcor ] 18 
      set newxcor round xcorcandidate1 ] 19 
      ; the "newxcor" is redefined, by selecting a patch where 20 
is in feasible area and closest to the 21 
      ; suggested X coordinate. 22 
 23 
    if (MeanYcorSuppliers > ( ycor + MY ) ) 24 
    [ set YcorCandidate1 max [pycor] of patches with [ pvalue = 25 
1 and pxcor = newxcor] 26 
      if YcorCandidate1 = nobody [set YcorCandidate1 max-pycor] 27 
      set newycor round ( min list (round newycorShouldBe) 28 
YcorCandidate1 ) ] 29 
    ; If the suppliers are less responsive than the manufacturer, 30 
they would make the manufacturer less responsive 31 
    ; than its real capability. 32 
    ; However, if the manufacturer less responsive than the 33 
suppliers, the suppliers capability would not 34 
    ; affect manufacturer capability. 35 
 36 
        ;;FOR VERIFICATION ................................... 37 
           ;;show newycor 38 
           ;;show newycorShouldBe 39 
           ;show YPatchesCandidate1 40 
        ;;.................................................... 41 
    ;; FOR VERIFICATION ........................... 42 
      ;show newxcor 43 
      ;show newxcorShouldBe 44 
 45 
      ;show newycor 46 
      ;show newycorShouldBe 47 
      ;show YcorCandidate1 48 
    ;; ............................................ 49 
    move-to patch newxcor newycor 50 
    findposition 51 
  ] 52 
end 53 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 54 
;;MANUAL INTERVENTION: ADDITIONAL FEATURE;; 55 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 56 
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;; 18.TO ENABLE THE MANUAL INTERVENTION TO THE AGENTS 1 
to mousedown 2 
  if mouse-down? [ 3 
    ask turtles with-min [distancexy mouse-xcor mouse-ycor] 4 
    [ setxy mouse-xcor mouse-ycor ] 5 
    ] 6 
end 7 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 8 
;; PLOTTING OUTPUTS ;; 9 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 10 
;; 19. TO PLOT DECAY RATE OF SUPPLY CHAINS FILL RATE 11 
; Decay rate is defined as the cumulative decline rate of supply 12 
chain fill rate at the current time unit. 13 
to accumdecayrate 14 
  let decay_rate (previous%SCs_fillrate - %SCs_fillrate) / 100 15 
  set accumdecay_rate accumdecay_rate + decay_rate 16 
  if time unit > 2 17 
  [ set meanaccumdecayrate ( accumdecay_rate / time unit ) 18 
    plotxy time unit meanaccumdecayrate ] 19 
        ;;FOR VERIFICATION ................................... 20 
           ;; print (word "previous%SCs_fillrate " 21 
previous%SCs_fillrate ) 22 
        ;;.................................................... 23 
  set previous%SCs_fillrate %SCs_fillrate 24 
        ;;FOR VERIFICATION ................................... 25 
           ;; print (word "%SCs fill rate " %SCs_fillrate ) 26 
           ;; print (word "decay rate " decay_rate ) 27 
           ;; print (word "accumdecayrate " accumdecay_rate ) 28 
           ;; print (word "meanaccumdecayrate " 29 
meanaccumdecayrate ) 30 
        ;;.................................................... 31 
end 32 
 33 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 34 
;; CREATING NEW FIRMS DURING SIMULATION RUN ;; verified 35 
;;------------------------------------------------------------- 36 
;; 20. TO CREATE A NEW MANUFACTURER IN THE MODEL, AS A NEW ENTRANT 37 
to CreateOneManuf 38 
  create-manufacturers 1 [ 39 
    setupManuf 40 
    if SupplierOn? 41 
    [ set #Intended_source MaxSource 42 
      set duration_of_collaboration random 43 
(MaxDuration_of_collaboration - MinDuration_of_collaboration + 44 
1) 45 
                                            + 46 
MinDuration_of_collaboration 47 
      set nearestsupp nobody 48 
      if time unit > 0 [ 49 
        CreateLinksManufSupp 50 
        if (count my-smlinks < #Intended_source ) 51 
        [ set possiblesupp (suppliers with [count my-smlinks < 52 
MaxLinks] ) 53 
          create-smlinks-with n-of (min list ( #Intended_source 54 
- (count my-smlinks )) (count possiblesupp)) 55 
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                                   possiblesupp [ set thickness 1 
0.1 set color magenta ] ] 2 
        ; this logic is to adjust manufacturers' initial 3 
strategic position. They would be located in a space where a 4 
supplier is available. 5 
      ] 6 
      AdjustPosition ] ] 7 
end 8 
 9 
;; 21. TO CREATE A NEW SUPPLIER IN THE MODEL, AS A NEW ENTRANT 10 
to CreateOneSupp 11 
  ;;the following command is to enable suppliers in the model 12 
  if SupplierOn? [ 13 
  create-suppliers 1 [ 14 
    setupSupplier 15 
    ] 16 
  ] 17 
end18 
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APPENDIX I:  DECAY RATE OF DEMAND 
FULFILMENT FOR EACH 
EXPERIMENTAL FACTOR 
 
 
Table I.1 The decay rate of supply chain fill rate 
No Experimental factor 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 
Manufacturer competitive behaviour           
1 Duration of collaboration           
   - with single-link supplier 79.50% 78.84% 75.86% 80.71% 83.25% 
   - with dual-link supplier 80.05% 83.80% 82.48% 82.48% 84.24% 
2 Manufacturer number of sourcing and 
supplier number of partnerships 
          
   - in short-term collaboration (4 time 
unit) 
79.50% 82.03% 81.15% 78.51% 81.15% 
   - in long-term collaboration (80 time 
unit) 
83.25% 100.00% 92.51% 93.17% 100.00% 
3 Manufacturer trust           
   - in short-term collaboration (4 time 
unit) 
79.50% 80.38% 83.03% 84.13% 68.48% 
   - in medium-long-term collaboration 
(40 time unit) 
75.86% 82.92% 80.93% 79.28% 71.01% 
   - in long-term collaboration (80 time 
unit) 
83.25% 74.32% 79.39% 80.16% 67.82% 
4 Manufacturer survivability 84.13% 80.49% 79.50% 77.40% 75.42% 
5 Manufacturer strategic movement 79.50% 84.79% 84.24% 85.34% 87.66% 
Supply and demand market behaviour           
1 Supplier trust           
   - in short-term collaboration (4 time 
unit) 
79.50% 78.40% 79.83% 79.61% 78.29% 
   - in long-term collaboration (80 time 
unit) 
83.25% 80.05% 82.92% 77.85% 82.81% 
2 Supplier survivability 80.16% 79.28% 79.50% 75.97% 74.87% 
3 Customer loyalty 79.50% 79.28% 81.37% 83.47% 69.36% 
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APPENDIX J:  THE MANN-WHITNEY U-TEST 
RESULTS 
 
 
This appendix shows the results of the Mann-Whitney U test, which are presented 
as follows.  
 
 
J.1 Duration of collaboration 
Table J.1  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of 
duration of collaboration with single-link firms (with critical value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(20 time unit) (40 time unit) (60 time unit) (80 time unit) 
1 Z stat = -0.25 Z stat = -1.05 Z stat = -0.89 Z stat = -1.5 
(4 time unit) Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
  
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
2   Z stat = -1.59 Z stat = -0.75 Z stat = -1.39 
(20 time 
unit) 
  Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
  
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
3     Z stat = -1.93 Z stat = -2.38 
(40 time 
unit) 
    Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
  
    No significant 
difference 
Scen.3 > Scen.5 
4       Z stat = -0.67 
(60 time 
unit) 
      Do not reject H0 
        No significant difference 
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Table J.2  The Mann-Whitney U test of the number of supply chains in the market 
between all scenarios of duration of collaboration with single-link firms (with critical 
value -2.33) 
Scenario 2 3 4 5 (20 time unit) (40 time unit) (60 time unit) (80 time unit) 
1 Z stat = -1.41 Z stat = -0.99 Z stat = -1.47 Z stat = -1.75 
(4 time unit) 
  
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
2   Z stat = -0.4 Z stat = -0.11 Z stat = -0.5 
(20 time 
unit) 
  
  Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
3     Z stat = -0.43 Z stat = -0.77 
(40 time 
unit) 
  
    Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
    No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -0.42 
(60 time 
unit) 
      Do not reject H 
null 
        No significant 
difference 
 
 
Table J.3  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of 
duration of collaboration with dual-link firms (with critical value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(20%) (40%) (60%) (80%) 
1 Z stat = -2.51 Z stat = -2.21 Z stat = -1.39 Z stat = -2.41 
(4%) Reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
  
Scen.1 > Scen.2 No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
Scen.1 > Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -0.4 Z stat = -0.93 Z stat = -0.13 
(20%)   Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
  
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
3     Z stat = -0.62 Z stat = -0.2 
(40%)     Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
  
    No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -0.78 
(60%)       Do not reject H0 
  
      No significant 
difference 
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Table J.4  The Mann-Whitney U test of the number of supply chains in the market 
between all scenarios of duration of collaboration with dual-link firms  
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(20%) (40%) (60%) (80%) 
1 Z stat = -2.06 Z stat = -3.33 Z stat = -2.93 Z stat = -3.5 
(4%) Do not reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
  No significant 
difference 
Scen.1 > Scen.3 Scen.1 > Scen.4 Scen.1 > Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -1.45 Z stat = -1.03 Z stat = -1.63 
(20%)   Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
    No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
3     Z stat = -0.3 Z stat = -0.03 
(40%)     Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
      No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -0.22 
(60%)       Do not reject H0 
        No significant 
difference 
 
 
J.2 Number of partnerships 
Table J.5  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of 
number of partnerships in short-term partnerships (with critical value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(2%) (3%) (4%) (5%) 
1 Z stat = -2.22 Z stat = -0.35 Z stat = -0.68 Z stat = -0.58 
(1%) Do not reject H null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
  
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
2   Z stat = -1.25 Z stat = -2.19 Z stat = -1.38 
(2%)   Do not reject H null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
  
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
3     Z stat = -0.47 Z stat = -0.06 
(3%)     Do not reject H null 
Do not reject H 
null 
  
    No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -0.78 
(4%)       Do not reject H null 
  
      No significant 
difference 
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Table J.6  The Mann-Whitney U test of the number of supply chains in the market 
between all scenarios of number of partnerships in short-term partnerships (with critical 
value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(2%) (3%) (4%) (5%) 
1 Z stat = -1.62 Z stat = -1.47 Z stat = -1.69 Z stat = -1.69 
(1%) Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
2   Z stat = -2.83 Z stat = -3.06 Z stat = -3.07 
(2%)   Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
    Scen.2 < Scen.3 Scen.2 < Scen.4 Scen.2 < Scen.5 
3     Z stat = -0.26 Z stat = -0.05 
(3%)     Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
      No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -0.16 
(4%)       Do not reject H0 
        No significant 
difference 
 
 
Table J.7  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of 
number of partnerships in long-term partnerships (with critical value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(2%) (3%) (4%) (5%) 
1 Z stat = -4.66 Z stat = -5.14 Z stat = -4.22 Z stat = -4.5 
(1%) Reject H null Reject H null Reject H null Reject H null 
  Scen.1 > Scen.2 Scen.1 > Scen.3 Scen.1 > Scen.4 Scen.1 > Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -0.19 Z stat = -0.41 Z stat = -0.08 
(2%)   Do not reject H null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
  
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
3     Z stat = -0.73 Z stat = -0.38 
(3%)     Do not reject H null 
Do not reject H 
null 
  
    No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -0.37 
(4%)       Do not reject H null 
  
      No significant 
difference 
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Table J.8  The Mann-Whitney U test of the number of supply chains in the market 
between all scenarios of number of partnerships in long-term partnerships (with critical 
value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(2%) (3%) (4%) (5%) 
1 Z stat = -5.39 Z stat = -5.68 Z stat = -6.12 Z stat = -5.27 
(1%) Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
  Scen.1 > Scen.2 Scen.1 > Scen.3 Scen.1 > Scen.4 Scen.1 > Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -0.08 Z stat = -0.15 Z stat = -0.07 
(2%)   Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
    No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
3     Z stat = -0.25 Z stat = -0.01 
(3%)     Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
      No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -0.2 
(4%)       Do not reject H0 
        No significant 
difference 
 
 
J.3 Manufacturer’s trust of the supplier (manufacturer trust) 
Table J.9  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of the 
manufacturer trust in short-term collaboration (with critical value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(25%) (50%) (75%) (100%) 
1 Z stat = -0.97 Z stat = -2.54 Z stat = -3.52 Z stat = -3.21 
(0%) Do not reject H null 
Reject H null Reject H null Reject H null 
  
No significant 
difference 
Scen.1 > Scen.3 Scen.1 > Scen.4 Scen.1 < Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -1.64 Z stat = -2.53 Z stat = -3.8 
(25%)   Do not reject H null 
Reject H null Reject H null 
  
  No significant 
difference 
Scen.2 > Scen.4 Scen.2 < Scen.5 
3     Z stat = -0.85 Z stat = -4.86 
(50%)     Do not reject H null 
Reject H null 
  
    No significant 
difference 
Scen.3 < Scen.5 
4       Z stat = -5.58 
(75%)       Reject H null 
        Scen.4 < Scen.5 
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Table J.10  The Mann-Whitney U test of the number of supply chains in the market 
between all scenarios of the manufacturer trust in short-term collaboration (with critical 
value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(25%) (50%) (75%) (100%) 
1 Z stat = -2.87 Z stat = -3.83 Z stat = -5.08 Z stat = -2.34 
(0%) Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
  Scen.1 > Scen.2 Scen.1 > Scen.3 Scen.1 > Scen.4 Scen.1 < Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -1.34 Z stat = -2.72 Z stat = -4.84 
(25%)   Do not reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
    No significant 
difference 
Scen.2 > Scen.4 Scen.2 < Scen.5 
3     Z stat = -1.15 Z stat = -5.53 
(50%)     Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
      No significant 
difference 
Scen.3 < Scen.5 
4       Z stat = -6.51 
(75%)       Reject H0 
        Scen.4 < Scen.5 
 
 
 
Table J.11  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of 
the manufacturer trust in long-term collaboration (with critical value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(25%) (50%) (75%) (100%) 
1 Z stat = -1.65 Z stat = -1.44 Z stat = -0.6 Z stat = -3.82 
(0%) Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
  
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
Scen.1 < Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -0.49 Z stat = -1.54 Z stat = -2.79 
(25%)   Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
  
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
Scen.2 < Scen.5 
3     Z stat = -0.99 Z stat = -2.8 
(50%)     Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
  
    No significant 
difference 
Scen.3 < Scen.5 
4       Z stat = -3.68 
(75%)       Reject H0 
        Scen.4 < Scen.5 
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Table J.12  The Mann-Whitney U test of the number of supply chains in the market 
between all scenarios of the manufacturer trust in long-term collaboration (with critical 
value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(25%) (50%) (75%) (100%) 
1 Z stat = -1.13 Z stat = -0.63 Z stat = -0.23 Z stat = -4.17 
(0%) Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
Scen.1 < Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -0.64 Z stat = -0.98 Z stat = -3.3 
(25%)   Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
    No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
Scen.2 < Scen.5 
3     Z stat = -0.37 Z stat = -3.83 
(50%)     Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
      No significant 
difference 
Scen.3 < Scen.5 
4       Z stat = -4.16 
(75%)       Reject H0 
        Scen.4 < Scen.5 
 
 
J.4 Supplier’s trust towards manufacturer (supplier trust) 
Table J.13  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of 
the supplier trust in short-term collaboration (with critical value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(25%) (50%) (75%) (100%) 
1 Z stat = -0.11 Z stat = -0.26 Z stat = -1.03 Z stat = -0.2 
(0%) Do not reject H null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
  
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No difference 
2   Z stat = -0.3 Z stat = -1.01 Z stat = -0.32 
(25%)   Do not reject H null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
    No difference No difference No difference 
3     Z stat = -0.71 Z stat = -0.04 
(50%)     Do not reject H null 
Do not reject H 
null 
      No difference No difference 
4       Z stat = -0.77 
(75%)       Do not reject H null 
        No difference 
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Table J.14  The Mann-Whitney U test of the number of supply chains in the market 
between all scenarios of the supplier trust in short-term collaboration (with critical value 
-2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(25%) (50%) (75%) (100%) 
1 Z stat = -0.45 Z stat = -0.9 Z stat = -1.23 Z stat = -0.58 
(0%) Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No difference 
2   Z stat = -0.53 Z stat = -0.83 Z stat = -0.14 
(25%)   Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
    No difference No difference No difference 
3     Z stat = -0.3 Z stat = -0.47 
(50%)     Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
      No difference No difference 
4       Z stat = -0.63 
(75%)       Do not reject H 
null 
        No difference 
 
 
Table J.15  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of 
the supplier trust in long-term collaboration (with critical value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(25%) (50%) (75%) (100%) 
1 Z stat = -1.08 Z stat = 0 Z stat = -1.42 Z stat = -0.13 
(0%) Do not reject H null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
  
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
2   Z stat = -1.38 Z stat = -0.09 Z stat = -1.44 
(25%)   Do not reject H null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
  
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
3     Z stat = -1.83 Z stat = -0.18 
(50%)     Do not reject H null 
Do not reject H 
null 
  
    No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -1.91 
(75%)       Do not reject H null 
  
      No significant 
difference 
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Table J.16  The Mann-Whitney U test of the number of supply chains in the market 
between all scenarios of the supplier trust with long-term  
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(25%) (50%) (75%) (100%) 
1 Z stat = -1 Z stat = -1.45 Z stat = -0.78 Z stat = -1.76 
(0%) Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
2   Z stat = -2.39 Z stat = -1.7 Z stat = -2.77 
(25%)   Reject H0 Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
    Scen.2 > Scen.3 No significant 
difference 
Scen.2 > Scen.5 
3     Z stat = -0.63 Z stat = -0.2 
(50%)     Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
      No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -0.85 
(75%)       Do not reject H0 
        No significant 
difference 
 
J.5 Customer loyalty 
Table J.17  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of 
the customer trust/loyalty (with critical value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(25%) (50%) (75%) (100%) 
1 Z stat = -0.57 Z stat = -2 Z stat = -3.59 Z stat = -3.71 
(0%) Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
  
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
Scen.1 > Scen.4 Scen.1 < Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -1.25 Z stat = -2.81 Z stat = -3.97 
(25%)   Do not reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
    No difference Scen.2 > Scen.4 Scen.2 < Scen.5 
3     Z stat = -1.9 Z stat = -5.31 
(50%)     Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
      No difference Scen.3 < Scen.5 
4       Z stat = -6.22 
(75%)       Reject H0 
        Scen.4 < Scen.5 
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  Table J.18  The Mann-Whitney U test of the number of supply chains in the market 
between all scenarios of the customer trust/loyalty (with critical value -2.33)  
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(25%) (50%) (75%) (100%) 
1 Z stat = -2.38 Z stat = -4.26 Z stat = -6.51 Z stat = -7.62 
(0%) Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
  Scen.1 > Scen.2 Scen.1 > Scen.3 Scen.1 > Scen.4 Scen.1 > Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -2.1 Z stat = -5.03 Z stat = -6.63 
(25%)   Do not reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
    No difference Scen.2 > Scen.4 Scen.2 > Scen.5 
3     Z stat = -3.75 Z stat = -5.96 
(50%)     Reject H0 Reject H0 
      Scen.3 > Scen.4 Scen.3 > Scen.5 
4       Z stat = -2.66 
(75%)       Reject H0 
        Scen.4 > Scen.5 
 
 
J.6 The manufacturer survivability  
Table J.19  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of 
manufacturer survivability (with critical value -2.33 and 0% manufacturer strategic 
mutation) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(16 time unit) (20 time unit) (24 time unit) (28 time unit) 
1 Z stat = -2.12 Z stat = -3.39 Z stat = -3.52 Z stat = -3.98 
(12 time 
unit) 
  
Do not reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
No significant 
difference 
Scen.1 < Scen.3 Scen.1 < Scen.4 Scen.1 < Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -1.23 Z stat = -1.51 Z stat = -1.93 
(16 time 
unit) 
  
  Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
3     Z stat = -0.54 Z stat = -0.85 
(20 time 
unit) 
  
    Do not reject H 0 Do not reject H0 
    No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -0.24 
(24 time 
unit) 
  
      Do not reject H0 
      No significant 
difference 
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Table J.20  The Mann-Whitney U test of the number of supply chains in the market 
between all scenarios of manufacturer survivability (with critical value -2.33 and 0% 
manufacturer strategic mutation) 
Scenario 2 3 4 5 
  (16 time unit) (20 time unit) (24 time unit) (28 time unit) 
1 Z stat = -4.45 Z stat = -6.28 Z stat = -6.29 Z stat = -6.86 
(12 time 
unit) 
Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
Scen.1 < Scen.2 Scen.1 < Scen.3 Scen.1 < Scen.4 Scen.1 < Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -3.53 Z stat = -3.96 Z stat = -4.83 
(16 time 
unit) 
  Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
  Scen.2 < Scen.3 Scen.2 < Scen.4 Scen.2 < Scen.5 
3     Z stat = -0.94 Z stat = -1.63 
(20 time 
unit) 
    Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
    No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -0.61 
(24 time 
unit) 
 
      Do not reject H0 
      No significant 
difference 
 
 
 
J.7 The supplier survivability 
Table J.21  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of 
probability of supplier survivability (with critical value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(2 time unit) (4 time unit) (6 time unit) (8 time unit) 
1 Z stat = -0.92 Z stat = -1.3 Z stat = -1.68 Z stat = -2.38 
(1 time unit) 
  
Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Reject H0 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
Scen.1 < Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -0.24 Z stat = -0.77 Z stat = -1.1 
(2 time unit) 
  
  Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
3     Z stat = -0.47 Z stat = -0.82 
(4 time unit) 
  
    Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
    No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -0.35 
(6 time unit)       Do not reject H0 
       No significant 
difference 
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Table J.22  The Mann-Whitney U test of the number of supply chains in the market 
between all scenarios of supplier survivability (with critical value -2.33) 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(2 time unit) (4 time unit) (6 time unit) (8 time unit) 
1 Z stat = -1.99 Z stat = -3.15 Z stat = -3.04 Z stat = -4.1 
(1 time unit) 
  
  
Do not reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
No significant 
difference 
Scen.1 < Scen.3 Scen.1 < Scen.4 Scen.1 < Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -1.24 Z stat = -1.19 Z stat = -2.26 
(2 time unit) 
  
  
  Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
  No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
3     Z stat = -0.02 Z stat = -1.06 
(4 time unit) 
  
  
    Do not reject H0 Do not reject H0 
    No significant 
difference 
No significant 
difference 
4       Z stat = -1.01 
(6 time unit) 
      Do not reject H0 
      No significant 
difference 
 
J.8 Manufacturer strategic movement 
 
Table J.23  The Mann-Whitney U test of supply chain fill rate between all scenarios of 
manufacturer strategic movement 
Scenario 
2 3 4 5 
(16 time unit) (20 time unit) (24 time unit) (28 time unit) 
1 Z stat = -2.12 Z stat = -3.39 Z stat = -3.52 Z stat = -3.98 
(12 time 
unit) 
 
Do not reject H 
null 
Reject H null Reject H null Reject H null 
No significant 
difference 
Scen.1 < Scen.3 Scen.1 < Scen.4 Scen.1 < Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -1.23 Z stat = -1.51 Z stat = -1.93 
(16 time 
unit) 
 
  Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
  No difference No difference No difference 
3     Z stat = -0.54 Z stat = -0.85 
(20 time 
unit) 
    Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
      No difference No difference 
4       Z stat = -0.24 
(24 time 
unit) 
      Do not reject H 
null 
        No difference 
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Table J.24  The Mann-Whitney U test of the number of supply chains in the market 
between all scenarios of manufacturer strategic movement 
Scenario 2 3 4 5 
  (16 time unit) (20 time unit) (24 time unit) (28 time unit) 
1 Z stat = -4.45 Z stat = -6.28 Z stat = -6.29 Z stat = -6.86 
(12 time 
unit) 
Reject H null Reject H null Reject H null Reject H null 
  Scen.1 < Scen.2 Scen.1 < Scen.3 Scen.1 < Scen.4 Scen.1 < Scen.5 
2   Z stat = -3.53 Z stat = -3.96 Z stat = -4.83 
(16 time 
unit) 
  Reject H null Reject H null Reject H null 
    Scen.2 < Scen.3 Scen.2 < Scen.4 Scen.2 < Scen.5 
3     Z stat = -0.94 Z stat = -1.63 
(20 time 
unit) 
    Do not reject H 
null 
Do not reject H 
null 
      No difference No difference 
4       Z stat = -0.61 
(24 time 
unit) 
      Do not reject H 
null 
        No difference 
 
